Special Issue: The Oromo in Ethiopian Studies: Confronting Challenges to Politically Engaged Scholarship || The Rise of Coffee and the Demise of Colonial Autonomy: The Oromo Kingdom of Jimma and Political Centralization in Ethiopia

The Rise of Coffee and the Demise of Colonial Autonomy: The Oromo Kingdom of Jimma and Political Centralization in Ethiopia Author(s): Guluma Gemeda Source: Northeast African Studies, New Series, Vol. 9, No. 3, Special Issue: The Oromo in Ethiopian Studies: Confronting Challenges to Politically Engaged Scholarship (2002), pp. 51-74 Published by: Michigan State University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41931280 . Accessed: 12/06/2014 19:18 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Michigan State University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Northeast African Studies. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=msupress http://www.jstor.org/stable/41931280?origin=JSTOR-pdf http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp The Rise of Coffee and the Demise of Colonial Autonomy: The Oromo Kingdom of Jimma and Political Centralization in Ethiopia Guluma Gemeda University of Michigan-Flint introduction In the late nineteenth century, King Menelik II (d. 1913) of Shewa con- quered the regions south of his kingdom and created the modern Ethiopian empire. From Entoto, where the imperial court was estab- lished in the late 1870s, he sent out his soldiers to the south and the southwest and annexed vast Oromo and Omotic territories. The admin- istration of the conquered regions was maintained by loyal northern soldiers and their commanders, who facilitated the transfer of resources to the imperial center. The soldiers ( naftanya ) were garrisoned at strategic places ( katama ) to suppress any resistance and ensure imper- ial control. The specific nature of the colonial administration was deter- mined by a number of factors such as the level of initial resistance, the economic and political conditions of the territory, the location of the province, and the strategic interest of the empire. Ethiopianists have classified the postconquest imperial administration of the south into three categories: the qurt-gibr or fixed tribute-paying autonomous regions; the territories of gabbar or tribute-paying subjects; and the bor- derlands or frontier zones.1 The indigenous rulers of the fixed trib- ute-paying regions initially enjoyed some autonomy from the imperial center. Paying fixed annual tributes, they escaped the excessive ® Northeast African Studies (ISSN 0740-9133) Vol. 9, No. 3 (New Series) 2002, pp. 51-74 51 This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 52 Guluma Gemeda demands of taxation and labor, and the burden of sustaining Menelik's soldiers. Social and political dislocation was relatively minimal in the semi-independent regions. On the other hand, the gabbar territories and the "fringe peripheries" were directly controlled and heavily taxed by imperial soldiers. Besides annual tribute payments, they furnished the soldiers with wide-ranging services and provisions. Over time, however, the differences between the various administrative categories faded away as the imperial govern- ment tightened its control over all the provinces of the empire. Such changes were not very visible during the reign of Menelik (1889-1913). But after Ras Taffari (Emperor Haile Sellassie, after 1930) came to power in 1916, the imperial administration was more centralized and its means of economic extraction systematized. Between 1916 and 1936, Ras Taffari/Haile Sellassie eliminated the semiautonomous status of sev- eral regions and created an "absolutist state."2 During this period, the autonomous status of Jimma, the most prosperous province in the south- west, was suddenly eliminated.3 This article examines the relationship between political centraliza- tion and the penetration of the market economy in Ethiopia during the early twentieth century. It attempts to show how increased coffee pro- duction and export, despite its contribution to the prosperity of Jimma, undermined the kingdom's autonomy and accelerated Haile Sellassie's drive for the creation of a centralized bureaucratic state. The annexation of Jimma occurred in 1932 during a political crisis in the kingdom, an event that I will discuss later. The Political Context of Jim ma's Autonomy The kingdom of Jimma was one of the five Oromo monarchies of the Gibe region before it was conquered by Menelik's army in the early 1880s. It emerged in the second half of the eighteenth century and its state structure was consolidated during the reign of Abba Jifar I (r. 1830-5 5). 4 Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Jimma fought against its neighbors, extended its frontiers to the east and south- east, and eventually became the most powerful kingdom in the region. By the 1870s, it controlled the fertile agricultural lands and the important This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp The Rise of Coffee and the Demise of Colonial Autonomy 53 trade routes in the Gibe Valley that linked Kafa in the south with Gondar in the north and other markets in central Ethiopia.5 During the early 1880s, despite its relative power, Jimma's ambitions were kept in check by political events in the Gibe Valley. In 1881, the kingdom was confronted by two Abyssinian powers from the north. First, it was challenged by the forces of King Takla Haymanot (d. 1901) of Gojam. Shortly after Emperor Yohannes IV of Ethiopia made him "King of Gojam and Kafa" in 1881, Takla Haymanot sent his army to the Gibe Valley to conquer the Oromo kingdoms and the Omotic Kafa. The young sultan of Jimma, Abba Jifar II (r. 1878-1930), planned to resist the Gojamé army. Concerned that the enemy was better armed than Jimma's militia, the more experienced court officials refused to endorse his plan.6 Abba Jifar surrendered immediately. But Gojam' s domination of Jimma ended abruptly when the Shewan army of King Menelik defeated Takla Haymanoťs Gojamé forces at the Battle of Embabo on 6 June 1882. Abba Jifar accepted Menelik's suzerainty and Jimma came under Shewan control.7 Because he submitted peacefully, Abba Jifar was able to negotiate with Menelik and receive autonomous status for his kingdom. The details of the agreement between Menelik and Abba Jifar are not fully documented, but it is widely believed that Abba Jifar was allowed to rule his kingdom in return for loyalty and the regular payment of fixed annual tributes. Menelik promised not to garrison his soldiers in Jimma or to impose Christianity on the Muslim population of the kingdom. On his part, Abba Jifar agreed to pay annual tributes and support the Abyssinian army in the conquest of the regions to the southwest of Jimma. According to the agreement, each year in November or December, Abba Jifar went to Addis Ababa to deliver his tribute to Menelik in per- son. In October 1886, Abba Jifar submitted his tribute including ivory, civet, honey, gold, and other local products.8 In 1897, he paid 7,000 Maria Theresa (MT) dollars, 4,000 ounces of gold, and large quantities of ivory and honey.9 He also assisted Menelik's generals to conquer the Omotic-speaking kingdoms of the southwest. In 1894, Abba Jifar joined Menelik and his commanders in the conquest of Walyata; and in 1897, he assisted Ras Wolde Giorgis, Ras Tessema, and Ras Demise in subju- gating the Kingdom of Kafa. In 1887, Abba Jifar was given custody of the