Dr Lance L P Gore is senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute. The survey mentioned in this brief was conducted with Dr Li Hui of the Lee Kuan Yee School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore. The author gratefully acknowledges the feedback of Professor Zheng Yongnian on an earlier draft.
Thomas L. Friedman, "Our one-party democracy", The New York Times, 8 Sep. 2009.
Kishore M., "Is China's slowdown just Western wishful thinking?" Financial Times, 11 Oct. 2012.
Zhang Weiwei, "Meritocracy versus democracy", The New York Times, 9 November 2012,
Ann Lee, What the U.S. can learn from China: an open-minded guide to treating our greatest competitor as our greatest teacher, San Francisco, CA, Berrett-Koehler Publishers Inc., 2012.
Banyan, "Embarrassed meritocrats: westerners who laud a Chinese meritocracy continue to miss the point", The Economist, 27 October 2012.
Young, The rise of the meritocracy, 1870-2033: An essay on education and inequality¸London: Thames and Hudson, 1958.
Levinson, David and Sadovnik, Alan R., Education and sociology: an encyclopaedia¸Taylor and Francis, 2012, p. 436.
Ani Matei, Florin Popa, Meritocratic aspects concerning civil servant career: comparative study in central and eastern European countries, paper presented at NISPAcee Annual Conference, 2010, pp. 12-14.
High-ranking cadres at the provincial-ministerial level and above.
There have been numerous studies that confirm this, e.g. Hong Yung Lee's 1990 book, From Revolutionary Cadres to Party Technocrats in Socialist China (Center for Chinese Studies, UC Berkeley); Ma Min-hao, "Zhongguo xianyiji dangzhen ganbu xuanba renyong zhidu de yanjiu" (Research on cardia's evaluation and promotion system at county-level in China), PhD diss., Beijing University (1997); Landry Pierre F., Controlling decentralization: the party and local elites in post-Mao Jiangsu (China), PhD diss., University of Michigan (2000); Huang xin-hao, "Youxian huohua: zhongguo dangguo tizhixia de jingqing liudong, 1978-2008" (Limited Renewal: political elite mobility in Chinese party-state, 1978-2008), PhD diss., National Chengchi University (2007); and Zang Xiao-wei, Social stratification and mobility: the overseas scholar's advanced research on China (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2008).
A case study of the operation of the procedure in selecting the 18the Party Central Committee is provided in Lance Gore, "The Making of the 18th Central Committee: Issues of Institutionalization", EAI Background Brief, no. 794, February 2013.
The working bureaucracies of a Party committee usually include an organisation department, a propaganda department, the united front department and a general office.
(accessed 10 February 20130.
Daniel Bell and Eric Li, "In defense of how China picks its leaders", Opinion, 11 November 2012.
Zhou Li-an, "Governing China' local officials: an analysis of promotion tournament model", Economic Research Journal, 7, 2007: 36-50. See also Zhang Jun and Zhou Li'an, Competing for growth: the political economy of Chinese growth, Shanghai People's Publishing House, 2008. Similarly, Lance L. P. Gore used a "market competition plus bureaucratic rivalry" model to explain the Chinese growth pattern in Gore, Market communism: the institutional foundations of China's post-Mao hyper-growth, Oxford University Press, 1998; Rong Jing-ben at el proposed a "pressurisation model" to explain the operation of county and township level government: the government divides and allocates quantitative assignments of quotas and tasks to be fulfilled to lower level governments and other units and evaluate their performance in accordance with their task fulfilment. The lower level government in turn did the same to their lower level governments and work units, all the way to the villages. (Rong Jing-ben, et al, "Cong yalixing tizhi xiang minzhu hezuo tizhi de zhuanbian" [Transition from pressurized system to a democratic cooperation system],Beijing: Central Compilation and Translation Press, 1998).
Wu Jian-nan and Ma Liang, "Zhengfu Jixiao yu guanyuan jinsheng yanjiu zongshu" (A literature on government performance and cadre's promotion), Journal of Public Administration 2, 2009.
Pei Min-xin, "The myth of Chinese meritocracy", Project Syndicate 15, 2012.
