Revolution in Military Affairs and Its Effects on Logistics

1 RESTRICTED ABSTRACT OF REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND ITS EFFECTS ON LOGISTISC An RMA is a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations. However, the success or failure of any military campaign is directly related to the effectiveness and efficiency of the war fighter’s logistic support pipeline. Modern armies of the world have been improving their logistic systems to support new operational concepts and military doctrines emerging out of RMA. These efforts in the field of logistics led to another term, “Revolution in Military Logistics”. Today military thinkers are convinced that in future, there will be no RMA without first going for revolution in military Logistics. Realizing the importance of military logistics, the leading countries have started homing on to revolutionizing the field of logistics. RMA has also affected military affairs in our region. Indian defence forces made a quantum jump from 1970s. She started exploiting the emerging technologies and synergized these with innovative operational doctrines and organizational adaptation to achieve far higher levels of relative military effectiveness. The full scale mechanization of her armed forces, harnessing her Navy and Air Force with modern technology and indigenization of most of the defence products has given new dimensions to any future conflict. She also improved her logistic system to support the operational concepts and doctrines. On the contrary, Pakistan is still relying on old system of logistics with a lot of inherent anomalies. Under the circumstances Pakistan should improve her logistic system in support of own operational strategy to counter en operational concept of “Simultaneity”. RESTRICTED 1 2 RESTRICTED REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS(EFFECTS ON LOGISTICS) THEME Revolutions in military affairs (RMA) are brought about by the innovative application of new technologies. In order to implement the conceptual changes emerging out of RMAs and harness their benefits, a concurrent revolution in the logistic systems of the armed forces becomes an imperative. The contemporary armies have remained alive to these phenomenal changes in their logistic systems giving birth to yet another term called Revolution in Military Logistics (RML). On going RML is likely to affect military affairs in South Asia and so does the changes in the logistics support systems. Our adversary is already engaged in the process of large scale mechanization of its military with requisite changes in the logistic systems. It would be crucial for Pakistan Armed Forces to stay alert to these evolving changes so as to sustain symmetry in any future war. In view of the above, study the RML with special reference to Indo-Pak scenario so as to determine the latest changes in Indian log system in support of their military and operational strategy and as a response recommend changes in our logistic systems in line with our military and operational strategy. RESTRICTED 1 3 RESTRICTED REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS (EFFECTS ON LOGISTICS) 1. 2. Introduction. Aim. PART I RMA AND A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 3. Concept of RMA. a. RMA and its definition. b. Chracteristics of RMA 2. 3. Past RMA. Current Technology trends and new areas of warfare. PART II RMA AND ITS REVELANCE TO RML 4. 5. 6. New operational concepts. Importance of military logistics. Logistic systems of contemporary armies. a. USA b. UK 7. New emerging revolutionary concepts in military logistics. a. Components of RML. b. Tenants of RML. PART III INDIA’S REVOLUTION IN MILITARY SYSTEMS RESTRICTED 1 4 RESTRICTED 10. 11. Ambition. Harnessing RMA. a. b. 12. Revolution in various military fields. op concept. Logistic system to support the concept. PART IV ANALYSIS OF PAKISTAN ARMY’S LOGISTICS 13. 14. Impact of Indian armed Forces on our logistic system. Analysis of existing logistic system. PART V RECOMMENDATIONS RESTRICTED 1 5 RESTRICTED REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND ITS EFFECTS ON LOGISTICS Introduction 1. Ever since the era of fortification and siege warfare, technology has been exploited for military uses at a rapid pace. Usually, the introduction of new concept or weapon is followed by a transient period when it appears that military effectiveness has reached a vertex. Presently, we may be passing through a transient period, since the lethality of weapons of mass destruction and amazing mobility and firepower have apparently reached an ultimate. Yet, history testifies, that it may be merely a matter of time befo]re technology offers a breakthrough that brings about a fundamental change in the military affairs. The change could be affected through the introduction of new weapon, developed by technological ingenuity or, by developing a new doctrinal concept, which in turn is based on exploiting the technology. An idea of bringing about a revolutionary change in the nature of warfare is termed as revolution in military affairs(RMA). In the past, RMA has been taking place in many fields. However no RMA can be fully absorbed without requisite logistics infrastructure. Thus military logistics is an important factor which influences any change in military concepts, doctrines and tactics as a result of RMA. The contemporary armies have remained alive to these phenomenal changes in their logistic systems giving birth to yet another term called Revolution in Military Logistics (RML). Now, military thinkers have started realizing that there will be no RMA without first going for RML. USA and other leading countries are now concentrating to bring RML. Ongoing RMA together with RML is likely to affect our region. Our adversary made a quantum jump from 1970s. She started exploiting the emerging technologies and synergized them with innovative operational doctrines and organizational adaptation to achieve far higher levels of relative military effectiveness. Within last two decades, she emerged as dominant power with an unquestionable thirst for expansion and hegemony in the region. Its large scale mechanization with requisite improvement in military logistics is going to affect our defence capability. Therefore it is imperative for us to remain alive with these changes for sustenance of cemetery in any future conflict. 