This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 54 Guluma Gemeda deposed Oromo kings of Limmu, Gera, and Gomma while Menelik cam- paigned in Gondar.10 This amicable relationship lasted as long as Menelik remained Ethiopia's effective ruler. The arrangement served the interests of both leaders. For Menelik, peaceful submission and collaboration minimized the cost of conquest and the administration of the empire. It also helped him to check and counterbalance the growing power and autonomy of his generals in the field. On the other hand, despite the payment of tribute, Abba Jifar's power within Jimma remained largely unaffected. He continued to appoint his own officials and he rewarded them with titles and lavish gifts. He collected taxes, retained large portions for himself, and for- warded the rest to Menelik in Addis Ababa. Between 1889 and 1890, Abba Jifar briefly fell out with Menelik. In November 1889, when he went to Addis Ababa to deliver his annual tribute, Abba Jifar was thrown in jail and remained there for about six months. Officially, he was arrested for luring poor Christians to his king- dom and encouraging them to convert to Islam.11 In fact, other factors prompted Menelik to arrest Abba Jifar. First, Abba Jifar was not quite able to maintain peace and order in the Gibe Valley during the absence of Abyssinian soldiers from the region in 1888. Jules Borelli, a French explorer who visited the Gibe Valley and Jimma in 1887-88, reported that the Oromo around Limmu were in a state of revolt when Menelik's army left the region in December 1887. In March 1888, an Oromo upris- ing in Limmu, Nonno, and Hagalo disrupted direct communication between Addis Ababa and the Gibe Valley. In May 1888, Abba Jifar told Borelli that "The moment is critical; the whole country is in plain revolt."12 Second, a rebellion in the neighboring Muslim district of Qabena con- tributed to the temporary discord between Abba Jifar and Menelik. Between 1885 and 1889, Hassan Injamo, the chief of Qabena, had put up a formidable challenge to the imperial soldiers in Gurage land, east of the Gibe Valley. Although Jimma did not join the rebellion officially, some Jimma volunteer fighters did participate in it.13 Later, Abba Jifar was accused of harboring Hassan Injamo, the fugitive leader of the rebellion.14 Third, during the late 1880s, Abba Jifar had taken some initiatives to increase his independence from Menelik. Sometime in 1888-89, he This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp The Rise of Coffee and the Demise of Colonial Autonomy 55 contacted foreign merchants to facilitate his communication with French agents in Djibouti in order to purchase firearms without Menelik's permission.15 In 1888, he had also received emissaries from the Mahdist state of the Sudan, emissaries who attempted to spread their religious revolution to the Muslim Oromos of Jimma.16 The foreign con- tacts produced nothing for Abba Jifar. But the fact that they took place alarmed Menelik, because his monopoly on the firearms trade and his control of the newly conquered western Oromo lands were threatened. Abba Jifar was released and returned to his kingdom in 1890 after giv- ing more assurances of loyalty to Menelik. Significantly, Jimma's special autonomous status within the empire was left unchanged. Although it enjoyed a special autonomy, Jimma was nevertheless sur- rounded by provinces that were directly administered by Abyssinian commanders. Until 1910, the provinces of Limmu to the north and Kafa to the south were administered by Ras Wolde Giorgis, Menelik's cousin, who commanded about 40,000 soldiers armed with modern firearms. To the west, Illu Abba Bor (Illubabor) was ruled by Ras Tessema Nadew, son of the emperor's tutor, who had over 30,000 soldiers under his com- mand. Other powerful Abyssinian governors in the region included Ras Demissew Nesibu in Leqa-Arjo and Dejazmach Taye in Gimira. Both officials were well connected in the imperial center.17 In the 1920s, other high-ranking imperial officials, such as Ras Desta Damtew, Haile Sellassie's son-in-law, Dejazmach Megesaha Yilma, Haile Sellassie's nephew, and Ras Kebede Mengesha, took turns to rule over the provinces adjacent to Jimma. Surrounded by such powerful imperial lords, Jimma's precarious autonomy and prosperity were seriously threatened toward the end of Menelik's reign. Abba Jifar became more suspicious of the imperial offi- cials who governed the neighboring provinces, particularly Ras Wolde Giorgis and Ras Tessema. Their direct interference in the affairs of Jimma became more frequent when the health of Menelik began to deteriorate after 1907. Abba Jifar knew that both men were waiting for an opportune time to add Jimma to their respective domains. To avoid such an outcome, he took steps to strengthen his army, in order to resist the political pressure from these imperial rulers in the region. In 1908, for example, he was busy buying firearms and recruiting soldiers.18 In This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 56 Guluma Gemeda addition to the traditional militia, whose members were poorly trained to meet a serious challenge from the imperial army, Abba Jifar recruited about 1,000 Christian soldiers, locally known as th ejabarti, from north- ern Ethiopia.19 By recruiting Christian soldiers, Abba Jifar not only aimed to consol- idate his power but also wanted to deny imperial officials any pretext to interfere in Jimma's affairs. Enlisting Christians into his army was meant to impress upon the imperial court that his loyalty was sincere and the integration of his kingdom was real. The strategy worked to a limited extent. The natives of Jimma continued to devote their energies to agriculture and commerce, while a small Christian militia unit main- tained peace and order in the kingdom. In 1910, the threat from the two powerful imperial governors dimin- ished, because both became mired in a political crisis in Addis Ababa caused by the deterioration of Menelik's health and the ensuing power struggle between Empress Taitu, Menelik's wife, and the supporters of Lij Iyasu, Menelik's grandson and heir apparent. Mobilizing her northern loy- alists, Taitu attempted to block Iyasu's accession to the throne. But she failed to earn the support of Menelik's powerful generals, who ruled vast provinces in the south. Ras Tessema and Ras Wolde Giorgis declined to lend their support to her bid for power. After being appointed as regent and caretaker of the government, Ras Tessema remained loyal to the young prince instead of joining Taitu's party. Although married to Taitu's sister, Ras Wolde Giorgis also refused to back the empress. As Wolde Giorgis was Menelik's cousin and governor of Kafa with the largest army in the empire, his support tipped the balance in favor of Lij Iyasu and led to the failure of Taitu's scheme.20 Because of their central role in the cri- sis at Menelik's court, neither Ras Tessema nor Wolde Giorgis was able to interfere in Jimma's affairs. During the crisis, Tessema was appointed regent and head of the central government and remained preoccupied with administrative activities. He died suddenly in April 1911. In 1910, Wolde Giorgis was transferred to Gondar as governor to calm the situation there, since the province was the natural political power base of Empress Taitu. With the departure of the two powerful Abyssinian potentates from the southwest, Jimma's sense of insecurity dissipated somewhat. First, This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp