The politics of cultural pluralism in Ethiopia and Eritrea: trajectories of ethnicity and constitutional experiments

This article was downloaded by: [University of Tennessee, Knoxville] On: 02 September 2014, At: 10:20 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Ethnic and Racial Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rers20 The politics of cultural pluralism in Ethiopia and Eritrea: trajectories of ethnicity and constitutional experiments Assefaw Bariagaber a a Department of Political Science , University of Nebraska at Kearney , Kearney, NE, 68849, USA Published online: 16 Jun 2008. To cite this article: Assefaw Bariagaber (1998) The politics of cultural pluralism in Ethiopia and Eritrea: trajectories of ethnicity and constitutional experiments, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21:6, 1056-1073, DOI: 10.1080/01419879808565652 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419879808565652 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub- licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rers20 http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/01419879808565652 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419879808565652 forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs ity o f T en ne ss ee , K no xv ill e] a t 1 0: 20 0 2 Se pt em be r 20 14 http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions The politics of cultural pluralism in Ethiopia and Eritrea: trajectories of ethnicity and constitutional experiments Assefaw Bariagaber Abstract Theoretical discourse on nationalism and ethnicity has crystallized around three schools of thought: primordialism, instrumentalism and construc- tivism. I take an instrumentalist approach to examine the processes that shaped the drafting of the new constitutions of Ethiopia and Eritrea, with particular focus on the role of elites in group identity definition, formation and mobilization. I argue that despite their similar ethnic and religious seg- mentation, levels of economic development, and cultural heritage, the qual- itatively different approaches to group accommodation which Ethiopia and Eritrea have pursued are explained by and are functions of (i) each country's constitutive myths - that is, the trajectory of ethnicity traversed over time in altering existing myths and constructing alternative myths; (ii) the leaders' behaviour of avoiding risk at all cost; and (iii) the political uncertainties that prevailed in both countries at the time the regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam was overthrown. Together, these variables point to a strong probability, if not inevitability, that such sharply different constitutions would be adopted. Keywords: Ethnicity; identity formation; nationalism; constitution; Ethiopia; Eritrea. Introduction Could the dramatic shifts in the theory and praxis of politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s also mean that there is yet another shift before the century is over? This question, though seemingly odd, is not irrelevant; the collapse of the Soviet Union and the near universal revival of eth- nicity appear to have come from nowhere. Very few expected the demise of the Soviet Union and certainly nobody was prepared to see it collapse in the way it did. Similarly, few noticed the pervasive nature of prim- ordial sentiments and fewer still expected such sentiments to profoundly Ethnic and Racial Studies Volume 21 Number 6 November 1998 O Routledge 1998 0141-9870 D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs ity o f T en ne ss ee , K no xv ill e] a t 1 0: 20 0 2 Se pt em be r 20 14 Cultural pluralism in Ethiopia and Eritrea 1057 shake the state-system. The analytical frameworks developed by gener- ations of intellectuals were so inadequate in explaining contemporary political events and processes that it has become increasingly necessary to search for alternative frameworks. Thus, Marxist and liberal theories of modernization are being reassessed. The recent plethora of studies anchored in cultural pluralism and the conceptual discourses which have crystallized around three schools - primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism - are testimonies to this effect. Each of these may be seen either as competing theories (Eller and Coughlan 1993; Grosby 1994) or 'complementary within a general theory of ethnicity' (Tilley 1997, p. 499). None the less, the inadequacies of liberal and Marxist theories in explaining present ethnic resurgence are readily apparent. Modernization theory sees the nation-state as the most appropriate unit of social organization, equipped not only with the means necessary to meet societal needs, but also with the power to withstand and neu- tralize various forces that seek to destroy it, including racial, ethnic and religious solidarities (Benedict 1962). Such an entity, it is further argued, was necessary for the viability of the newly independent states of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, where such solidarities were endemic but sup- posedly non-enduring. It was predicted, almost to the point of certainty, that in a few years citizens of culturally plural societies would have shed their ethnic baggage in favour of national identity (see, for example, Emerson 1960; Smith 1964). On the contrary, ethnicity and nationalism have withstood the onslaught of modernization (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Geertz 1973; Young 1976), and have actually become more power- ful recently with renewed attempts at reconstructing the past and imag- ining the future (Anderson 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Smith 1991). Indeed, the revival of ethnicity coincided with the inability of post- colonial states to meet the challenges of modernization. Examples of such states abound not only in Africa and Asia, but also in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Having finally accepted responsibility for its colossal failure and its inability to govern as it promised, the state looked for alternative ways to balance its interests, which were still based on an incessant search for uniformity, and the objective needs of the com- munity, which were characterized by pluralism. The countries selected for examination in this article - Ethiopia and Eritrea - provide an interesting case-study in the search for balance between centralization and pluralism. Indeed, with the adoption of the new constitution in 1995, Ethiopia has transformed itself from a central- ized state to a federation of ethnic groups. According to Article 39, (I), (2) and (3): Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession. Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs ity o f T en ne ss ee , K no xv ill e] a t 1 0: 20 0 2 Se pt em be r 20 14 1058 Assefaw Bariagaber speak, to write and to develop its own language; to express, to develop and to promote its culture; and to preserve its history. Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has the right to a full measure of self-government which includes the right to establish insti- tutions of government in the territory that it inhabits and to equitable representation in the State and Federal Go~ernments .