Set 1 Digest

Page |1AGAPITO ROM et al., vs ROXAS AND COMPANY INC. G.R. No. 169331 September 5, 2011 FACTS: On September 30, 1997, respondent sought the exemption of 27 parcels of land located in Brgy. Aga, Nasugbo, Batangas, from the coverage of CARP, pursuant to DAR Administrative Order (AO) No.6, series of 1994. Respondent asserted that Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) covers only agricultural land which is defined under Section 3(c) thereof as ―land devoted to agricultural activity x x x and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.‖ Prior to the effectivity of the CARL the lands subject of its application were already re-classified as part of the Residential Cluster Area specified in Zone A VII of the Nasugbu Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1982, which zoning ordinance was approved by the Human Settlement Regulatory Commission. Respondent cited DOJ Opinion No. 44 (1990) which provides that lands already classified by a valid zoning ordinance for commercial, industrial or residential use, which ordinance was approved prior to the effectivity of the CARL, no longer need conversion clearance from the DAR. The application for exemption was approved by DAR with the condition that the farmers shall maintain in their peaceful possession and cultivation of their respective areas until final determination shall be made on the amount of the disturbance compensation. From this order petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that the certifications have already been superseded by Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 30, Series of 1993, which classified the area of Barangay Aga as an agricultural zone except for the 50-meter strip from both sides of the National Road with existing roads, which was classified as residential zone. The motions, however, were dismissed by DAR leading aggrieved party to file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the grounds that it acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders since it has no jurisdiction over the case due to lack of the required proof of disturbance compensation, a condition sine qua non, to grant the exemption. Also, petitioners argued that since respondent had previously voluntarily offered to sell the subject land to the DAR, then they (petitioners) have already acquired a vested right over the subject properties. In a Decision dated April 29, 2005, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari it being an improper remedy. The CA held that petitioners should have filed a petition for review under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Even if the certiorari petition is considered as properly filed, the CA ruled that it would still dismiss the same as there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DAR in issuing the assailed Orders. Thus, this petition for Review on Certiorari. ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE GRANT OF RESPONDENT ROXAS‘ APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE OF THE CARL WITHOUT THE REQUIRED PAYMENT OF DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION, WITHOUT ANY UNDERTAKING TO PAY THE SAID Page |2 COMPENSATION AND WITHOUT ANY BOND BEING POSTED BY THE LANDOWNER TO SECURE PAYMENT OF SAID COMPENSATION. HELD: There is no merit in the petition. Remarkably, in its application for exemption in DAR ADM Case No. A-9999-014-98 subject of this case, respondent submitted documents in support of its application for exemption similar to those submitted by it in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98 subject of G.R. No. 167505. And, having established through said documents that the 27 parcels of land are within the coverage of the said (Nasugbu) Municipal Zoning Ordinance No. 4, the DAR declared as well that respondent substantially complied with the requirements of DAR AO No. 6, series of 1994 in DAR ADM Case No. A-9999-014-98. The DAR thus granted the application in an Order of the same date and of exactly the same tenor as that issued in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-008-98. ―In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of Agrarian Reform, it was held that lands not devoted to agricultural activity are outside the coverage of CARL including lands previously converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the effectivity of CARL by government agencies other than the DAR.‖ This being the case, respondent is not bound by its previous voluntary offer to sell because the subject properties cannot be the subject of a VOS, they being clearly beyond the CARP‘s coverage. Given this backdrop, we are inclined to uphold the DAR‘s November 6, 2002 Order which granted respondent‘s application for exemption in DAR Administrative Case No. A-9999-014-98 subject of this case. Aside from the fact that this Court in Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-NFSW has already upheld the grant of a similar application which, notably, was supported by the same documents submitted in support of the application herein, our own review of the records of this case reveals that there was indeed no error on the part of the DAR in issuing said Order. The documents submitted by respondent to support its application for exemption as well as the Investigation Report of CLUPPI-II clearly show that the 27 parcels of land, specifically identified, were already re-classified as residential prior to the effectivity of the CARL.―Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of x x x quasi-judicial bodies (like the DAR) which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great respect but even finality. They are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in utter disregard of the evidence on record. WHEREFORE, this petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated April 29, 2005 and Resolution dated August 11, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82709 are AFFIRMED. Page |3 ANTONIO VS MANAHAN G.R. No. 176091 August 24, 2011 FACTS: On 16 November 1993, Manahan, the owner of 2 parcel of agricultural land located at San Mateo, Rizal and Antonio entered into a ‖Kasunduang Buwisan sa Sakahan” (Leasehold Agreement) whereby the latter undertook to cultivate the subject parcels for an annual rental of 70 cavans of dried, cleaned and good quality palay, each weighing 44 kilos. The Leasehold Agreement provided, that the land shall be exclusively planted to rice; that Antonio shall neither expand the 12x12 square meter portion on which his house stands nor allow others to construct their homes on the lands in litigation; that the planting and harvest on both parcels shall be simultaneously accomplished by Antonio; and, that Manahan shall be entitled to a three-day prior notice of the harvests done on the property. In 1994, 1996 and 1997, Manahan filed complaints before the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) against Antonio, for such violations of the Leasehold Agreement on the ground that Antonio persisted with the foregoing violations. Manahan filed on 16 September 1997 a Complaint for Ejectment before the Rizal Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD). Antonio, however, specifically denied the material allegations of the foregoing complaint. On 4 October 1999, Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision for Manahan based on the following ascertained violations of the Leasehold Agreement committed by Antonio: (a) failure to pay the stipulated rental in full from 1993 to 1998; (b) failure to give Manahan prior notification of impending harvests; and (c) utilization of 3,000 square meters of the property to the planting of kangkong, despite Manahan‘s objections. As a consequence of the foregoing findings, the PARAD ordered the ejectment of Antonio from the landholding, payment of the unpaid lease rental and to surrender the subject land. On appeal, the foregoing decision was initially reversed and set-aside in the 8 January 2004 decision rendered by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) however, based on the ocular inspection conducted by the DARAB the motion for reconsideration filed by Manahan was granted and DARAB issued the 28 December 2004 Resolution reinstated the PARAD‘s 4 October 1999 decision. On 10 February 2005 Antonio filed a petition for review with the CA arguing that the DARAB gravely erred in finding that he violated the leasehold agreement. The CA rendered the herein assailed 31 October 2006 Decision, dismissing the petition and affirming the DARAB‘s 28 December 2004 Resolution. Antonio‘s motion for reconsideration of said decision was denied for lack of merit in the CA‘s 4 January 2007 resolution, thus, this petition. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT CA ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED SECTION 36 (PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4) OF RA 3844 AS AUTHORIZED CAUSES FOR DISPOSSESSION OF PETITIONER. HELD: We find the affirmance of the assailed decision in order, despite the partial merit in the petition. We find that Antonio‘s dispossession is. a becoming modesty demands that this kindness should at least be reciprocated.A.Page |4 An agricultural leasehold relationship is said to exist upon the concurrence of the following essential requisites: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. Antonio‘s planting of ―kangkong‖ directly flies in the face of the categorical prohibition in the Leasehold Agreement against the planting of other plants on the land and Manahan‘s objections/complaints against the same as early as 24 November 1994. (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee. Fealty to the fact that ―R. 3844 does not operate to take away completely every landowner‘s rights to his land‖ or ―authorize the agricultural lessee to act in an abusive or excessive manner in derogati on of the landowner‘s rights‖ impels us to uphold Antonio‘s dispossession as ordered by the PARAD. 3844. While the ―term ‗deliberate‘ is characterized by or results from slow. still warranted by his repeated violations of the terms of the Leasehold Agreement which prohibited. the burden of proof is upon the agricultural lessor to show the existence of the lawful causes for ejectment or dispossession under Section 36 of Republic Act No. No. In recognition and protection of the tenant‘s right to security of tenure.‖ WHEREFORE. careful. 5. among other matters. (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land.‖Despite the complaints Manahan filed with the MARO in 1994 and 1996 . ―Although the agrarian laws afford the opportunity for the landless to break away from the vicious cycle of having to perpetually rely on the kindness of others. accordingly. Series of 1993 allows the tenant to plant secondary crop on the land provided he shoulders the expenses thereof. thorough calculation and consideration of effects and consequences. Once the tenancy relationship is established. (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship. Antonio‘s claim that that ―kangkong‖ grew naturally on the property is belied by the pictures submitted by Manahan and the PARAD‘s finding that a 3. The rule is settled that failure to pay the lease rentals must be willful and deliberate in order to be considered as ground for dispossession of an agricultural tenant. our perusal of the record shows that Antonio‘s failure to pay and/or incurrence of shortages from the stipulated annual lease rentals of 70 Cavans of palay weighing 40 Kilos cannot be considered willful and deliberate. the DARAB and the CA. however. in whatever small way. the expansion of the tenant‘s dwelling as well as the non-synchronized plantings and harvests thereon. the tenant is entitled to security of tenure and cannot be ejected by the landlord unless ordered by the court for causes provided by law. AFFIRMED. (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production.‖ the term "willful" has been ―defined as one governed by will without yielding to reason or without regard to reason. the cultivation of other plants on Manahan‘s properties. . by those benefited by them. the receipts on record show that the latter was able to remit the following rentals which were duly received by the former. and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.000 square meter portion of the property was devoted to said plant and it was likewise established that Antonio planted other vegetable crops. Granted that paragraph III (G) of DAR Administrative Order No. Even with Manahan‘s rejection of the rentals tendered by Antonio in 1993 and 2001 for supposed poor quality. the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision is. Later. Casimiro Development Corporation (CDC) and China Bank executed a deed of absolute sale over the property which resulted to the issuance of TCT No. (whose married surname was Lara-Mateo) under an agreement denominated as Pagaayos Na Gawa Sa Labas Ng Hukuman.R. In 1962. 1991. In the end. originally owned by Isaias Lara. On appeal (G. and other occupants of the property. which.R. being a fishpond. T-34640 in the name of CDC. she executed a deed of sale in favor of Pe. that the jurisdiction belonged to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). China Bank foreclosed the mortgage. the defendants maintained that the MeTC did not have jurisdiction over the action because the land was classified as agricultural. OCT was issued in Laura‘s sole name. Cesar. the dispute was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB pursuant to Republic Act No. The RTC resolved against CDC. This alone would not be sufficient to bring the land in question under the operation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. who. On February 28. CDC appealed to the CA. As a result. an heir.Page |5 CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION VS MATEO G. The decision of the MeTC was assailed in the RTC via petition for certiorari and prohibition. Jr. and held that the MeTC had acted without jurisdiction because the land. applied for land registration. the respondent‘s maternal grandfather. 1996. and Leonardo. leading to the issuance of TCT in the name of Pe. Felicidad Lara-Mateo had five children. and consolidated its ownership of the property in 1985 after Pe failed to redeem. . the co-heirs effected the transfer of the full and exclusive ownership to Felicidad. the MeTC ruled in favor of CDC stating that the classification of the land in a tax declaration certificate as a ―fishpond‖ merely refers to the use of the land in question for the purpose of real property taxation. Candido. respondent Renato. On March 4. The property now was used as collateral to secure a succession of loans. a deed of sale covering the property was executed in favor of Laura. hence. the property passed on to his children. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988). No. who in turn constituted a mortgage on the property in favor of China Banking Corporation (China Bank) as security for a loan. Felicidad died intestate and on June of the same year CDC brought an action for unlawful detainer in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Las Piñas City against the respondent‘s siblings. 1992. declaring that the MeTC had jurisdiction. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE HEIRS ARE CONSIDERED AGRICULTURAL TENANTS OR LESSEE OF CDC. namely: Laura. No. On October 19. Therein. Upon the death of Isaias Lara in 1930. 1993. was agricultural. 175485 July 27. found in favor of CDC. Las Piñas City. the CA reinstated the decision of the MeTC. in 1967. the Court affirmed the CA‘s decision in favor of CDC. With the agreement of the entire Lara-Mateo family. 128392). on January 25. 2011 FACTS: This case is about a registered parcel of land in Barrio Pulang Lupa. After the application was granted. Jr. As for the third element. Worthy of mention is that Candido. Isaias Lara. They merely showed six tax declarations. . No. and that CDC is merely a successor-in-interest of their grandfather. dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. the fourth element cannot be present since there can be no purpose to a relationship to which the parties have not consented WHEREFORE. For the sake of argument. T-34640 in the name of Casimiro Development Corporation valid and subsisting. CV No. tax declarations or receipts are not adequate proofs of ownership. as against a transfer certificate of title. and declare Transfer Certificate of Title No. Granting arguendo that the land was really owned by the petitioners‘ grandfather. It must be noted that the petitioners failed to adequately prove their grandfather‘s ownership of the land. if petitioners were able to prove that their grandfather owned the land. set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. Petitioners were unable to show any proof of consent from CDC to work the land. Furthermore. petitioners did not even attempt to show how the land went from the patrimony of their grandfather to that of CDC. the petitioners have tried to prove that they are tenants or agricultural lessees of the respondent corporation. by showing that the land was originally owned by their grandfather. petitioners did not prove. 94-2045. who gave them permission to work the land.. Since the third element was not proven. It has been held by this Court that. there is apparently no consent between the parties.Page |6 HELD: We grant the petition. we grant the petition for review on certiorari. and Cesar‘s defense in the ejectment case brought by CDC against them was not predicated on a claim of their ownership of the property. but on their being agricultural lessees or tenants of CDC. but relied on mere allegation. they nonetheless failed to show any proof of consent from their grandfather to work the land. CDC. Even that defense was ultimately rejected by this Court by observing in G. Leonardo. 128392 as follows: With regard to the first element.R. 71696. that they indeed had an agreement with their grandfather to use the land. 2001. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the June 27. 2001. 2001.Page |7 SORIANO VS REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G. acting as SAC. the RTC denied the motion to dismiss and declared that the ―DARAB Rules of Procedure must give way to the laws on prescription of actions as mandated by the Civil Code. the CA likewise denied petitioners‘ motion for reconsideration. 2012 FACTS: The Spouses Francisco and Dalisay Soriano were the registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land located in Hijo. Rule XIII. disagreed with the valuation and brought the matter before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for a summary administrative proceeding to fix the just compensation. Section 11 of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure. alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. On October 26. 2007. Rule XIII of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure. 2000. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Hence. and in finding that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing Agrarian Case No. as the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss filed by the DAR. which was then applicable.‖ The DAR sought reconsideration of the order. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) made a preliminary determination of the value of the subject lands. petitioners filed the present petition alleging that the CA committed serious errors of law. filed a motion to dismiss the petition. In October 1999. for the fixing of just compensation. 2001 Order of the SAC which denied the DAR‘s motion to dismiss. Thus. The appellate court correctly granted the writ of certiorari and nullified the June 27. the two parcels of land were compulsorily acquired by the government pursuant to Republic Act (R. . 2001 and February 22. 2001 Order of the RTC acting as SAC. 2001 that petitioners filed a petition before the RTC of Tagum City. the DAR. the DAR lodged a petition for certiorari with the CA. 64-2001 on the ground that it was filed late. HELD: The petition lacks merit.A. 184282 April 11. the DARAB rendered its decisions affirming the LBP‘s preliminary determination. the CA granted the petition and dismissed Agrarian Case. however. Thus. through the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO) of Tagum City. Compostela Valley Province. respectively. explicitly provides that: . The DAR argued that the petition was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period provided in Section 11. On June 27.R. but its motion was denied on September 24. Maco. it was only on April 6. notices of the two decisions were received by counsel for petitioners on March 8.) No. However. No. On September 30. Petitioners. Later. although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts. fixes the price to be paid for the land. WHEREFORE.This in essence is the procedure for the determination of compensation cases under R. What adjudicators are empowered to do is only to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid to landowners. the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. 2007. the private respondent‘s case was properly brought by it in the RTC. In Republic v. we ruled [U]nder the law. leaving to the courts the ultimate power to decide this question. Consequently.In the terminology of§57. No.A. and it was error for the latter court to have dismissed the case. Court of Appeals. he may bring the matter to the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. it is clear from§57 that theoriginalandexclusivejurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. we explained that the consequence of the said rule is that the adjudicator‘s decision on land valuation attains finality after the lapse of the 15 -day period. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to§57 and therefore would be void.If the landowner does not agree to the price fixed. of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. Court of Appeals. the regional (RARAD) or the central (DARAB) adjudicator as the case may be. 2008. SP No. the RTC. depending on the value of the land. and Resolution dated July 29. Veterans Bank v. – The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. No. sitting as a Special Agrarian Court.Page |8 Section 11. the Land Bank of the Philippines is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking. the DAR makes an offer. has ―origin al and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. The Decision dated October 26. Through notice sent to the landowner pursuant to§16(a) of R. In case the landowner rejects the offer. a summary administrative proceeding is held and afterward the provincial (PARAD).‖ It would subvert this ―original and exclusive‖ jurisdiction of the RTC for the DAR to vest original jurisdiction in compensation cases in administrative officials and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. 6657. 6657.A. . In Phil. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. 80551 are AFFIRMED and UPHELD.In accordance with it. Since no settlement had occurred. (2) the subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land. (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production. respondent‘s act of allowing the petitioner to cultivate her land and receiving rentals therefore indubitably show her consent to an unwritten tenancy agreement. After due proceedings. No. (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee.Page |9 GALOPE VS BUGARIN G. (3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship. ejectment and payment of rentals before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer to assist in computing the rentals. Contrary also to the CA and DARAB pronouncement. . HELD: We find the petition impressed with merit and we hold that the CA and DARAB erred in ruling that there is no tenancy relationship between the parties.R. and that no receipts prove petitioner‘s payment of rentals. respondent filed a petition for recovery of possession. Petitioner appealed. that respondent‘s act of lending her land without consideration cannot be taken as implied tenancy. respondent complained that she lent the land to petitioner in 1992 without an agreement. petitioner filed the instant petition. An agricultural leasehold relation is not determined by the explicit provisions of a written contract alone. Aggrieved. ISSUE: Whether or not there exists a tenancy relationship between the parties. Domingo. The DARAB found no tenancy relationship between the parties and stressed that the elements of consent and sharing are not present. On appeal.000 to P6. but the CA affirmed D ARAB‘s ruling that no tenancy relationship exists. Nueva Ecija. 