The Rise of Coffee and the Demise of Colonial Autonomy 5 7 the immediate successors of Wolde Giorgis and Tessema were not strong enough to threaten Jimma's autonomy. Second, the policy of the uncrowned emperor Lij Iyasu (r. 1913-16) was more favorable to Jimma. In 1912, Iyasu paid a brief visit to the kingdom and reassured Abba Jifar that the autonomy would continue under his imperial policy. Iyasu even married Abba Jifar's niece, as a sign of his desire to foster a good relationship between the ruling house of Jimma and the imperial court.21 Unfortunately, the favorable situation did not last long. In 1916, Iyasu was deposed by the Shewan nobility and the officials of former Emperor Menelik. Ras Taffari, the leading figure in the coup d'état of 1916, became regent and head of government and embarked on a policy of political centralization. Between 1916 and 1935, he removed the rulers of the semi-independent regions and replaced them by officers loyal to him. Taffari's centralization policy also aimed at controlling the cash econ- omy in order to use it for the establishment of a modern state bureau- cracy. In the 1920s and early 1930s, Taffari/Haile Sellassie needed the agricultural and commercial resources of the conquered regions of the south more than ever before. Thus, Jimma's autonomy became a victim of centralization, because it was incompatible with Taffari's desire to gain direct control of the coffee-rich kingdom. Autonomy obviously hin- dered full exploitation of the wealth of Jimma. The desire to control the coffee trade led to a renewed effort to put Jimma under the direct admin- istration of Addis Ababa. The Rise of Coffee Exports and the Economic Context of Jimma's Autonomy, 1 926-35 Coffee became a major agricultural commodity during the 1920s. With the economic significance of the coffee trade rising, Ras Taffari found it difficult to honor the earlier agreement that Menelik had reached with Abba Jifar and Iyasu had cemented with marriage. But as long as Fitawrari Habte Giorgis Dinagde, the powerful minister of war, and Abuna Mattewos, the influential head of the Orthodox Church, were alive, Taffari did not have carte blanche to carry out his This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 58 Guluma Gemeda plans. As stalwarts of Menelik's era, the minister and the abuna were too powerful for Taffari to dismantle the earlier arrangements without worrying about their reactions. When both died in 1926, their depar- ture created a favorable condition for Ras Taffari to implement his pro- gram of political centralization. The penetration of the market economy and the emergence of coffee as the major export commodity added urgency to Taffari's political program. Since Taffari's decision to end the autonomy of Jimma was intimately linked with the importance of coffee as a major export commodity, it is necessary to provide some explanation of this crop's rise to prominence. Coffee is native to the Jimma and Kafa forests. Although it grew pro- fusely in the natural state, coffee was also widely cultivated by the Oromo and Omotic farmers of the Gibe region for a very long time. The coffee plantations that flourished in the Gibe region before Menelik's conquests were destroyed during the conquest and the early Abyssinian administration.22 During the period of resistance, indigenous cultivators abandoned their coffee farms and focused on the production of subsis- tence crops for household consumption and for the forced provision of rations to the garrisoned imperial soldiers. The abandoned farms were later designated as "wild/forest" coffee and claimed by Menelik's sol- diers and their commanders.23 As the imperial conquest and its plundering turned into systematic economic exploitation, Menelik imposed coffee taxation on the gover- nors of the Oromo territories. Cash was needed to purchase modern firearms for the imperial army. In a letter to Abba Jifar in 1893, for example, Menelik stated: "I have imposed coffee taxation on the gover- nors of the Galla [Oromo] lands, because the ferenji [Europeans] from whom I have purchased firearms asked me to pay them in coffee. I have imposed 500 dawulas [50,000 kilograms] of coffee on you. Collect the said amount and send it to me immediately."24 It is not known whether Abba Jifar was able to deliver the requested amount of coffee in 1893. But the instruction clearly indicates the grow- ing importance of coffee to the country's foreign trade and Menelik's acquisition of modern firearms. Evidently, after some years of neglect, coffee production gradually picked up during the early decades of the twentieth century. The return to coffee production came as result of the This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp The Rise of Coffee and the Demise of Colonial Autonomy 59 establishment of an orderly administration, the continued demand for exports, and the Abyssinian governors' desire to share in the coffee wealth. During the same period, the naftanya appropriated the aban- doned farms as "wild/forest" coffee. According to Captain H. H. Kelly, a British colonial officer in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan Administration, the naftanya considered coffee as their "exclusive property" and ordered the farmers to bring the ripe beans to the governors' storehouses. Then the governors' agents sold the stored coffee to local and foreign merchants.25 In the 1920s, the Abyssinian governors realized the need to expand the coffee plantations. To increase their revenue, they began adding new plantations to the existing coffee plots that they had confiscated from the indigenous farmers. Young imperial governors such as Dajazmach Desta Damtew, then governor of Gomma, and Dajazmach Makonnen Demissew, who had succeeded his father as governor of Leeqaa Arjo, started their own coffee plantations rather than relying on the collection of tribute from the subject farmers.26 Thus the production of "Abyssinian coffee,"27 which came largely from the southwest, increased significantly throughout the decade. Its export through the port of Djibouti jumped from 288 metric tons in 1921 to 5,864 metric tons in 1925 and 9,408 in 1935.28 In the meantime, about 25,000 to 45,000 quintals 29 of coffee were exported from the southwest through Gambela to the Sudan.30 Under the Ethiopian colonial system, coffee production required sac- rifices from cultivators. It required sufficient capital investment and it consumed labor that would otherwise have been allocated to food pro- duction. Its marketing was dominated by the local chiefs, the imperial soldiers, and their commanders. The colonial administration's system of taxation and the nature of coffee marketing exposed the farmers to exploitation. The growing importance of coffee resulted in new tensions between imperial governors and indigenous chiefs, who fought over the allocation of land and labor, and farmers, who sought a better share of the coffee wealth. The conflict over coffee production focused the attention of the impe- rial court on Jimma and its autonomous status. While Jimma's limited autonomy protected the farmers in the kingdom from the rapacity of the imperial soldiers, the conquered people in the neighboring gabbar terri- tories languished under the harsh naftanya rule. Because of Jimma's This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 60 Guluma Gemeda autonomy, its farmers were spared periodic taxation. In comparison with their neighbors, who were