2. 3. AIM 4. Carryout in depth study of RML with special reference to Indo-Pak scenario so as to determine the latest changes in Indian log system in support of their military and operational strategy and as a response, recommend changes in our logistic systems in line with our military and operational strategy. RESTRICTED 1 6 RESTRICTED PART I RMA AND A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Concept of RMA1 5. RMA and its Definition a. According to Andrew Marshall, director of the Office of Net Assessments in the Office of the Secretary of Defense: "An RMA is a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations. b. There is a debate about what exactly constitutes an "RMA". Some analysts maintain that there have been only three and that these have been linked to the nature of the societies: agrarian, industrial, and information. Others have identified as many as fourteen. There is agreement; however, that technology alone is insufficient to bring about a true RMA. In other words, an appropriate operational concept is just as important as technological invention in bringing about an RMA. 6. Characteristics of RMA. Defining characteristics of an RMA can be stated as “An RMA involves a paradigm shift in the nature and conduct of military operations which either renders obsolete or irrelevant one or more core competencies of a dominant player, or creates one or more new core competencies, in some new dimensions of warfare or both”. Some of the other characteristics are as under:a. RMA are rarely brought about by dominant players. b. RMA frequently bestow an enormous and immediate military advantage on the first nation to exploit them in combat. c. RMA are not always technology driven. d. Technology-driven RMA are usually brought about by combination of technologies, rather than individual technologies. 1 Mr.Lothar Ibriigger (Germany), “The Revolution in Military Affairs” (online) Available http://www.naa.be/publications/comrep/1998/ar299stc-e.html#footnotes RESTRICTED 1 7 RESTRICTED e. Not all technology driven RMA involve weapons. For example, the coming of railroad to Europe and America in the 1830s-1840s led to the revolution in strategic mobility. f. All successful technology-driven RMA appear to have three components: technology, doctrine and organization. Technology, even when developed into a revolutionary weapon or system, is not enough to produce an RMA. It must be combined with doctrine and organization. g. RMA often take along time to come to fruition. h. The military utility of an RMA is frequently controversial and in doubt up until the moment it is proven in battle. Past Revolutions 7. General. Technology-driven changes in military operations are not recent phenomena. Indeed, technological developments have been bringing about profound changes in the nature of warfare since the dawn of history. A number of RMA have occurred throughout history which may not be possible to in totality. Therefore, only major past revolutions which altered the nature of warfare will be discussed in the historical perspective. 8. Infantry and Artillery Revolutions.2 The Infantry Revolution and the Artillery Revolution took place during the Hundred Years War. The outcome of the Battle of Crecy, which marked the end of cavalry supremacy, provides an example of the overwhelming dominance that becomes evident from the completion of an RMA. 9. Fortress Revolution3. A fortress revolution in the sixteenth century resulted from the development of fortifications better able to withstand the siege artillery of the day. The development of muskets and tactics to overcome their weaknesses and exploit their power led to another revolution. 10. The Napoleonic Revolution4. During the last decade of the eighteenth century, a social and political revolution in France transformed war. All-weather roads and a new form of military organization–the corps–transformed logistics, and mass column assaults and mobile artillery transformed tactics. 2 Theodar W.Galdi. “Revolution in Military Affairs” CSR Report for Congress http://www.fas.org/man/crs/95-1170.htm#N_3_ 3 Theodar W.Galdi. “Revolution in Military Affairs” CSR Report for Congress http://www.fas.org/man/crs/95-1170.htm#N_3_ 4 http://www.csbaonline.org/2Strategic_Studies/1Revolution_in_Military_Affairs/ RESTRICTED 1 8 RESTRICTED 11. The Land Warfare Revolution5. The commercial development of the railroad and telegraph and the military development of the breech-loading rifle between 1840 and 1870 revolutionized war on land. The railroad revolutionized logistics, the rifle transformed tactics, and the telegraph fundamentally changed strategic command and control. 12. The Dreadnought/Submarine Revolution6. The advent of steam propulsion and metal construction in naval shipbuilding ushered in a period of near constant technological change during the last decades of the nineteenth century. The completion in 1906 of the H.M.S. Dreadnought, the world’s first allbig gun, turbine-driven battleship, provided existential evidence of another RMA. A principal impetus of the Dreadnought Revolution, the submarine, proved to be equally revolutionary. As a result of the increasing threat that these new weapons posed to battle fleet, the long-standing naval strategy of close blockades of enemy ports had to be abandoned. 