185669 February 1. Petitioner countered that respondent cannot recover the land yet for he had been farming it for a long time and that he pays rent ranging from P4.000 or 15 cavans of palay per harvest. and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. 2012 FACTS: Respondent owns a parcel of farm land located in Sto. the Provincial Adjudicator dismissed the petition and ruled that petitioner is a tenant entitled to security of tenure. The essential elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. the later gave nothing in return as a sign of gratitude or monetary consideration for the use of the land. The respondent also claimed that petitioner mortgaged the land to Jose Allingag who allegedly possesses the land and now she wants to recover the land to farm it on her own. that the elements of consent and sharing are not present. The DARAB ordered petitioner to pay rentals and vacate the land. In a Barangay Case. the DARAB disagreed with the Adjudicator and ruled that petitioner is not a de jure tenant. entitles the tenant to a security of tenure.P a g e | 10 Section 5 of Republic Act (R. a farm land. processes in palay farming.R.A. 9378 is . WHEREFORE. Respondent‘s motion to supervise harvesting and threshing. petitioner‘s personal cultivation of the land is conceded by respondent who likewise never denied the fact that they share in the harvest. The tenant can only be ejected from the agricultural landholding on grounds provided by law. recognizes that an agricultural leasehold relation may exist upon an oral agreement. After the harvest. SP No.) No. Respondent is the landowner. DARAB Case No. we GRANT the petition and REVERSE the Decision dated September 26. The petition filed by respondent Cresencia Bugarin in hereby DISMISSED insofar as petitioner Juan Galope is concerned. 2008 and Resolution dated December 12. petitioner pays rental consisting of palay or its equivalent in cash. The purpose of their relationship is clearly to bring about agricultural production. all the elements of an agricultural tenancy relationship are present. Lastly. further confirms the purpose of their agreement. 97143. 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code. The subject matter of their relationship is agricultural land. They mutually agreed to the cultivation of the land by petitioner and share in the harvest. Thus. petitioner is her tenant. 3844. The principle of a tenancy relationship. once established. before the CA could act on Land Bank‘s application for TRO. which had become final and executory. and ordered the DARAB sheriffs to resume their implementation of the alias writ of execution issued in DARAB Case No.R. Region IV. Occidental Mindoro with a total area of 3. however. In 1972. V-0405-0001-00.30. Immediately.002. It received the denial on March 26. modifies or alters the Supreme Court Decision dated October 11. V-0405-0001-00 his urgent ex parte manifestation and motion to resume interrupted execution. 188376 December 14. MERALCO recorded the transfer of ownership of the affected stocks in its stock and transfer book.P a g e | 11 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS SUNTAY G. July 31. Land Bank wrote back on November 3.0285 hectares. citing Land Bank v.141. on October 30. 2001. RARAD Miñas granted Suntay‘s urgent ex parte manifestation and motion.68.1911 hectares of Suntay‘s land pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 2008.R. 2001. Lucia. Petitioner Land Bank and DAR fixed the value of the expropriated portion at P4. In response. Land Bank moved for reconsideration.251.R.951. 2008 to request PDTC to disregard the DARAB sheriffs‘ demand to comply. Without yet being aware of the transfers. 2008 as it varies. On October 29. the CA issued a TRO on December 4. but RARAD Miñas denied its motion on March 14. impleading Suntay and RARAD Miñas. No. On April 20.‖ and that the DARAB sheriffs had ―committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing to. Sablayan. the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) expropriated 948. 2001. (STSI). 2008 to .497. The DARAB sheriffs forthwith served a demand to comply dated October 30. 560 SCRA 776). 2008 on the Philippine Depository and Trust Corporation (PDTC) and Securities Transfer Services. SP No. No. and serving on. 2008.682. 2008 a special civil action for certiorari in the CA (CA-G. Martinez (G. 2007. 2008. 2008 notwithstanding the unquestioned finality of the Supreme Court‘s decision dated October 11. Occidental Mindoro as a Special Agrarian Court. Suntay filed a petition for determination of just compensation in the Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of Region IV. for a total valuation of P4. 169008. 2007.750 shares of stock and issued new stock certificates in the name of Lubrica. 2008. 27. on October 31. the Philippine Depository and Trust Corporation. Given the foregoing. 2011 FACTS: Respondent Federico Suntay (Suntay) owned land situated in Sta. 2008. Rejecting the valuation.50/hectare. Inc. a copy of the Demand to Comply dated October 30. 106104). Land Bank brought a petition for the judicial determination of just compensation in the RTC in San Jose. Miñas rendered a decision fixing the total just compensation for the expropriated portion at P157. stating that it had already ―issued a written notice‖ to Land Bank ―to uplift the assets involved‖ and that ―it ha(d) caused the subject assets to be outside the disposition‖ of Land Bank. 541. Land Bank commenced on November 12. PDTC filed a manifestation and compliance in the office of the RARAD. Suntay presented to RARAD Miñas in DARAB Case No.‖ On November 28. MERALCO cancelled Land Bank‘s 42. alleging that RARAD Miñas had ―committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering ex parte the assailed Order dated October 30. DARAB. we hold that Land Bank‘s liability under the CARP was to be satisfied only from the ARF. from releasing on May 11. seeking thereby to enjoin MERALCO. Land Bank then sought the approval of its bond for that purpose. 2008 was lawful. On May 5. and its Assistant Corporate Secretary. 2010. hence. an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS (P50. The ARF was first envisioned in Proclamation No. In Land Bank v. of no force and effect. 2010 and thereafter the cash dividends pertaining to the disputed shares in favor of Lubrica or any person acting on her behalf. to wit: Section 2. On December 24.000.R.‖ As a result.000. to be known as the Agrarian Reform fund. 2005 were expressly quashed and rendered of no force and effect A further cause that invalidated the execution effected against Land Bank‘s MERALCO shares derived from the statutory and reglementary provisions governing the payment of any award for just compensation. Suntay (G.000. 2008. of no force and effect. At the outset. The amounts collected and accruing to this special . holding that all actions done in compliance or in connection with the alias writ of execution were ―DEEMED QUASHED. The writs of execution issued by RARAD Miñas and the manner of their enforcement by the DARAB sheriffs did not accord with the applicable law and the rules of DARAB. and therefore. 131 issued on July 22. No. 2005. HELD: The appeal has merit. 1987 by President Aquino to institute the Government‘s centerpiece Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. the CA denied Land Bank‘s very urgent motion to resolve and supplemental motion.‖ On October 25. the Court directed the parties on October 24. declaring that ―all actions done in compliance or in connection with the xxx Writ‖ issued by her ―are DEEMED QUASHED.There is hereby created a special fund. and therefore.00) to cover the estimated cost of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust receipts of illgotten wealth received through the Presidential Commission on Good Government and such other sources as government may deem appropriate. they were invalid and ineffectual. RARAD Miñas herself quashed the acts done pursuant to her writ of execution. Agrarian Reform Fund.P a g e | 12 prevent the implementation of RARAD Miñas‘ order dated October 30. 157903). ISSUE: Whether or not the manner of execution of RARAD Miñas‘ order dated October 30. its Corporate Secretary. the following acts done in compliance with or pursuant to the writ of execution issued ex parte by RARAD Miñas on September 14. . 2005 to maintain the status quo prior to the issuance of the alias writ of execution. Land Bank filed an urgent verified motion for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction. pending the proceedings and until the resolution of the case. 2008. Lubrica opposed Land Bank‘s motion. P a g e | 13 fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized in this proclamation. Land Bank‘s as sets and properties must necessarily come under segregation. and REVERSE the Decision promulgated June 5. In fact.As provided in Proclamation No. the liability is not the personal liability of Land Bank.R. The prior determination of whether the asset of Land Bank sought to be levied to respond to a judgment liability under the CARP in favor of the landowner was demanded by its being a banking institution created by law. Republic Act No. Rule 19 of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure. Being the official depository of Government funds. 2009 in CA-G. reiterates that the satisfaction of a judgment for just compensation by writ of execution should be from the ARF in the custody of Land Bank. mainly as the administrator of the ARF. . Given its discrete functions and capacities under the laws. 251. 106104. namely: (a) those arising from its proprietary functions as a regular banking or financial institution. 131 dated July 22. 9700 amended the CARL in order to strengthen and extend the CARP. a special fund is created. Execution of judgments for Just Compensation which have become Final and Executory. As a regular bank. WHEREFORE. SP No. Agrarian Reform Fund. Subsequently. 9700 expressly provided that ―all just compensation payments to landowners. but its liability only as the administrator of the ARF. Land Bank isunder the supervision and regulation of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. As such. . an initial amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS (P50 billion) to cover the estimated cost of the CARP from 1987 to 1992 which shall be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) and receipts of the sale of ill-gotten wealth recovered through the Presidential Commission on Good Government and such other sources as government may deem appropriate. shall only be sourced from the Agrarian Reform Fund. Executive Order No. The amount collected and accruing to this special fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized in this Order. possessed with universal or expanded commercial banking powers by virtue of Presidential Decree No. to wit: Section 10. we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari. 229 implemented the creation of the ARF.‖ The enactments of the Legislature decreed that the money to be paid to the landowner as just compensation for the taking of his land is to be taken only from the ARF. and (b) those arising from its being the administrator of the ARF. known as The Agrarian Reform Fund. viz: Section 20. – The Sheriff shall enforce a writ of execution of a final judgment for compensation by demanding for the payment of the amount stated in the writ of execution in cash and bonds against the Agrarian Reform Fund in the custody of LBP [Land Bank of the Philippines] in accordance with RA 6657 xxx. It is notable that Section 21 of Republic Act No. Section 10. including execution of judgments therefore. Land Bank is also invested with duties and responsibilities related to the implementation of the CARP. 1987. and the Philippine Stock Exchange. in San Jose.P a g e | 14 ACCORDINGLY. Miñas (directing the DARAB sheriffs ―to resume the interrupted execution of the Alias Writ in this case on September 14. Branch 46. Conchita C. R-1241. (c) AFFIRMS and REITERATES the order issued on October 25. Occidental Mindoro to continue the proceedings for the determination of the just compensation of Federico Suntay‘s expropriated property in Agrarian Case No. (b) QUASHES and NULLIFIES the orders issued in DARAB Case No. and the order issued on December 17. and all acts performed pursuant thereto.. and any stockbroker. Inc. . and to restore the ownership of the shares to Land Bank and to record the restoration in MERALCO‘s stock and transfer book. the Court: (a) DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court. and to determine if she was administratively liable as a member of the Philippine Bar. Securities Transfer Services. 2005 by RARAD Miñas (deeming to be quashed and of no force and effect ―all actions done in compliance or in connection with‖ the writ of execution issued by her). (e) COMMANDS the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to investigate the actuations of Atty. V-0405-0001-00 on September 14. dealer. and the Philippine Dealing System Holdings Corporation and Subsidiaries (PDS Group). V-0405-0001-00. Philippine Depository and Trust Corporation. (d) DECLARES Land Bank fully entitled to all the dividends accruing to its levied MERALCO shares of stocks as if no levy on execution and auction were made involving such shares of stocks. or agent of MERALCO shares to stop trading or dealing on the shares). and to proceed against them if warranted. 2005 (granting Suntay‘s ex parte motion for the issuance of analias writ of execution) and October 30. 2005‖). Miñas in DARAB Case No. 2008 by RARAD Marivic Casabar (directing MERALCO to cancel the stock certificates issued to Josefina Lubrica and to any of her transferees or assignees. 2008 by RARAD Conchita C. and (f) ORDERS the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board to conduct a thorough investigation of the sheriffs who participated in the irregularities noted in this Decision. acquired ownership of the subject Doronilla property by virtue of court litigation. to which the processed applications were forwarded. N-70860 in his name. only 75 CLTs had actually been distributed. 2012 FACTS: At the heart of the controversy is a large tract of land. 1979. organized themselves into farmers‘ cooperatives or Samahang Nayons and applied for certificates of land transfer (CLTs). other lands in the municipalities of San Mateo and Montalban. The DAR. Alarmed by the turn of events whereby DAR was having its property. Montalban. 1990. On December 12. then DAR Undersecretary. out of the 106 CLTs generated.53 hectares of the land now covered by TCT No. then President Corazon C. he had OCT No. 1989. incidental to effecting compulsory land acquisition. Letter of Instructions No. processed 106 CLTs involving 100 tenants-beneficiaries covering 73 hectares out of the total 1. thereby increasing the size of the reservation. surveyed. carving out a wide expanse from the Watershed Reservation in Antipolo. Aquino issued Proclamation No. copy furnished the Agrarian Reform Office. of the conversion of Lot 23 from agricultural to commercial. On July 27. 1989. Araneta. was directed to initiate condemnation proceedings for the acquisition of private lands within the new townsite. (LO I) 625 addressed to several agencies was issued for the implementation of the aforementioned proclamations. ―subject to private rights.312 hectares and revising its technical description so as to include. by 20. or a portion of it. 1977. for reasons stated in the covering letter. among other agencies. AMADO ARANETA G.645 hectares of Lot 23. listing seventy-nine (79) ―bona fide planters‖ he allegedly permitted to occupy a portion of his land. Proclamation 1637 dated April 18. A little over a week later.‖ Then came the amendatory issuance.R. industrial and other non-agricultural uses. then President Marcos issued Proclamation 1283. Rizal.P a g e | 15 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ESTATE OF J. formally protesting the series of land surveys being conducted by the Bureau of Lands on what is now its property. the Araneta Estate addressed a letter to DAR dated June 27. 1972. 1983. 1977. On June 21. or on March 15. as heir of J. Jorge L. On July 22. However. located in Brgy. Doronilla issued a Certification. ordered the Regional Director of DAR Region IV to proceed with the OLT coverage and final survey of the Doronilla property. if any there be. Rizal to absorb ―the population overspill in Greater Manila Area. It claimed that the CARL .‖ but again ―subject to private rights. Thereafter. denominated as Lot No. J. among which was Lot 23. if any there be. 161796 February 8. within its coverage. Prior to LOI 625. PD 27 (Tenant’s Emancipation Decree) was issued. DAR issued a ―Notice of Acquisition‖ addressed to Doronilla. On June 6. 131 instituting the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). who claimed their primary crops to be rice and/or corn. Amado Araneta. No. 1987. on October 21. 7924 canceled and secured the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.‖ On November 9. Mascap. In line with this program. in particular. Rizal and reserving the segregated area for townsite purposes. Earlier. 216746 and offering compensation at a valuation stated in the notice. Amado Araneta and administrator of his estate. 1974. now deceased. wrote the DAR Secretary requesting approval. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). covering 7. designated as ―Lungsod Silangan Townsite‖ (LS Townsite). 23 of the Montalban Cadastre. the tenants of Doronilla (Lot 23) tilling portions of his property. On February 26. 1992. in effect nullifying all the individual farm lots awards thus made by the DARAB ostensibly in favor of the named intervenor-appellees and necessarily all other unnamed awardees. the land transfer claim covering 1. rendered a Decision dated February 7. was indisputably agricultural. 1991. with a slope of more than 70 degrees and containing commercial quantities of marble deposit. 625. Doronilla.645-hectare Doronilla property. By Decision dated October 17. Therefrom. provided concerned government agencies with a list of seventy-nine (79) names he considered bona fide ―planters‖ of his land. 2003. nonetheless. CLTs were eventually generated covering 73 hectares. apart from being mountainous. 1992. the 1. so it seems. who may reasonably be considered tenant-farmers. Subsequently. came to this Court on a petition for review under Rule 45. Araneta went to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on the stated principal issue of whether or not the DARAB in its appealed decision unduly expanded the scope of coverage of PD 27. By Decision of September 19. proceeded to approve. DARAB turned over the case folder to the Rizal Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD). some parts devoted to rice and/or corn production tilled by Doronilla‘s tenants.412. Several basic premises should be made clear at the outset. On November 29. Sometime in April 1992. in fact. upon its compliance with certain requirements. Notwithstanding Araneta‘s protest against the compulsory agrarian reform coverage and acquisition of the property in question. representing just compensation for its covered parcels of land. ISSUE: Whether or not CA committed serious errors of law when it gave imprimatur to the virtual conversion through Proclamation Nos. with about 75 CLTs . These planters. being part of the LS Townsite reservation. of the amount of PhP 3. on January 21.266 hectares.324. had purposely.P a g e | 16 does not cover the said property. In due time. HELD: We find the petitions partly meritorious. Immediately prior to the promulgation of PD 27 in October 1972. the DARAB. the CA set aside the Decision of the DARAB. the Office of the Provincial Adjudication Board of Rizal set a hearing to determine the just compensation for the subject property. following the RARAD‘s line that the intervenor-appellees were deemed owners of the land they tilled as of October 21. Araneta filed with the DARAB an action against the DAR and Land Bank for Cancellation of Compulsory Coverage under PD 27 and Exemption from CARL Coverage of the erstwhile Doronilla property. organized themselves into Samahang Nayon(s) so that the DAR could start processing their applications under the PD 27 OLT program. in December 2009. Land Bank notified Araneta of its entitlement. denying its bid to have its property excluded from OLT coverage and/or the compulsory scheme under CARL. 1994. Araneta appealed to the DARAB proper. the Land Bank. 1283 & 1637 of erstwhile agricultural lands to residential use without the requisite expropriation/condemnation proceedings pursuant to LOI No. or a large portion of it. 1972. Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) ruled against Araneta.05. Duran and eight others. Thereafter. 2001 affirming in toto that of the RARAD‘s decision. or some six (6) years after the CA rendered its appealed judgment. as self-styled petitioners-intervenors. Perforce. prior to the effectivity of [RA] 6657 x x x are not considered and treated as agricultural lands and therefore. It ceased. now Araneta‘s property.. the key date to reckon. beyond DAR‘s or DARAB‘s jurisdictional reach.. To restate a basic postulate. by virtue particularly of Proclamation 1637 –– were converted for residential use. nonagricultural uses by government agencies other than the [DAR]. are deemed full owners of the lots covered by 75 CLTs vis-à-vis the real registered owner. 1977. as amended. having been effectively classified as residential by force of Proclamation 1637. Guided by the foregoing doctrinal pronouncement. and the Doronilla property are situated within the same area covered by Proclamation 1637. the provisions of RA 6657 apply only to agricultural lands under which category the Doronilla property. by necessarily corollary. they would be exempt from land reform and. however. following Natalia Realty. However. is the precise time when Doronilla‘s Lot 23. ceased to be agricultural. Inc. to be agricultural land upon approval of its inclusion in the LS Townsite Reservation pursuant to the said reclassifying presidential issuance. in turn. as a preliminary matter. Inc. outside the ambit of said law. for all intents and purposes. Both the Natalia lands. albeit parts of the lot may still be actually suitable for agricultural purposes. 1974 when Proclamation 1283. By the terms of Natalia Realty. because the lots have already been reclassified as residential and are beyond the compulsory coverage for agrarian reform under RA 6657. to the property in question..