Ou-yang Jing, "Grassroots officials promotion in differentiated model association", Journal of Gansu Administration Institute, 1, 2012. The construction of the guanxi networks is deeply influenced by Chinese Confucian cultural tradition (see Huang Guangguo, Confucian rationalism, cultural, reflection and theoretical construction,Beijing University publisher, 2006).
E.g, Andrew Nathan, "A factionalism model for CCP politics", The China Quarterly, 53, 1973: 34-66; Dittmer Lowell, "Bases of power in Chinese politics: a theory and an analysis of the fall of the 'Gang of Four'", World Politics 31, no.1, 1978: 26-60; Lampton, David M., Paths to power: elite mobility in contemporary China, no. 55. Centre for Chinese Studies, The University of California Press, 1986; Lucian Pye, "Factions and the politics of guanxi paradoxes in Chinese administrative and political behavior", The China Journal, 34, 1995: 35-53.
Pierre F. Landry. "The political management of mayors in post-Deng China", The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies, 17, 2005: 31-58.
Opper Sonja and Stefan Brehm, Networks versus performance: political leadership promotion in China, Department of Economics, Lund University, 2007.
For instance, family planning, environmental protection, petitioning etc. are common causes for veto.
Dimensions were derived using principal component analysis with varimax rotation; Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin index =0.6565. Bartlett's test of Sphericity is significant at 0.001 level. Boldface items in each column are those used for the same dimension.
The change is also noted by Ma Liang's study.
Reasonableness
Comprehensiveness
Abstract
Meritocracy has been singled out as the key contributing factor in the Chinese success. Many however have countered that the corruption-infested system operates on patronage instead of merit. In such a system competent leadership emerges by chance. The survey study reported here indicates that Chinese cadres are eager to impress their superior, but what impresses the superior is more along the line of competence and achievement than patronage. Even corrupt officials have to deliver and be competent; competence is the bottom line but corruption is not. The system may not always favour the most competent but it is geared towards performance. The Chinese system is thus more merit-oriented than patronage-based.
Executive Summary
That China has been enormously successful and yet exceedingly corrupt is a China paradox that few could explain.
Apart from the reform policies and development strategies, meritocracy has been singled out as the key contributing factor in the Chinese success. "Enlightened authoritarianism" is thought to have certain advantages.
However, many have countered that the corruption-infested system operates on patronage instead of merit. In such a system competent leadership emerges by chance instead of by meritocracy.
The Chinese political system (many others as well) does not distinguish between politicians and career civil servants. The careers of politicians and bureaucrats are structured in the same career hierarchy. This greatly complicates the idea of meritocracy in China
However China does have in place an elaborate system of cadre promotion consisting of six procedures: "democratic nomination", "democratic assessment", "public opinion poll", "analysis of actual achievements", "individual interview" and "comprehensive deliberation".
Party-state officials and civil servants are regularly evaluated for job performance and promotion. Existing studies on whether merit or patronage/guanxi is more important in career advancement have yielded conflicting results.
In one survey, cadres were asked on what they considered the most important factors in their career advancement and on their judgement of the cadre management system in China.
Cadres overwhelmingly identified "recognition and appreciation from superiors" as the most important factor; "social stability" was at least as important as "economic growth." They generally had positive opinions on the cadre evaluation and promotion system currently in place.
However, a superior can be impressed either by outstanding job performance or by loyalty and other personal qualities unrelated to job performance, or by both. A principle-component analysis was conducted to assess the relative weight of merit and patronage.
The result indicates that what impress the superiors is more along the line of competence and achievement than patronage. Between merit and patronage the scale is tipped to the former.
Even corrupt officials have to deliver and be competent. Competence is the bottom line but corruption is not. The system may not always favour the most competent but it is geared towards performance. The Chinese cadre system is thus more merit-oriented than patronage-based.
I
Understanding Chinese Meritocracy
Lance L. P. Gore
A Corrupt but Successful Regime
China has been enormously successful as well as exceedingly corrupt—a successful corrupt regime is a China paradox that has been nagging people for years. The meteoric rise of China since the 1997 Asian financial crisis has captivated much of the world.