~ Moreover, the constitution specifies the conditions under which the right to secession may be invoked, proceduralizes its implementation, and details the duties and responsibilities of the federal and state governments. The Eritrean constitution, on the other hand, provides for a unitary government where '[tlhe equality of all Eritrean languages is guaranteed7 (Article 4, (3)). The details of how the stated equality of languages is guaranteed is a prerogative of the executive and judicial branches of government. Such is the striking contrast between the two. Although each document takes cultural cleavages into account, these cleavages are accorded differential recognition. Also, both constitutional devices rep- resent near-anomalies, especially when viewed in the light of current trends in world politics: Ethiopia's 'ethnic federalism7 resembles the post- 1945 Yugoslav constitution which some have blamed for the disintegra- tion of Yugoslavia and the ensuing human suffering of mammoth proportions, and many do not see any future in the Ethiopian experi- ment. Eritrea's choice of a unitary and centralized government - in a world increasingly disillusioned with such a mechanism and where politi- cal liberalization has become a yardstick of political correctness every- where - is seen by many as a stubborn exercise by a cohesive group of individuals used to the centralization and top-down control that is characteristic of liberation movements. Despite similarities with respect to their (i) ethnic and linguistic diver- sity, (ii) levels of economic development, (iii) almost identical religious composition (Christians and Muslims are about equal in proportion to the entire population in both countries), and (iv) common 'cultural heri- tage' anchored in deep historical time, Ethiopia and Eritrea have pursued different approaches to group accommodation. What are the factors that account for such a difference? Obviously, the common socio- economic characteristics outlined above cannot explain the differences in the formulas for ethnic accommodation; they constitute control vari- ables and explanations must be sought e l s e ~ h e r e . ~ In this article, I argue that each constitution is a meaningful descrip- tion of political reality in each country because it is a function of three variables: (1) the country's constitutive myths - that is, the trajectories followed in altering existing myths and constructing alternative myths - and, as corollaries to this, (2) leaders7 inherent tendency for risk aver- sion; and (3) the political climate under which the transfer of power occurred in the early 1990s. D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs ity o f T en ne ss ee , K no xv ill e] a t 1 0: 20 0 2 Se pt em be r 20 14 Cultural pluralism in Ethiopia and Eritrea 1059 Ethnic differences in Ethiopia Why did Ethiopia, which claimed three thousand years of continuous existence as a state, adopt a constitutional framework that codified seces- sion of its constituent groups? Why did Eritrea, whose existence as a political entity only extended to a little over a century, appear more united on the basis of Eritrean national identity and opt for a constitution that barely recognized the existence of diverse population groups? These questions can only be answered by looking at each country's history and the myths which accompanied this history. Almost each community has some type of a constitutive myth(s) intended to serve like glue in holding the members of the community together. In general, myths are rooted in past adversity and the ways in which, despite all odds, this adversity was overcome either through the sheer efforts of that community or through some supernatural inter- vention. Like many communities, Eritrea, and especially Ethiopia, have myths intended to provide unity of purpose. These myths have directly affected the present political systems of each. Two schools dominate interpretations of Ethiopian history. The first assumes that Ethiopian nationalism existed and is based on 'the legacy of the Axumite state symbolized by the monarchy, a distinct culture blended with Coptic Christian theology, a language with its own script, and a myth that developed out of its persistent confrontation with foreign encroachment (Gashaw 1993). Although this interpretation does not deny the existence of distinct cultural groups, it puts more emphasis on factors that promoted the unity of the peoples of Ethiopia. According to this interpretation, the core AmharaITigray culture was so powerful and pervasive that whoever seized state power had no alternative but to maintain the unique identity of the country (Gabre Sellassie 1975). Thus, far from being exclusionary, the Ethiopian state gave access to accom- plished individuals regardless of their ethnic background (Clapham 1987). This, it is further argued, has cemented pan-Ethiopian cultural traits common to all peoples of the land (Levine 1974). The second school challenges the interpretation of Ethiopia as a politi- cal entity in which all its peoples - regardless of the manner of incorpor- ation - were equal participants in shaping the destiny of the country, and focuses on Amhara hegemony and the exclusionary nature of the Ethiopian political system. Thus, Jalata (1993) argues that Ethiopian incorporation of Oromo regions was a classic colonial case, albeit by an African power, driven by the imperatives of economic exploitation of rich Oromo resources: Oromos were colonial subjects and never became an integral part of the Ethiopian polity. Similar arguments have also been advanced by Holcomb and Ibssa (1990) and Lewis (1993). But most important, and such interpretations notwithstanding, various groups, including Eritreans in 1961, and Tigrayans, Oromos, Afar and other D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs ity o f T en ne ss ee , K no xv ill e] a t 1 0: 20 0 2 Se pt em be r 20 14 1060 Assefaw Bariagaber groups after the Ethiopian revolution of 1974, have questioned and chal- lenged the very foundations of the Ethiopian state, and have called for a fresh look at, and a reconstruction of, Ethiopian history. At present there are about seventy cultural groups in Ethiopia of which the Oromo, Amhara, Tigray, Afar and Somalis are the largest but none has a demographic majority. Also, there are two dominant religious groups: Muslims, constituting about 40 per cent and Christians slightly higher. Nevertheless, the AmharaITigray Christian hegemony remained the most distinguishing feature of the Ethiopian state despite several attempts to alter this from within and without. Ahmed Gran7s Islamic conquests in the sixteenth century (Gorman 1981), Beta Israel's (Felasha) opposition to Christian hegemony in the fourteenth and fif- teenth centuries (Quirin 1993), and the Mahdist attacks from Sudan in the late nineteenth century (Erlich 1996) are cases in point. Religious rivalry, such as the above, cannot be separated from ethnic rivalry between the Christian AmharaITigray culture on the one side, and the Afar and Somali Muslims on the other. Similarly, Menelik 11's subjugation of the Oromos, a significant portion of which were Muslims, may be seen as part of the Christian-Muslim conflict matrix. According to Gorman (1981), such conflicts 'underscore the religious nature of the conflict that had transpired in the Horn' (p. 25). But this does not exhaust the roster of conflicts in the region. Amhara and Tigrayan encroachments in the bordering Afar lowlands to forcibly collect tribute, Afar-Somali competition for water and grazing land, Amhara incursions into tra- ditionally Somali