‖ The discontinuance of the OLT processing was obviously DAR‘s way of acknowledging the implication of the townsite proclamation on the agricultural classification of the Doronilla property. exempted ordinarily from land reform. considered residential. means the date when Proclamation 1637 establishing LS Townsite was issued: April 18. as determined in Natalia Realty. upon the issuance of Proclamation 1637. Inc. during the period material. the entire Lot 23 was. It ought to be emphasized. the farmer-beneficiaries who were given the 75 CLTs prior to the issuance of Proclamation 1283. In this regard. Inc. converted to. The farmer-beneficiaries have private rights over said lots as they were deemed owners prior to the establishment of the LS Townsite reservation or at least are subrogated to the rights of the registered lot owner. became effective do not acquire rights over the lots they were claiming under PD 27 or RA 6657. From then on.] ruling was reiterated in National Housing Authority vs. Those farmer-beneficiaries who were issued CLTs or EPs after June 21. since the lots in . Allarde where the Supreme Court held that lands reserved for. no longer falls. the principles regarding the classification of the land within the Townsite stated in Natalia Realty. the said CLTs or EPs issued after June 21. Summarizing. the Court cites with approval the following excerpts from the appealed CA decision: The above [Natalia Realty. 1974 have to be annulled and invalidated for want of legal basis. as amended by Proclamation 1637. apply mutatis mutandis to the instant case. Inc. if any. This is the same crucial cut -off date for considering the existence of ―private rights‖ of farmers. that the former agricultural lands of Doronilla ––situated as they were within areas duly set aside for townsite purposes.P a g e | 17 actually distributed to the tenant-beneficiaries. This. thus. as a general proposition. ―all activities related to the OLT were stopped. EPs. as effectively reiterated in its Resolution of January 22. is AFFIRMED with the modification that the 75 CLTs issued prior to the effectivity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21. The Land Bank and DAR are hereby ordered to COMPUTE the just compensation of the land subject of the 75 CLTs and PAY the just compensation to the Estate of J. Amado Araneta. 1974 are declared legal and valid. WHEREFORE. The other CLTs. CLOAs issued by DAR involving the subject property are hereby CANCELED and NULLIFIED. 2004.P a g e | 18 question are no longer subject to agrarian reform due to the reclassification of the erstwhile Doronilla estate to non-agricultural purposes. . 2003. The CA Decision dated September 19. 2004 and April 2. the petitions are hereby partly DENIED. On January 3. Sorsogon. The Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ordered to pay the same to the landowner in the manner provided for by law. located in Inlagadian. Alex A.689. T-20193. he directed the issuance of an arrest order against Manager Alex A. on September 6. The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision which nullified the Orders of the Regional Trial Court. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. petitioner Land Bank filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon. for the determination of just compensation. On January 29. Thus. 1998.9066 hectares. alleging that petitioner Land Bank failed to comply with the Writ of Execution issued on June 18.956. 1999. Hence. PARAD Capellan denied due course to petitioner‘s Notice of Appeal and ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the payment of the adjudged amount of just compensation to respondent. He voluntarily offered to sell the said land to the government. On October 14. sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC). In a Resolution dated November 27. 2001. . Hence.871. 2001. Petitioner‘s Motion for Reconsideration of said dismissal was likewise denied.963. the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sorsogon commenced summary administrative proceedings to determine the just compensation of the land. Casiguran. 2000. Sorsogon. also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL). 2000. respondent filed a Motion for Contempt with the PARAD. Petitioner Land Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforequoted Order which was however denied by the PARAD on September 20. 2003 FACTS: Respondent Severino Listana is the owner of a parcel of land containing an area of 246. No.R.03. which was however rejected by the respondent. through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). On the other hand.25) for the acquired area of 240. the instant petition for review. with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain PARAD Capellan from issuing the order of arrest. On August of the same year.A. Meanwhile. 152611 August 5. the trial court issued an Order requiring the respondent Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone acting in its stead is enjoined as it is hereby enjoined from enforcing its order of arrest against Mr.0561 hectares. respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on December 11. under Section 20 of R. The DAR valued the property at P5. the Special Agrarian Court dismissed the petition for the determination of just compensation filed by petitioner Land Bank in an Order dated October 25. manifesting its intention to appeal the decision to the DARAB Central. 2000. Lorayes. 1999. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before RTC Branch 52. Thereafter. the DARAB rendered a Decision ordering Land Bank of the Philippines to set aside prior valuation and a new valuation in the amount of (P10. a Writ of Execution was issued by the PARAD directing the manager of Land Bank to pay the respondent the aforesaid amount as just compensation. petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the PARAD. 1999. Sorsogon upon the posting of a cash bond by the Land Bank. 6657. 2001. On September 2. the motion for contempt was granted by the PARAD. G. Petitioner Land Bank filed a petition for injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon.P a g e | 19 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS SEVERINO LISTANA SR. Thus. quasi-judicial agencies that have the power to cite persons for indirect contempt pursuant to Rule 71 of the Rules of Court can only do so by initiating them in the proper Regional Trial Court. are null and void. Consequently. not with the Regional Trial Court. but with the PARAD. Hence. dated January 29. it was by a motion filed by respondent. SP No. WHEREFORE. neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. AS IT ATTEMPTED TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH THE PARAD DECISION THAT WAS ADMITTEDLY NOT FINAL AND EXECUTORY.‖ specifically the Orders of the PARAD dated August 20. in view of the foregoing. The issuance of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB. In the present case. The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio. rather. 2001. Lorayes. the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court. 2001. These matters are still within the province of the Regional Trial Courts. Lorayes pending the final termination of the case before Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon. Sorsogon. and it was the PARAD that cited Mr. Second. which was not complied with in this case. is REINSTATED . 2000 and January 3. It is not within their jurisdiction and competence to decide the indirect contempt cases.P a g e | 20 ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PARAD ORDER OF CONTEMPT WAS PATENTLY NULL AND VOID. all the proceedings that stemmed from respondent‘s ―Motion for Contempt. Lorayes with indirect contempt. the indirect contempt charge was filed. 65276. Branch 51. is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. which enjoined the Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB or anyone acting in its stead from enforcing its order of arrest against Mr. AS THE MATTER OF JUST COMPENSATION BEFORE THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT WAS ON APPEAL WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS HELD: Evidently. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. Sorsogon.R. Branch 52. 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified ―Motion for Contempt‖ filed by the respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the following reasons: First. Alex A. the petition for review is GRANTED. dated December 11. R. the RTC rendered a Decision remanding the case to the MTC for preliminary hearing to determine whether tenancy relationship exists between the parties. respondent filed a Petition for review with the CA. Petitioners moved for reconsideration arguing that the purpose of a preliminary hearing was served by the parties‘ submission of their respective position papers and other supporting evidence. On June 23. under the agreement that Lucia and Serapio would devote the property to agricultural production and share the produce with the Salvador siblings. 2005. 2004. It ruled that no tenancy relationship exists between the parties because petitioners failed to prove that respondent or her predecessors-ininterest consented to the tenancy relationship. respectively before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dalaguete. petitioners refused to vacate the subject land. On January 12. dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Serapio. the MTC promulgated a Decision finding the existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship between the parties. 2003. and thereby. Petitioners interposed the defense of agricultural tenancy. Cebu. mother and daughter. respondent filed an appeal. the RTC granted the reconsideration and affirmed the MTC Decision dated September 10. Lucia claimed that she and her deceased husband. respondent Teresita V. Since there is a tenancy relationship between the parties. 171972 June 8. 2011 FACTS: On May 22. 2003. No. Aggrieved. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT PETITIONERSDEFENDANTS ARE NOT TENANTS OF THE SUBJECT LAND. and that despite several verbal and written demands made by her. . 2003. Agricultural tenancy relationship does not exist in the instant case. Respondent alleged that she is the absolute owner of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title issued by virtue of Free Patent in the name of the Heirs of Cristino Salvador represented by Teresita Salvador and that petitioners acquired possession of the subject land by mere tolerance of her predecessors-in-interest. Respondent sought for reconsideration but was denied. Thus. On August 24. 2004.P a g e | 21 RODRIGUEZ VS SALVADOR G. On September 10. siblings Cristino and Sana Salvador. HELD: The petition lacks merit. petitioners argued that it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) which has jurisdiction over the case and not the MTC. the CA rendered judgment in favor of respondent. with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Argao. Cebu. Salvador filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against petitioners Lucia (Lucia) and Prudencia Rodriguez. entered the subject land with the consent and permission of respondent‘s predecessors-in-interest. Except for the self-serving affidavit of Lucia. 4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production. the petition is DENIED.P a g e | 22 Agricultural tenancy exists when all the following requisites are present: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. . This case is ordered REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court of Dalaguete. no other evidence was submitted to show that respondent‘s predecessors -in-interest consented to a tenancy relationship with petitioners. Aside from consent. It is incumbent upon a person who claims to be an agricultural tenant to prove by substantial evidence all the requisites of agricultural tenancy. Cebu. 5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee. As we have often said. petitioners also failed to prove sharing of harvest. and 6) the harvest is shared between landowner and tenant or agricultural lessee. petitioners failed to prove consent and sharing of harvest between the parties. the remand of the case to the MTC for the determination of the amount of damages due respondent is proper. Self-serving statements. 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G. 2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land. their defense of agricultural tenancy must fail. The affidav its of petitioners‘ neighbors declaring that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest received their share in the harvest are not sufficient. The assailed August 24. In the instant case. Petitioners should have presented receipts or any other evidence to show that there was sharing of harvest and that there was an agreed system of sharing between them and the landowners. As correctly found by the CA. independent evidence is necessary. will not suffice to prove consent of the landowner. SP No.R. mere occupation or cultivation of an agricultural land will not ipso facto make the tiller an agricultural tenant. 2005 Decision and the February 20. the element of consent is lacking. to determine the amount of damages suffered by respondent by reason of the refusal and failure of petitioners to turn over the possession of the subject land. Consequently. however. 3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship. No error can therefore be attributed to the CA in reversing and setting aside the dismissal of respondent‘s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. 86599 are AFFIRMED. The MTC has jurisdiction over the instant case. Accordingly. WHEREFORE. with utmost dispatch consistent with the above disquisition. 2011 filed by petitioner Hacienda Luisita.Sec. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IN DETERMINING THE JUST COMPENSATION. by Resolution of November 22. et al. the result will be the same. and as such. (HLI) v. hence. this Court denied the petition for review filed by HLI and affirmed the assailed Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) Resolution No. Inc. one last time. 2011. Upon separate motions of the parties for reconsideration. 2005 and PARC Resolution No. 1989. Just compensation has been defined as ―the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator.R. and Windsor Andaya (collectively referred to as ―Mallari. G. Nonetheless. WHEN PARC APPROVED HLI‘s SDP [STOCK DISPTRIBUTION PLAN] ―IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THIS IS THE TIME THAT THE FWBs WERE CONSIDERED TO OWN AND POSSESS THE AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN HACIENDA LUISITA. 2011 Resolution.‖). 171101 April 24. but the owner‘s loss. (HLI) and the Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification dated December 9. 2012 FACTS: Before the Court are the Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution of November 22. Julio Suniga. a prohibited pleading. 2006 with the modification that the original 6. 2011 dated December 16. et al.‖The measure is not the taker‘s gain. Inc.296 qualified farmworker-beneficiaries of Hacienda Luisita (FWBs) shall have the option to remain as stockholders of HLI. et al. 4. HELD: In the instant case. while maintaining that all the benefits and homelots received by all the FWBs shall be respected with no obligation to refund or return them. a subsequent motion touching on the same issue undeniably partakes of a second motion for reconsideration. Supervisory Group of Hacienda Luisita. 2006-34-01 dated May 3. rely upon in support of their respective stance on the matter had been previously raised by them in their first motion for reconsideration and fully passed upon by the Court in its November 22. In Our July 5. recalled and set aside the option thus granted to the original FWBs to remain as stockholders of HLI.. No. THE DATE OF ―TAKING‖ IS NOVEMBER 21. 2011 filed by private respondents Noel Mallari. Considering that the issue on just compensation has already been passed upon and denied by the Court in its November 22. et al. even if we entertain said motion and examine the arguments raised by HLI and Mallari. In determining just compensation. 2011 Resolution.P a g e | 23 Hacienda Luisita Inc. the issue on just compensation and the grounds HLI and Mallari. 2005-32-01 dated December 22. Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that the taking of land for use in the agrarian reform program of the government is conditioned on the payment of just compensation. 2011 Decision in the above-captioned case. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC). 2011 Resolution. the Court. The similarities in the issues then and now presented and the grounds invoked are at once easily discernible from a perusal of the November 22. the motion or plea must be denied. . it was the PARC approval which should be considered as the effective date of ―taking‖ as it was only during this time that the government officially confirmed the CARP coverage of these lands. The investment on SACs of original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners will not preclude the Court from ruling upon a matter that may already be resolved based on the records before Us. 1989 when PARC approved HLI‘s stock option plan. As regards the issue on when ―taking‖ occurred with respect to the agricultural lands in question. As regards the issue of interest on just compensation. the Court affirmed its ruling that the date of ―taking‖ in determining just compensation is November 21. Nonetheless. Option will not ensure control over agricultural lands. Contrary to the stance of HLI. both the Constitution and RA 6657 intended the . the fact that the reckoning point of ―taking‖ is already fixed at a certain date should already hasten the proceedings and not further cause undue hardship on the parties. as in the instant case. ―Taking‖ also occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered by a landowner and approved by PARC for CARP coverage through the stock distribution scheme. subject to review by the RTC acting as a SAC. The Court agrees that the option given to the qualified FWBs whether to remain as stockholders of HLI or opt for land distribution is neither iniquitous nor prejudicial to the FWBs. however. Indeed. the Court held that ―the ‗time of taking‘ is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property.P a g e | 24 the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from the owner and appropriated by the government shall be the basis. If the government takes possession of the land before the institution of expropriation proceedings. November 21. Livioco. that ―taking‖ does not only take place upon the issuance of title either in the name of the Republic or the beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). especially the qualified FWBs. Even though the compensation due to HLI will still be preliminarily determined by DAR and LBP. We also leave this matter to the DAR and the LBP. HLI‘s submitting its SDP for approval is an acknowledgment on its part that the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita are covered by CARP. 89-12-2. the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession. that is. such as when title is transferred to the Republic. not of the filing of the complaint. By a vote of 8-6. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. with due regard to the rights of landowners to just compensation. subject to review by the RTC acting as a SAC.‖ It should be noted. stock distribution option and compulsory land acquisition are two (2) different modalities under the agrarian reform program. however. to have ―a more equitable distribution and ownership of land. 1989. Nonetheless. based on the above-mentioned disquisitions. both share the same end goal. Thus. as it has in fact already ruled on its reckoning date. We. the date of issuance of PARC Resolution No. maintain that this Court can rule. the Court is not unmindful of the policy on agrarian reform that control over the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the farmers. However. that is. individually or collectively. association or corporation composed of farmers. Based on the provisions. otherwise. are authorized vehicles for the collective ownership of agricultural land. given that.915 hectares of Hacienda Luisita were already covered by CARP. less deductions of the 3% of the proceeds of said transfers that were paid to the FWBs. However. Notably. XIII of the Constitution that land can be owned COLLECTIVELY by farmers. as prescribed in our November 22. Inc. as differentiated from individual farmers. the taxes and expenses relating to the transfer of titles to the transferees. subject to payment of just compensation. Even the framers of the l987 Constitution are in unison with respect to the two (2) modes of ownership of agricultural lands tilled by farmers––DIRECT and COLLECTIVE. It cannot be denied that the adverted 500-hectare converted land and the SCTEX lot once formed part of what would have been agrarian-distributable lands. it has been this Court‘s consistent stand that control over the agricultural land must always be in the hands of the farmers FWBs Entitled to Proceeds of Sale. were it not for the approval of the SDP by PARC. HLI‘s insistent view that control need not be in the hands of the farmers translates to allowing it to run roughshod against the very reason for the enactment of agrarian reform laws and leave the farmers in their shackles with sheer lip service to look forward to. 31 is constitutional as it simply implements Sec. 29 of RA 6657 and corporations or associations under the succeeding Sec. these large parcels of land would have been distributed and ownership transferred to the FWBs. Homelots .‖ Accordingly. as of 1989. while corporations are juridical persons under the Corporation Code. all these rhetoric about agrarian reform will be rendered for naught. in fine subject to compulsory CARP coverage. 31. workers‘ cooperatives or associations under Sec. Cooperatives can be registered with the Cooperative Development Authority and acquire legal personality of their own. there is collective ownership as long as there is a concerted group work by the farmers on the land. regardless of whether the landowner is a cooperative. to have control over the agricultural lands of HLI.P a g e | 25 farmers. Clearly. As aforequoted. And. the subject 4. Sec. the proceeds realized from the sale and/or disposition thereof should accrue for the benefit of the FWBs. which is to emancipate the tiller from the bondage of the soil and empower the common people. for legitimate corporate purposes. This claim is bereft of merit. and the expenditures incurred by HLI and Centennary Holdings. 2011 Decision. Accordingly. this definition of collective ownership should be read in light of the clear policy of the law on agrarian reform. We have extensively discussed this ideal in Our July 5. 2011 Resolution. as stated in our July 5. the notion of farmers and regular farmworkers having the right to own directly or collectively the lands they till is abundantly clear. Thus. Worth noting too is its noble goal o f rectifying ―the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource among our people. 2011 Decision. 4 of Art. be paid to Tadeco as the landowner. 4. 31 of RA 6657. Supervisory Group of Hacienda Luisita. where Tadeco transferred and conveyed to HLI the titles over the lots in question. the Court directs the government through the DAR to pay HLI the just compensation for said homelots in consonance with Sec. As We have explained in Our July 5. 2011 Resolution. as modified by the November 22. 2011 Resolution. Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution that the taking of land for use in the agrarian reform program is ―subject to the payment of just compensation. rules and regulations.‖ In fact. This is provided under Sec.75 hectares covered by the SDP. Inc. is FURTHER MODIFIED in that the government. with each family beneficiary being assured of receiving and owning a homelot in the barrio or barangay where it actually resides. 