The sharp contrast between the performance of the Chinese economy and those of Western democracies in the global financial crisis following the Great Wall Street Meltdown of 2008 has created many more admirers of the Chinese system.
The anomie of the Chinese "miracle" has sent academics as well as pundits scrambling for explanations. Besides reform and development policies, meritocracy emerges as a key factor. Thomas Friedman, a columnist at the New York Times, wrote in 2009 that when a one-party autocracy is led by "a reasonably enlightened group of people, as China is today, it can also have great advantages".
The question here is whether the Chinese system can systematically elevate such enlightened group of people to leadership positions. Most in the West think it is by chance. However, 35 years of long boom (and still going) is long enough to suggest otherwise.
Kishore Mahbubani, dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, asserts that China is fast getting to where Singapore is in terms of governance. He wrote in the Financial Times, "Far from being an arbitrary dictatorial system, the Communist Party may have succeeded in creating 'a rule-bound system' that has thrown up possibly the best set of leaders that China could produce".
Zhang Weiwei, a professor at Fudan University in Shanghai, declares that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is far more meritocratic than the ruling elites of most Western countries and the vast majority of developing countries. Ann Lee even wrote a book on what America can learn from Chinese meritocracy.
However, the opposing voice is equally loud and clear, usually in association with China's reputation for corruption. The Economist wrote, "Chinese government and society are shot through with corruption. Even official media report about cadres gaining promotion through connections, not merit, and despite the occasional execution of corrupt officials, the government can do little about it." Therefore any assessment of the Chinese regime must face the issue of corruption.
Meritocracy Defined
In early discussions the term meritocracy was used to describe society that bases individual advancement on ability, competence and achievement instead of wealth (plutocracy), origin, family connection (nepotism), class privilege (aristocracies), the right of the first born, popularity (democracy) or other key factors concerning social position or political power.
The most common definition of meritocracy conceptualises merit in terms of tested competency and ability measured by IQ or standardised achievement tests. In government or other administration systems, meritocracy assigns appointments and responsibilities to individuals based on "merit", namely intelligence, credentials and education, determined through evaluations or examinations. By design modern civil service is the paragon of meritocracy.
Unlike Western democracies, the Chinese political system (many others as well) traditionally does not distinguish between politicians and career civil servants. Politicians are not elected; they are recruited and appointed just like civil servants, who can also climb up the ladder to become leaders or decision makers. This greatly complicates the concept of meritocracy. The careers of politicians and bureaucrats are structured in the same career hierarchy. Such a system can be labelled as a "political meritocracy."
Hannes Mueleer categorises bureaucratic institutions into patronage and meritocracy. Under patronage politicians influence the selection of bureaucrats but under meritocracy, objective standards, firing restrictions and independent civil service commissions all hinder political meddling.
Bureaucratic systems are basically a mixture of the two in varying proportions. High levels of meritocracy produce efficient civil services as seen in Singapore, Hong Kong, Germany and the Scandinavian countries. In extreme cases of patronage, the system becomes a Kleptocracy—literally the rule by thieves.
Given China's reputation for rampant and audacious corruption, vindicated once again by the more than 100 "tigers" (and counting) implicated for corruption by President Xi's anti-corruption campaign, the state should have come quite close to being a Kleptocracy. Yet the Chinese system has produced a development "miracle".
The Cadre Promotion System in China
That the Chinese state is increasingly meritocratic is well documented. Studies have found that since the late 1970s, people with better educational credentials, better skills and better performance have moved up faster. More importantly, substantial institution-building has undergirded the development of Chinese meritocracy.
A substantial chunk of the work in Chinese bureaucracies is devoted to performance evaluation. Both routine cadre appointments and end-of-the term succession that takes place every five years are now conducted through institutionalised routines of performance evaluation at all levels of the party-state hierarchy.
Party-state officials and civil servants are regularly evaluated for job performance and promotion, which has since the early 2000s followed a more or less standardised procedure. It consists of six components: "democratic nomination", "democratic assessment", "public opinion poll", "analysis of actual achievements", "individual interview" and "comprehensive deliberation".