13. Trench Warfare7. The culmination of the tactics, organizations and technology of the two 19th century revolutions was reached in the early stages of World War I with static trench warfare on land and submarine warfare at sea. 14. Armoured Warfare8. The changes in technology and organization which had taken place by the end of World War I set the stage for the Revolutions in Mechanization, which took place in the interwar period. From then on, the unit of account in measuring any army’s strength would no longer be the number of soldiers it had under arms. Several other developments–in supporting technologies (e.g., tank radios), organization (combined arms formations and supporting air arms), operational concepts (deep penetrations on narrow fronts and air superiority), and climate of command (mission-oriented tactics)–were essential components of the transformation launched by the blitzkrieg. 15. Naval Air Power9. World War II also saw a transformation of war at sea. With the advent of naval air power, fleets that formerly could not engage their enemy unless they were in visual range could now hurl blows at one another from distances of hundreds of miles. Moreover, whereas naval battles had 5 http://www.csbaonline.org/2Strategic_Studies/1Revolution_in_Military_Affairs/ http://www.csbaonline.org/2Strategic_Studies/1Revolution_in_Military_Affairs/ 6 7 Theodar W.Galdi. “Revolution in Military Affairs” CSR Report for Congress http://www.csbaonline.org/2Strategic_Studies/1Revolution_in_Military_Affairs/ http://www.csbaonline.org/2Strategic_Studies/1Revolution_in_Military_Affairs http://www.fas.org/man/crs/95-1170.htm#N_3_ 8 9 RESTRICTED 1 9 RESTRICTED previously been characterized by gunnery duels, destructive force could now be delivered in great pulses of power. 16. Air Power Revolution. The advent of aircraft technology and its effective employment in world wars I&II gave birth to another dimension of warfare. The aircraft were used for reconnaissance, strategic bombing, in support of land warfare, air-to-air combat etcetera. 17. Electronic Warfare Revolution10. Warfare in the 20th century was also influenced by an electronic revolution, which yielded radar and sonar systems for detection of enemy units beyond the range of human eyeball and radios to coordinate the operations of friendly combat units at a tactical and strategic level. The Nuclear Revolution11. The detonation of atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki provided evidence of another military revolution. As with previous revolutions, the advent of nuclear weapons saw the emergence of new warfighting doctrines and military organizations. In the minds of most strategists, however, the sole purpose of the new weapons had shifted from warfighting to deterrence. 18. Revolutions in Last Half of the Twentieth Century. Because a defining characteristic of the last half of the twentieth century has been very rapid, accelerating, unavoidable, technological change, one of the major elements needed for an RMA, a technological change, is now always present. At the same time, rapid social change and organizational adaptations by military forces are taking place. 19. Current Technology Trends and New Areas of Warfare12 20. Current Technology. Current trends in military technology can be categorized in following ways: a. b. c. d. e. 10 Greater lethality. Increased volume and precision of fire. Better integrative technology leading to increased efficiency and effectiveness. Increasing ability of smaller units to create decisive results. Greater invisibility and increased detectability. David Kirkpatric, “Revolution in Military Technology and their Consequences”Rusi Journal August 2001, P 70 11 http://www.csbaonline.org/2Strategic_Studies/1Revolution_in_Military_Affairs 12 Mr.Lothar Ibriigger (Germany), “The Revolution in Military Affairs” (online) Available http://www.naa.be/publications/comrep/1998/ar249stc-e.html RESTRICTED 10 1 RESTRICTED 21. New Warfare Areas.13 The new technological trend is towards smaller, more lethal forces, able to deliver a high volume of precise fire through the integration of delivery systems with effective sensor and information distribution systems. This current trends lead to the emergence of following new warfare areas:a. Precision Strike. Current systems include long-range cruise missiles, and precision-guided munitions delivered by aircraft and artillery, minimizing collateral damage, friendly-fire casualties, and enemy counterstrikes. Information Warfare. Although the critical value of information in warfare has been acknowledged since ancient times, warfare nowadays relies on information systems to an unprecedented degree. Information-gathering systems provide huge amounts of data which can be sorted and channeled through advanced information distribution and communications. Space Warfare. The military importance of space has been clear for over 40 years but only recently has it become possible to envisage an almost seamless integration of space systems into military operations. The utility of space systems for communications is well established but their use for global, real-time surveillance, reconnaissance and targeting is a more recent phenomenon. Space systems also provide precise navigation and meteorological data. b. c. 13 . http://www.na.be/publications/comrep/1998/ar299stc-e.html#To-4 RESTRICTED 11 1 RESTRICTED PART II RMA AND ITS RELAVANCE TO RML New Operational Concept of RMA 22. Many of the operational concepts that