regions, and the Oromo northward migration into lands previously occupied by the Amhara, Afar and Somali peoples constitute the economic dimensions of these conflicts. Since each of these groups had a distinct tradition and spoke a different language, such conflicts also carried an ethnic character. More recently, with the rise of Menelik I1 as emperor of Ethiopia in 1889, Amhara forces occupied most of the Somali Ogaden and the rich agricultural lands of southern and western Ethiopia. By the early 1900, traditional Ethiopia had roughly expanded four-fold and assumed its present size (Perham 1948): it became an empire encompassing cultur- ally distinct groups in its domain (Jalata 1993; Lewis 1993). Furthermore, the hitherto autonomous or semi-autonomous regions of Ethiopia, including Tigray, came under the central rule of Addis Ababa. With the modest expansion of the bureaucracy and the adoption of Amharic as the national language, the 'acculturation7 of peoples in the newly incor- porated regions began and continued for most of the twentieth century. That is, Ethiopia behaved like a nation-state when in fact it was an empire. Partly because of this, and partly because the Ethiopian state was never strong enough to spread its centralizing tentacles, it did not succeed in assimilating many of its peoples. Indeed, despite claims of the D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs ity o f T en ne ss ee , K no xv ill e] a t 1 0: 20 0 2 Se pt em be r 20 14 Cultural pluralism in Ethiopia and Eritrea 1061 pervasiveness of the AmharaITigray culture, Haile Selassie's govern- ment recognized the fragility of the ties that bound the various cultural groups. It refused to consider limited self-administration because 'Ethiopia [was] composed of different tribal groups which were far from regarding one another as members of the same nation . . .' (Erlich 1983, p. 34). Thus, strict control from the centre was maintained to hold the empire together. Except for Eritrea, such a control made it difficult for cultural groups to mount effective resistance until Haile Selassie was overthrown in 1974. The dynamics of group interaction discussed above define the context of the present ethnic conflicts; they constitute the long- term variables and are the givens upon which the political salience of present group cleavages is based. The revolutionary government instituted in 1974 officially recognized the 'question of nationalities7 as one of the many pressing issues facing Ethiopia. This recognition opened the way for the emergence of, what Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) call, 'political entrepreneurs7 to help define and articulate ethnic demands (p. 83). Each ethnic group presented itself as the most oppressed hoping to extract more government concessions. In response to spiraling ethnic demands, the Derg (the Amharic term for the military committee that overthrew Haile Selassie) issued the National Democratic Revolution Programme [NDRP] as a solution to the question of nationalities in Ethiopia. The programme, however, did not go far enough nor was it put into effect because of the Derg's repres- sive measures first against class-based and later against ethnicity-based political parties. According to Johnson and Johnson (1981), the Derg's repressive measures against class-based groups during 1976-77 'resulted in a predominance of nationalist currents' that engulfed Ethiopia in the 1980s (p. 181). That is, the Derg sought the resolution of ethnic issues through a Leninist model of a centralized state. Thus, by first creating high expectations of a truly democratic, multi- ethnic state and later suppressing the forces that were unleashed by such expectations, the revolution helped only to reify ethnic solidarities: ethnic movements proliferated in many parts of the country and pressed their demands for self-determination, many through armed revolt. Indeed, like the Soviet Union, which instituted a 'thoroughgoing state-sponsored codification and institutionalization of nationhood and nationality exclu- sively on a sub-state level rather than a state-wide level', and this later became the reason for its demise and the powerfully conflicting 'expec- tations of belonging' in the incipient successor states (Brubaker 1996, pp. 2627; 54; emphasis in original), the Derg never issued and carried out a prudent state-wide nationalities policy. This ultimately led to the secession of Eritrea and the near break-up of Ethiopia into several states. The Ethiopian revolution was therefore directly responsible for awakening the hitherto dormant sub-state identities and represented a medium-term variable in the steadily increasing salience of ethnic segmentation. D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs ity o f T en ne ss ee , K no xv ill e] a t 1 0: 20 0 2 Se pt em be r 20 14 1062 Assefaw Bariagaber The role of elites in identifying issues around which group identity could coalesce and in providing leadership for mobilized groups had thus far been minimal. Even during the 1974-75 tumultuous years, when spontaneous ethnic awakening shook Ethiopia, most elites hoped that satisfactory resolution of ethnic issues would come from the top. Indeed, many were not prepared to challenge the dominant culture openly and assumed such a role only after the Derg's drive for increased centraliza- tion became more evident. Among the many organizations that sought self-determination, the role of the Tigray People's Liberation Front [TPLF] and the Oromo Liberation Front [OLF] in group identity for- mation and mobilization are especially instructive. In its quest to mobilize the people of Tigray, the TPLF employed many tactics. First, it stressed the Tigrayan character of Axum - the seat of ancient 'Ethiopian' civilization and the origin of the Tigrigna and Amharic script; second, it emphasized the repeated Ethiopian victories over Egyptian, Mahdist and Italian forces in the latter half of the nine- teenth century were essentially Tigrayan endeavours; and third, it attrib- uted the present poverty and underdevelopment in Tigray to a calculated Amhara policy to inflict damage on the population of Tigray (Markakis 1994). The TPLF also employed Tigrigna (rather than the usual Amharic) in all its communications, conducted massive literacy cam- paigns, and took major initiatives to raise the cultural as well as the politi- cal consciousness of the Tigrayan peasantry. It rejected a significant part of the existing Ethiopian historiography and reconstructed a new one where Tigrayans dominated. Through selective applications of certain symbols, such as Axum and Adwa, the TPLF succeeded in creating a new, or as the case may be, an old but revived Tigrayan personality. For example, the obelisk of Axum featured prominently in TPLF's insignia as if to emphasize that the present Tigrayans were inheritors of the great Axumite civilization. Similarly, 'because periods of hardships tend to be stronger forgers of identity than triumphs' (Abbay 1997, p. 334), the TPLF consistently reminded Tigrayans of the brutal government sup- pression of the Weyane revolt in Tigray in 1943. In fact, the TPLF referred to its campaign as the 'Second Weyane'. Also, 'the stories, poems, and songs that had been collected from the Weyane of 1943 were revitalized and popularized in 1975' (Abbay 1997, p. 334). As Cohen (1974) has argued, and as the TPLF has meticulously