The process is orchestrated by the Party's organisation department under the stewardship of the Party committee (usually the standing committee) it is subordinated to. Before an appointment is made an inspection team (kaochazu) put together by the organisation department of the Party committee one level up is dispatched to conduct background check on the candidates through some or all of the abovementioned six procedures.
The Central Organisation Department (COD) has over the decades developed a comprehensive set of criteria for performance evaluation that is unmistakably meritocratic despite the vagueness in some of the indexes (Appendix). On this blueprint local Party committees have developed more detailed indexes tailored to local conditions. Cadres are sensitive to the criteria by which they are evaluated because their careers are at stake.
Take the selection of the 18th Party Central Committee (CC) for example; the nomination of candidates for the 376-member 18th Central Committee (205 full members and 171 alternate members) was conducted under the stewardship of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) with the COD in charge of the actual operation.
At the beginning of the entire process, Hu Jintao convened first a PSC meeting and then a full Politburo meeting to set the basic criteria, the geographic and sectorial distribution, the age structure and the procedures of selecting the candidates of the 18th Central Committee.
Between July 2011 and June 2012, 59 inspection teams with some 1,000 members, were dispatched to the 31 provinces and 130 central bureaucracies and SOEs—the nomination units—to select CC candidates through the six procedures described earlier.
Based on the nomination result, a preliminary candidate list was prepared by the inspection teams in consultation with the party chief and other top leaders of the local Party committees. The list is 1.5 to 2 times larger than the number of final candidates allocated to each nomination unit (usually three to four).
A full or enlarged Party committee meeting would be convened to vote on the listed candidates. Those who made it to the final candidate list are declared 'inspection targets' (kaochaduixiang) and would go through the remaining procedures.
All together 42,800 cadres participated in the "democratic nomination" and "democratic assessment" and a total of 27,500 individuals were interviewed by the inspection teams to solicit their views on potential candidates. In the 31 provinces, 29,000 questionnaires were distributed for a "public opinion poll".
The 59 inspection teams produced 727 candidates (including candidates for the Central Discipline Inspection Committee or CDIC). From the later half of 2011 to June 2012, the PSC met 11 times to listen to the reports of the inspection teams.
After extensive deliberation the PSC settled on 532 candidates in October 2012. On the 22nd of the same month a full Politburo meeting passed the final candidate list for election at the 18th Party Congress, which elected 506 from the list for the next CC and CDIC.
According to a Xinhua news report, the vast majority of the final candidates were top vote-getters in the "democratic nomination". In the "democratic assessment," the "adequate" or above votes of most exceeded 90%, and most candidates got 80% or above satisfactory rating in the "public opinion poll".
This same system and procedure are universally adopted at lower levels as a requirement for cadre appointment and promotion. It is intended as a merit-based system, albeit with political and ideological standards inserted, which is typical of a political meritocracy. This elaborate system of cadre selection and promotion is at the core of the argument for China's meritocracy. Daniel Bell and Eric Li for example claim that the system recruits the best and the brightest and the vetting process is "impressively objective and rigorous".
Competition is intense for the limited number of positions for promotion at each level. The winners must deliver superb job performance results. In 2007, a Chinese scholar proposed a "political tournament" model to explain the career advancement of Chinese officials. Local governments at each level were pitted against each other in a contest to produce higher growth figures because it is the key task of the CCP. He asserted that to a great degree China's breakneck growth could be explained by this tournament model.
However, other studies highlight the patronage or "corrupt" aspect of the Chinese system as its dominant characteristic. In the Chinese state guanxi system, the patron-client networks and factional politics and, more recently, naked money-power exchange prevail. Pei Minxin pointed out the practice of buying and selling party-state official posts that is widespread in today's officialdom.
Ouyang Jing discovered that there were two sets of rules governing the career of cadres, one explicit and one implicit; the implicit rules were centred on interpersonal relations of a private nature. In conducting official businesses such relations were among the first considerations in decision making.