under the direct control of the naftanga , the farmers and merchants of Jimma paid less in tribute and enjoyed a better life.31 The administration of the kingdom under its indigenous rulers encouraged the exploitation of the previously unsettled frontier lands. This in turn increased agricultural production. During his visit to the kingdom in 1897, a Russian officer, Alexander K. Bulatovich, observed "very extensive" farming with "almost no fallow land" in Jimma. The farmers produced "not only to meet local needs and pay taxes but also for export of bread [grain]."32 Jimma's commerce also flourished during the early twentieth cen- tury. According to Bulatovich, Jimma's merchants enjoyed special legal protection and privileges. To encourage the development of commerce, land was set aside for merchants to establish their storage facilities and residences.33 Roads were well maintained, to facilitate the transporta- tion of goods. Jimma's merchants participated actively in regional com- merce. They brought ivory from the borderlands, collected coffee from Jimma, and sold these products at the central market in Addis Ababa. They also distributed imported goods to local consumers in Jimma. As commercial intermediaries between the southwestern borderlands and the central Ethiopian markets, the merchants of Jimma became very prosperous. On the other hand, taxation was arbitrary and onerous in the adja- cent gabbar territories. Irregular taxes and heavy tributes discouraged the farmers in the gabbar territories from producing a surplus beyond what was needed to feed their families and pay their regular taxes. Besides the high rates of tribute and tax, the farmers in the gabbar lands were burdened with the responsibility of feeding a large number of imperial soldiers garrisoned in their villages.34 Until the 1920s, each Abyssinian soldier was allotted several gabbars , farmers of the con- quered territories, to provide him with provisions and labor. Later, the transformation of the gabbar system to the qalad system35 brought no relief to the indigenous farmers. The qalad system in fact created more landless tenants. As long as Jimma remained an autonomous province, the naftanya in the adjacent provinces of Limu, Kafa, flu Abba Bora, and This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp The Rise of Coffee and the Demise of Colonial Autonomy 61 Gimira believed that the control of their tenant farmers and their labor would be undermined by the flight of these farmers to Jimma. To end the flights, they demanded an immediate end to Jimma's autonomy and the creation of a uniform imperial administration throughout the region. Not surprisingly, they became the most enthusiastic supporters of Haile Sellassie's plan to end the Jimma kingdom's autonomy. The rise of the export of coffee coincided with the alienation of land through the qalad system. The system was basically designed to facili- tate the collection of taxes and the growth of imperial revenue. But it also led to extensive expropriation of gabbar land. After measurement, two-thirds of the land was appropriated by the imperial government and awarded to its military, civil, and religious officials. One-third or sisso was left to the indigenous chiefs ( balabat ) and the farmers. In reality, most of the sisso land was allocated to the local chiefs while the major- ity of the farmers were left as landless tenants.36 The landless farmers were then forced to enter into sharecropping arrangements or migrate to other places to avoid heavy taxation. Many of the dispossessed farmers left their villages and settled in Jimma, where the demands of the land- lords were less exacting.37 The qalad system was not implemented in Jimma until the 1950s. Its absence from Jimma in the early twentieth century and the more mod- erate autonomous administration were sources of irritation for the naf- tanya lords of the adjacent regions, who believed valuable labor and revenue were being drained away from their domains with the migration of landless farmers to Jimma. As one imperial official commented, "the landless and those who were tired of heavy taxation in the adjacent provinces migrated to Jimma" because they were offered land in the kingdom on more generous terms. The settlers cleared the forests and "increased the wealth of Jimma through the cultivation of coffee, pepper, and cotton on a large scale."38 While the naftanya agonized over their loss of labor and revenue, the migrant farmers in Jimma contributed to the booming economy of the kingdom. Predictably, the naftanya accused Abba Jifar of luring away their tenants and undermining their revenue. Thus, ironically, Jimma's success precipitated a political crisis that even- tually led to the demise of its autonomy and its prosperity. This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 62 Guluma Gemeda The End of J im m a's Autonomy Haile Sellassie's decision to end Jimma's autonomy in 1932 was part of a long-term effort to control the coffee wealth of the kingdom. As early as the mid 1920s, Haile Sellassie was planning to connect the south- western region with Addis Ababa in order to channel its coffee trade through the capital. For this reason, while pursuing his policy of cen- tralization, Ras Taffari initiated the Jimma Road Project. In 1926, Charles H. Bentinck, British minister in Addis Ababa, reported that Taffari's intention to build a road to Jimma was to tap "the rich coffee plantations near Jimma and eventually extend the road and railway to Gambeila."39 The actual construction of the Jimma Road did not start until 1928. Progress was very slow because of lack of capital. Haile Sellassie's per- sonal fund of 96,000 MT dollars ran out before the construction work reached the Awash Bridge, about 35 miles west of Addis Ababa. The financial problem forced the government to establish a limited share company to complete the project. Perhaps hoping to monopolize future profits from the coffee trade, Haile Sellassie did not involve foreign cap- ital or local Oromo chiefs in the share company. He retained a substan- tial percentage of the shares and sold some to northern landlords.40 While construction was still under way, Haile Sellassie took another step that undermined Jimma's autonomy. In 1931, he appointed a cen- tral government official to supervise the collection of taxes in the local markets of Jimma.41 The appointment immediately eroded Abba Jifar's political and economic power and the autonomy of the kingdom. Without control of taxes on market transactions, the sultan was unable to meet his tribute obligations.42 Ironically, as Haile Sellassie was taking control of taxation, Jimma's tribute obligations were rising. In 1927, Abba Jifar paid over 100,000 MT dollars in tribute.43 To compensate for the revenue lost due to the increased tribute, Abba Jifar raised the taxes on his subjects. The burden ultimately fell on the farmers and mer- chants of the kingdom. The loss of revenue came at the worst possible time for the kingdom of Jimma. In the early 1930s, coffee prices plummeted as a result of the world economic depression. Just before the onset of the depression, a This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp The Rise of Coffee and the Demise of Colonial Autonomy 63 feresula (about 17 kilograms) of coffee from Jimma was sold for 13 MT dollars.44 During the depression, the same amount of coffee fetched only about 8 MT dollars. The MT silver dollar was produced abroad and imported into