applied in Tigray, the manipulation of certain symbols served as a means of instigating communal action and helped to negotiate identity for- mation in intergroup competitive relations. Indeed, the dramatic rise in the ranks of the TPLF in the 1980s is evidence of the high degree of support that the organization enjoyed in Tigray. Furthermore, Hendrie's (1991) report of TPLF-organized cross-border migration to Sudan of an estimated 200,000 Tigrayan refugees in 1984-85 - although the TPLF advised them to seek aid in government-controlled areas - and trek back D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs ity o f T en ne ss ee , K no xv ill e] a t 1 0: 20 0 2 Se pt em be r 20 14 Cultural pluralism in Ethiopia and Eritrea 1063 a year or so later in a similar fashion despite escalating levels of conflict in Tigray is further evidence of the complete identification of the Tigrayans with the TPLF and its nationalist aspiration. The reconstruction of Tigrayan identity provides an interesting case of the way that certain symbols are selected, manipulated, and even con- structed by elites in their struggle against ethnic others. For example, the historic rivalry between the Tigrayans and the Amhara occupied a central position in the discourse of Tigrayan nationalism: the emergence of the Amhara as the most dominant group in this rivalry is seen as a direct cause of the utter poverty in Tigray. But the rivalry between the Tigrayans and other groups (the Afar, for example), which in antiquity were almost equally widespread, is seen as inconsequential. Treating this otherwise would not have advanced elite interests of seizing state power from the Amhara. Thus, by their selective manipulations of primordial elements and linking it with the recent past, Tigrayan elites were simul- taneously able to mobilize their co-ethnics and to prevent the formation of a potentially powerful grand coalition of other ethnic groups. The OLF, on the other hand, employed different tactics in mobilizing the Oromo. Instead of appealing to the critical role that the Oromo played in the making of modern Ethiopia, it turned to pre-incorporation Oromo social and cultural system. Crucial in the identity formation of Oromo people was the adoption of 'Oromo' in place of 'Galla', as they were commonly called before, and the use of the Latin script for Oromiffa, the native language. This represented a critical step in self- definition and the reconstruction of the self. Bulcha (1996) contends that the adoption of a non-Geez script for Oromiffa (Tigrigna and Amharic use the Geez script) made the socio-linguistic boundary of the Oromo more distinct and had advanced the quest for Oromo national identity. In an effort to tie the Oromo with the past, the OLF embraced the gada - 'a "republican" organization of assemblies, election, and rotation of officers, based on age grades,. . .' (Lewis 1993, p. 170) as a rallying symbol of unique identity and as a potential political formula in a future independent Oromo state (Sorenson 1996). To attain statehood, Oromo nationalist discourse emphasized the cultural unity of the Oromos (Jalata 1993; Baxter 1994) and their presumed common ancestry (Bulcha 1996). An Oromo state was seen not as an end in itself but rather as the only instrument of cultural survival; that is, state power became a condition necessary for maintaining cultural identity. In this way, Oromo national- ist klites hoped to unite the peasantry (which may or may not care about a state but certainly cares about culture) behind, what Anderson (1983) would characterize as, an 'imagined' Oromia. The selection of particular symbols is, of course, contingent upon present realities and the goals that elites aim for. In Tigray, the goal was to seize state power: hence the rallying symbols were selected, and indeed constructed, in order not to antagonize other groups outside the D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs ity o f T en ne ss ee , K no xv ill e] a t 1 0: 20 0 2 Se pt em be r 20 14 1064 Assefaw Bariagaber power structure. In the case of the Oromo, the goal was to 'exit' from the existing Ethiopian state and establish a sovereign Oromo state: hence the targets included groups opposed to the realization of this goal, including the Amhara, Tigrayans and the Somalis. As mentioned earlier, other liberation movements also existed in Ethiopia. The sole issue which kept a semblance of intergroup unity in the 1980s was their total opposition and their determination to overthrow the Derg. After this was accomplished in 1991, disagreements over the future of Ethiopia and the type of government to be instituted surfaced. The 'question of nationalities7, kindled but unresolved during the Derg's rule, became the sole dominant issue when dozens of groups debated the Transitional Charter in 1991 and ethnicity became central in drafting the 1995 constitution. Indeed, throughout the latter half of the 1970s and the 1980s, group klites had stressed, to use Brass's (1991) phrase, 'the variety of ways in which the members of the group were similar to each other and collectively different from others7 (p. 21). It appeared therefore that a constitutional stipulation with generous devolution of power was the only way of keeping Ethiopia together, especially after Eritrea became a de facto independent nation in 1991. The fall of the Ethiopian government had helped to transform ethnic- ity from being one of several important issues to being the only issue in redefining Ethiopia and, as such, constituted the short-term variable which directly influenced the nature of the new constitution. The pro- gressive weakening of the state was thus critical in the transformation of the constitutive myth of Ethiopian-ness, based on a core culture, into a new Ethiopia of distinct cultures, where no specific group enjoyed special claims to the state. Indeed, the conquest of the centre by the periphery provided the latter with the opportunity to devise a constitution that redefined the very foundation of the Ethiopian state. Religious and ethnic differences in Eritrea Examination of societal cleavages in Eritrea reveals the existence of two dominant religious groups - Muslims and Christians - and a multitude of ethnic/linguistic groups. In general, the Muslims, comprising eight dis- tinct cultural groups and about 50 per cent of the population, live in the lowlands and are pasturalists; the Christians generally live in the high- lands and are sedentary agriculturalists. Because of their semi-nomadic lifestyle, lowlanders have competed for water and grazing land for many years and this has produced internecine conflicts. The conflict between the Beni Amir and the Kunama, usefully exploited by successive Ethiopian governments, is one such example. The Tigrigna Christians comprise the other 50 per cent of the population but live in an area of about a fifth of the Eritrean landmass: they have occasionally encroached into the low-lying regions where Muslims lived (Woldemicael1993). This D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs ity o f T en ne ss ee , K no xv ill e] a t 1 0: 20 0 2 Se pt em be r 20 14 Cultural pluralism in Ethiopia and Eritrea 1065 contributed to conflicts with religious and ethnic dimensions (Markakis 1987; Negash 1987). Such conflicts subsided when the Italians colonized Eritrea in 1890 and established a centralized colonial state. The combi- nation of