Factionalism is a disrupting force in meritocracy but the factionalist model has been the workhorse for analysing Chinese elite politics in Western literature. Frequently identified factions in the history of the PRC include military factions that emerged from the four field armies of the Chinese civil war; the oil gangs headed by Yu Qiuli in the Mao era and by the now disgraced Zhou Yongkang in the Hu-Wen era; the Shanghai gang; the Qinghua gang that has dominated Beijing since the 1990s; the secretary fraternities stemming from individual senior politicians; the Youth League faction, the princelings and so on.
Landry examined the CCP's control of the municipal leading cadres using a data set of the mayors of 104 cities and found that economic performance had very limited impact on the career advancement of mayors. Opper and Brehm (2007) analysed the data of provincial party secretaries and governors between 1987 and 2005 and concluded that guanxi, not job performance, played a more important role in the career advancement of cadres; they argued that in China's unitary political system frequent interventions from above rendered economic performance unreliable as the basis for personnel decisions.
The empirical studies surveyed produce a complicated picture of Chinese officialdom and seemingly contradictory findings. They suggest that political elites' promotion is affected by multiple factors in a complicated process ridden with political intricacies.
Key Factors in Career Advancement
A survey was administered on two cohorts of cadres undergoing training at the Lee Kuan Yee School of Public Policy, from 2011 to 2012. The questionnaire was constructed based on in-depth interviews conducted in several rounds of field work done in China previously.
Of the 122 respondents, 18 are local leading cadres from not only the executive branch, but also party organs, People's Congress and Political Consultative Conference; 33 are department/agency leaders from the four branches of government; 33 are non-leader position cadres; 31 are from enterprises or public institutions and five are designated "other".
Six questions were designed to find out the relative importance of merit and patronage in the career of a local leading cadre:
1) What do you think are the most important factors for local leading cadres to be successful in their careers?
2) What do you think the term zhengji mainly refer to? (Note: as interviews identified "political achievement" (zhengji) as a buzzword in the career discourse, an open question was designed here)
3) What are local leading cadres most worried about in the term-end review process (huanjie kaohe)?
4) What do you think are the major pressures or concerns facing local leading cadres in their daily work?
5) How would you evaluate the current cadre review system?
6) How would you evaluate the current cadre promotion system?
For Questions 1, 3 and 4 the respondents were asked to rate the options provided and score them using a 5-point Likert scale, with 1 denoting "least important" and 5 denoting "most important." For each questionnaire item, the mean value of all responses is calculated to represent the "score" for that item.
For Questions 5 and 6, there are four sub-questions asking respondents to score the system's usefulness, fairness, comprehensiveness, and reasonableness, respectively, using a 5-point scale.
Table 1 reports the rating of the nine factors that contribute to the career success of leading cadres. Of the nine factors, "recognition and appreciation from superiors" is regarded as the most important (4.54). "Having officials in higher positions as backers (houtai)" and "the ability to network" rank second (3.99) and third (3.87), respectively, followed by "work competence" (3.83) and "political achievement" (3.81).
Both "merit" (measured by d and e) and guanxi (by b and c) are ranked high, which indicates that the current cadre promotion system has traits of both meritocracy and patronage. The single most important factor is "recognition and appreciation from superiors", which is the only factor with a score above 4 (4.54) and rather ambiguous in implication.
Table 1: Factors for Local Leading Cadres' Success in Political Career
Factors
Mean Value
a. recognition and appreciation from superiors受领导赏识
4.54 (112)
b. having officials in higher positions as connections有后台
3.99 (111)
c. the ability to network 活动能力强，会拉关系
3.87 (110)
d. work competence工作能力强
3.83 (111)
e. Political achievement政绩突出
3.81 (108)
f. mass support受群众拥护
3.05 (109)
g. the ability to adapt to environment环境适应能力强
2.94 (108)
h. having a good rapport with others人缘好
2.17 (105)
i. academic qualification学历高
2.13 (105)
Table 2 reports the keywords the respondents used to describe "administrative achievement" (zhengji). In total, 62 respondents answered the question and 13 keywords were identified from the answers, of which "social stability", "economic development" and "GDP" are the three most frequently mentioned. Surprisingly, "social stability" had the highest frequency (30), instead of "economic development" (29) or "GDP" (20). This throws doubt on the common perception of local states' single-minded pursuit GDP growth.