Ethiopia, where it served both as a commodity and as a medium of exchange. Its value fluctuated, depending on supply and demand, export conditions, and the rise and fall of the price of silver in the international market. The government usually allowed duty-free importation of MT dollars, but restricted their exportation. This practice caused a financial crisis even before the beginning of the worldwide depression of the 1930s. During the late 1920s and early 1930s, the value of the MT dollar declined. In 1928 and 1929, the demand for the export of coffee, hides, and skins was sluggish, but imports of the silver currency remained high. The result was an excess of MT dollars in the country. In addition, the MT dollar further lost value owing to falling international silver prices. Between 1928 and 1932, its value dropped by 53.5 percent.45 This was bound to have an adverse effect on the emerging coffee mar- ket. During this period, the volume of coffee exports increased by a stag- gering 400 percent while their value rose only by 32 percent.46 The effect of declining coffee prices and the loss of revenue from transaction taxes, compounded by the declining value of the MT dollar, worsened Jimma's economic woes. The impact of the worldwide depression on the Ethiopian economy was devastating. During the depression, while the overall volume of exports increased, foreign exchange earnings declined. In 1930, for example, although the volume of exported commodities increased by 5.3 percent over the previous year, the exchange earnings dropped by 21 per- cent. Between 1929 and 1931, customs revenue, a major source of income for the imperial government at the time, declined by 35.6 per- cent.47 Partly to compensate for the declining state revenue, Haile Sellassie centralized the taxation of market transactions and began to take other measures to facilitate the annexation of the coffee-rich king- dom of Jimma. In 1930, in addition to its economic difficulties, Jimma was confronted by an internal political crisis. Abba Jifar's health began failing. Though the sultan was aware that it was time to begin making arrangements for This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 64 Guluma Gemeda the transfer of power, there was no obvious choice for a capable succes- sor. Abba Dula, his eldest son, was not interested in politics. The second choice was Abba Jobir, the sultan's grandson, but he was inexperienced and lacked the political shrewdness of his grandfather to maintain the delicate balance of power between the kingdom and the imperial center. Instead of adopting the subtle negotiations and compromises of Abba Jifar, Abba Jobir seemed to prefer direct confrontation with Haile Sellassie. He did not seem to appreciate the gravity and seriousness of the emperor's plans for Jimma. Despite his apparent liability as a successor, however, Abba Jobir was nominated as the heir apparent. By 1932 there was very little time left to save Jimma's autonomy. Nagadras Sahle Eshete, Haile Sellassie's appointee to the Customs Office of Jimma, arrived with a clear mandate to impose direct imperial rule on the kingdom. In addition to his duty as supervisor of the Customs Office and the collection of taxes, the nadragas was also appointed as a judge in the newly created Office for the Abolition of Slavery. To enforce imperial rule, Negadras Sahle was accompanied by 200 armed guards. Observing the turn of events, some members of Abba Jifar's jabarti militia defected to the imperial side. Abba Jobir's power was seriously weakened. These developments did not sit well with the people of Jimma. Farmers resented the increased taxes. Local abba qoros (district gover- nors) disliked the growing erosion of their power and the rising influ- ence of the imperial soldiers. Encouraged by the spirit of resistance, Abba Jobir decided to confront Haile Sellassie's appointee. Doubting the loyalty of the Christian jabarti militia in the event of direct confronta- tion with imperial soldiers, he recruited the natives of Jimma and dis- tributed arms to them.48 The crisis reached a critical stage in early 1932. According to a Berhanena Salam reporter, from February to April 1932, the people of Jimma were selling their cattle to buy firearms and ammu- nition. Those who lacked funds for outright purchase rented rifles. In March, violent incidents broke out at the market town of Hirmata and in other districts of Jimma. Then, Abba Bushen of Gibe, the acting gov- ernor (Abba Jobir was in Addis Ababa at the time), informed Nagadras Eshete that the sporadic violence had developed into an outright rebel- lion.49 In May, the rebellion had spread to the districts of Manna and This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp The Rise of Coffee and the Demise of Colonial Autonomy 65 Dedo, which were the major centers of Jimma's agricultural production. Manna was famous for its coffee farms. As one customs official esti- mated, the annual taxes of Manna district accounted for about 20,000 MT dollars.50 Dedo produced large quantities of grain. But as a result of the rebellion, agricultural production and tax collection in these districts were disrupted. To suppress the rebellion, Haile Sellassie sent in 300 soldiers from the neighboring Limmu province. With a force of about 500 imperial sol- diers and some local collaborators, Nagadras Eshete eventually sup- pressed the revolt.51 Ahmed Tibba, a rebel chief in the district of Manna, was captured and sent to Addis Ababa. A few days later, he was sent back to Jimma and hanged in a public square in Jimma town. Another rebel leader in the district of Dedo held out until 1935. In May 1932, Abba Jobir was taken into custody and remained in prison until the arrival of the Italians in 1936. 52 Grazmach Abebe Naqe, a judge, was dis- patched to investigate the causes of the rebellion. Haile Sellassie appointed his son-in-law, Dajazmach Desta Damtew, as the new gover- nor of Jimma. With Jimma under direct imperial rule, the autonomous status that it had enjoyed for half a century was effectively ended. The new governor was a person well versed in the political economy of Jimma. As the governor of Gomma, Kafa, Kullo, and Konta in the 1920s, Desta had witnessed the growing importance of coffee in the national economy. He had also observed the migration of landless farm- ers to Jimma. Like Emperor Haile Sellassie, Desta was keenly interested in coffee production and trade. During his governorship of Gomma in the 1920s, for example, he encouraged indigenous farmers to grow cof- fee. By 1929 he had already built a road from Agaro to Jimma town to facilitate the coffee trade.53 When Jimma was added to his domain, Desta became the governor of the largest and richest coffee-producing province in the country. In 1933, when the situation in Jimma seemed under control, Desta was transferred to Sidamo, a coffee-rich province in the south. In his place, Dajazmach Wolde Emanuel was appointed as governor of Jimma. The new governor was loyal to Haile Sellassie, but had neither the formal education nor the administrative experience to be an effective governor.54 Upon his arrival in Jimma in December 1933, Wolde This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 66 Guluma Gemeda Emanuel declared the beginning of a new era of collaboration between the imperial government, local elites, and the people of Jimma. In a speech at his welcome ceremony, he reassured the suspicious people of Jimma that the imperial government had