30 of RA 6657 Since none of the above-quoted provisions made reference to corporations which opted for stock distribution under Sec. HLI undertook to ―subdivide and allocate for free and without charge among the qualified family-beneficiaries x x x residential or homelots of not more than 240 sq. through DAR. 1989 executed between Tadeco and HLI. The July 5. The entry of judgment of said decision shall be made upon the time of the promulgation of this Resolution. DAR is ordered to compute the just compensation of the homelots in accordance with existing laws. 2011 dated December 16. in our November 22. Julio Suniga. 2011 Decision. 2011 filed by private respondents Noel Mallari. as modified by the November 22. 2011 Decision. is ordered to pay Hacienda Luisita. and theMotion for Reconsideration/Clarification dated December 9. The Court. the distribution of homelots is required under RA 6657 only for corporations or business associations owning or operating farms which opted for land distribution. WHEREFORE. the just compensation for the 240-square meter homelots distributed to the FWBs. since the SDP was already revoked with finality. Inc. However. 2011 Resolution and further modified by this Resolution is declared FINAL and EXECUTORY. Nonetheless. by a unanimous vote. . and Windsor Andaya are hereby DENIED with this qualification: the July 5. then it is apparent that said corporations are not obliged to provide for homelots.P a g e | 26 In the present recourse. resolved to maintain its ruling that the FWBs shall retain ownership of the homelots given to them with no obligation to pay for the value of said lots. Inc. 2011 filed by petitioner Hacienda Luisita. We declared that the homelots already received by the FWBs shall be respected with no obligation to refund or to return them.915. HLI was able to distribute homelots to some if not all of the FWBs. HLI also harps on the fact that since the homelots given to the FWBs do not form part of the 4. Thus. 2011 Decision. We disagree. each. m. then the value of these homelots should. the Motion to Clarify and Reconsider Resolution of November 22.‖ J ust compensation should be paid to HLI instead of Tadeco in view of the Deed of Assignment and Conveyance dated March 22. with the revocation of the SDP. 1994. primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. DARAB. 132767 (January 18.P a g e | 27 Philippine Veterans Bank vs. this Rule is an acknowledgement by the DARAB that the power to decide just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R. Sec.R. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. because of Rule XIII.A. It only means that." As we held in Republic vs. The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglamentary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB. The Decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.A. No. The Secretary of DAR. as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative .A. Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure provides: "Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. No. The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and exclusive" because the question is first passed upon by the DAR. 11. but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts. Branch 2. in accordance with settled principles of administrative law. Rule XIII. Dissatisfied with the valuation of the Land Bank of the Philippines and the DARAB. No. Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals. this Petition for Review. Davao which were taken by the Department of Agrarian Reform for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R. Davao on January 26. petitioner filed a petition for determination of the just compensation for its property with the Regional Trial Court. No. particularly Section 50 thereof. Davao City and Land Bank of the Philippines G. 6657. — The decision of the adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. To implement the provisions of R. 6657). Hence. 2000) FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum. ISSUE: Whether or not the Special Agrarian Courts are considered appellate courts in the determination of just compensation HELD: No. 6657 is vested in the Courts. It is error to think that. Tagum. For that matter. RESORT TO THE COURTS CANNOT BE FORECLOSED ON THE THEORY THAT THE COURTS ARE THE GUARANTORS OF THE LEGALITY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION. the trial court correctly dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the order of dismissal. Nevertheless. Accordingly. as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Rule XIII. . resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action.P a g e | 28 determination. JURISDICTION: THE ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO DECIDE JUST COMPENSATION CASES REMAINS WITH THE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT WHILE ONLY THE PRELIMINARY DETERMINATION THEREOF IS VESTED WITH THE DARAB. 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB. the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and unappealable. On appeal. No. both the trial court and the appellate court overlooked and disregarded the overwhelming evidence in favor of Rupa and instead relied mainly on the statements made in the decision in another case. without any prior written notice.00 in January 1981. and that he sought assistance with the local office of Agrarian Reform for the redemption of the questioned property and even deposited the amount of P5. that there is no clear and convincing evidence to show that plaintiff was a share tenant of the spouses Lim and that Rupa is bound by his admission in Criminal Case No. 532-U. Mariano Luzong filed six months after the instant case wherein he admitted that he was the overseer and administrator of the five parcels of land owned by the Lim spouses. However. entitled People of the Philippines. sharing the harvests on a 50%-50% basis. 2000) FACTS: The case at bar involves an action for redemption with damages filed by Gerardo Rupa Sr. not entitled to a right of redemption over the same. vs. with the latter's consent. sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system. 1981." A careful examination of the record reveals that.00 with the trial court. 80129 (January 25. indeed. against Magin Salipot. HELD: In the case at bar. A tenant is defined under Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a lawful tenant of the land or a mere overseer thereof. negating his claim of tenancy. Thus. The CA therefore affirmed on appeal the decision of the lower court. for purposes of production.000. Petitioner averred that he only learned of the sale on February 16.P a g e | 29 Gerardo Rupa Sr. that he is the overseer over four parcels of coconut land owned by the Lim spouses. this petition seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. vs. However. in substance. the land tenanted by the petitioner was sold to Magin Salipot for P5. the Court of Appeals finds.R. we find that there are compelling reasons for this Court to apply the exception of nonconclusiveness of the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts on the ground that the "findings of fact of both courts is premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is in actuality contradicted by evidence on record. or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in . Also. 1199 as a person who himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another. Rupa claimed that he had been a tenant of a parcel of coconut land formerly owned by Vicente Lim and Patrocinia Yu Lim for more than twenty (20) years now. The Honorable Court of Appeals and Magin Salipot G. Hence. the Regional Trial Court of Masbate rendered a decision dismissing the complaint on the ground that Rupa was not a tenant of the subject property and thus.000. in a criminal case for malicious mischief which Rupa filed against one Mariano Luzong. as amended. Rupa could avail of the benefits afforded by R. 2. the latter shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided. we must look at the context in which these statements were made. The parties are the landowner and the tenant. on the ground that the latter destroyed the banana and cassava plants growing in Rupa's farm. There is consent. 4. for this relationship to exist. That the entire landholding sold must be redeemed: Provided.P a g e | 30 money or both under the leasehold tenancy system. Upon proof of the existence of the tenancy relationship. The statements made in the decision that "[Rupa] claimed that he was made administrator by the Lim spouses of their five (5) parcels of land in Armenia. 3. namely. The admission made by Rupa as stated in the decision was made. Said statement was apparently made to prove . First of all. particularly.A. Lessee's right of redemption. Section 12 thereof which reads: "SECTION 12. Masbate" and that the "prosecution witnesses in that case. b) the land must have been sold by the owner to a third party without prior written notice of the sale given to the lessee or lessees and the DAR in accordance with Section 11. Briefly stated. — In case the landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised within two years from the registration of the sale. each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area actually cultivated by him. Uson. 6. That where there are two or more agricultural lessees. as mentioned earlier. 3844. son-in-law of Salipot. as amended. The subject is agricultural land. The purpose is agricultural production. this right of redemption is validly exercised upon compliance with the following requirements: a) the redemptioner must be an agricultural lessee or share tenant." As correctly pointed out by the CA. RA 3844. it is necessary that: 1. and e) there must be an actual tender or valid consignation of the entire amount which is the reasonable price of the land sought to be redeemed. c) only the area cultivated by the agricultural lessee may be redeemed. Pablito Arnilla and Antonieta Rongasan admitted that they were hired laborers of Rupa in tilling the land in question" should not have been relied upon by the CA to conclusively disprove the tenancy relationship. and There is sharing of harvests. further. There is personal cultivation. and shall have priority over any other right of legal redemption. 5. No. d) the right of redemption must be exercised within 180 days from notice. However. Certainly. the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that they were "hired laborers" should not have been given significant weight by the CA. 1979. a farmer of limited education must have used the word "administrator" in a loose sense to mean one taking care of a certain piece of property by clearing and planting on the same. we find that this does not necessarily rule out Rupa's claim that he was a tenant-farmer since 1962. had not been convincingly rebutted and we have no reason to doubt the veracity of the testimonies of his witnesses. harvest seasons come far and in between. he was tenant of one parcel of land belonging to the Lim spouses and administrator or overseer of the other four parcels of land owned by the said spouses. As aptly pointed out by counsel for Rupa during the trial. As regards the certificate issued by the Office of the Treasurer to the effect that Rupa was a copra buyer from May 19. According to Rupa. the dates indicated therein cover only a short period of time as against Rupa's claim that he was tenant from 1963 until his ejectment sometime in 1981. in our view. The rule is well-settled that the rights of a person cannot be prejudiced by the declaration. We are therefore constrained to overturn the appealed judgment insofar as it ruled that the records do not establish Rupa's status as an agricultural tenant. with no objection from the counsel of Salipot. the testimony of Rupa and his witnesses in open court. except as provided by the Rules of Court in cases of admission by a co-partner. In coconut lands. the term administrator is used interchangeably with tenancy. This may well lead a person to find an incompatibility between the two. supervising the laborers therein and receiving a fixed salary for one's services. one could in fact be overseer of a parcel of land. in claiming that he was administrator of the property. he may have been receiving a fixed salary. Second. As tenant under our legal definition. conspirator and privies. Rupa. "under common usage in the locality. A meticulous review of the record would have found overwhelming evidence in favor of Rupa. the passing statements contained in the decision in the criminal case for malicious mischief cannot overcome the evidentiary value of the testimonies of said witnesses. ." Moreover. Indeed. act or omission of another. he may have been sharing the harvests with the landowner. and at the same time. the CA did not bother to explain its finding on the "inherent incompatibility" between being a tenantfarmer and an administrator or overseer. A scrutiny of the entire evidence on hand would be in line with the State's policy of achieving a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices.P a g e | 31 Rupa's standing to file the complaint and to prove how he could have witnessed the destruction made by said person. As overseer. and the tenant can always engage in the business of copra-buying in the interim. agent. Rupa has satisfactorily explained that "pursuing two or three lines of work is nothing new. Fourth. act as tenant farmer in another landholding. Third. The said witnesses do not come under any of these exceptions. 1978 to October 10. Salipot and his witnesses had interchangeably claimed Rupa to be an overseer and a copra agent or copra buyer. Case No." . Respondent was one of the squatters living in one of the complainant's parcels of land situated in Antipolo. Because of the conflicting causes of action. Rizal. claiming to be owners and not mere tenants of the land. Nace Adm. allege to be a lawful tenant one moment. They traced their alleged ownership to an old Spanish title. Allegedly. the findings of the former are as follows: ". Respondent herein. It has long been settled that Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership. thus deceiving the court and giving it an inaccurate appreciation of facts. It escapes this Commission [on Bar Discipline] how Respondent can. . in good faith. 3808 (February 2. it is their total inconsistency. Magdaluyo vs. total opposition with each other which raises doubts about the respondent's sincerity. respondent was delinquent in his duty as a lawyer to maintain only such suits as appears to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable. as a lawyer. This time. Complainant filed a case against respondent accusing him of having deliberately committed a falsehood and of forum-shopping praying that proper disciplinary sanctions be imposed against the latter. Enrique L. nay. HELD: After referral of the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). . was remiss in his duty to correctly inform the court of the law and the facts of this case. Yet respondent dares raise the same in his complaint to defeat Complainant's duly registered certificate of title. ISSUE: WON respondent acts amount to deceit and gross misconduct. He failed to allege in his complaint the fact that a prior dispute had existed between the parties before the PARAB. the latter refused and instead filed a complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAB) claiming to be tenants therein. and be an owner the next. Atty. both cases were dismissed. Any lawyer should know that a Spanish title would have no legal leg to stand on in the face of Transfer Certificate of Title over the same parcel of land. while it may be true that different causes of action are indeed involved. 2000) FACTS: Complainant accused respondent of acts amounting to deceit and gross misconduct. Three months later.P a g e | 32 Raymundo T. Lastly. when complainant offered to relocate the squatters. the squatters again including respondent also filed a case before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo for the annulment or cancellation of complainant's land titles. . Clearly. in all probability. immoral or deceitful conduct. less than sincere in asserting two conflicting rights over a portion of land that. He was indeed. disbarment or other disciplinary action. The lawyer‘s oath is a source of obligations and violation thereof is a ground for suspension. respondent violated the prohibition in the Code of Professional Responsibility against engaging in unlawful.P a g e | 33 The Court concurs with the IBP's findings and recommendations being fully supported by evidence on record. he knew not to be his. respondent is bound by his oath not to do falsehood or consent to its commission and to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. Said acts are clearly in violation of his lawyer's oath that the court will not tolerate. dishonest. As a lawyer. Benjamin T. this Appeal. Bulacan being cultivated by the herein respondents. which is subject to qualification by the legislature. • Undaunted. Meycauayan. Hence.1865 hectare riceland. Represented by Adriano D. No. DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B.P a g e | 34 Eudosia Daez and/or Her heirs. Emancipation Patents (EPs) were issued to the respondents. which would be a pointless process. Being distinct remedies. • The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right. No. • The Secretary of DAR. There was. 6657. Court of Appeals. Leong. DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Lawa. the petitioner's total properties having exceeded the 7-hectare limit provided by law. finality of judgment in one does not preclude the subsequent institution of the other. Rogelio Macatulad and Manuel Umali G. Daez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland under R. 2000) FACTS: • Eudosia Daez applied for exemption of her 4. Apolonia Mediana.A. . sparing the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the landowner afterwards. even after her appeal for exemption of the same land was denied in a decision that became final and executory. Macario Sorientes. thus. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can still file a petition for retention of the subject landholdings. Bernardo allowed her to retain the subject riceland but denied the application of her children to retain three (3) hectares each for failure to prove actual tillage or direct management thereof. thus. A retained area as its name denotes.1685 hectare riceland in Brgy. 133507 (February 17. This order was set aside by the DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao but reinstated on appeal by the Office of the President. In the meantime. the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court all affirmed the said Order and disregarded an Affidavit executed by the respondents stating that they are not the tenants of the land. despite the fact that a previous decision denying the petition for exemption had long become final and executory HELD: • It is incorrect to posit that an application for exemption and an application for retention are one and the same thing. Their findings was that the Affidavit was merely issued under duress. Medina denied the application for exemption upon finding that the subject land is covered under LOI 474. Garilao. is land which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion. The Court of Appeals again reversed this Decision and ordered the reinstatement of the previous Decision of DAR Secretary Ernesto D.R. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant by implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner. Daez vs. no procedural impediment to the application filed by Eudosia Daez for the retention of the subject 4. Series of 1994. 2.P a g e | 35 • The issuance of EPs and CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the landowner from retaining the area covered thereby. FINALITY OF JUDGMENT IN ONE DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE SUBSEQUENT INSTITUTION OF THE OTHER . an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found to be part of the landowner's retained area. RETENTION/EXEMPTION. AN APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION AND AN APPLICATION FOR RETENTION ARE DISTINCT REMEDIES IN LAW. Under Administrative Order No. for the maintenance of status quo and for the recognition of his right as tenant of the land. he entered into an oral tenancy agreement with Gregorio Araneta II whom he has known and believed as the owner of the land. Plaintiff prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the defendant from the continued employment of threats and harassments against his person. . On appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a lawful tenant of the subject landholding HELD: • The Appeal lacks merit. likewise relies on the certification (ARPT and MARO) that he is a tenant on the landholding. 2000) FACTS: • In essence. this Appeal. However. Patricia Araneta G. • Petitioner contends that in 1978. successor of Gregorio Araneta II and warned plaintiff to vacate and to stop cultivating the subject landholding. de Cuesta Auxilum Christianorum Foundation Incorporated and leased to defendant for the development of a bio-dynamic farm and ultimately for the establishment of a training center for bio-dynamic agriculture in the Philippines and humid tropics in Asia. the plaintiff changed his mind and refused to leave. Hence. • The PARAD ruled in favor of the plaintiff (petitioner) and declared him as a bonafide tenant. the DARAB affirmed the said Decision. Efforts at conciliation did not push through and instead a Complaint for Peaceful Possession with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed by the plaintiff. No. The former invited the latter to join the project but he declined and agreed to leave the premises.R. Petitioner. • Defendant to summarize. were sent by herein defendant Patricia Araneta. denied all the allegations of the plaintiff and stated that the property belonged to Consuelo A. In April 1991. During an ocular inspection. However. The land also does not fall under CARL because it has more than 18% slope. allegedly. a group of armed security guards. for the issuance of a permanent preliminary injunction during the pendency of the case. 135829 (February 22. the plaintiff averred that he had been the lawful tenant of a three (3) hectare parcel of land owned by Gregorio Araneta II since 1978. defendant learned of the presence of the plaintiff. And that he regularly delivered to Gregorio forty (40) cavans from the harvest through Lino Tocio. the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the DARAB.P a g e | 36 Bayani Bautista vs. we cannot sustain petitioner's argument that he is a tenant by virtue of the factual finding of the DARAB. . . Act No." • In sum." • Lastly. LESSEE. In the 1961 case of Lastimoza vs. DARAB mainly relied on the certifications issued in favor of petitioner in holding that he is a tenant in the disputed landholding. USUFRUCTUARY OR LEGAL POSSESSOR OF THE LAND . TENANCY RELATIONSHIP CAN ONLY BE CREATED WITH THE CONSENT OF THE TRUE AND LAWFUL LANDHOLDER WHO IS EITHER THE OWNER. 5 [b]. lessee. In Oarde vs. Blanco. As the Court of Appeals aptly observed. Rep. we ruled that "tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful landholder who is either the 'owner. usufructuary or legal possessor of the land' (sec. To rule otherwise. As discussed above. respondent and the landowner are not bound by the alleged agricultural leasehold agreement between petitioner and Gregorio. we held that certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant are merely provisional and not conclusive on the courts. Court of Appeals. would be to pave the way for fraudulent collusions among the unscrupulous to the prejudice of the true and lawful landholder.P a g e | 37 • "His reliance on the certifications issued in his favor is misplaced because they do not prove that the landowner made him his tenant. This Court is not necessarily bound by these findings specially if they are mere conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence. they only show that petitioner is in possession of the land. 1199). . The certifications do not disclose how and why he became a tenant. and not thru the acts of the supposed landholder who has no right to the land subject of the tenancy. Meanwhile. On April 1. 