REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CARLOS R. VEGA, et al., respondents. G.R. No. 177790 January 17, 2011 Third Division Sereno, J. FACTS: The respondents Vegas filed an application for registration of title covering a parcel of land. They alleged that they inherited the subject land from their mother, Maria, who in turninherited it from her father, Lorenz. Their mother’s siblings died intestate, all without leaving anyoffspring. The Republic filed an opposition to respondents Vegas’ application for registration onthe ground that the subject land or portions thereof were lands of the public domain and, assuch, not subject to private appropriation. During the trial, respondents Vegas presentedseveral exhibits in compliance with the jurisdictional requirements, as well as witnesses to proverespondents Vegas’ ownership, occupation and possession of the land subject of theregistration. Significant was the testimony of Mr. Rodolfo Gonzales, a Special Investigator of theCENRO of Los Baños, Laguna, under the DENR. He attested to having conducted aninspection of the subject land and identified the corresponding Report which he had submittedto the granted respondents Vegas’ application and directed theLRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration in the name of respondents Vegas andrespondents . in its decision. During the trial. to the former’s predecessors - in - interest - the sisters Gabriela and Isabel - byvirtue of a Bilihan ng Isang Bahagi ng Lupang Katihan. They likewise formally offered inevidence a Subdivision Plan. The report stated that the area subject of theinvestigation was entirely within the alienable and disposable zone. respondents - intervenors Buhays entered their appearance and moved tointervene in respondents Vegas’ application for registration. and that there was no publicland application filed for the same land by the applicant or by any other person.Maria. The trial court. which they claimedwas sold to their predecessors - in - interest.Regional Executive Director. which indicated the portion of the subject land. Region IV. Respondents - intervenors Buhaysclaimed a portion of the subject land consisting purportedly sold by respondents Vegas’mother. has nonetheless recognized and affirmed applications for land registration on other substantialand convincing evidence duly presented without any opposition from the LRA or the DENR onthe ground of substantial compliance. however. formally offered as evidence byrespondents - intervenors Buhays.Gonzales did not contain the date when the land was declared as such. ISSUE Whether or not. Subdivision Plan Csd - 04 - 02433 - 6. the LRAdid not interpose any objection to the application on the basis of the nature of the land. expressly indicates that the land is alienable and disposable. respondents Vegas have sufficientlyestablished that the subject land is alienable and disposable?RULING: The best proofs in registration proceedings that a land is alienable and disposable are acertification from the CENRO or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)and a certified true copy of the DENR’s original classification of the land. The Court.First.Finally. and who identified his written report on hisinspection of the subject land. since the testimony of Mr. The appellate courtaffirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. in proportion to their claims over the subjectland. based on the evidence on record. Applying these precedents. arguing that respondents Vegasfailed to prove that the subject land was alienable and disposable. The Republic appealed the Decision of the trial court. therehas been substantial compliance with the requirement to show that the subject land is indeedalienable and disposable based on the evidence on record. Gonzales of the CENRO who testifiedthat the subject land is alienable and disposable.- intervenors Buhays’ predecessors. respondents Vegas were able to present Mr. upon being informed of respondents Vegas’ application for original registration.the LRA never raised the issue that the land subject of registration was not alienable anddisposable.Second. . In the Supplementary Report submitted during the trial court proceedings. the Court finds that despite the absence of a certification bythe CENRO and a certified true copy of the original classification by the DENR Secretary. who in turn. Gonzalo seeks the reinstatement of the trial court's ruling. On appeal. vs.GONZALO VILLANUEVA (represented by his heirs). the CA granted the Spouses’ appeal and set aside the trial court's ruling. The Spouses entered the property and paid taxes afterwards. petitioner grounds his claim of ownership over the Property through his andVere's combined possession of the Property for more than ten years. The trial court rejected Spouses Branoco’s claim of ownership after treating the Deed as a donation mortis causa whichRodrigo effectively cancelled by selling the Property to Vere.having allegedly occupied it for more than 10 years. FACTS:Gonzalo Villanueva. Thus. In his petition. petitioner claims ownership over the Property through acquisitive prescription. by the time Rodriguez soldthe property to the Spouses. Alternatively. No. the Spouses Baranoco similarly claimed ownership over the property thru purchase from Rodriguez. In their answer. andordered the Spouses Branoco to surrender possession to Gonzalo. petitioner. who in turn. acquired the property from Rodrigo byway of donation.ISSUE:Whether or not Gonzalo acquired title over the property?RULING:Gonzalo acquired no title over the property. SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA BRANOCO. sued Spouses Branoco to recover a parcelof land. Alternatively. counted from Vere'spurchase of the Property from Rodrigo in 1970 until petitioner initiated his suit in the trial court inFebruary 1986. Gonzalo declared the property in his name for tax purposessoon after acquiring it. The former claimed ownership over the property thru purchase from Vere. 172804 January 24. J.bought the property from Rodrigo.The trial court ruled in favor of Gonzalo and declared him owner of the property. . represented by his heirs.G. it held that the deed of donation is one of inter vivos. she had no title to transfer. respondents.R. 2011 Second Division Carpio. Good faith. Undeniably. nearly three years before Rodrigo's donation in 3 May 1965 and sevenyears before Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo. petitioner's insistent claim that Rodriguez occupied the Property only in 