Table 2: Understanding of "Administrative Achievement"
How do you understand "Political Achievement"?
Keyword Frequency
Social stability
30
Economic development
29
GDP
20
Realised targets
7
Targets set by superiors or higher-level governments
5
Fiscal revenues
4
Urban construction
4
Sustainable development
4
Zero mass incident
1
Recognition and appreciation from superiors
1
Development of cultural undertakings
1
Incorruptible and righteous
1
Lining one's own pocket in the name of seeking happiness for the people
1
As shown in Table 1, local leading cadres regard "administrative achievement" as important as patronage and the skills of building guanxi in a successful cadre career; they are motivated to perform well in the areas they assume most important like social stability or economic development.
Table 3 reports the main worries of local leading cadres during the review process for appointment for the next term (huanjie kaohe). The questionnaire listed 13 factors for respondents to score and mean values range from 2.45 to 4.39, with "satisfaction from superiors" (4.39) and "mass incidents" (4.38) topping the list and "slow GDP growth" taking the bottom rung (3.10).
Table 3: Local Leading Cadres' Worries in Succession Evaluation
Main Worries
Mean Value (# of Respondents)
Satisfaction from superiors
4.39 (105)
Mass incidents
4.38 (110)
One-vote veto
3.91 (107)
Competitors having connections
3.84 (102)
Public tip-offs (whistle-blowing)
3.48 (106)
Petitioning
3.36 (106)
Online public opinion
3.33 (105)
Democratic appraisal
3.23 (106)
Public opinion polls
3.18 (107)
Democratic recommendation
3.15 (107)
Slow GDP growth
3.10 (105)
Sabotage
2.63 (106)
Canvassing
2.45 (104)
Consistent with "impression of superiors" in Question 1, "satisfaction to the superior" is most important. The findings also suggest that social issues like "mass incident" (4.38) and "one-vote veto" (3.91), which usually takes place in social policy areas, are more important than economic issues like GDP growth (3.10). This is consistent with the high ranking of "social stability" in the definition of zhengji in Question 2.
The fourth question asked about the major pressures or concerns that local leading cadres face in their daily work. A total of 11 factors were considered (Table 4). The highest score items are "maintaining social stability" (4.73), "pressures from superiors" (4.59), "mass incidents" (4.54) and "developing local economy" only comes in fourth (4.28).
Table 4: Local Leading Cadres' Pressures/Concerns in Daily Work
Pressures/Concerns
Mean Value (# of Respondents)
Maintaining social stability
4.73 (120)
Pressures from superiors
4.59 (119)
Mass incidents
4.54 (119)
Developing local economy
4.28 (117)
Accountability
4.12 (119)
Competition from peer governments
3.74 (119)
Petitioning
3.77 (119)
Unity of the local leadership lineup
3.68 (117)
Environmental pollution
3.41 (117)
Reform and innovation
3.12 (119)
Democratic election
2.97 (118)
The last two questions asked about respondents' assessment of the current cadre review system and the cadre promotion system in terms of usefulness, fairness, comprehensiveness and reasonableness. As shown in Figures 1 and 2, the responses are overwhelmingly positive, which indicates an affirmation of the Chinese cadre system as meritocratic by insiders whose lives are directly affected by it.
Figure 1: Perceptions on the Current Cadre Review System
Figure 2: Perceptions on the Current Cadre Promotion System
Note: category 1 refers to the leading cadres in the respondents.
The survey questions consistently identify "recognition and appreciation from superiors" as the most important factor in a cadre's career. Both elements of merit and patronage could be involved here. A superior could be impressed by either outstanding job performance or by loyalty and other personal qualities unrelated to job performance, or by both.
To find out whether merit or patronage is weighted higher in their selection of this item, a principal component analysis was conducted on the responses to the nine questionnaire items of Question 1.