369-BUL '92 praying that petitioner be enjoined from preventing private respondent from gathering the mango fruits lest they "over-mature and become useless". The Provincial Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Bulacan on October 24. Private respondent Exequiel Garcia failed to exercise his right of redemption within the reglementary period. Cruz of the DARAB issued an Order allowing the gathering of the mango fruits and directing that the proceeds thereof be deposited with the Adjudication Board. the Deputy Sheriff of Bulacan and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Then on April 27. 109992. 1992.650. as the sole bidder for P34. Court of Appeals.P a g e | 38 Heirs of the Late Herman Rey Santos vs. Bulacan which was levied on execution by the Municipal Trial Court of Plaridel. 1992. 1989 and subsequently sold at public auction on September 20. private respondent filed a Petition for Consignation before the RTC of Bulacan. On May 7. 2000 FACTS: The case involves a parcel of land in Parulan.532. The Motion was granted and intervenor was allowed to withdraw P87.00 out of the P174. 1992 private respondent filed a complaint for Annulment/Cancellation of Sale and Document. a motion to withdraw intervenor's deposited share. No. a Motion to intervene with the DARAB claiming that "he is affected in his rights and interests as the party who tended and had the mango trees bear fruits this season". respondent filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages with an application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) docketed as DARAB Case No. in an apparent attempt to redeem his land.R. 1992.50. 1992. de Santos. March 7. intervenor this time filed with the DARAB. On July 8. The DARAB suspended the hearing on Pantaleon Antonio's motion for intervention pending the resolution of the ownership issue.00 harvests proceeds with intervenor Antonio being recognized as the duly constituted . one Pantaleon Antonio filed on May 18. The petition was dismissed.300. Plaridel. Redemption with Damages and Preliminary Writ of Injunction against Herman Rey Santos. et al. G. 1990 with Herman Rey Santos now substituted by his heirs and represented by his widow Arsenia Garcia vda. 228 and 129-A. Hence. including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating. Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. both are contending parties for the ownership of the subject property. both original and appellate. the instant petition for review on Certiorari. 229. Executive Order Nos. whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary. fixing. this Court held: .. tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries. The Court of Appeals affirmed these orders of the DARAB. Primary. changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. No. and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. ISSUE: WON the PARAD/DARAB has jurisdiction to rule on ancillary matters even when the question of ownership is pending resolution with the Regional Trial Courts HELD: Rule II. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers. Clearly. or lessor and lessee. Republic Act No. stewardship or otherwise. maintaining. 6657. (Emphasis supplied) "Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. In the case of Morta v.P a g e | 39 tenant of the land. over lands devoted to agriculture. In fact. to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes. P. 6389. — The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. provides: SECTION 1. as: (d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements. et al. whether leasehold. tenancy. landowner and tenant. 6657 (CARP Law).D. Occidental. cases. controversies. and other non-agricultural uses. leasehold. This issue. Consequently. the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondent's petition for injunction in the first place. b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems.P a g e | 40 For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case. and c) approval and disapproval of the conversion. Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial. commercial. 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship. The issue of who can harvest the mangoes and when they can be harvested is an incident ancillary to the main petition for injunction. after all. 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production. it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements. it is dependent on the main case. Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 885). . or any agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of agrarian reform laws. 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land. can be resolved by the trial court. 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee. we held that the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform is limited to the following: a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform. the motion for intervention loses the leg on which it can stand. industrial. and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. In Vda. to wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. which has the jurisdiction to order the gathering of the mango fruits and depositing the proceeds with it. Inasmuch as the DARAB has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the controversy between the parties. de Tangub v. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute. considering that an action has already been filed before it on the specific issue of ownership. there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. necessarily. As such. restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential. Spouses Geronimo Grospe and Hilaria Grospe G. Respondents in their answer. Hence. ISSUE: WON the signatures of petitioners on the waiver are null and void for being contrary to agrarian laws . had passed Resolution Nos. Petitioner mortgaged the subject land to pay for his wife's hospitalization on January 20. this petition. Petitioner denied waiving his rights and claimed that his and his children's signatures appearing on the waiver were forgeries.500. he again mortgaged the property to respondent Hilaria Grospe [wife of Geronimo Grospe] for a period of four years (from December 5.00.R. 1982 in favor of Virginia de Leon. The parties even executed a "Kasunduan sa Pagpapahiram ng Lupang Sakahan" which allowed the respondents to use and/or cultivate the land during the duration of the mortgage. Upon the expiration of the contract. 1986 to December 5. No. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Sto. Petitioner instituted an action for recovery of possession with the DARAB against the respondents averring that the latter entered the disputed land by force and intimidation and destroyed the palay planted on the land. Nueva Ecija which in turn. However. instead of paying his loan. 1990) to guarantee a loan of P32. Likewise. 2000 FACTS: Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of the DAR. Domingo. petitioner's appeal and subsequent reconsideration thereof were denied by the Court of Appeals. 135297. 16 and 27 recommending the reallocation of the said lots to the respondent spouses who were the "most qualified farmer(s)beneficiaries". claimed that the petitioner himself allowed them to take over the possession and cultivation of the property until the latter has paid his loan. petitioner had allegedly executed a "Waiver of Rights" over the landholding. The PARAD ruled that petitioner abandoned and surrendered the landholding to the Samahang Nayon ng Malaya.P a g e | 41 Gavino Corpuz vs. June 8. The DARAB affirmed the Provincial Adjudicator's decision. negating the government's program of freeing the tenant from the bondage of the soil. of his rights under the agrarian laws. PD 27 provides that title to land acquired pursuant to the land reform program shall not be transferable except through hereditary succession or to the government. voluntary surrender of the landholding in favor of the Samahang Nayon constitutes the valid ground for the abandonment of rights under PD 27. .A. the nullity of the Waiver does not save the case for him because there is a clear showing that he voluntarily surrendered his landholding to the Samahang Nayon which. and (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect.P a g e | 42 HELD: The waiver of rights is null and void for being contrary to our Agrarian Reform Laws. However. absolute or irrevocable intent to abandon." . Abandonment requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or property. This ruling is intended to prevent a reversion to the old feudal system in which the landowners reacquired vast tracts of land. (2) [v]oluntary surrender of the landholding by the agricultural lessee . under the present circumstances. the private respondents were obligated to return possession of the landholding to the petitioner. No. The Waiver was void. may qualify as a surrender or transfer. . . Furthermore. The intention to abandon implies a departure. shall be extinguished by: . Section 8 of R. Thus. . 3844 also provides that "[t]he agricultural leasehold relation . We have already ruled that the sale or transfer of rights over a property covered by a Certificate of Land Transfer is void except when the alienation is made in favor of the government or through hereditary succession. However. . resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned. the mortgage expired after four years. with the avowed intent of never returning. we see on the part of the petitioner no clear. His surrender of possession did not amount to abandonment because there was an obligation on the part of private respondents to return possession upon full payment of the loan. At bottom. to the government. in accordance with the provisions of existing laws and regulations. thus. . . not transferred to another private person.P a g e | 43 To repeat. Besides. Under Memorandum Circular No. which awarded the landholding to the private respondents who were declared as qualified beneficiaries under the agrarian laws. 8-80 of the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform. through the DAR. upon notice from the agrarian reform team leader. these cooperatives are established to provide a strong social and economic organization to ensure that the tenant-farmers will enjoy on a lasting basis the benefits of agrarian reform. Petitioner's voluntary surrender to the Samahang Nayon qualifies as a surrender or transfer to the government because such action forms part of the mechanism for the disposition and the reallocation of farmholdings of tenant-farmers who refuse to become beneficiaries of PD 27. It was the government. the Samahan shall. recommend other tenant-farmers who shall be substituted to all rights and obligations of the abandoning or surrendering tenant-farmer. does not require court approval as long as it is convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence. the land was surrendered to the government. . Voluntary surrender. as a mode of extinguishment of tenancy relations. 1996. Considering the foregoing. 2000 FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for ejectment against the private respondent with the Municipal Trial Court of Guiguinto. should not have disregarded defendant's Answer and should have heard and received the evidence for the purpose of determining whether or not it had jurisdiction over the case. Private respondent appealed the case to the Regional Trial Court and submitted documents to support his claim that he is a tenant of the petitioner's lot. Corpin vs. June 19. this Petition.R. Amor S. Subsequently. dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 1996. Vivar and the Honorable Court of Appeals G. it is clear that there is a need to conduct a hearing whereby both parties may present evidence which may shed light on the issue of the municipal trial court's jurisdiction over the case. Hence. and (4) Sinumpaang Salaysay of private respondent dated April 22. No. (2) Affidavit of Dr. Natino which the appellate court cited. Mendoza dated April 22. For failure to timely file his Answer with Motion to Dismiss the court deemed the case submitted for judgment and rendered a decision ordering private respondent to vacate the land in dispute. What were presented to the municipal trial court were limited to the following: (1) Pagtitibay dated February 21. petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the said Decision with the Court of Appeals.P a g e | 44 Jaime P. 1996. 137350. 1996 signed by Angel Torres. The Regional Trial Court in turn. (3) Sinumpaang Salaysay of Ambrosio T. which dismissed defendant's Answer for having been filed out of time and decided the case based on the allegations in the complaint. . Teodoro Placido dated April 22. ISSUE: WON the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties HELD: In the case of Bayog vs. Bulacan. The latter upheld the Regional Trial Court's finding and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Chairman of the BARC of Tabang. we held that the metropolitan circuit trial court. The records of the case must be remanded to the Municipal Trial Court and hear the issue of jurisdiction. must be set aside. .P a g e | 45 Consequently. which was based on the documents attached by private respondent to his memoranda in the Regional Trial Court only on appeal and were not previously presented to the municipal trial court in the original case. the Regional Trial Court's finding that there exists a landlord-tenant relationship between petitioner and respondent. Marcos issued Proclamation No. Secretary Benjamin T. commercial. Fifteen (15) occupants assisted by the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) claiming to be tenants of a fortyfour (44) hectare portion filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Order. Leong who succeeded Secretary Santiago ruled on the validity of the questioned Order and denied the Motion for Reconsideration holding that pursuant to Proclamation No. this Petition. filed their objections to these Santiago notices. former President Ferdinand B. 1520 on November 27. Petitioner KSMP filed a complaint-in-intervention on the aforementioned case. industrial and urban uses. the private respondents filed a Petition with the DARAB for the purpose of implementing the Conversion Orders which in effect suggested the manner of invalidating the Santiago Notices as it was contrary to the Leong Order. Ternate and Nasugbu are declared as tourist zones. Private respondents. In essence. Subsequently. Gonzalo Puyat and Sons. the Order stated that the subject land is not economically suited for agricultural cultivation and that if there are any tenant-tillers. commercial. (KSMP) vs. G. 2000 FACTS: The case stemmed from the Order by then DAR Secretary Conrado Estrella granting the request for conversion of 1. Hence. This was dismissed by the DAR. ISSUE: WON the petitioners are the proper parties in interest in the subject controversy HELD: Petitioner's insistence that there was no final disposition yet of the conversion case. as in fact. Batangas into residential.R. Cavite and Nasugbu. DARAB Case No. DARAB. A perusal of the records reveal that .P a g e | 46 Kooperatiba ng Sandigan ng Magsasakang Pilipino. 0335 was initiated by the private respondents is untenable. Apparently unaware of the conversion orders and presidential proclamation. disturbance compensation should be paid to them in accordance with law. June 26. 139051. 1975 declaring the Municipalities of Maragondon and Ternate. KSMP filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion on the DARAB. Batangas as tourist zones more suitable for residential. Meanwhile. et al. Maragondon. Inc.837. then DAR Secretary Miriam Defensor-Santiago issued Notices of Acquisition. No. The CA dismissed the same. Thereafter.30 hectares of agricultural land situated in Nasugbu. industrial and other urban purposes. But prior to such. 1520. petitioner. a juridical entity. 0335 was filed by the private respondents for the purpose of implementing the Conversion Orders particularly the fixing of the final disturbance compensation to the legitimate farmeroccupants. however. Furthermore. has no personality to file the instant petition to intervene in the case as the real parties-in-interest are the members thereof who were not even recognized as the rightful tenants occupying the subject land." The fact. . remains that the land in question has already been excluded from the purview of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) by the Estrella and Leong Orders which had long become final and executory.P a g e | 47 DARAB Case No. puts in issue petitioner's alleged tenancy relationship and security of tenure which the DARAB does not have any jurisdiction. however. The complaint-in-intervention. As observed by the DAR. "members of petitioner are merely holding on to an expectancy that they will become the beneficiaries assuming that the land is still CARPable. . Oriental Mindoro against the Bejasas for "Recovery of Possession with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Damages".00 in consideration of an "Aryenduhan" or "pakyaw na bunga" also for a term of one year. July 6. Oriental Mindoro. situated in Barangay Del Pilar. COSLAP dismissed the case. purchase and plant calamansi. Oriental Mindoro seeking the ejectment of the Bejasas. The Bejasas were unable to pay the full amount of the consideration. citrus and rambutan seeds and make the necessary harvests of fruits. more or less. 2000 FACTS: Isabel Candelaria is the owner of two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT No. The Honorable Court of Appeals. 108941. In 1983. Candelaria and the Dinglasan again entered into a three-year lease agreement over the land. the Bejasas have security of tenure. Jaime filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the Bejasas reasoning that a tenancy relationship was created between the parties and that as bona-fide tenant-tillers.P a g e | 48 Reynaldo Bejasa and Erlinda Bejasa vs. 1987. Calapan.Jaime's wife. The case was however referred to the DAR who in turn certified that the case was not proper for trial before the civil courts.000. The special power of attorney in favor of Jaime Dinglasan was also renewed by Candelaria on the same date. Sometime on June 1987. Sometime in 1973. T-58191 and TCT No. for a period of one year. Naiyan. Candelaria constituted respondent Jaime Dinglasan as her attorney-in-fact having powers of administration over the disputed property. After the aryenduhan expired. the Bejasas agreed to pay rent to Victoria of P15. et al. Candelaria gave Malabanan a six-year usufruct over the land. G. Jaime filed a complaint before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP).R. despite Victoria's demand to vacate the land. No. clean and cultivate the land. modifying their first agreement. the Bejasas continued to stay on the land and did not give any consideration for its use. On September 21. Meanwhile. Candelaria entered into a three-year lease agreement on the land with Pio Malabanan. Malabanan hired the Bejasas to plant on the land and clear it. The trial court dismissed the complaint including the Bejasas' counterclaim for leasehold and damages. Malabanan was under no obligation to share the harvests with Candelaria. The Bejasas then filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for "confirmation of leasehold and homelot with recovery of damages" against Isabel Candelaria and Jaime Dinglasan. T59172 measuring 16 hectares and 6 hectares. Calapan. Malabanan died. 1984. 1984. Candelaria entered into a new lease contract over the land with Victoria Dinglasan. On October 26. The contract stipulated that Malabanan will clear. On April 7. True enough Candelaria disavowed any knowledge that the Bejasas during Malabanan's lease possessed the land. the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reversing the trial court's ruling. In Chico v. The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984. there is consent. ." Candelaria and the Bejasas. Hence. Malabanan (as Candelaria's usufructuary) allowed the Bejasas to stay on and cultivate the land. proof must be adduced. and there is sharing of harvests. the Bejasas claim that this defect was cured when Candelaria agreed to lease the land to the . 1993. no such relation existed. even if we assume that he had the authority to give consent to the creation of a tenancy relation. we faulted private respondents for failing to prove sharing of harvests since "no receipt. ISSUE: WON there is a tenancy relationship created in favor of the Bejasas HELD: The elements of a tenancy relationship are the following: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) the parties are the landowner and the tenant. they had no contact with Candelaria. Malabanan and the Bejasas. or any other evidence was presented. On February 9. still. True.P a g e | 49 Respondents appealed the aforementioned decision. . we find that there is no tenancy relationship between the parties. Candelaria as landowner never gave her consent. After examining the three relevant relationships in this case. However. the subject is agricultural land. There was no proof that they shared the harvests. Between them. there is personal cultivation. Court of Appeals." We added that "Self serving statements . They acknowledge that Candelaria could argue that she did not know of Malabanan's arrangement with them. are inadequate. there is no tenancy relationship. However. this Appeal. the purpose is agricultural production. P a g e | 50 Bejasas for P20,000.00 per annum, when Malabanan died in 1983. We do not agree. In a tenancy agreement, consideration should be in the form of harvest sharing. Even assuming that Candelaria agreed to lease it out to the Bejasas for P20,000 per year, such agreement did not create a tenancy relationship, but a mere civil law lease. Dinglasan and the Bejasas. Even assuming that the Dinglasans had the authority as civil law lessees of the land to bind it in a tenancy agreement, there is no proof that they did. Again, there was no agreement as to harvest sharing. The only agreement between them is the "aryenduhan", which states in no uncertain terms the monetary consideration to be paid, and the term of the contract. P a g e | 51 Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. G.R. No. 152640; June 15, 2006 FACTS: The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is seeking the nullification of the Decision and Resolution, dated November 23, 2001 and March 7, 2002, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57435, entitled "Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) v. DAR." The controversy involves a parcel of land owned by respondent PHILCOMSAT situated within the area which had been declared a security zone under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848, entitled "Declaring the Area within a Radius of Three Kilometers surrounding the Satellite Earth Station in Baras, Rizal, a Security Zone," which is subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the government. Pursuant to the decree, the Ministry of National Defense promulgated the Revised Rules and Regulations to Implement P.D. No. 1845 dated 30 April 1982, as amended, Declaring the Philippine Earth Station (PES) Security Zone. In view of this, the metes and bounds of PHILCOMSAT's satellite earth station in Baras, Rizal, were delineated. In 1992, a Notice of Coverage was sent to PHILCOMSAT by petitioner DAR informing the former that the land in question shall be placed under CARP's compulsory acquisition scheme. On January 28, 1994, PHILCOMSAT wrote to DAR seeking an exemption of the subject property from CARP coverage, insisting that the land will be utilized for the expansion of its operations. Respondent's application for exemption from CARP coverage was evaluated by DAR. During the pendency of the application, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, in a letter dated March 21, 1994, suggested that respondent enter into a usufructuary agreement with the occupants of the subject property until such time that it will have to use the property for its planned expansion. The occupants, however, refused to enter into such an agreement. Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tanay, Rizal, in its Resolution No. 65-94 that was endorsed to DAR, moved for the coverage of the 700-hectare PHILCOMSAT property within the security zone under CARP. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer of Teresa, Rizal further opined that subjecting the surrounding agricultural area within the security zone under CARP will not be detrimental to the operations of PHILCOMSAT. An Order was issued by then Secretary Garilao rejecting PHILCOMSAT's application for exemption from CARP. Having been denied, PHILCOMSAT filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals to which the appellate court granted. Consequently, DAR moved for reconsideration but the same was denied hence this petition. ISSUE: P a g e | 52 WON the subject property of PHILCOMSAT which had been declared a security zone under P.D. No. 1845m as amended by P.D. No. 1848, can be subjected to CARP HELD: P.D. No. 1845, as amended by P.D. No. 1848, was issued way before the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. The same was issued in 1982 pursuant to an exigency to create a security zone in the surrounding areas of PHILCOMSAT's satellite earth station in order to ensure its security and uninterrupted operation considering the vital role of the earth station in the country's telecommunications and national development. P.D. No. 1848, amending P.D. No. 1845, subjected the security zone to the authority of the Ministry of National Defense, consequently conferring on the Minister of National Defense the power and authority to determine who can occupy the areas within the security zone, and how the lands shall be utilized. The area, however, should be exempt from CARP coverage by virtue of P.D. No. 1845, as amended, which, as stated earlier, declared the area to be a security zone under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defense. It is evident from the very wording of the law that the government recognized the crucial role of PHILCOMSAT's operations to national security, thereby necessitating the protection of its operations from unnecessary and even anticipated disruption. Thus, every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Section 10 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law or R.A. No. 6657, as amended, provides that lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense shall be exempt from the coverage of the Act. The determination as to whether or not the subject property is actually, directly, and exclusively used for national defense usually entails a finding of fact which this Court will not normally delve into considering that, subject to certain exceptions, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the Court is called upon to review only errors of law. Suffice it to state, however, that as a matter of principle, it cannot seriously be denied that the act of securing a vital communication facility is an act of national defense. Hence, the law, by segregating an area for purposes of a security zone for such facilities, in effect devoted that area to national defense. Exemption from CARP coverage of a landholding declared as a security zone. there being no tenancy or leasehold relationship between the parties. Manuel K. vs. exclusive. 159089. In question are the rights and obligations of two juridical persons engaged in the management.R. Inc. who executed the contract were not authorized by it. 1993. Asta. The RTC then issued its decision on October 18. Respondent then filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has primary. 1999 dismissing the case. filed a complaint with the RTC for Declaration of Nullity. Damages. the fifth element of personal cultivation is clearly absent. respondent then filed a case at the DARAB for Breach of Contract. Petitioner subsequently filed an amended complaint with leave of court alleging that the persons. May 3. On August 21. Damages and Attorney‘s Fees. No. a certain Ramon Cajegas entered into a Joint Production Agreement for Islanders CarpFarmer Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative. and Injunction with Restraining Order. Mandamus. Inc. petitioner]. Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation G.P a g e | 53 Islanders CARP-Farmers Beneficiaries Multi-Purpose Cooperative. ISSUE: WON DARAB has jurisdiction over the controversy HELD: The subject matter of the present controversy falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. In the present case. The DARAB decided the case in favor of respondent declaring the Joint Production Agreement as valid and binding. with prayer for Preliminary Injunction against respondent. Finding the relationship between the parties to be agricultural leasehold. this case does not constitute an agrarian dispute that falls within the DARAB‘s jurisdiction. represented by its alleged chairman. Almost three years after. 1996. the Court of Appeals held that the issue fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the DARAB. . 2006 FACTS: On March 8. Petitioner contends that. Hence. Specific Performance. the appellate court ruled that the RTC had correctly dismissed the Complaint filed by petitioner. Petitioner is thus correct in claiming that the relationship between the parties is not one of tenancy or agricultural leasehold. with Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation. cultivation and use of agricultural land acquired through the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. and original jurisdiction. P a g e | 54 Nevertheless, we believe that the present controversy still falls within the sphere of agrarian disputes. An agrarian dispute "refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements — whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise — over lands devoted to agriculture. Such disputes include those concerning farm workers' associations or representations of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. Also included is any controversy relating to the terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farm workers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries. The assailed Joint Production Agreement is a type of joint economic enterprise. Joint economic enterprises are partnerships or arrangements entered into by Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) land beneficiaries and investors to implement agribusiness enterprises in agrarian reform areas. Jurisdiction over the present controversy lies with the DARAB. As the RTC had correctly dismissed the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, it was superfluous for the trial court and the Court of Appeals for that matter to have ruled further on the issue of the validity of the agreement. P a g e | 55 Land Bank of the Philippines, et. al. vs. Hon. Saludanes, et. al. G.R. No. 146581; December 13, 2005 FACTS: The instant case stemmed from twenty one (21) petitions for just compensation filed on April 6, 1999 by several landowners with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), herein petitioner and the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) were impleaded as respondents. The petitions involve several tracts of land forming part of a banana plantation operated by the AMS Group of Companies, one of herein respondents. Pursuant to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), the landowners offered to sell these parcels of land to the government. The LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. In a Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for having been filed thirty-two (32) days beyond the sixty (60) day period prescribed by the Rules of Court. Petitioner bank admits that its petition before the Court of Appeals was indeed filed thirty-two (32) days late. However, it pleads for an exemption from the operation of Section 4, Rule 65 by reasons of justice and equity. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: WON the petition of Land Bank has merit. HELD: No. The petition is denied outright. The Court has the power to suspend its Rules, however, it has not shown any compelling reason why we should do so. Moreover, records reveal that petitioner has paid respondents the amounts specified in the joint Decision of the Special Agrarian Court. This has rendered the case moot and academic. Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides: SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty day period shall be counted notice of the denial of said motion. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. P a g e | 56 Heirs of Julian Dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro, as represented by Maximino dela Cruz vs. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, as represented by Benedicto U. Cruz G.R. No. 162890; November 22, 2005 FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines acquired the De Leon Estate in Nueva Ecija for resale to deserving tenants and landless farmers. The property was under the administration of the Land Tenure Administration and later the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). In 1950, the DAR allocated a portion of the property in favor of Julian dela Cruz who was a tenant thereon. By virtue of an Agreement to Sell, the DAR issued Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) in his favor as the qualified allocatee of the landholding. Julian bound and obliged himself to pay the amortizations over the land in 30 annual installments. He cultivated the property and made payments to the government for a period of almost 20 years. He died in 1979 and was survived by his wife, Leonora Talaro-dela Cruz and their 10 children, including Mario and Maximino dela Cruz. Mario administered the landholding, until their mother executed a private document declaring that, with the consent of her children, she had sold the land in favor of Alberto Cruz. Alberto took possession of the landholding and cultivated it over a period of 10 years without any protest from Leonora and her children. He then filed an application to purchase the property with the DAR. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) recommended that the landholding be declared vacant and disposable to a qualified applicant and the approval of Alberto's application to purchase the property. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) issued an Order approving the recommendation of the MARO. He directed the cancellation of Julian's CLT and declared that his rights be forfeited in favor of the government under the agreement. The DAR Secretary signed and issued CLOA over the property in favor of Alberto Cruz, and the certificate was registered with the Land Registration Authority (LRA). Sometime in 1996, Maximino, one of the surviving children of Julian, discovered that the landholding had already been registered in the name of Alberto Cruz. On October 10, 1996, Leonora and her 10 children, with the assistance of the DAR Bureau of Legal Assistance, filed a petition with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for the nullification of the order of the PARO, CLOA and TCT issued in favor of Alberto Cruz. After due proceedings, the PARAD granted the petition in a Decision declaring the petitioners as the rightful allocatees of the property, and directed the MARO to cancel CLOA and issue another in favor of the petitioners. Alberto was ordered to vacate the property. The PARAD also directed the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel the said title and issue a new one over the landholding in favor of the petitioners. Alberto appealed the decision to the DARAB, which affirmed the ruling of the PARAD. CLOA-0-3035 and the cancellation thereof is not agrarian in nature. Indeed. any act or omission of the parties. they must relate to an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to whom CLOAs have been issued . the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that the dispute between the petitioners and the respondents over the validity of the November 16. There is no showing that before the execution of the deed of transfer/sale. including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency. including its decision. The proceedings before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction. for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such cases. However. HELD: The petition is denied for lack of merit. and TCT No. 51750. correction and cancellation of CLOAs which were "registered" with the LRA. under Section 2 (f). especially where the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or petition. such dispute must be addressed and resolved by the DARAB. The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from addressing the issue. Moreover. and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through. over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for. or that he was landless. or waived by. Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure. However. or agrarian relations whatsoever when petitioners Leonora and her son Mario executed the deed of sale in May 1980 in favor of Alberto. the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to dismiss.P a g e | 57 ISSUE: WON the DARAB has jurisdiction over matters involving the issuance. The Court agrees with the petitioners' contention that. hence. estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. are null and void. CLOA No. 1990 Order of the PARO. It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal. susceptible to direct and collateral attacks. the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance. Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy. The petitioners themselves categorically admitted in their pleadings that there was no landlord-tenancy relationship between them and Alberto over the landholding. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law. Alberto was a tenant or farmer. If the issues between the parties are intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. Nor did they have any tenurial. The sole tenantbeneficiary over the landholding was Julian dela Cruz. correction and cancellation of registered CLOAs. leasehold. nor when the petitioners filed their petition with the DARAB. rules and regulations to parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees are within the jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the DARAB. correction and cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in the administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws. In the present case. over whom the DAR Secretary has supervision and control. the DAR Secretary approved CLOA No. The approval was based on the Report of the MARO. the November 16. 51750 in the name of Alberto in the exercise of his administrative powers and in the implementation of the agrarian reform laws. .P a g e | 58 by the DAR Secretary. The DAR Secretary also had the authority to withdraw the CLOA upon a finding that the same is contrary to law and DAR orders. The cases involving the issuance. 1990 Order of the PARO and the recommendation of the DAR Director of the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution. circulars and memoranda. On December 21.: 1:1 animal-land ratio and a ratio of 1. 2003 and February 4. a new agrarian law. dated September 19. . null and void for being violative of the Constitution. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock. 1987. Ponce (OIC) vs. 1992. On December 27. series of 1993. 162070. respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. 2004.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL. Sutton-Soliman and Harry T. poultry and swine as of June 15.R. On June 10. respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law. in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. 9.O. pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government. Masbate. 9. 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL.) No.O.A. No. which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock. also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. Sutton G. In view of this. DAR issued A. The case involves a land in Aroroy. 1993. fixed the following retention limits. the Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land and declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform. series of 1993. Ella T. respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith. poultry and swine. took effect. respectively. Sutton. inspected respondents' land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. Masbate. October 19. 6657. Secretary of DAR. the A. viz. represented by Secretary Jose Mari B. 1990.) No. On April 27. Delia T. 2005 FACTS: This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. On December 4. 1988. Petitioner ignored such request. No.O. In determining the area of land to be excluded. which declared DAR Administrative Order (A. On October 26. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.P a g e | 59 Department of Agrarian Reform. the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy. Republic Act (R. 1993. sprayers. 9. feedmill with grinders. petitioner exempted 1. 9. respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as. However. and a maximum of 102. Series of 1993 as void." The raising of livestock.O. and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A. extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies. . pumphouses. ISSUE: WON DAR Administrative Order No. drainage. 9. exhausts and generators. s. not an agricultural.O. the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude. 1994. inter alia.209 hectares of respondents' land for grazing purposes. 1993. s. swine and poultry-raising. and other technological appurtenance. in view of the Luz Farms case which declared cattle-raising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform. 9. elevated water tanks. swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity. Respondents filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A. Respondents moved for reconsideration. No. anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds. Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. contending that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. Series of 1993 which prescribes a maximum retention for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional HELD: The impugned A. mixers. their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL. 1993. The OP affirmed the impugned order. then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. the CA ruled in favor of respondents and declared A. On September 14. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets. On appeal to CA. Said motion was denied.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents' landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition. swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. It is an industrial. waterers and blowers. No. The A.O. which provided for a ratio between land and livestock in determining the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL. 1995. under the Luz Farms doctrine. No. activity.O. such as: animal housing structures and facilities.P a g e | 60 On February 4. No. 09. all lands exclusively devoted to livestock.O.O. conveyors. deepwells. it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. . In the case at bar. Congress enacted R. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution. On the other hand. Specifically. Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A. To be valid.O.O. after the passage of the 1988 CARL. by making a new law. No.A. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution. Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform. the new law changed the definition of the terms "agricultural activity" and "commercial farming" by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock. In case of conflict between an administrative order and the provisions of the Constitution. Moreover. they must conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. 7881 which amended certain provisions of the CARL. poultry and swineraising. With this significant modification. The assailed A.P a g e | 61 Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. the latter prevails. Moreover.D. affirming as it did "the need to distribute and create an economic equilibrium among the inhabitants of this land.D.) No. 6657. 27 was a special law. a general law. which covered all rice and corn lands. ISSUE: WON provision in Section 4 of Act No. 2005 FACTS: Petitioner Hospicio de San Jose de Barili ("Hospicio") is a charitable organization created as a body corporate in 1925 by Act No. It sustained the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) position that Section 4 of Act No.R. as it applied only to particular individuals in the State. or by the latter's general repealing clause.D. No. 6657. specifically the tenants of rice and corn lands. the Court of Appeals affirmed the DAR Secretary's issuance. The Hospicio filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary. The law was enacted in order to formally accept the offer made by Pedro Cui and Benigna Cui to establish a home for the care and support. Cebu City vs. which could not have been repealed by P. 27. No. 27. No. It argued that Act No. both laws being explicit in mandating the distribution of agricultural lands to qualified beneficiaries. 27. but also by Republic Act No. 3239 was expressly repealed not only by P. The DAR Secretary rejected the motion for reconsideration in an Order held that P. 3239 is a special law.P a g e | 62 Hospicio De San Jose de Barili. was cited as legal basis for the order. Presidential Decree (P. 3239. 3239 prohibiting the sale of the properties donated to the charitable organization that was incorporated by the same law bars the implementation of agrarian reform laws as regards said properties . No.D." Unsatisfied with the Court of Appeals' Decision. No. the Court of Appeals and hereby. Act No. Department of Agrarian Reform G. The Court of Appeals further noted that the subject lands did not fall among the exemptions provided under Section 10 of Rep. provides no exemptions based on the manner of acquisition of the land by the landowner. a land reform law. petitioner filed Petition for Review. The Order of the DAR Secretary was assailed in a Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals which the latter. most especially those with less privilege in life. 27. of indigent invalids and incapacitated and helpless persons. citing the aforementioned Section 4 of Act No. 3239.D. our peasant farmer. The appellate court brought into play the aims of land reform. September 23. free of charge. otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. The Department of Agrarian Reform Regional Office (DARRO) Region VII issued an order ordaining that two parcels of land owned by the Hospicio be placed under Operation Land Transfer in favor of twenty-two (22) tillers thereof as beneficiaries. 