no intention of destroying the traditional ruling house of Jimma. "The purpose of my coming to this country," he declared, "is to assist the balabat [Abba Dula] in adminis- tration . . . [and] to enhance your interests in agriculture and in all other aspects. ... I did not come here to hurt you."55 He urged the people of Jimma to cooperate with the imperial government. Neither the leaders nor the ordinary people of Jimma were comforted by the governor's words of reassurance. The public remained hostile toward the measures taken by the central government. Convinced that the autonomy of their kingdom had ended, Abba Jifar's officials expressed their disappoint- ment through everyday activities. For example, they were conspicuously absent from social gatherings and political meetings organized by the governor. Farmers obviously resented the new administration's increased taxes. In May 1932, Jimma, which had escaped the direct occupation of Menelik's army five decades earlier, joined the rank of the conquered provinces of the south. Even before the death of Abbajifar in 1934, sym- bols of imperial control had been installed everywhere in Jimma. Contrary to the previous agreement between Abba Jifar and Menelik that the faith of the Muslim population would not be interfered with, the Orthodox Church established a church and a church school in the town in 1932. Imperial soldiers were garrisoned at various strategic places. Jimma town was even renamed "Haile Sellassie Town."56 The emperor took full control of the coffee wealth of the province. In February 1935, Haile Sellassie made a brief visit to Jimma to inaugurate the new motor road and celebrate his other achievements.57 It was a triumphal tour. The emperor took a motor ride of 200 miles to Jimma in two days, a trip that had taken more than two weeks before the road was built. Thus, the policy of centralization was completed just before the outbreak of the Italo-Ethiopian War in 1935. Political annexation and road construction, however, failed to pro- duce the exploitable wealth that the emperor had hoped for. The crises of 1932 proved to be more destructive than Haile Sellassie had probably This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp The Rise of Coffee and the Demise of Colonial Autonomy 67 anticipated. First, after Jimma's annexation, its economic prosperity began a long decline. The farmers and merchants were not happy with an administration that took control of the production and marketing of the bulk of their coffee. The fair tax assessment that they had been accustomed to under the indigenous rulers was eliminated along with Jimma's political autonomy and replaced with direct and arbitrary taxa- tion. The new system damaged the emerging coffee economy of Jimma.58 Second, Jimma's elite refused to cooperate with the imperial govern- ment. Resistance continued in several districts. Violence remained wide- spread until the Italian occupation in 1936. Third, the outbreak of the Italo-Ethiopian War and the subsequent Italian occupation of Ethiopia disrupted the imperial system.59 During the Italian occupation, imperial soldiers in Jimma lost their power and migrated to other provinces. Fourth, Jimma also faced a farm labor shortage during the Italian occu- pation and the immediate postwar years. The recovery of Jimma's econ- omy had to wait for more than two decades until a coffee boom returned in the 1950s. Conclusion The end of Jimma's autonomy symbolized the completion of the process of political centralization in Ethiopia that Haile Sellassie had initiated in the early 1920s. By 1935, the three types of administrative structures that had existed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century had been discarded. Rather than extending autonomy to the gabbar regions, Haile Sellassie endeavored to achieve political integration through centralization. The creation of a unitary state out of a hetero- geneous society has since remained the major goal of Ethiopia's modern rulers, irrespective of their background and ideological persuasion.60 The process of political centralization that culminated in the annex- ation of the Kingdom of Jimma in 1932 was shaped by various events emanating from local, regional, or global circumstances. This article has attempted to explain the circumstances that led to Haile Sellassie's deci- sion to end Jimma's autonomy in 1932. Earlier scholars argued that the subjugation of Jimma was related to the emperor's policy of the aboli- tion of slavery and the slave trade.61 But by 1932, slavery was a dying This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 68 Guluma Gemeda institution and only a few domestic slaves were used in agricultural production in Jimma.62 Slavery may have provided Haile Sellassie with a pretext to annex the coffee-rich kingdom, but even the emperor's loy- alists and apologists admit that it was not the main reason for ending Jimma's autonomy.63 As Harold G. Marcus has pointed out, the emperor's decision was influenced more by declining coffee prices in the 1930s than by the desire to abolish slavery, although, to be sure, the plan to annex Jimma predated the depression of the 1930s that caused coffee prices to plummet. I have argued in this article that the end of Jimma's autonomy was related to the expansion of the market economy and the rise of coffee as a major export crop in the 1920s. Political cen- tralization in Ethiopia under Haile Sellassie was intertwined with the changing political economy of the region. However, although it increased the imperial state's domination of the coffee-rich kingdom, the end of Jimma's autonomy contributed to the ethnic tensions between the center and the periphery that are still threatening the polit- ical stability of the country. Notes 1. Joanna Mantel-Niecko, "The Division of Ethiopia into Regions According to the Native Land Typology in Use at the Turn of the 19th and 20th Centuries," in Modern Ethiopia from the Accession of Menelik II to the Present , ed. Joseph Tubiana (Rotterdam: A. A. Balkema, 1980): 469-78; Donald Donham, "Old Abyssinia and the New Ethiopian Empire: Themes in Social History," in The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia: Essays in History and Social Anthropology, ed. Donald Donham and Wendy James (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 37-44; Gebru Tareke, Ethiopia: Power and Protest, Peasant Revolts in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 68. Gebru Tareke divides the conquered lands into two categories: gabbar and menyist. The latter corresponds to what Donham calls "fringe peripheries." 2. For the characterization of the Ethiopian state under Haile Sellassie as an "absolutist state," see Bahru Zewde, "The Economic Origins of the Absolutist State in Ethiopia, 1916-1935," Journal of Ethiopian Studies 17 (1984): 1-29. 