religious and ethnic conflicts therefore constituted the long- term variables and, as in Ethiopia, are the givens which defined the parameters of religious and ethnic cleavages that existed in Eritrea between 1945 and 1980. A survey of political parties in Eritrea in the 1940s indicated the exist- ence of two major parties, more or less organized according to the geo- graphic and religious affiliation of the population (Sherman 1980), with an overwhelming majority of Muslims calling for independence and a majority of Christians favouring union with Ethiopia. As a compromise, and also because of international political exigencies of the time (Yohannes 1991), Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia under the Ethiopian crown in 1 9 Z 3 The federal arrangement, however, collapsed in 1962 and Eritrea was formally incorporated into the Ethiopian Empire. Many attribute this to the failure of Eritrean political parties - some of which had ethnic and religious orientation - to mount a unified opposition to the systematic dismantling of the federation. For example, the Moslem League had opposed the federal arrangement and, when its quest for an independent Eritrea failed, it defended the federation. The Christian dominated Unionist Party, on the other hand, campaigned for union with Ethiopia. Its efforts contributed to the slow erosion of the federal structure and Eritrea's eventual incorporation into Ethiopia. As a consequence, the Muslim-dominated Eritrean Liberation Front [ELF] was formed in 1961 to press for Eritrean independence. During the first few years of its existence, the ELF cast the Eritrean struggle as an ArabIMuslim struggle for self-determination. Disagree- ments over the character of Eritrea and the role religion played in that struggle ultimately led to the formation of the Eritrean People's Liber- ation Front [EPLF]. This development opened the way for a fresh attempt at a liberal re-definition of Eritrea where social solidarities based on religion and ethnicity were viewed as inconsistent with Eritrean nationhood. Despite this, the EPLF took notice of the power of religion and ethnicity in Eritrean politics. For example, the EPLF leadership was composed of almost an equal number of Christians and Muslims and rep- resented major ethnicllinguistic groups in contrast to the dominance of Muslims from the western lowlands in the ELF. This grand coalition of Christians and Muslims, Tigrigna and non-Tigrigna linguistic groups, enhanced the national character of the EPLF and made the construction of Eritrean national identity much easier. Among the items which contributed to the formation of Eritrean national identity are the constant references to the dehumanizing experi- ences of all Eritreans under external rule, including Italy and Ethiopia, and the underestimations of the shared cultural characteristics, especially D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs ity o f T en ne ss ee , K no xv ill e] a t 1 0: 20 0 2 Se pt em be r 20 14 1066 Assefaw Bariagaber with Ethiopia. Woldemicael (1993) states that the EPLF had considered the proposal to adopt the Latin script for all Eritrean languages, including the Tigrigna and Tigre languages which use the Geez script. The EPLF also stressed how the armed struggle and the unparalleled fortitude of the Eritrean people had transformed Eritrean society into a cohesive unit and used vernacular languages in official communications in contrast to the dominance of Arabic in the ELF. Such policies increased the support base of the EPLF from Muslims and Christians alike. It is also instructive to note how Christians in large numbers came to support Eritrean nationalism in the mid-1970s when it had traditionally been a Muslim preserve. First, following the weakening of government authority in the aftermath of the Ethiopian revolution of 1974, both the EPLF and the ELF mobilized their forces to the hitherto government-con- trolled highlands where Christians traditionally lived. This provided the liberation movements with the opportunity of reaching population groups who have largely remained as spectators. Second, the Ethiopian govern- ment responded to such presence with a series of suppressive measures in the highlands. The ensuing government violations of human rights against civilians, hitherto confined to the lowland areas where Muslims tradition- ally lived, became nationwide. As a result, many Christians joined the ranks of the opposition, especially the EPLF, and Christians and Muslims fought side by side for national independence. By the mid-1980s, the political salience of religious and ethnic cleav- ages had declined and Eritrean national identity was set on firm ground. Although the ELF no longer enjoyed the prominent role it had played before the EPLF established its hegemony in Eritrea in 1982, it had also made concerted efforts to present itself as a truly national organization by including more Christians in leadership positions. The emergence of the EPLF therefore constituted a medium-term variable that trans- formed ethnicitylreligion from being a primary issue in Eritrean national- ist discourse to one of secondary importance. The result of the 1993 referendum in Eritrea, characterized as 'a virtual unanimity . . . for Eritrean independence' (Fessehatzion 1996, p. 167) underscores the central role that nationalist movements, especially the EPLF, had played in redefining Eritrean identity. In 1991 the Ethiopian government collapsed and the EPLF formed a new government in Eritrea. The onslaught on ethnic and religious soli- darities which began when the EPLF was founded in the early 1970s made such solidarities irrelevant in the new nation. Except for the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement, thus far unable to pose a serious threat to the government despite its decade-old campaign, no organiz- ation has explicitly recognized ethnicity or religion as politically salient in contemporary E~- i t rea .~ The constitution adopted in 1997 has put to rest any doubt regarding the secular and non-ethnic Eritrea. The collapse of the Ethiopian government and the formation of an EPLF government D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs ity o f T en ne ss ee , K no xv ill e] a t 1 0: 20 0 2 Se pt em be r 20 14 Cultural pluralism in Ethiopia and Eritrea 1067 in 1991 constituted the short-term variables that helped to define the nature of the new Eritrean constitution. Like Ethiopia therefore, religious and ethnic cleavages became salient as a result of the weaken- ing - indeed, the demise - of the Jacobin state established by the Italians in 1890. Unlike Ethiopia, however, the quest for independence and the unity of purpose that this demanded made such cleavages secondary. Moreover, the Leninist model which reified group identity in Ethiopia did not take hold in Eritrea partly because of the former's tenuous control of most of Eritrea and partly because of the emphasis on Eritrean-ness in the course of the struggle for independence. None the less, in both countries, the political salience of cultural cleavages varied according to fluctuations of state power. A comparison of the trajectories of ethnicity What were the implications of the varying ethnic trajectories on the constitutional frameworks that Ethiopia and Eritrea have adopted? The types of relationships that existed among cultural groups in Ethiopia and Eritrea in