140847. P. Regrettably. such as to satisfy a debt. No. etc.D." Thus. No. place under coverage are all public and private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced. 27 and the CARL. but the will of the law.D. Moreover. Nonetheless. we can hardly characterize the acquisition of the subject properties from the Hospicio for the benefit of the tenants as a sale. Agrarian reform is justified under the State's inherent power of eminent domain that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. The transfer arises from compulsion of law. We agree with the Court of Appeals that neither P. Ultimately. No. subject to the exempted lands listed in Section 10 thereof. preferring to rely instead on the conclusion that Section 4 was repealed by P. and not the desire of any parties. Nonetheless. under both laws. the DAR Secretary and the Court of Appeals failed to apply that sound principle. within the contemplation of Section 4 of Act No. even assuming for the nonce that Section 4 contemplates even forced sales such as those through expropriation. It has even been characterized as beyond the traditional exercise of eminent domain. but a revolutionary kind of expropriation. and in the mode prescribed by law. 3239. . which has been aptly described in common law jurisdictions as "sale made under the process of the court. 27. judgment.D.P a g e | 63 HELD: Under Section 4 of the CARL. we would agree with the DAR Secretary and the Court of Appeals that Section 4 is deemed repealed by P. the result arrived at in the assailed issuances should be affirmed. tax lien. as both laws are keyed into the same governmental objective.D. Even if the Hospicio had voluntarily offered to surrender its properties to agrarian reform. The twin process of expropriation of lands under agrarian reform and the payment of just compensation is akin to a forced sale. whether of a mortgage. 27 nor the CARL exempts the lands of the Hospicio or other charitable institutions from the coverage of agrarian reform. This characterization is warranted whether the expropriation is operative under the CARL or P." and "which is not the voluntary act of the owner. 27 and the CARL. No. since the obligation is created not out of the mandate of the parties. the resulting transaction would not be considered as a conventional sale. the landowner is entitled to just compensation for the properties taken. both the DAR Secretary and the appellate court failed to appreciate what to this Court is indeed the decisive legal dimension of the case. in order for the reclassification to become effective. subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion. 132477. The application was based on Municipal Ordinance No. al. No. Said ordinance was approved by the Provincial Board of Cebu on April 3. . agricultural lands. agricultural lands already reclassified before the effectivity of R. then such reclassification must be confirmed by the DAR pursuant to its authority under Section 65 of the CARL. 1995. for non-agricultural uses such as residential. Reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized. jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. 6657 are exempted from conversion. Cebu. owners/developers of several parcels of land located in Balamban. industrial. et. DAR. G.A. 6657. al.A. August 31.P a g e | 64 Jose Luis Ros. However. then no confirmation from DAR is necessary. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by DAR. have to go through the process of conversion. vs. et. that if the land sought to be reclassified is not covered by CARL and not distributed to ARBs. subject to the conditions set forth in Section 20 of the Local Government Code that if agricultural lands sought to be reclassified by the local government is one which has already been brought under the coverage of the CARL and/or which has been distributed to ARBs. Because of such disapproval. Petitioners filed with the RTC of Toledo City a complaint for Injunction with application of TRO and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 101 passed by the Mun. Cebu which reclassified such lands as industrial lands.R. 2005 FACTS: The case stems from a denial of the application for conversion before the Regional Office of DAR Region 7 disallowing the application for conversion filed by petitioners. Council of Balamban. No. ISSUE: WON the reclassification of the subject lands is beyond the jurisdiction of the DAR HELD: After the passage of R. as embodied in the land use plan. RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction ruling that it is DAR which has jurisdiction citing Section 20 of the Local Government Code. No. Petitioners claim that local grants have the power to reclassify portions of their agricultural lands. commercial. through reclassification. which reclassified the subject land. and the Provincial Ordinance No. long after R. 101 was passed on 03 April 1995. No. which adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 12 dated October 1994 which provides for the consolidated and revised rules and procedures governing conversion of agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses. 6657 has taken effect. DAR issued Administrative Order No.A.A. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has not been pierced by the passage of the Local Government Code. To further clarify any doubt on its authority. 6657 took effect on 15 June 1988 and Municipal Ordinance No. 95-8 of the Provincial Board of Cebu. The authority of DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No. No. The code explicitly provides that nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657. .P a g e | 65 R. 101. was passed on 25 March 1992. Court of Appeals. Eli G. In accordance with settled principles of administrative law. 27 (PD 27). The petition named as respondents the DAR and Land Bank. which were acquired by the government pursuant to Presidential Decree No. With leave of court. Natividad G. 228 (EO 228) are mere guidelines in the determination of just compensation. after all. Private respondents thus failed to exhaust administrative remedies when they filed a petition for the determination of just compensation directly with the trial court. essentially a judicial function. May 16. which includes the determination of questions of just compensation. Hon. . C. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is. private respondents should have sought the reconsideration of the DAR's valuation of their properties. 2005 FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition before the trial court for the determination of just compensation for their agricultural lands situated in Arayat. 127198. The first refers to administrative proceedings. but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. No. and in relying on private respondents' evidence of the valuation of the properties at the time of possession in 1993 and not on Land Bank's evidence of the value thereof as of the time of acquisition in 1972. primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program. According to Land Bank. ISSUE: WON the trial court has jurisdiction in determination of just compensation HELD: In Philippine Veterans Bank v. the petition was amended to implead as co-respondents the registered tenants of the land. while the second refers to judicial proceedings.R. and the original and exclusive jurisdiction of regional trial courts over all petitions for the determination of just compensation.P a g e | 66 Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Pampanga. Land Bank also insists that the trial court erred in declaring that PD 27 and Executive Order No. we declared that there is nothing contradictory between the DAR's primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. assessor's value and the volume and value of its produce. full and ample. It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR's failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of time. . In this case. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with RA 6657.P a g e | 67 Thus. and not PD 27 or EO 228. the trial did not err in taking cognizance of the case as the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice. the trial court arrived at the just compensation due private respondents for their property. location along the highway. and guided by. This Court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the amount of just compensation due private respondents in accordance with. RA 6657 and existing jurisprudence. taking into account its nature as irrigated land. market value. is especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. substantial. the equivalent being real. pursuant to R. MARO Noe Fortunado filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of the action.R. Noe Fortunado. HELD: The Petition has merit. ISSUE: WON DAR has jurisdiction over all controversies involving the implementation of Agrarian Reform program. 154112. In an order dated 16 February 2000. a matter over which the DAR has original and exclusive jurisdiction. Series of 1990. 6657. otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). 2004 FACTS: Private respondent Roberto J. Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of La Carlota City issued and sent a NOTICE OF COVERAGE to private respondent Cuenca placing the above-described landholding under the compulsory coverage of R. pursuant to Section 50 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R. No.A. No. Cuenca G. 6657. Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. The issue involves the implementation of agrarian reform.A. Private respondent Cuenca filed with the Regional Trial Court. a complaint against Noe Fortunado and Land Bank of the Philippines for 'Annulment of Notice of Coverage and Declaration of Unconstitutionality of E. Roberto J.A. La Carlota City and devoted principally to the planting of sugar cane. 6657) .P a g e | 68 Department of Agrarian Reform vs. September 23. No.O. the respondent Judge denied MARO Noe Fortunado's motion to dismiss and issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction directing Fortunado and all persons acting in his behalf to cease and desist from implementing the Notice of Coverage. With Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order. and the LBP from proceeding with the determination of the value of the subject land. Haguimit. 405. " . even though they raise questions that are also legal or constitutional in nature. it follows that the RTC of La Carlota City (Branch 63) was devoid of authority to issue the assailed Writ of Preliminary Injunction. All doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. since the law has granted it special and original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matters Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction over the instant case. 29-2002 and 38-2002. — No injunction. restraining order. That Writ must perforce be stricken down as a nullity. which reads: "Section 68. These Circulars enjoin all trial judges to strictly observe Section 68 of RA 6657. prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).P a g e | 69 All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Such nullity is particularly true in the light of the express prohibitory provisions of the CARP and this Court's Administrative Circular Nos. the Department of Agriculture (DA). the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program. et al. Cavite. that the parcel of land subject hereof was found to be suitable for conversion to residential subdivision by the Ministry of Local Government and Community Development. agricultural lands refer to lands devoted to agriculture as conferred in the said law and not classified as industrial land. industrial and residential lands. ISSUE: WON the property subject of the suit is covered by the Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)? HELD: The contention of the petitioners has no merit. Agricultural lands are only those lands which are arable or suitable lands that do not include commercial. the aforesaid titles were cancelled issued to and in the name of the LDC's successor. When Agrarian Reform Minister Conrado F. by the Regional Director for Region IV. the application of the private respondent/LDC for the conversion of 35. and considering further. 2004 FACTS: Sometime in 1964. 27. On September 20.80 hectares of the property covered by TCT No. 6657 took effect only on June 15. The LDC/CAI undertook to develop its 75-hectare property into a residential and industrial estate.P a g e | 70 Pasong Bayabas Farmers Assoc. Rep. it being untenanted and not devoted to the production of palay and/or corn as reported by the Agrarian Reform Team Leader concerned and favorably recommended for conversion by him and further. Act No. 946. as amended. Under Section 3(c) of Rep.. 6657. the Credito Asiatic. 815 and P. Only Agricultural lands are covered by CARP. G. Lakeview Development Corporation (LDC) bought a parcel of land located at Barrio Kabilang-Baybay. ..D. vs. he did so pursuant to his authority under Rep. 3844. No. Considering the parcel of land to be not covered by P.D. 62972 into non-agricultural land. where industrial sites and a low cost housing project. 1977. No. 1988. May 25. Court of Appeals. No.R. Metro Manila. Act No. Inc. 142359. et al. Pasig. by P. Estrella confirmed the reclassification of the property by the Municipal Council of Carmona to non-agricultural land. Carmona. Act No.D. Incorporated (CAI). The Hon. Section 4(e) of the law provides that it covers all private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon. All proceedings before a tribunal or quasi-judicial agency bereft of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action are null and void. .P a g e | 71 The jurisdiction of a tribunal or quasi-judicial body over the subject matter is determined by the averments of the complaint/petition and the law extant at the time of the commencement of the suit/complaint/petition. ISSUE: WON the findings of the PARAD and the DARAB that petitioner is a bona fide tenant is supported by substantial evidence. . and. Tenancy relationship is a juridical tie which arises between a landowner and a tenant once they agree. The PARAD rendered a Decision in favor of Vicente which was affirmed by the DARAB. (3) there is consent between the parties. (6) there is sharing of the harvests between the parties. July 5. Seeing the letter of Alice as a threat to his peaceful possession of subject farmland which might impair his security of tenure as a tenant. 2010 FACTS: On December 18. 168164. (2) the subject matter is agricultural land.4692 hectares located in Norzagaray. respondent Alice Tanco purchased a parcel of land devoted to Mango plantation consisting of 28. to undertake jointly the cultivation of a land belonging to the landowner. (5) there is personal cultivation by the tenant. (4) the purpose is agricultural production. ALICE TANCO et. the instant petition is DENIED. and the absence of one or more requisites is fatal. Later on. This was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals. Controversy arose when Alice sent to Vicente a letter dated January 16. as a result of which relationship the tenant acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land. HELD: The findings of the agrarian tribunals that tenancy relationship exists are not supported by substantial evidence.R. After a thorough evaluation of the records of this case. it was partitioned among the respondents. The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and allegations that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. She asked him to vacate the property as soon as possible. 1975. we affirm the findings of the CA that the essential requisites of consent and sharing are lacking. Bulacan.25 All the requisites must concur in order to establish the existence of tenancy relationship. 1995 informing him that subject landholding is not covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). expressly or impliedly. WHEREFORE. the following essential requisites must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant.P a g e | 72 VICENTE ADRIANO vs. No. For tenancy relationship to exist. Vicente filed before the regional office of DARAB in Region III a Complaint for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. al G. institutional and other non-agricultural purposes. June 18. on 30 March 1999. (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized. agricultural lands. commercial. though . Department of Agrarian Reform. 6657 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 20 of Republic Act No. the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO No. as amended. industrial." which consolidated all existing implementing guidelines related to land use conversion. petitioner claims that there is an actual slowdown of housing projects. By reason thereof." amending and updating the previous rules on land use conversion. commercial. No. industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" in the definition of agricultural lands finds basis in jurisprudence. (2) those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as livestock. THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM G. 183409. or other nonagricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. in turn. 6657. violates the constitution HELD: The petition was dismissed. The authority of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to include "lands not reclassified as residential. 01-99. and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988. and fishpond ─ the effect of which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage. 2010 FACTS: The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued "Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses. which. to wit: (1) those to be converted to residential. and (4) those reclassified to residential. aggravated the housing shortage. unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the whole nation.P a g e | 73 CREBA vs. Its coverage includes the following agricultural lands. entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses. industrial. 7160 and other pertinent laws and regulations. poultry. commercial. The aforesaid rules embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced. ISSUE: WON DAR AO NO. 01-02. In Ros v.R. and are to be converted to such uses. this Court has enunciated that after the passage of Republic Act No. Subsequently. commercial. 6657 served as the cut-off period for automatic reclassifications or rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR conversion clearance or authority. it made clear what are the lands that can be the subject of DA R‘s conversion authority. instead. However. It necessarily follows that any reclassification made thereafter can be the subject of DAR‘s conversion authority. 6657 which is 15 June 1988. jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR.It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and conversion that agricultural lands though reclassified to residential. serving the very purpose of the land use conversion provisions of Republic Act No. agricultural lands. It bears stressing that the said date of effectivity of Republic Act No. Having recognize d the DAR‘s conversion authority over lands reclassified after 15 June 1988. industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" in the definition of agricultural lands. it can no longer be argued that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform was wrongfully given the authority and power to include "lands not reclassified as residential.P a g e | 74 reclassified. are exempted from conversion. have to go through the process of conversion. thus. . commercial. industrial or other non-agricultural uses must still undergo the process of conversion before they can be used for the purpose to which they are intended. which are already reclassified before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657. Such inclusion does not unduly expand or enlarge the definition of agricultural lands. 1472 took effect on 11 June 1978.D. Court of Appeals nonetheless upheld the PARAD and DARAB decisions. Its Section 1 does not make any distinction whether the land the NHA acquired is tenanted or not. the exemption under Section 1 of P. According to the PARAD. 1978. ISSUE: WON the land acquired by the NHA. When the law does not distinguish. the estate of the late C. the NHA bought the land when the bank foreclosed the Estate‘s mortgage over the same. Hodges (Estate) asked Mateo Villaruz (Villaruz) to work as tenant of the Estate‘s 7-hectare rice field in Bacolod. In 1985. Based on the ―whereas‖ clause of that presidential decree. the NHA filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court. to prevent squatters from occupying the land. 1472 contemplated. May 4. DARAB G. 175200. 3844. 2010 FACTS: In 1960. Accordingly. therefore. No. Consequently.D.R. squatters settled in 4 hectares of the land. In 1976. 1472 exempts from land reform those lands that the NHA acquired for its housing and resettlement programs whether it acquired those lands when the law took effect or afterwards. did not apply to the subject land since the NHA bought it in 1985.) No. the exemption did not apply. 1472 applied only to lands already acquired by the NHA when P. since Villaruz was already a tenant of the subject land when the NHA acquired it.P a g e | 75 National Highway Authority vs. .D. was exempt from the coverage of agrarian reform HELD: P. According to Villaruz.D. the intent was to preserve properties that the NHA already acquired on or before June 11. the NHA assumed responsibility for maintaining his tenancy over the land by way of subrogation pursuant to Section 10 of Republic Act No. Villaruz asked the PARAD to recognize him as tenant-beneficiary under Presidential Decree (P. the situation in this case differed from what P.N. The exemption. The language of the exemption is clear: the exemption covers ―lands or property acquired x x x or to be acquired‖ by NHA.D. 271 and to retain his possession of the 3-hectare portion of the land. no distinction should be made. since the NHA stepped into the shoes of the Estate. While the Court was mindful of the plight of tenant-farmers like Villaruz. 1472 provides that the NHA shall not be liable for disturbance compensation. Since only tenants working on agricultural lands can claim disturbance compensation. If the ruling of the Court of Appeals were to be upheld. . 27. it was incumbent upon it to weigh their rights against the government‘s interest in meeting the housing needs of then greater majority. in turn. would become prejudicial to the government‘s housing projects. the NHA would have to allow Villaruz and his successors-in-interest to work on the subject land as agricultural tenants for as long as they liked without any chance of getting an emancipation patent over it under P.P a g e | 76 In addition. the exemption assumes that the NHA may have to acquire such kinds of land for its housing program.D. As for the NHA. it would become an agricultural lessor with no right to use the land for the purpose for which it bought the same. If the exemption from payment of disturbance compensation applied only to untenanted lands. This.D. Section 1 of P. then such exemption would be meaningless or a superfluity. This would be antithetical to the objectives of the agrarian reform program. should be appealed to this Court and not the SAC. LBP computed the initial value of the land at P2. pursuant to Section 16(a) of RA 6657. the RARAD‘s decision. the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land. Isabela. No. Hence. sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. being a final determination of the appraisal of just compensation by the DARAB. ISSUE: WON RTC. Petitioners questioned the authority of the SAC to give due course to the petition of LBP.961. since the courts have the ultimate power to decide the question on just compensation. Petitioners moved to dismiss LBP‘s petition on the ground that they already accepted the RARAD‘s decision. claiming that the RARAD has concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC over just compensation cases involving lands covered by RA 6657. Petitioners filed a second petition for review asking for re-evaluation of the land. commences with LBP determining the value of the lands under the land reform program.03. Using LBP‘s valuation. April 30. Unable to agree on revalued proposal. Petitioners rejected the valuation. the DAR adjudicator conducts a summary administrative proceeding to determine the compensation for the land by requiring the landowner. the land was voluntarily offered for sale to the government under the CARL of 1988.333. LBP revalued the land however. 