have been emerged in the context of the RMA have clearly been absorbed by the United States military leadership. The US, realizing the importance of latest technology trends and new emerging areas of warfare gave the concept of “Joint Force 2010”. This concept 14 is basically aimed at giving a frame work for the application of RMA by US forces by 2010 to achieve “Full Spectrum Dominance” or total dominance. This concept is based on four pillars: a. Dominant Manoeuvre. It implies an operation from various dispersed points all focusing on one target. It will envisage multidimensional application of information, engagement, and mobility capabilities to position and employ widely dispersed joint air, land, sea, and space forces to accomplish the assigned operational tasks. Precision Engagement. This means the engagement of the target with extreme precision by precision guided munitions from land or sea platforms. Precision engagement envisages the employment of precision delivery systems by widely dispersed forces coordinated through highly capable information distribution systems. Full Dimensional Protection. This is the ability to protect the forces including plans from any damage. According to concept, “The primary prerequisite for full-dimensional protection will be control of the battle space to ensure our forces can maintain freedom of action during deployment, maneuver and engagement, while providing multi-layered defenses for our forces and facilities at all levels”. Focussed Logistic. It means reducing the logistic load to only the essential requirement in shortest possible time, at the fastest speed and in the correct quantity. The concept of "focused logistics" to meet the demands of operations in the early 21st century will be responsive, flexible, and precise" through the fusion b. c. d. 14 Mr.Lothar Ibriigger (Germany), “The Revolution in Military Affairs” (online) Available http://www.naa.be/publications/comrep/1998/ar249stc-e.html RESTRICTED 12 1 RESTRICTED of information, logistics, and transportation technologies. The goal is to be able to track and redirect assets even while en route, and to provide support in hours or days rather than weeks. Modular supplies, specifically tailored "combat service support packages", and pre-positioning will be used extensively, and lessons, techniques and assets from the business sector will be incorporated as appropriate. Importance of Military Logistics 24. The success or failure of any military campaign is directly related to the effectiveness and efficiency of the warfighter’s logistic support pipeline. Historical examples abound of situations where inadequate attention to logistics planning contributed to sub-optimal combat effectiveness. O'Konski, the executive director of the U.S. Army Logistics Integration Agency said, “If military logistics is done well, it is a significant combat multiplier, If it is not done well, it can lead to disaster” 15 25. Combat effectiveness is measured by ever-evolving state-of-the-art weapons systems, designed to elicit combat superiority with maximum precision. Exploitation of technology is a major force multiplier which will lead to a revolution in military affairs. US Army Chief of Staff, General Dennis J. Reimer has been quoted as saying: "An RML precedes any RMA". Thus, the RML is identified as a necessary precondition of the RMA. Over the last few years US and UK forces have put considerable effort into revolutionizing logistics concepts, doctrine and technology to capitalize on the revolution in military affairs. 26. The future of global warfare is shaping up as an environment of UN/coalition missions emphasising humanitarian and peacekeeping operations. All such missions depend on an effective logistic system to get the right stuff, to the right place, at the right time. 27. It is now an established fact that no RMA can bring about change in its operational concepts and doctrines unless logistics system does not support it. Contemporary armies remained alive to absorb changes in their logistic systems to support and new concepts and doctrines emerge out of RMA. 15 . Mask J.O’ Konski,US Army “Revolution in Military Affairs:an overview” 1998, online article RESTRICTED 13 1 RESTRICTED Logistic Systems of Contemporary Armies 28. Logistic System of US Army a. US Army has got a very elaborate logistic support system. It can provide the intimate logistic support to various operations16 of war:b. In order to provide the logistic support to different type of operations the logistic units are grouped according to the type and size of formation. Following are the different units: (1) Forward Support Battalion17. It provides supply, maintenance and health service support to heavy division, brigade and other units in brigade support area. It consists of following: (a) HQ and HQ detachment. (b) Supply Company. (c) Maintenance Company. (d) Medical Company. (2) Division Support Command18. It provides the logistic support forward to the combat brigades to Division units within the Division support area. Airborne and air assault Division has a supply and service battalion instead of a supply and transport battalion and different configuration within the maintenance battalion. Also, the air assault Division has an aircraft maintenance battalion. Organisation of a Division support command is as following:(a) HQ and HQ Company. (b) Finance Company. (c) Medical Battalion. (d) Supply and Transport Battalion. (e) Maintenance Battalion. Royal Logistic Corps19. a. With the constitution of “Logistic Support Review” in 1989, the British Army broadly aimed to examine and review its existing logistic support organisation and system for achieving greater economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in its logistic support operations both during peace and war. “Logistic Support Review” gave out its radical blue print for the creation of the Royal Logistic Corps. On April 1993, the Royal Logistic Corps was formed and became the official successor to the Royal Corps of Transport, Royal Army Ordnance Corps, Royal Pioneer Corps, Army Catering Corps and the Postal and Courier Services of the Royal Engineers. The Royal Logistic Corps has been organised on following three pillars:- 29. 