Table 5: Dimensions of Factors Contributing to Career Success of Local Leading Cadres
Variable
Guanxi
Merit
Popularity/
Sociability
Having officials in higher positions as backers
0.8803
0.074
-0.0736
Ability to network
0.8372
-0.2372
0.2181
Having a good rapport with others
0.2151
0.1114
0.7596
Mass support
-0.6082
0.1534
0.5295
Recognition and appreciation from supervisors
0.2592
0.5786
0.1862
Work competence
-0.5938
0.4226
0.2833
Administrative achievement
-0.2629
0.8547
0.0183
Academic qualification
0.0694
0.4295
0.5146
Ability to adapt to environment
-0.2242
-0.033
0.7334
In Table 5, three dimensions are extracted from the responses to Question 1 (Table 5) as indicated in the clustering of numbers in bold. The first dimension is named "guanxi" since the items loaded on this dimension include "having officials in higher positions as backers (houtai)" (highest score), "ability to network," "mass support" and "work competence". The negative signs of the latter two mean that while the respondents view "having officials in higher positions as backers" and "ability to network" as guanxi, they view "mass support" and "work competence" negatively related with the component of guanxi.
The second dimension is merit since the loaded items (in bold) are "administrative achievement," "recognition and appreciation from superiors" (highest score), "academic qualification" and "work competence". "Recognition and appreciation from superiors" is also loaded (second only to "administrative achievement") on this dimension but not items associated with the guanxi.
Both "administrative achievement" and "work competence" are negative in the first dimension. The only two factors that are positively and strongly related with the guanxi dimension are "having officials in higher positions as backers" and "ability to network", while four factors are strongly related with the merit dimension, including the highest score item "recognition and appreciation from superiors". This suggests that respondents considered superiors' impression as more of a merit-oriented than guanxi-oriented factor.
The items loaded on the third dimension include "having a good rapport with others (renyuanhao)" (the highest), "ability to adapt to environment", "mass support" and "academic qualification" (which is also loaded on the second dimension). The analysis shows that these three are unrelated to any of the other two dimensions. Thus, we may label this dimension as "popularity" or "sociability."
In sum, the principal component analysis produced three dimensions of cadre career success; the highest score item, "recognition and appreciation from superiors," is categorised under the merit instead of guanxi dimension. Apart from guanxi and merit, a third dimension, "popularity/sociability: is also important for career success.
Merit-oriented Despite Tendencies Towards Patronage
The top three factors in career success reported in Table 1 are about human relations, while "competence" and "administrative achievement" are ranked fourth and fifth (though the differences with second and third are minuscule). Educational attainment occupies the bottom slot. This however does not necessarily leads to the conclusion that patronage is more important.
First, academic credential comes last but there are good reasons for that—the education attainment among cadres is universally high and a college education is almost a pre-requisite for career advancement. Instead of being considered least important, it is taken for granted.
Second, the term "recognition and appreciation from superiors" was included because it was frequently cited by cadres during the pre-survey interviews. However its meaning is ambiguous and probably varies from respondent to respondent. It is used as a neutral phrase to distinguish from both "administrative achievement" and "having officials in higher positions as backers" and turned out to be the top choice across the board.
To find out the relative weight of merit and patronage in this "container" phrase, a principal-component analysis is conducted. The result indicates that patronage factors are less important than merit factors; in other words what impress the superiors is more along the line of competence and achievement than patronage. Between merit and patronage the scale is tipped to the former.
Contrary to popular belief, the biggest worry or pressure for local leading cadres — either during the review process for the reappointment/promotion or in daily work — is not economic development. Rather, cadres seem to care more about non-economic issues, such as mass incidents and public opinion. Social stability is now equally important, if not more.
There is no doubt that the system is still very top-down or authoritarian. However cadres are sensitive to the criteria their superiors use to evaluate their performance, and during the reform era such evaluation, even construed as "impression", is performance-based.
During the post-survey focus group interviews it was repeatedly pointed out that regardless of patronage a cadre must satisfy a minimum standard of competence and achievement in order to be promoted, and the standard is rising. The performance evaluation system is designed to screen out the impotent and subpar performers.
In sum, the findings suggest that the promotion of local leading cadres is primarily based on their superiors' impression, with patronage playing second fiddle. Careful analysis reveals that the whole system is geared towards performance. Due to the pre-eminence of "recognition and appreciation of superiors" as a career factor, corruption cannot be eliminated.