2010 FACTS: Petitioners are the owners of a land located in Barangay Masipi East.P a g e | 77 Heirs of Vidad vs. petitioner similarly rejected this offer.724. The SAC rendered a decision fixing the just compensation at P5. A party who disagrees with the decision of the DAR adjudicator may bring the matter to the RTC designated as a Special Agrarian Court for final determination of just compensation. On the other hand. sitting as SAC. has jurisdiction in just compensation cases HELD: The procedure for the determination of just compensation under RA 6657.R.626. 166461.47. LBP filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC. Land Bank of the Philippines G. Cabagan. Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the DARAB which dismissed the petition. the DAR makes an offer to the landowner through a notice sent to the landowner. Petitioners manifested their acceptance thereof. petitioners instituted before the RARAD to determine the just compensation for their land. . In case the landowner rejects the offer. LBP insists that the RARAD/DARAB decision is merely a preliminary valuation. under Section 50. DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. RA 6657 does not make DAR‘s valuation absolutely binding as the amount payable by LBP. the PARAD/RARAD/DARAB do not exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the SAC in just compensation cases. make the final determination of just compensation. WHEREFORE. final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party. Consequently. we GRANT the petition. could not have attained finality. sitting as SAC. It must be emphasized that the taking of property under RA 6657 is an exercise of the State‘s power of eminent domain. except if the aggrieved party fails to file a petition for just compensation on time before the RTC. the determination of just compensation in the RARAD/DARAB requires the voluntary agreement of the parties. which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction in just compensation cases under RA 6657. When the parties cannot agree on the amount of just compensation. 6657. the Court has upheld the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. The courts will still have the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function. as it is only the courts that can resolve the issue on just compensation. Unless the parties agree. The valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies. It is well-settled that the DAR‘s land valuation is only preliminary and is not. The determination of just compensation is judicial in nature. 6657 is vested in the courts. LBP thus correctly filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the SAC. jurisdiction on just compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA No. In a number of cases. On the other hand. except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR.P a g e | 78 Contrary to petitioners‘ argument. only the exercise of judicial power can settle the dispute with binding effect on the winning and losing parties. over all petitions for determination of just compensation to landowners in accordance with Section 57 of RA No. . which are within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. the SAC properly took cognizance of LBP‘s petition for determination of just compensation. and not the DAR. A reading of Section 18 of RA 6657 shows that the courts. Thus. In fact. DAR‘s valuation. Clearly. there is no settlement of the dispute before the RARAD/DARAB. Further exception to the DAR‘s original and exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657. by any means. being preliminary in nature. Quezon. Even a perusal of the DARAB Revised Rules shows that matters strictly involving the administrative implementation of the CARP and other agrarian laws and regulations. et. 162446. Paulino Rubio G. Primary. Al. No. viz: IRENEO CONCHA. a matter exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform. both original and appellate. thus. Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. an administrative function falling within the jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. are the exclusive prerogative of. controversies. They alleged that they are the tenants thereof and have not relinquished their rights over the same. LAZARO CONCHA. BRAULIO DE TORRES. and cognizable by. and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian . and beyond the jurisdiction of the DARAB. – The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction. the Court was categorical in ruling that the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP. cases. Rule II of the said Rules read: SECTION 1. ISSUE: WON DARAB has jurisdiction to resolve the issue involving the identification and selection of qualified farmer-beneficiaries of a land covered by the CARP HELD: The petition is meritorious. 2010 FACTS: The subject landholding was placed under the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. March 29.P a g e | 79 Romanita Concha vs. Jalandoni. to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes.R. named as beneficiaries. As held in Lercana v. as they returned the monetary awards given by the landowners Petitioners argue that the DARAB is not clothed with the power or authority to resolve the issue involving the identification and selection of qualified farmer-beneficiaries since the same is an Agrarian Law Implementation case. Respondents filed a complaint for declaration of their tenancy and their identification as beneficiaries and for disqualification of the petitioners to become beneficiaries over the subject landholding. the Secretary of the DAR. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Tiaong. Cases Covered. Section 2 of the said Rules specifically provides. 6389. Republic Act No.These Rules shall govern cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary which shall include the following: x x x (b) Identification. The administrative function of the DAR is manifest in Administrative Order No. 228 and 129-A. qualification or disqualification of potential farmer-beneficiaries. 6657. the DAR Secretary has exclusive jurisdiction over identification. Wherefore. x x x Based on the foregoing. 06-00. the petition is granted. the conclusion is certain that the DARAB had no jurisdiction to identify who between the parties should be recognized as the beneficiaries of the land in dispute. which provides for the Rules of Procedure for Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. as it was a purely administrative function of the DAR.inter alia. Under said Rules of Procedure. 229. Executive Order Nos. . 3844 as amended by Republic Act No.P a g e | 80 Reform Program under Republic Act No. qualification or disqualification of potential farmerbeneficiaries. that: SECTION 2. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. . Presidential Decree No. Agrifina Enriquez. The CA on its decision rendered dismissed the petition for lack of merit. filed several expropriation actions before the various branches of the RTC of Angeles City. is the mortgagee of the lands by virtue of the loans it extended for their acquisition. Pablo Santos. Catgerube Castro. ISSUE: WON intervention in the expropriation cases allowed HELD: YES. All of them are the registered owners of the expropriated lands that they acquired as beneficiaries of the comprehensive agrarian reform program. Carlito Mercado. January 19. prompting the bank to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Conrado Espeleta. 173085. PVB then filed its motion for reconsideration but Branch 58 denied the same. The lands in these cases were located in Porac and Floridablanca. 2011 FACTS: Sometime in 2003 respondent Bases Conversion Development Authority. PVB‘s point regarding the authority of the court in expropri ation cases to hear and adjudicate conflicting claims over the ownership of the lands involved in such cases is valid. a government corporation. Rolando David. But such rule obviously cannot apply to PVB for the following reasons: .R. No. Respondents are Armando Simbillo. and Alfredo Suarez. another respondent herein. Bases Conversion Development Authority G. Hence this case. move for intervention before the RTC which was also denied by said court.P a g e | 81 Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Pampanga. Ricardo Bucud. Christian Marcelo. petitioner herein. Upon notice of the filing of the case. for acquisition of lands needed for the construction of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway Project. Land Bank of the Philippines. its conflict with the farmer beneficiaries who held CLOAs. or TCTs emanating from such titles were already pending before Angeles City RTC. Of course. Cuenca. . Section 9 above empowers the court to order payment to itself of the proceeds of the expropriation whenever questions of ownership are yet to be settled. a co-equal branch of the same court. There is no reason why this rule should not be applied even where the settlement of such questions is to be made by another tribunal.P a g e | 82 1. after the CA dismissed PVB‘s petition on January 26. Branch 58 had no authority to pre-empt Branch 62 of its power to hear and adjudicate claims that were already pending before it. Denied. 2. 2006. At the time PVB tried to intervene in the expropriation cases. pointing out that it had in the meantime already withdrawn the actions it filed with Branch 62 after learning from the decision of the Supreme Court in Department of Agrarian Reform v. subsequently. the latter filed a motion for reconsideration. that jurisdiction over cases involving the annulment of CLOAs and EPs were vested by Republic Act 6657 in the DARAB. EPs. Branch 58 would still have no power to adjudicate the issues of ownership presented by the PVB‘s intervention. A.R. . the MARO conducted an onsite investigation on the two parcels of land confirming the presence of the livestock as enumerated. 9 heads of goats and 18 heads of swine. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform. Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Socorro C. 192 SCRA 51 (1990).P a g e | 83 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. and thus exempt from agrarian reform. not agricultural. 5 carabaos. poultry and swine have been classified as industrial. 1991. It alleged that pursuant to the case of Luz Farms v. No.5455 hectares are used for grazing and habitat of petitioner‘s 105 heads of cattle. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law). January 10. 2011 FACTS: On August 2. 11 horses. 1993. poultry and swine are classified as industrial. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word ―agricultural‖ showed that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include the livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally mandated agrarian reform program of the government. LOPEZ AGRI-BUSINESS CORP G. 178895. an Application for Exemption of the lots from CARP coverage. not agricultural. and thus exempt from agrarian reform. Petitioner filed with the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office (PARO). Davao Oriental. Thus. prior to the effectivity of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). DAR Secretary said parcels of land are exempted from coverage as the said parcels of land with a total area of 110. lands devoted to the raising of livestock. Salga issued a Notice of Coverage to petitioner with regards to the aforementioned landholdings which were subsequently placed under Compulsory Acquisition pursuant to R. ISSUE: WON the Lopez and Limot lands of SNLABC can be considered grazing lands for its livestock business and are thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL HELD: Lands devoted to the raising of livestock. the Court declared unconstitutional the CARL provisions that included lands devoted to livestock under the coverage of the CARP. SALVADOR N. 1992 and March 1. In Luz Farms v. On December 13. . are DISMISSED. the Petitions of the Department of Agra-rian Reform and the Salvador N. and the rulings of the Court of Appeals and the DAR Regional Director are hereby AFFIRMED. Lopez AgriBusiness Corp.P a g e | 84 WHEREFORE. Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. The perambulatory clauses of PP 1520 identified only "certain areas in the sector comprising the [three Municipalities that] have potential tourism value" and mandated the conduct of "necessary studies" and the segregation of "specific geographic areas" to achieve its purpose. Roxas & Co. 2010 FACTS: Roxas & Co. Roxas & Co. ISSUE: WON PP 1520 reclassified all lands in 1975 exempt Roxas & Co.P a g e | 85 Roxas and Company. petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses.O. the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988. vs. or residential before the Effectivity of CARP no longer need conversion clearance from the DAR.R. on May 6. 149548. As a result. 1988 and took eff ect on June 15. filed with the DAR an application for exemption from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of 1988 on the basis of PP 1520 and of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. Inc. No. 1988. 1988. industrial. Roxas & Co. The Act was signed by the President on June 10. 229. HELD: P 1520 did not automatically convert the agricultural lands in the three municipalities including Nasugbu to non-agricultural lands. 6657.‘s three haciendas in Nasugbu from CARP coverage. filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell [VOS] Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E. 6. No. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later placed under compulsory acquisition by DAR in accordance with the CARL. December 14. Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act No. through its President.. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu. DAMBA-NSFW and DAR G. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas. sent a letter to the Secretary of DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. Before the law‘s Effectivity. Series of 1994 which states that all lands already classified as commercial. If all the lands in those tourism zones . barangays. The same would also undermine the land use reclassification powers vested in local government units in conjunction with pertinent agencies of government. municipalities. It did not reclassify the areas to non-agricultural use. or intend the entirety of the land area of the zone for non-agricultural purposes. Moreover.P a g e | 86 were to be wholly converted to non-agricultural use. To reiterate. reserve. PP 1520 merely recognized the "potential tourism value" of certain areas within the general area declared as tourism zones. to view these kinds of proclamation as a reclassification for non-agricultural purposes of entire provinces. there would have been no need for the PP to direct the PTA to identify what those "specific geographic areas" are. Neither does said proclamation direct that otherwise CARPable lands within the zone shall already be used for purposes other than agricultural. islands. A proclamation that merely recognizes the potential tourism value of certain areas within the general area declared as tourist zone clearly does not allocate. . A mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use since there is still that process of conversion before one is permitted to use it for other purposes. or peninsulas would be unreasonable as it amounts to an automatic and sweeping exemption from CARP in the name of tourism development. 1988. and without their knowledge or consent. still the MTC has jurisdiction. The amendment included Benigno as defendant. 2010 FACTS: On June 27. Thus despite the allegation of Narciso in his answer of tenancy relationship. that they were the registered owners of a five-hectare parcel of land (subject property). No. that his brother. Subsequently plaintiff filed an amended complaint to the PARAD. Nueva Ecija against respondent Narciso Germino for forcible entry. Mendoza (plaintiffs) filed a complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Germino G. Rosa. Defendants appealed the case to the CA. the petitioner and Aurora C. 165676. Because of Narciso's allegation of tenancy the plaintiffs move to remand the case to the DARAB. among others. . respondent Narciso refused to vacate the subject property. A careful perusal of petitioner's complaint manifest that their cause of action is for forcible entry and damages. The plaintiffs alleged that it was not Benigno who is the lessee of the property but it was Efren Bernardo. was the plaintiffs‘ agricultural lessee and he merely helped the latter in t he cultivation as a member of the immediate farm household. respondent Benigno Germino. As a general rule jurisdiction is conferred by law and determined by the allegation in the complaint. Respondent Narciso filed his answer. The decision was affirmed by the DARAB. Sometime in 1988. Without conducting a conference the MTC remanded the case to the DARAB. The PARAD decided in plaintiff favor. The CA set aside the decision of the DARAB contending that the case was recovery of possession and not tenancy. ISSUE: WON the MTC or DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.P a g e | 87 Mendoza vs.R. respondent Narciso unlawfully entered the subject property by means of strategy and stealth. Despite the plaintiffs‘ repeated demands. HELD: The MTC has the jurisdiction over the case. claiming. November 22. instead of conducting a preliminary conference. Neither did the amendment of the complaint confer jurisdiction on the DARAB. which required the referral of a land dispute case to the Department of Agrarian Reform for the preliminary determination of the existence of an agricultural tenancy relationship. the MTC immediately referred the case to the DARAB. has indeed been repealed by Section 76 of R. Section 2 of P. Besides. No.P a g e | 88 The court explains: "Although respondent Narciso averred tenancy as an affirmative and/or special defense in his answer. The plaintiffs alleged in the amended complaint that the subject property was previously tilled by Efren Bernardo. This was contrary to the rules. jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. After all. and the respondents took possession by strategy and stealth. No. the action was for recovery of possession of real property that was within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.D. Otherwise. It continued to have the authority to hear the case precisely to determine whether it had jurisdiction to dispose of the ejectment suit on its merits. 6657 in 1988.A. 316. In the absence of any allegation of a tenancy relationship between the parties. jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant. . In the present case. this did not automatically divest the MTC of jurisdiction over the complaint. without their knowledge and consent. DAR offered P86. that DAR is to pay AFC and HPI a total of P1. July 12. DAR was given chance to support its ruling on why the purchase price should be at a lower amount but DAR failed to present such evidence.38B. The RTC‘s finding is to be sustained as it based its ruling on evidence. titles were given to farmers under the CARP.40 for HPI‘s land. 2010 FACTS: AFC and Hijo Plantation Inc. Davao. DAR appealed to the CA. 164195. were owners of 5 parcels of land located in San Isidro. Court of Appeals. which was the reason that AFC and HPI filed the cases before the RTC. The DAR also caused the titling of the land in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Land Bank of the Philippines G.9M for AFC‘s land and P164. an agency of the DAR which was commissioned by law to determine just compensation. but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. that the purchase price should be at P103. m. Tagum. based on the reports it gathered from assessors. The two voluntarily offered to sell the properties to the DAR. and to leave them empty-handed while government withholds compensation is undoubtedly oppressive. et al vs. AFC‘s and HPI‘s land were taken in 1996 without just c ompensation. The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of the land. the government deposited P26M into AFC‘s account and P45M into HPI‘s account as down payment in 1996.P a g e | 89 APO Fruits Corp. The DARAB failed to render a decision on the valuation of the land for three years. Without .33/ sq. ISSUE: WON there was just compensation HELD: No. that the purchase price should be higher than what was offered by DAR. the CA reversed the RTC. AFC and HPI filed a complaint for determination of just compensation before the RTC of Davao which rendered a decision in favor of AFC and HPI. Later. But nevertheless. HPI and DAR cannot agree on a price hen ce the Complaint for Determination of Just Compensation was filed before the DAR Adjudication Board. DARAB. No. To allow the taking of landowners‘ properties. sat on the cases for three years. AFC. Due to DARAB‘s failure to adjudicate. The RTC ruled.R. The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that ―private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation‖ and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpret ation of this principle. permanent improvements on AFC‘s and HPI‘s lands have been introduced and found existing. Note should be taken that in said Appraisal Report. the sworn valuation by the owner. all weather-road network. among others. and ample. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. 6657. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) provides: SEC. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. the current value of like properties. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation. The power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). as follows: Sec. Section 57 of Republic Act No. irrigation system.g. Special Jurisdiction. providing as it does the guideposts for the determination of just compensation. wherein substantial amount of capital funding have been invested in putting them up. – The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners.. Basically.P a g e | 90 prompt payment. packing houses. full. and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. airstrip. its nature. the tax declarations. 17. the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation. 57. which is particularly relevant. e. – In determining just compensation. reads. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker‘s gain but the owner‘s loss. The word ―just‖ is used to intensify the meaning of the word ―compensation‖ to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real. the cost of acquisition of the land. substantial. pier. unless modified by this Act Section 17 of Republic Act No. compensation cannot be considered ―just‖ inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. actual use and income. . Determination of Just Compensation. and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. its actual or potential use. a fact DAR should never ignore. . The market value of the property (plus the consequential damages less consequential benefits) is determined by such factors as the value of like properties. its size.P a g e | 91 The agricultural properties of AFC and HPI are just a stone‘s throw from the residential and/or industri al sections of Tagum City. shape and location.