16 17 US Army Field Manual 63-1 p2-13 US Army Field Manual 43-12 p2-6 18 ibid. p4-5 19 Log Mag 98 p10 RESTRICTED 14 1 RESTRICTED (1) Logistic Support. It assumed all functions of Royal Corps of Transport, Royal Ordnance Corps (less vehicles and spares), Royal Pioneer Corps, Army Catering Corps, and the Postal and Courier elements. (2) Equipment Support. Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers was made responsible for the equipment and supply management of motor transport and technical stores and vehicles from the Royal Ordnance Corps. It was designed to bring spares under the one who carried out repairs. (3) Staff Secretariat. It was made responsible for logistic policy, planning and central resource management besides, the operational tasks of setting up establishments, equipment tables and training centres etc. Today the Royal Logistic Corps is a progressing reality and a powerful voice in the British Army with proven credentials and achievements in Gulf, Bosnia and Rwanda. b. New Emerging Revolutionary Concepts in Military Logistics 20 27. The end of the Cold War has had a powerful impact on security relationships around the world. These changing relationships have led to fundamental changes in the security strategy, as well as in supporting the U.S. National Military Strategy. The challenge for Army leaders now is to apply the new military strategy, and ensure they can always deliver the proper mix of forces and materiel to the area in which they are needed, by the time in which they are needed. 28. The U.S Army is planning to create the most responsive, efficient, and reliable logistic system to support mission execution that span the entire spectrum of military operations accomplishing rapidly, and with minimal casualties. To accomplish these missions, the Army is undergoing a fundamental transformation in the way it conducts military operations…an "RMA." However, as the [former] Chief of Staff of the Army has stated, "you cannot have RMA until you have an RML." The Army is hard at work making the logistics revolution a reality. This will insure that as modern warfare increases in complexity, logisticians will continue to decisively support the war fighter. 29. The U.S Army is challenged with developing logistic concepts in support of new RMA based operational concepts to meet future battle field environment. This is being done by visualizing and boldly harnessing technology, with new systems and processes, to produce revolutionary ways to project and sustain America's Army. The objectives are:a. 20 Reduced demand streams from more supportable weapon systems. Thomas J. Edward and Dr. Rick Edem, “Velocity Management and the Revolution in Military Affairs. RESTRICTED 15 1 RESTRICTED b. More accurate and timely visibility of demands exploitating realtime information connectivity, via health and status sensor platforms." Quicker, more responsive processes. Installation capabilities must be leveraged to sustain the force during split-based operations over extended distances." Reduced footprint. "Deployment of fewer logistics support forces into theater." Tenants of RML. U.S efforts are focused on following six tenants of RML to bring new logistic concepts to improve its logistic system in support of new operational concepts:a. Seamless Logistics System21. A seamless logistics system is envisioned as a fully modernized and integrated information system built to support RML logistics management and proactive logistics value chains. c. d. e. 30. b. Distribution-Based Logistics. It is a key component of the RML. Rather than stockpiling materiel, Distribution-Based Logistics will place materiel in motion based on mission requirements. Inventories will be managed through improved information-based technologies, allowing for dynamic resupply and maintenance. c. Agile Infrastructure. It highlights the total integration of Army components to accomplish a specific mission. Joint, coalition and civilian industry will provide additional flexibility in logistical support missions. d. Total Asset Visibility(TAV). It provides logistics managers with the location and status of specific requisitions in the supply chain. TAV data will allow shipments to be redirected or key parts to be identified and routed in response to mission needs. e. Rapid Force Projection. Provides for:(1) (2) The strategic force projection of early entry forces. The strategic projection of dominant land-based forces. 