3. In addition to Jimma, other regions in the north and south came under direct imperial control in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In the north, two powerful hereditary regional lords, Ras Gugsa (d. 1930) and Ras This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp The Rise of Coffee and the Demise of Colonial Autonomy 69 Haylu Takla Haymanot (d. 1951), were removed from power, in 1930 and 1932, respectively. Both leaders were opposed to Haile Sellassie's plan to involve the J. C. White Engineering Company in the construction of the Lake Tana Dam. In the south, Dajazmach Balcha, a long time governor of Sidamo, was removed in 1928. The indigenous rulers of the border provinces of Leeqaa-Qallem and Beni Shangul, which had enjoyed some autonomy earlier, were also replaced by imperial governors. The auton- omy of the Leeqaa-Naqamtee was significantly eroded in the 1920s but survived until the 1940s. 4. Herbert S. Lewis, A Galla Monarchy: Jimma Abba Jifar, 1830-1932 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965); Mohammed Hassen, The Oromo of Ethiopia: A History, 1570-1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Guluma Gemeda, "The Process of State Formation in the Gibe Region, the Case of Gomma and Jimma," in Proceedings of the Second Annual Seminar of the Department of History (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University, 1984); Guluma Gemeda, "Land, Agriculture and Society in the Gibe Region, Southwestern Ethiopia, c. 1850-1974" (PhD diss., Michigan State University, 1996). 5. Guluma Gemeda, "Markets, Local Traders and Long Distance Merchants in Southwestern Ethiopia during the Nineteenth Century," in Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies 1, ed. Taddese Beyene (Addis Ababa: Institute of Ethiopian Studies, 1988): 375-89 . 6. In 1883, Abba Jifar had no more than 50 rifles and a few old pistols. Augusto Franzoj, Continente Nero: Note di Viaggio (Turin: Roux and Favale, 1885), 285-87. 7. Richard Caulk, "Territorial Competition and the Battle of Embabo," Journal of Ethiopian Studies 13, no. 1 (1975): 65-88; Harold G. Marcus, The Life and Times ofMenelik II, 1844-1913 (London, Oxford University Press, 1975). 8. Jules Borelli, Ethiopie Meridionale: Journal de mon Voyage aux pays Amhara, Oromo, et Sidama, septembre 1885 a Novembre 1888 (Paris, 1890), 158-59. 9. Alexander K. Bulatovich, "Les Campaignes de Menelik," Journal des Voyages 297 (1902): 186. 10. Borelli, Ethiopie Meridionale, 280. 11. Gabra-Sellassie, Tarïka Zaman Za-Dagmawi Menelik Neguse Nagast Za- Itiyopia (Addis Ababa, Berhanenna Salam Printing Press, 1959 Ethiopia Calendar)), 166. 12. "Le moment est critique; tous ces pays son en pleine revolte." Translation in the text is mine. Borelli, Ethiopie Meridionale, 278, 322, 355, 381. 13. High-ranking Jimma officials, including Abba Wajii Abba Gomol, Abba Jifar' s brother, had joined Hassan Inj amo against Menelik' s army. This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 70 Guluma Gemeda 14. On Hassan Injamo's rebellion, see Enerico Cernili, "Folk Literature of the Galla of Southern Abyssinia," Harvard African Studies , vol. 3 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1922), 162-65. 15. Richard Caulk, " Between the Jaws of Hyenas": A Diplomatic History of Ethiopia, 1876-1896 (Wiesbaden, Germany: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2002), 204-5. 16. Borelli, Ethiopie Meridionale, 381-82. 17. Ras Demissew was the son of Afa-Negus Nesibu. Dajazmach Taye was related to Menelik and had good credentials to accede to the imperial throne. For this reason, he was kept away from the center. 18. H. H. Kelly (Captain), "Report by Captain Kelly of His Journey through South-Western Abyssinia and Beni Shangul," 10 February 1909, 58, PRO, FO 401/12, Public Record Office (PRO), London. At the time of his visit to Jimma in late 1908, Captain Kelly worked for the colonial administra- tion of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan as assistant director of Works for Roads and Communications. Captain Kelly to the Assistant Director of Intelligence, Khartoum, 10 February 1909. 19. This group should not be confused with the Muslim merchants in north- ern Ethiopia. In Jimma, jabarti referred to a small group of Christian sol- diers who served in Abba Jifar's army. They came from the northern provinces of Gojam, Gondar, Wollo, and Tigray, where they abandoned their masters in search of a better life. It is probably because of their north- ern origin, like that of the northern Muslim merchants, that these Christian soldiers were called jabarti. All of them received their titles and salaries from Abba Jifar. They were different from the naft any a, who were paid by the imperial government. The jabarti became an enclave Christian community within the Muslim population of Jimma. This small commu- nity later on played an important role, when Haile Sellassie annexed Jimma in 1932. H. S. Lewis calls them zabenya (guards). The tradition of employing such soldiers goes back at least to the early 1880s. Lewis, A Galla Monarchy, 103-4. 20. Marcus, The Life and Times ofMenelik II, 236-48. 21. During his visit to Jimma in 1912-13, Iyasu married Abba Jifar's niece and raised the prospect of stronger ties with Addis Ababa. See Gebre- Igziabiher Elyas, Prowess, Piety and Politics: The Chronicle of Abeto Iyasu and Empress Zewditu of Ethiopia (1909-1930), trans, and ed. Reidulf K. Molvaer (Cologne: Rudiger Koppe Verlag, 1994), 41, 335. 22. Gemeda, "Land, Agriculture and Society in the Gibe Region," 91-127, 159-77. 23. The designation of coffee from Jimma and Kafa regions as "wild/forest" coffee is not precisely correct. What was very often labeled as "wild/ forest" coffee was in fact cultivated coffee that was abandoned during the This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp The Rise of Coffee and the Demise of Colonial Autonomy 71 political and social upheavals in the region. In some cases, political con- siderations prompted the designation of coffee plantations as "forest coffee." 24. Menelik to Abba Jifar, 28 August 1893 (from the collections of Abba Jifar's family, copy available from the author). 25. Kelly, "Report by Captain Kelly of His Journey through South-Western Abyssinia," 64, PRO, FO 401/12. 26. Berhanena Salam , 15 March 1928. Berhanena Salam was an Amharic weekly newspaper published in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) from 1925 to 1936. Publication was discontinued during Italian occupation, 1936-41. 27. Coffee exported from Ethiopia during the early twentieth century was classified into "Harar" and "Abyssinian" coffee. The former came from Harar and a small, Belgian-owned, plantation in Arsi. The "Abyssinian" coffee came mostly from the Jimma area and Kafa. Some also came from Diu Abba Bor, Sidamo, and Wallaga. 28. Adrien Zervos, L'Empire d'Éthiopie : le Miroir de VÉthiopie Moderne , 1906- 1935 (Alexandria, Egypt, l'École professionnelle des Frères, 1935), 157; G. Mackereth, Economic Conditions in Ethiopia ( Abyssinia ), 1929-31 (London, Department of Overseas Trade [Government of the United Kingdom], 1932), 12-14; Raffaele Ciferri, "Primo rapporto sul caffè nellAfrica Orientale Italiana," Agricolo Coloniale , 34 (1940), 135-44. 29. A quintal is a unit of measurement which is equivalent to 100 kilograms or about 200 pounds. 30. C. H. Walker (British Consul at Gore) to Mr. Murray, 13 November 1926, FO 371/11574, PRO, FO; Charles H. Bentinck to Foreign Office, 9 April 1926, FO 371/11574, PRO, FO. See also Bahru Zewde, "An Overview and ^ Assessment of Gambela Trade (1904-1935)," International Journal of African Historical Studies 20, no. 1 (1987): 75-94. 31. The contrast between economic life in Jimma and in its neighbors was observed by many travelers who visited the region during the early twen- tieth century. For example, see Alexander K. Bulatovich, Ethiopia through Russian Eyes: Country in Transition , 1896-1898 , trans, and ed. Richard Seltzer (Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 2000); C. W. Gwynn, "A Journey in Southern Abyssinia," Geographical Journal 38, no. 2 (August 1911): 113-39; and L. F. I. Athill, "Through South-Western Abyssinia to the Nile," Geographical Journal 56, no. 5 (1920), 347-367. 