deep historical time, as explained above, may be termed as conflictual; these relationships developed over a long historical period and for various reasons, not least of which were societal segmentation and resource competition (Markakis 1994). There is nothing abnormal in such a relationship especially when the physical (scarcity of resources) and religious (ChristianIMuslirn) environments are taken into account. Such variables, to borrow Geertz's (1973) description, are the '"givens" - of social existence . . . [whose givenness] stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular lan- guage, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practice' (p. 259). However, they do not provide conditions sufficient for recent conflicts between the cultural groups in both countries. They have to be activated by other factors, including 'political entrepreneurs' who linked present uncertainties with past experiences. The long-term vari- ables, or primordial attachments, were largely similar in nature in Ethiopia and Eritrea, and remained somewhat irrelevant until the 1940s in Eritrea and the early 1970s in Ethiopia. In the former, religious and ethnic cleavages became salient after the centralized colonial state was replaced by an open system with competitive party elections; in the latter, such cleavages became salient after the autocratic government of Haile Selassie was overthrown and replaced by what initially appeared to be a democratizing military regime. In both cases, faced with a new environ- ment of uncertainties, cultural klites appealed for support from their co- ethnics in order to influence policies of the new governments. Thus, in Eritrea, religiouslethnic cleavages dominated the political / environment roughly from 1946 to 1980; however, as it became clear i later, this benefited no cultural group. As a consequence, the EPLF was , I D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs ity o f T en ne ss ee , K no xv ill e] a t 1 0: 20 0 2 Se pt em be r 20 14 1068 Assefaw Bariagaber established in the early 1970s and made a determined effort to construct a new Eritrean identity. In addition, the Ethiopian revolution had a posi- tive impact on this identity because it helped to transform the idea of an independent Eritrea from a possibility to a probability; the visible weak- nesses in the Ethiopian military in the aftermath of the 1974 revolution had emboldened the ELF and the EPLF both of which began conduct- ing political and military operations near Asmara, the capital of Eritrea. Similarly, the large number of recruits from the highlands which swelled the ranks of the liberation movements in the mid-1970s are evidences in support of this contention. The establishment of the EPLF - a medium-term variable - negatively affected the salience of cultural cleavages in Eritrea. In Ethiopia, however, persistent ethnic cleavages, suppressed until 1974, were brought into the open as a result of the revolution of 1974, and ethnic- based organizations proliferated all over the country. The revolution - a medium-term variable - positively affected the salience of cultural cleav- ages in Ethiopia. The overthrow of the Ethiopian government in 1991 helped formalize what had increasingly become clear in the 1980s; in Ethiopia, cultural pluralism became the most important variable in the process of drafting the new Ethiopian constitution; in Eritrea, cultural pluralism, at least in the formal sense, ceased to exist. Indeed, the Lenin- ist model of resolving the national question, embedded in Ethiopia for quite some time, was simply irrelevant in Eritrea. The above discussion makes it evident that the transformation of cul- tural cleavages in Ethiopia and Eritrea followed different trajectories. However, there was also a similarity: each trajectory involved both evo- lutionary and revolutionary/qualitative transformations and resembled, what Eldredge and Gould (1972) have referred to as, 'punctuated equi- l i b r i ~ m ' . ~ Although many have reservations about applying this theory to the social sciences, it is used here as a metaphor for the structure of variations in the political relevance of ethnicity and religion. Fearon and Laitin (1996) have also emphasized the punctuated nature of ethnic con- flicts in their study of ethnic cooperation. Indeed, transformations in the political salience of cultural cleavages in Eritrea and, especially Ethiopia, occurred within short periods of time, mainly due to regime changes. This does not mean that such transformations are a function of regime changes only: tensions between cultural communities have been sim- mering for quite some time but had remained hidden partly because of government suppression and partly because of lack of experienced leaders capable of mobilizing cultural groups. Rather, regime changes had qualitatively altered the nature of the relationships between differ- ent groups and had given rise to elites who stepped in to give direction and purpose to ethnic demands. When negotiations about constitutional formulas started in Ethiopia and Eritrea at the beginning of the 1990s, the vectors of ethnicitylreligion D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs ity o f T en ne ss ee , K no xv ill e] a t 1 0: 20 0 2 Se pt em be r 20 14 Cultural pluralism in Ethiopia and Eritrea 1069 in each were already pointing in opposite directions. It would have been risky for klites - and elites are averse to risk - to redirect the ongoing processes. That is, the policies that the victorious parties followed after they assumed power was essentially a continuation of the zero-sum policy followed during their years in opposition. The EPLF, as the hegemon in Eritrea, consistently followed policies of no compromise with the government and any other opposition group in Eritrea, and finally succeeded in achieving its goal. Hence, it established a centralized government which did not include other groups. The TPLF, on the other hand, did not establish its hegemony all over Ethiopia and entered into an alliance with other smaller groups and founded the Ethiopian Peoples7 Revolutionary Democratic Front [EPRDF] to facilitate the overthrow of the government. Despite belated calls for a broad-based government by Mengistu, the EPRDF persisted in its strategy of all or none, at least vis-a-vis the government. It succeeded in overthrowing the regime in 1991 and established a coalition government which will at least ensure its pivotal role in post-Mengistu Ethiopia. In other words, there existed a remarkable continuity in the EPLF and EPRDF policies despite profound changes in the state system in the Horn of Africa in the early 1990s. Risk aversion, characteristic of human and organizational behaviour, is a norm in any decision-making environment, especially in periods of higher uncertainty - and therefore higher risk - like the ones that pre- vailed in Ethiopia and Eritrea in the aftermath of the overthrow of the Ethiopian government in 1991. The behaviour of the victorious forces in choosing the particular type of constitution has to be understood in the light of the ethnic trajectories traversed over time and the rather uncertain political environment of the 1990s, especially considering that the leaders of these organizations have never had any prior experience in the management of state power and were fearful of the unknown. Conclusion Was it inevitable for Ethiopia and Eritrea