21 Roy Wallace and Dr. Christopher R. Hardy, “Seamless Logistic System” http:///www.almc.army.mil/ALOG/issues/JanFeb99/Ms362.htm RESTRICTED 16 1 RESTRICTED (3) f. The operational and tactical mobility of units and forces within the theater of operations. Adequate Logistics Footprint. It creates sufficient logistical capability and economy of scale to successfully support a mission. RESTRICTED 17 1 RESTRICTED PART III INDIA’ REVOLUTION IN MILITARY SYSTEMS Ambitions in the Region 31. India’s expansionist designs and lust of hegemony in the region kept her engaged in conflicts with neighboring countries. Just after independence, in October 1947, India occupied the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Having used force against a neighbour barely two months after gaining independence, India continued to use force as an instrument of her foreign policy in pursuit of her national goals and objectives in the region. After Kashmir Indian troops entered Junagadh and Manawadar, the following year it was Hyderabad, in Deccan. In 1961 the Portuguese territories of Diu, Daman and Goa were attacked and captured. In 1962 a border conflict was initiated against China and for the first time India was defeated by a neighbour of comparative size. The reverberations from this defeat still rankle the command structure of the large and well-equipped Indian Army. India has also used force to absorb tiny Sikkim, sent troops into Sri Lanka on the pretext of peace keeping, blockaded Nepal to change her government and flown troops into Maldives islands as a show of force. These actions by India over the years certainly do not inspire confidence in her small neighbours22. 32. The humiliating defeat at the hands of China (in 1962) awakened India to the new realities of military power as a major factor in international politics and inter-state relations. Based on this, Indian defence forces made a quantum jump from 1970s. She started exploiting the emerging technologies and synergized these with innovative operational doctrines and organizational adaptation to achieve far higher levels of relative military effectiveness. Thus within last two decades, she emerged as dominant power with an unquestionable thirst for expansion and hegemony in the region. Harnessing RMA 33. Revolution in various Military Fields. Over the years India achieved superiority in following areas of warfare:a. Mechanization. India changed her entire orientation from cautious and slow moving infantry warfare to a bold approach mobile warfare aimed at achieving quick victories. Ground mobility and firepower has been increased by induction of latest tanks, infantry combat vehicles , over helming superiority in arty, track mounted anti tank guided missiles and latest bridging equipment. 22 Lt Gen(Retired) Sardar FS Lodhi, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine” Def Journal Apr99, http://wwwdefencejournal.com/apr99.htm RESTRICTED 18 1 RESTRICTED b. Air Technology23. The induction of latest Mig series, Mirage 2000, Jaguars, SU 30 and manufacturing of a few hundred light aircraft, with advance technology in design and weapon systems implies a distinct quantitative and as well as qualitative edge. The Indian Air Force also improved its strategic lift capability. Naval Technology. The Navy too acquired a quantum technological edge. Nuclear Submarines and two aircraft carriers added to its maneuverability. With this capability, her navy can not only cause effective blockade of our major sea routes but can also support operations to cause a strategic effect. Electronic Warfare. Our adversary has taken a great leap in the field of electronic warfare, and her existing and projected capabilities will render our communications, radars, surveillance and other electronically operated systems highly susceptible to jamming and interception. Surveillance Means24. India has developed and acquired sophisticated battle field surveillance means which has given new dimensions to future conflict affecting our operations. Nuclear Warfare. Nuclear Warfare is another field of RMA which our adversary has harnessed herself and developed sufficient nuclear weapons for deterrence and second strike capability. This will affect the nature of future warfare between both the countries. Indigenization. Our adversity has developed the capacity for indigenous production of tanks, aircraft, light helicopters, small arms and all type of munitions. This provides her logistic stamina to sustain future war for atleast three months. c. c. d. d. e. 34. Operational Concept. A technological development is necessary for an RMA, however, technology by itself can not make the revolution in military effectiveness. Major changes can only be effected when new operational concepts incorporating new technologies are developed. Thus basing on development and acquisition of technology, India devised a new operational concept in mid 80s by General K.S. Sundarji known as “Simultaneity Concept”. The essence of this concept was to transform the Indian army into a hard hitting operational manoeuvre culminating in a classic battle of encirclement of Pakistan. The salient theoretical contours of the concept are given in succeeding paragraphs:- 23 24 Lt col Muhammad Ali Jan, “ Incompatibilities of our Defence Doctrine” The Citadel ___ P 47-49 Group research paper(Staff College 1999), “ Indian Surveillance Capabilities and our Response” The Citadel 2/2000, P 90-109. RESTRICTED 19 1 RESTRICTED a. The concept draws its inspiration from the doctrines of ‘Deep Strike’ and ‘Airland Battle’, both having an inbuilt element of ‘simultaneity’, which entails engagement of maximum forces at one time. In the doctrine of ‘Deep Strike’, ground troops play a key role, while in ‘Airland Battle’ the air component, combined with C3I and EW support, is the dominant part of the concept. It is currently applicable to both the tactical as well as operational realms. ‘Deep Strike’ envisages insertion of ground troops beyond strategic depth While ‘Airland Battle’ involves deep battle against enemy follow on forces/ reserves formations using long range fire support and combat air/aviation as an integral part of the doctrine. Combined arms and joint operations are the hallmark of the concept. Centre piece of this theory is simultaneity of attack and attempt at destroying the entire depth of enemy’s defences with speed and momentum as its essential features, hence the need for assault in waves. Moreover, to increase tempo of the offensive and interdict the defender’s reserves from approaching the penetrated sectors, the use of tactical missile is also considered vital. Air assault , heliborne and special forces are a key element of this concept which are meant to create major effects through the full depth of the en defences. b. c. d. Indian Logistic System To support the Concept 35. In the last two decades or so Indian Army has made considerable improvement in upgrading her logistics support system. New doctrines and concepts have been modified to support the defensive as well as deep thrust operations. She has also made a quantum jump to enhance her logistics stamina. 