However, corruption does not preclude performance. Even corrupt officials have to deliver and be competent. Competence is the bottom line but corruption is not—a likely explanation for the China paradox. The system may not always throw up "the best set of leaders that China could produce", but it is geared towards performance. These are all good reasons to conclude that the Chinese cadre system is more merit-oriented than patronage.
Appendixes:
COD: Key Points of Evaluation of Local State Leadership Team (2009)
Economic Development
Level of Economic development
Comprehensive efficiency of development 经济发展综合效益
Urban and rural resident income 城乡居民收入
Regional development gaps 地区经济发展差异
Cost of development 发展代价
Social Development
Basic education 基础教育
Urban employment 城镇就业
Medical care and public health 医疗卫生
Urban and rural cultural life quality 城乡文化生活
Public safety 社会安全
Sustainable Development
Energy conservation, emission reduction and environmental protection
Ecology, farmland and other resources conservation
Population and family planning 人口与计划生育
R&D and innovation 科技投入与创新
People's Livelihood
Rise in income level and housing improvement
Increase in employment and social security 扩大就业最低生活保障
Convenience in medical service, schooling and commune
Cultural facilities and cultural and sports activities
Social Harmony
Public security and sense of physical security
Mediation in social conflicts; letters and visits work
Citizens' moral education, civic virtue 公民道德教育，文明社会风尚
Safeguard of democratic rights, building grass-roots democracy
Governance
Rule of the law, open party (government) affairs
Quality of public service and work style
Effective party grassroots organisations and role-model of party members
COD: Key Points for Evaluation of Local Leading Cadres
Item
Content
Key Points for Assessment
Moral character
德
Party loyalty
Ideological faith; carrying out the Party line and policy; implementing democratic centralism; [abiding by the Party's] political discipline
理想信念，贯彻党的路线方针政策，执行民主集中制，政治纪律
Theoretic mastery
Adept in learning; thinking strategically; overall steering capability; skilful at policy
善于学习，战略思维，把握大局，政策水平
Being principled
Courageous to take charge and skilful at management; criticism and self-criticism
敢抓善管，开展批评与自我批评
Moral quality
Good work ethic, public morality, family value and personal integrity
职业道德，社会公德，家庭美德，个人品德
Ability
能
Leadership approach
[correct] view on development and political achievement; [good] at macro policymaking (e.g, innovativeness)
发展观、政绩观、宏观决策 创新意识
Organizing skill
[good at] organisation, mobilisation, coordination of various parties (division of labor and cooperation); emergency response; maintaining social stability
组织动员，协调各方 分工协作 ，处置突发事件，维护社会稳定
Law abiding
Rule of the law consciousness; the level of following the law (administration according to the law)
法治意识，依法办事 依法行政 水平
Diligence
勤
Attitude
Devotion to the cause; sense of responsibility and conscientiousness
事业心、责任感，敬业精神
Work style
Down to earth; pragmatism; close relations with the masses
深入实际，讲求实效，联系群众
Achievements
绩
Duty fulfillment
Duty fulfilment; team management or policy implementation 分管工作完成情况，抓班子带队伍 抓落实促发展 情况
Dealing with complicated issues
Resolving complex and hot-button issues that concern the masses 解决复杂矛盾和群众关心的热点难点问题
Consolidating basic work
Emphasis on long-term and base-level work (or department management), and on institution building 注重长远，重视基层工作 重视部门管理 ，加强制度建设情况
Integrity
廉
Clean and self-disciplined
Following clean government regulations (fulfilling economic responsibilities); discipline spouse, children and staff; accept supervision; lifestyle 遵守廉政规定 履行经济责任 ，对配偶、子女和身边工作人员的要求和约束，接受监督，生活作风
Reasonableness
Usefulness
Fairness
???
Don't understand. The sentence before it says more merit than patronage, now the scale is tipped towards patronage?
Please check
?? educational
Do you mean in descending order of importance? No. it refers to performance evaluation at the end of the term of office to decide future appointments of the cadres under evaluation
Meaning?
Don't understand
Should be former if you are saying that merit has more weight
Please provide source for the two appendixes
Policymaking? OK
Usefulness