1982.consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the possessor received the thingwas the owner thereof. Rodriguez was in possession of the Property. a fact that prevented Vere frombeing a buyer in good faith. on the other hand. but thegrantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. petitioner's only other recourse to maintain his claim of ownership by prescription is to show open. and could transmit his ownership.Indeed. neither was a good faith possessor. when shestarted paying taxes. including Vere and petitioner. Although Vere and petitioner arguably had just title having successively acquired the Property through sale. finds no basis in the records. Rodriguez already occupied and possessed the Property "in the concept of an owner"since 21 May 1962. when Vere bought the Property fromRodrigo in 1970. . The tenyear ordinary prescriptive period to acquire title through possession of real property in theconcept of an owner requires uninterrupted possession coupled with just title and good faith. continuous and adverse possession of the Propertyfor 30 years.Petitioner anchors his contention on an unfounded legal assumption.Lacking good faith possession. In short. As Rodrigo herself disclosed in theDeed. This admission against interest bindsRodrigo and all those tracing title to the Property through her. petitioner is unable to meet this requirement. There is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through oneof the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights. since his property is located at an elevated plateau of 15 feet. NAPOLEON A.G. Castro filed a complaint for damages with temporaryrestraining order/writ of preliminary injunction. Upon learning of the adverse claim. on the other hand. she was not able topark her vehicle at the dead-end portion of the street. Castro averred that when shebought the property from Manuela Homes in 1994. No. In defiance.For his part. she hired construction workers to see where theleak was coming from. J. Adjacent to his property is the land of Castro in Manuela Homes. Monsod alsofiled a complaint for malicious mischief and malicious destruction before the office of thebarangay chairman. above the level of Castro’s property. Monsod neither asked permission nor talked to her with regard tothe use of 65 sq.R. petitioner.MARGARITA F. The adverse claim was filed without any claim of ownership over the property.Monsod caused the annotation of an adverse claim against a portion of the property of Castro. FACTS: Castro is the registered owner of a parcel of land.When he bought the . respondent. 183719 February 2. Monsod claimed that he and his family had been residing in MoonwalkVillage since June 1984. When Castro noticed a leak that causedthe front portion of her house to be slippery. is theowner of the property adjoining the lot of Castro. there were deposits of soil and rocks abouttwo (2) meters away from the front door of the house of Castro. The workers had already started digging when police officers sent byMonsod came and stopped the workers from finishing their job. she feltdisturbed and experienced sleepless nights for fear that she would not be able to sell her property.Prior to the filing of the case before the RTC. more or less. MONSOD. Monsod.m. Monsodwas merely asserting the existing legal easement of lateral and subjacent support at the rear portion of his estate to prevent the property from collapsing. 2011 Second Division Nachura. CASTRO. Castro admitted that her TCT does not cover the open space at the dead-end portionof the Street. As such. vs. of her property as easement. there was no annotation or existence of anyeasement over the property. She also prayed that the Register of Deeds beordered to cancel the annotation of the adverse claim on the TCT. sometime in 1985 and 1986.in view of the latter's manifest determination to remove the embankment left by the developer of Manuela Homes. However. bulldozed. Monsod asserted that the affidavit of adverse claim was for theannotation of the lateral and subjacent easement of his property over the property of petitioner. of the property of Castro. Pilar DevelopmentCorporation. an embankment will be retained at the boundary of Manuela Homes and MoonwalkVillage. The purpose of the annotation was to prevent Castro from making injuriousexcavations on the subject embankment as to deprive the residential house and lot of Monsodof its natural support and cause it to collapse. the CAreversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the retention of the annotation at the back of the TCT. but a recognition of the existence of a legal easement of subjacent and lateral support constituted on the lengthwise or horizontal landsupport/embankment area of sixty-five (65) square meters. and possibledigging by any person. Thus. the land elevation of Moonwalk Village was almost on thesame level as Manuela Homes. the same might be dulyannotated in the title as recognition of the existence of a legal easement of subjacent and lateralsupport. . earthquake. the developer of Manuela Homes. and neither did he contest thetitle of petitioner. more or less. The trial court ratiocinated that the adverseclaim of respondent was non-registrable considering that the basis of his claim was aneasement and not an interest adverse to the registered owner. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Castro. the adverse claim of respondent failed to comply with therequisites provided under Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. Monsod personally complained toPilar Development Corporation and was assured that. Manuela Homesretained the embankment consisting of soil and rocks. 1529. On appeal. Furthermore. Before the said excavation. excavated.property in 1983. as provided by the National BuildingCode. Monsod had the open space rip rappedwith stones as reinforcement against any potential soil erosion. ordering the cancellation of Monsod’s adverse claim at the back of the TCT of Castro. The CA ruled that while respondent's adverse claim could not be sanctioned because itdid not fall under the requisites for registering an adverse claim. Manuela Homes becamelower than Moonwalk Village. which is more or less fifteen (15) feet higher than Manuela Homes. not as an adverse claim. and transferred portionsof the elevated land to the lower portions of Manuela Homes.
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Report "REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARLOS R. VEGA, et al., Case Digest Property"