36. Concept . For efficient maintenance during war, responsibilities for logistic support have been divided into two main functionaries i.e Communication Zone and Combat Zone. Through these zones a regular and uninterrupted flow of supply from base to field force is ensured. The Combat Zones are further organised into Maintenance Areas and Administrative Areas. 37. Replenishment. The chain of replenishment will be as following:Base Communication Zone RESTRICTED 20 1 RESTRICTED Army Maintenance Area Corps Maintenance Area Division Maintenance Area Troops 38. Latest Trends in Indian Logistic System a. Modified Logistics Support in the Command Zone. Efforts are at hand to have harmonised logistics organisations as dictated by geography and operational requirements rather than standard organisations for all formations in a Corps Zone. This would trim organisations obesity. b. Automatic Replenishment System (ARS). Modern logistics envisage switching from a system of pull to push. Thus stores in specified quantities as per consumption pattern must reach the units regularly and with a high assurance level. c. Reliance on Civil Economy. Indian army has drawn up plans for requisitioning of civil facilities and skilled manpower in the events of war. It will augment logistics resources. d. Army Service Corps. Following measures are being introduced in order to economise and facilitate supply:(1) Supply of tetra pack milk. (2) (3) e. Bulk carriage of Petrol Oil and Lubricants. Forward repair of Petrol Oil and Lubricants containers. Ordnance. As for as Ordnance procedures are concerned the following measures are being taken: (1) Speedier Procurement and Delivery Systems. Army Ordnance Corps is experimenting with improved system for supply and delivery of Ordnance stores. (2) Life Cycle Concept. The introduction of system of replacement of clothing of soldiers on a life cycle concept is a fairly recent innovation. (3) Centralised Procurement of stores has been further streamlined. (4) Direct Purchase. Low value items are being purchased directly. Electrical and Mechanical Engineers. More and more stress is now being laid on entering into contract at the time of procurement h. RESTRICTED 21 1 RESTRICTED itself with the manufacture of indigenous equipment for taking on the overhaul of the equipment as and when due. This will save tremendous manpower and cost of setting up of repair facilities by army in the workshop. RESTRICTED 22 1 RESTRICTED PART IV ANALYSIS OF PAKISTAN ARMY’S LOGISTIC SYSTEM Impact of Indian Armed Forces Modernization on our Logistics 39. The modernization of Indian Army with its new operational concepts will have serious implications on our logistics during any future conflict between both the countries. The salient features of future battle field and its implications for logistic system are given in succeeding paragraphs. a. Lethality. With the induction of lethal weapons, the rate of attrition in terms of men and material will be enormous which require elaborate arrangements for speedy replenishment. b. Mobility. Due to greater mechanization, enhanced means of strategic and tactical mobility attained by our adversary, the fate of any future battle may change many a times before it is finally concluded. Under such fluid battle field conditions, our logistic support entirely based on dumps will be late in terms of time and apace. This necessitates dynamism in logistic support system having compatible mobility to shift means of waging war and supplies quickly. d. Deep Strike Capability. With the ambitious mechanization plan, our adversary has acquired the capability to undertake deep strikes/maneouvre. This will sever the lines of communications with speed and violence, resulting into breakdown of rear to front logistic flow. c. Nuclear Environment. Indian nuclear capability, combined together with mechanization will necessitate dispersed deployment of forces in combat zone. Such an environment will have following implications on logistics:(1) Difficulty in provision of logistic support to dispersed forces. (2) Fast going operations will require compatible logistic mobility. (3) Danger of contamination of dumps due to nuclear fall out. (4) Special arrangements to cover the supplies from nuclear hazards. d. Rear Area Security. Indian capability to drop paratroopers poses a considerable threat to rear area security. Any such attempt directed against our logistic installations at critical stage of the battle will have serious implications on our operations. e. Air Threat. Development of airfields close to our border by our enemy has introduced another threat to our logistic installations/units which are within the striking radius. This will have pronounced effects on our logistic support. f. Isolation of Combat Zone. The Indian concept of Simultaneity, if successful, will isolate the combat zone forces. This RESTRICTED 23 1 RESTRICTED will create a dilemma for fighting formations, denude of any logistic support. g. Electronic Warfare. The Indian electronic warfare capability will create paralyses in our communication systems due