to adopt such contrasting con- stitutions? Of course, it is difficult to establish conclusively the inevitability of events and processes in the social sciences, primarily because of the interactions of numerous variables, some of which are not easily identifiable. Moreover, the variables identified may not be suitably isolated to assess and evaluate their independent effects. Never- theless, in seeking explanations of constitutional developments in Ethiopia and Eritrea, more important variables have been identified including the vectors of ethnicity, the prevailing political uncertainties, and elite risk-avoidance behaviour. Together they point to a strong probability, if not inevitability, that such constitutions would be adopted. Given that the two constitutions are a reality at present, D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs ity o f T en ne ss ee , K no xv ill e] a t 1 0: 20 0 2 Se pt em be r 20 14 1070 Assefaw Bariagaber perhaps a more relevant issue would be to see if the constitutions are capable of accommodating group demands. At present Ethiopia and Eritrea continue to face external as well as internal challenges. For example, both have accused Sudan, their common neighbour, of fermenting opposition, especially from Islamist groups. Eritrea is especially sensitive to this, partly because of the pres- ence of tens of thousands of Eritrean refugees in Sudan, who, because of their state of vulnerability, may avail themselves of the services of the latter, and partly because its constitution provides for a unitary govern- ment with no significant devolution of power. Equality of languages, guaranteed by the Eritrean constitution, may not be enough in the long run. Indeed, some groups have called for an explicit constitutional recog- nition of Arabic and Tigrigna as national languages. As Woldemicael (1993) has contended, perhaps 'the most serious challenge [in Eritrea] . . . is the persisting cultural factionalism predicated on Christian-Muslim split . . .' (p. 197). However, an encouraging sign at present - apart from the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement's decidedly religious character - is that no opposition group, including the Eritrean Liberation Front-Revol- utionary Council [ELF-RC] and the Eritrean Liberation Front-Abdallah Idris Group, has challenged the secular nature of the State of Eritrea. Also, no organization has thus far suggested reorganizing Eritrea along religious or ethnic lines. None the less, some form of devolution of power to local administrative units would go a long way in diffusing potential group conflict. Ethiopia continues to face challenges from groups with diametrically opposed conceptions of an Ethiopian state. On the one hand, groups such as the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party [EPRP] dismiss the present constitution as a recipe for disaster and have called for alterna- tive forms of federal arrangements. On the other hand, groups such as the OLF, while expressing support for the constitution, have accused the present government of heavy-handedness and, as a result, have demanded immediate exercise of the right to self-determination up to and including secession. The government has so far resisted such demands mainly because the EPRDF-affiliated Oromo People's Demo- cratic Organization [OPDO], which controls the State Council of Oromia, is not interested in such an exercise. It would be up to the government to convince opposition leaders that the generous devolution of power already in place was the best way to meet existing group demands and that secession, like a revolution, is just a remedial right to be exercised only in cases of extreme and repeated injustice^.^ Acknowledgements I gratefully acknowledge the research support provided by the National Endowment for the Humanities [NEH]. I would also like to thank D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs ity o f T en ne ss ee , K no xv ill e] a t 1 0: 20 0 2 Se pt em be r 20 14 Cultural pluralism in Ethiopia and Eritrea 1071 Professor Crawford Young and the 1997 NEH Summer Seminar partici- pants at the University of Wisconsin-Madison for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this article. Notes 1. The terminology as used in Ethiopia to refer to a cultural community is nation, nationality, or people. However, I have used terms such as ethnic, cultural, or religious group to refer to any collectivity regardless of whether that group constituted a nation, nationality, or people for no other reason except brevity. Such terminology, as used here, does not in any way question the rights and claims which these groups make on the basis of that identification. In fact, the rights of such collectivities are identical, as indicated in the 1995 constitution. 2. The design employed here resembles the 'most-similar-systems' research design. This design minimizes the effects of common characteristics on the explanatory variables and may be viewed as one that provides a semblance of experimental control for poten- tially confounding variables. For more information on this, please consult Przeworski and Teune (1970), pp. 430-35. 3. A detailed discussion of the Ethio-Eritrean federal arrangement may be found in Yohannes (1991), pp. 89-228. See also Negash (1997), pp. 71-81. 4. For example, the programmes of the Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council [ELF-RC] and the Eritrean Liberation Front-Abdallah Idris Group do not explicitly mention ethnicity or religion as politically relevant in Eritrea. However, their call for a constitutional recognition of Arabic and Tigrigna as official languages of Eritrea appears to be an implicit acknowledgment of the existence of two major cultural groups. 5. This theory posits that 'species undergo long periods of little or no evolutionary change . . . [and that these periods of equilibrium] are broken (i.e. punctuated) by relatively rapid [transformations]' (Somit and Peterson 1992, p. 4). 6. In an unpublished manuscript entitled, Secession and the New Ethiopian Consti- tution, written before Ethiopia adopted the 1995 constitution, Professor Allen Buchanan, University of Wisconsin, Madison, compares the right to a revolution and the right to secession and argues that the latter should not be a constitutional right in the same way as the former is not. That is: . . . the idea of a constitutional right to revolution is bizarre, to say the least, precisely because this right is viewed as a remedy to be applied only when the constitutional process as a whole has failed to protect basic rights. Hence it is not surprising (sic) that (to my knowledge) no constitutions include a right to revolution as a legal right. Instead, the right to revolution is understood as a moral right to be invoked when all consti- tutional rights have failed (Buchanan, undated, p. 10; emphasis in original). References ABBAY, ALEMSEGED 1997 'The trans-Mareb past in the present', The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol. 35, no.2, pp. 321-34 ANDERSON, BENEDICT 1983 Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso Editions BAXTER, P. T. W. 1994 'The creation and construction of Oromo nationality', in Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis (eds), Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa, London: James Currey and Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, pp. 167-86 