32. Bulatovich, Ethiopia through Russian Eyes, 193. 33. Ibid, 195. 34. For descriptions of the numerous obligations of the gabbar and their rela- tionship with the naft any a, see Charles F. Rey, Unconquered Abyssinia As It Is Today (London: Seeley, Service and Co, 1923), 189-90; and Charles McClellan, "Perspectives on the Neftenya- Gabbar System: The Darasa, This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 72 Guluma Gemeda Ethiopia," Africa 33, no. 3 (September 1978): 426-40. For local sources on gabbar-naf tanga relationships, see Gebrewold Ingida-Work, "Ethiopia's System of Land Tenure and Taxation," Ethiopia Observer 5, no. 4 (1962): 302-39; and Mahteme-Sellassie Wold-Maskal, "The Land System of Ethiopia," Ethiopia Observer 1, no. 9 (October 1957): 283-95. 35. Qalad was a system of land measurement that was implemented in the southern conquered regions during the early twentieth century. 36. See Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, 1855-1991, 2nd ed. (Oxford: James Currey, 2001); and Charles W. McClellan, State Transformation and National Integration : Gedeo and the Ethiopian Empire, 1895-1935 (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1988). 37. Berhanena Salam , 5 May 1932. 38. Ibid. 39. Charles H. Bentinck to Foreign Office, "Annual Report, 1926," PRO, FO 371/11574. 40. The Addis Ababa-Jimma-Gambela (Auto and Rail) Road Share Company was established in 1930 with a total capitalization of 20 million dollars. The money was to be raised by selling shares of 200 dollars each. Out of the total 100,000 shares, Haile Sellassie retained 25,000 (25 percent), and the remaining 75,000 were allocated as follows: Ethiopian Government 50,000 (50 percent), Ethiopian "citizens" 5,000 (5 percent), and "others" 20,000 (20 percent). Curiously, Abba Jifar and the richest merchants of Jimma did not hold any shares. It is not clear whether Abba Jifar refused to participate or whether he was deliberately excluded from the Jimma Road project. Berhanena Salam , 5 June 1930, 3 July 1930, and 17 July 1930. 41. Berhanena Salam, 22 October 1931. 42. The centralization of the collection of market taxes was part of Haile Sellassie's policy of political centralization and financial reform. Between 1928 and 1932, centrally controlled customs offices were established in several provinces. 43. "Le Popolazione dell'Ouest Etiopico: III - Gimma Abbagifar," Acrhivo storico della Ministero Africana Italiana (ASMAI), 54/34-137. 44. Mackereth, "Economic Conditions in Ethiopia," 28; Berhanena Salam, various issues, 1929, 1931. When it was published between 1925 and 1936, Berhanena Salam recorded the weekly fluctuation of prices of com- modities, including coffee. Another newspaper, Le Courrier d'Ethiopie, a French weekly published in Addis Ababa in the 1920s and 1930s, also included prices of import-export commodities. 45. In 1928, U.S. $1 was exchanged for MT $2.28. In 1932, the rate had become MT $4.90. Addison E. Southard to U.S. State Department, 28 November 1929; William M. Cramp to State Department, 7 March 1935: This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp The Rise of Coffee and the Demise of Colonial Autonomy 73 U.S. State Department Records, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland. File decimal no. 884.5151/1; 884.515/26; 884.516-State/10. For further discussion of the financial situ- ation in Ethiopia during the early twentieth century, see Charles Schaefer, "Enclavistic Capitalism in Ethiopia, 1906-1936: A Study of Currency, Banking, and Informal Credit Networks" (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1990). 46. Mackereth, Economic Conditions in Ethiopia , 13. 47. Ibid, 9. 48. Berhanena Salam , 5 May 1932. 49. Berhanena Salam, 14 July 1932. 50. Berhanena Salam , 5 May 1932. 51. Berhanena Salam , 5 May 1932, 12 May 1932, 25 May 1932. 52. Haji Abba Gojam Abba Wajii, interview by author, Jimma, 19 October 1991; Haji Abbajabal Abba Digga, interview by author, Jimma, 19 and 21 February 1985. 53. Berhanena Selam , 6 February 1930. 54. Margery Perham, The Government of Ethiopia, 2nd ed. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 306. 55. Berhanena Salam, 18 January 1934. 56. Berhanena Salam, 13 December 1934. 57. Berhanena Salam, 7 March 1935. 58. Perham, The Government of Ethiopia, 306. 59. U.S. Embassy (Rome) to State Department, 25 April 1937, report no. 15,918; 29 July 1938, 8650.00/35; 4 January 1940, 8650.00/57. U.S. State Department Records. 60. Despite its policy of ethnic federalism, the current regime appears to be committed to a unitary state. The earlier military regime, the Derg, attempted to promote a unitary state while preaching the equality of eth- nic nationalities. Even the policies of Lij Iyasu, which promised some form of federalism during the early twentieth century, are now interpreted as an attempt to achieve centralization by focusing on fiscally and strategically important peripheries. See Cedric Barnes, "Provinces and Princes: Power and the Eastern Ethiopian Periphery, c. 1906-16," Journal of Ethiopian Studies 34, no. 2 (December 2001): 95-120. 61. Patrick Gilkes, The Dying Lion: Feudalism and Modernization in Ethiopia (London: Julian Friedmann, 1975); Perham, The Government of Ethiopia, 306; Harold G. Marcus, Haile Sellassie I: The Formative Years, 1892-1936 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 121. 62. Addison E. Southard to State Department, Dispatch no. 179, 21 April 1931, and Dispatch no. 886, 1 February 1932, U.S. State Department Records, 884.5048/64, 884.5048/75, 884.5048/94; Tekalign W. Mariam, "The Slave This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp 74 Guluma Gemeda Trade in the Economy of Jimma," in Proceedings of the Eighth International Conference of Ethiopian Studies 1, ed. Taddese Beyene, (Addis Ababa: Institute of Ethiopian Studies, 1989), 309-18. 63. Berhanena Salam , 5 May 1932. This content downloaded from 194.29.185.251 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 19:18:03 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp Article Contents p. 51 p. 52 p. 53 p. 54 p. 55 p. 56 p. 57 p. 58 p. 59 p. 60 p. 61 p. 62 p. 63 p. 64 p. 65 p. 66 p. 67 p. 68 p. 69 p. 70 p. 71 p. 72 p. 73 p. 74 Issue Table of Contents Northeast African Studies, New Series, Vol. 9, No. 3, Special Issue: The Oromo in Ethiopian Studies: Confronting Challenges to Politically Engaged Scholarship (2002), pp. 1-192 Front Matter Introduction: Rendering Audible the Voices of the Powerless [pp. 1-14] Conquest, Tyranny, and Ethnocide against the Oromo: A Historical Assessment of Human Rights Conditions in Ethiopia, ca. 1880s-2002 [pp. 15-49] The Rise of Coffee and the Demise of Colonial Autonomy: The Oromo Kingdom of Jimma and Political Centralization in Ethiopia [pp. 51-74] The Italian Invasion, the Ethiopian Empire, and Oromo Nationalism: The Significance of the Western Oromo Confederation of 1936 [pp. 75-96] "Bribing the Land": An Appraisal of the Farming Systems of the Maccaa Oromo in Wallagga [pp. 97-113] A Nation without a City [a Blind Person without a Cane]: The Oromo Struggle for Addis Ababa [pp. 115-131] The Place of the Oromo Diaspora in the Oromo National Movement: Lessons from the Agency of the "Old" African Diaspora in the United States [pp. 133-160] At Issue: Learning Not to Become Oromo—Chasing the Ghosts Chasing John Sorenson [pp. 161-192] Back Matter