BENEDICT, BURTON 1962 'Stratification in plural societies', American Anthropologist, vol. 64, no. 6, pp. 1235-46 BRASS, PAUL R. 1991 Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison, New Delhi, India: Sage Publications D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs ity o f T en ne ss ee , K no xv ill e] a t 1 0: 20 0 2 Se pt em be r 20 14 1072 Assefaw Bariagaber BRUBAKER, ROGERS 1996 Nationalism Refranzed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press BUCHANAN, ALLEN (undated) 'Secession and the New Ethiopian Constitution', an unpublished manuscript BULCHA, MEKURIA 1996 'The survival and reconstruction of Oromo national identity', in P. T. W. Baxter. Jan Hultin and Alessandro Truilzi (eds), Being and Becoming Oromo: Historical and Anthropological Enquiries, Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, pp. 48-66 CLAPHAM. CHRISTOPHER 1987 Transformation and Continuity in Revolutionary Ethiopia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press COHEN, ABNER 1974 Two-Dimensional Man: A n Essay on the Anthropology of Power and Synzbolisnz in Conzplex Society, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press ELDREDGE, NILES and GOULD, STEPHEN J. 1972 'Punctuated equilibria: an alterna- tive to phyletic gradualism', in T. J. M. Schopf (ed.), Models in Paleobiology, San Francisco, CA: Freeman Cooper, pp. 82-1 15 ELLER, JACK DAVID and COUGHLAN. REED M. 1993 'The poverty of primordial- ism: the demystification of ethnic attachments', Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 183-201 EMERSON, RUPERT 1960 From Empire to Nation: The Rise of Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ERLICH, HAGGAI 1983 The Struggle over Eritrea, 1962-1978: War and Revolution in the Horn of Afr-ica, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution --- 1996 Ras Alula and the Scramble for Africa, Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press FEARON. JAMES D. and LAITIN, DAVID D. 1996 'Explaining interethnic cooperation', American Political Science Review, vol. 90, no. 4, pp. 715-35 GABRE SELLASSIE, ZEWDE 1975 Yohannes IV of Ethiopia: A Political Biography, Oxford: Clarendon Press FESSEHATZION, TEKIE 1996 'The Eritrean referendum of 1993', Eritrean Studies Review, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 167-75 GASHAW, SOLOMON 1993 'Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Ethiopia', in Crawford Young (ed.), The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralisnz: The Nation-State at Bay?, Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 138-57 GEERTZ, CLIFFORD 1973 The Interpretation of Cultures, New York: Basic Books GORMAN, ROBERT F. 1981 Political Conflict on the Horn of Africa, New York: Praeger GROSBY, STEVEN 1994 'The verdict of history: the inexpungeable tie of primordiality - a response to Eller and Coughlan', Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 17, no. 1 , pp. 164-71 HENDRIE, BARBARA 1991 'The politics of repatriation: the Tigrayan refugee repatri- ation, 1985-1987', Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 200-18 HOBSBAWM, ERIC and RANGER, TERENCE (eds) 1953 The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press HOLCOMB, BONNIE K. and IBSSA, SISAI 1990 The Invention of Ethiopia, Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press JALATA, ASAFA 1993 Oromia and Ethiopia: State Formation and Ethnonational Conflict, 1868-1992, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers JOHNSON, MICHAEL and JOHNSON, TRISH 1981 'Eritrea: the national question and the logic of protracted struggle', African Affairs, vol. 80, no. 319, pp. 181-95 LEVINE, DONALD N. 1974 Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution o,f Multiethnic Society, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press LEWIS, HERBERT S. 1993 'Ethnicity in Ethiopia: the view from below (and from the south. east, and west)', in Crawiord Young (ed.), The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralisnz: The Nation-State at Bay?, Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 158-78 MARKAKIS, JOHN 1987 'The nationalist revolution in Eritrea', The Jo~u.rzul 0.f Modern African Studies, vol. 25, no. 4, pp. 64348 - 1994 'Ethnic conflict and the state in the Horn of Africa', in Katsuyoshi Fukui and D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs ity o f T en ne ss ee , K no xv ill e] a t 1 0: 20 0 2 Se pt em be r 20 14 Cultural pluralism in Ethiopia and Eritrea 1073 John Markakis (eds), Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa, London: James Currey and Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, pp. 217-38 NEGASH, TEKESTE 1987 Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, 1882-1941: Policies, Praxis, and Impact, Uppsala, Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksell International - 1997 Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience, Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet PERHAM, MARGERY 1948 The Government of Ethiopia, New York: Oxford University Press PRZEWORSKI, ADAM and TEUNE, HENRY 1970 The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry, New York: John Wiley and Sons QUIRIN. JAMES 1993 'Ethnicity, caste, class, and state in Ethiopian history: the case of the Beta Israel (Falasha)', in Crawford Young (ed.), The Rising Tide of Cultural Pluralism: The Nation-State at Bay?, Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 200-21 RABUSHKA, ALVIN and SHEPSLE, KENNETH R. 1972 Politics in Pl~lral Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability, Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company SHERMAN, RICHARD 1980 Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution, New York: Praeger SMITH, ANTHONY D. 1991 'The nation: invented. imagined, reconstructed?', Millen- nium: Jo~lrnal o,f International Studies, vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 353-68 SMITH, DONALD 1964 Religion and Political Development, Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Company SOMIT, ALBERT and PETERSON, STEVEN A. 1992 'Punctuated equilibrium: the view from the elephant', in Albert Sonlit and Steven A. Peterson (eds), The Dynamics of Evolution: The P~lrzctziated Equilibrium Debate in the Natural and Social Sciences, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 1-18 SORENSON, JOHN 1996 'Learning to be Oromo: nationalist discourse in the diaspora', Social Identities, vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 439-67 TILLEY, VIRGINIA 1997 'The terms of the debate: untangling language about ethnicity and ethnic movements', Ethnic and Racial S t ~ d i e s , vol. 20, no. 3, pp. 497-522 WOLDEMICAEL, TEKLE M. 1993 'The cultural construction of Eritrean nationalist movements', in Crawford Young (ed.). The Rising Tide of Cultural Plliralism: The Nation- State at Bay?, Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 179-99 YOHANNES, OKBAZGHI 1991 Eritrea, A Pawn in World Politics, Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press YOUNG, CRAWFORD 1976 The Politics of C u l t ~ ~ r a l Pluralism, Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press ASSEFAW BARIAGABER is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Nebraska at Kearney. ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, University of Nebraska at Kearney, Kearney, NE 68849, USA. D ow nl oa de d by [ U ni ve rs ity o f T en ne ss ee , K no xv ill e] a t 1 0: 20 0 2 Se pt em be r 20 14