to which logistic staff will not be able to abreast with situational awareness for logistic support requirements. h. Surveillance Capability. Indian enhanced surveillance capability will assist our adversary to have an accurate and latest information about our logistic installations, thus vulnerable to destruction at early stage of the battle. j. Naval Blockade. Indian Naval expansion has provided her greater potential to carryout our naval blockade in any future war. This will have spontaneous effects on our logistic support due to our heavy reliance on foreign resources. Analyses of Existing Logistic System 40. Our existing logistic system is based on old concepts. Although changes have been taken place in our logistic system in the past to meet the requirements under changed operational scenario. But the incompatibilities of the system in terms of concepts, doctrines and organizational anomalies still exist when viewed in context with future operational requirements. Maj weaknesses in the system are discussed in succeeding paragraphs. 41. Conceptual Issues a. Stereo Type. Pakistan has variety of geographical regions but there is a uniform system of logistics to cater for these areas. This results in stereotype, unbalanced and inadequate logistics. b. Reliance on Imports. Continuous reliance on imports can create problems in an emergency in the absence of sound indigenous defence production plan. c. Over Lapping. In certain cases one logistic area is providing support to two corps or two logistic areas to one corps. Problem arises when allocation of resources by the field formations is at variance with the allocation and priorities specified by General Headquarters. d. Integrated Planning. Logistic planning requires integrated planning at the level of General Headquarters. Presently logistic functions are split between the Quartermaster General, Adjutant General and the Master General of Ordnance. Resultantly, there is lot of compartmentation in the planning process. 42. Organizational Anomalies a. Organizational Problems. Our field logistic units like ordnance maintenance parks, independent ammunition platoons, supply platoons are not capable of executing logistic support plans effectively. This is going to hamper their functional efficiency. b. Rolling Stock. The acute shortage of rolling and coaching stock with the railway is being felt even during peacetime. The mov of troops during peacetime is problematic due to shortage of basic RESTRICTED 24 1 RESTRICTED stock. The replacement/induction of new rolling stock is not compatible to the requirements. Similarly, railway tracks require regular maintenance. c. Non Standardization of Vehicles/Stores. Our present available equipment consists of wide variety. Accordingly, it affects maintenance, poses problems of spares and creates maintenance problems for the handlers. d. Shortage of Transport. Presently, the supply and transport battalions and mechanical transport battalions are deficient of vehicles. Resultantly, we are relying on civil transport which if made available in war will create problems of its own nature. In addition it will have adverse effects on national economy. e. Lack of Adequate Communication. There are no communication arrangements between the logistic elements. There are no arrangements between replenishment points and the units responsible to replenish these points. f. Rear Area Security. With the increased changes of air, missile and even deep thrusts by mechanized forces, the rear areas are equally exposed and vulnerable. This is going to have significant effects on the morale of the troops. Our logistic units/installations are not well equipped to deal with these threats. g. Lack of Compatible Mobility. A major shortcoming in our ability to sustain mechanized operations is the lack of compatible mobility between the supported elements and their logistic echelons. This particularly affects the strike formations, limits their sustenance capability and obligates their early securing of black top roads for continued support. However, this problem shifts into background when the more serious problem of inadequacy of transport is considered. h. Absence of Modernization. Logisticians in Pakistan are still grapping with old system of POL through jerricans. Thus negating modern concept of bulk movement. There is a requirement to keep pace with new technologies and latest trends to improve our logistic support system. Miscellaneous Aspects a. Lack of Cooperation. Cooperation between operations and logistic directorates is lacking. The tendency to neglect logistics, as it often happens naturally, results in administrative problems. These problems are attended to by trial and error method rather than systematic study, past experience and special expertise. b. Attitude. In our army most of the officers want to be called tacticians but non will feel proud in being called logician. This is the true reflection of our attitude towards logistic support. c. Emphasis on Logistics. During field exercise we do not test our logistic staff in a real battle field environment. Logistic support during field exercises is restricted to some administrative/logistic 43. RESTRICTED 25 1 RESTRICTED instructions rather planning/exercise. than a real operational oriented RESTRICTED 26 1 RESTRICTED PART V RECOMMENDATIONS 45. There is no short cut in finding solutions for our logistic problems. There is a dire need to evolve logistic discipline and carry out basic changes in our logistic system to make it compatible with future requirements. Recommended changes in are discussed in succeeding paragraphs:Reappraisal of Logistic Concepts. Logistic areas should be placed under General Headquarters both during peace and war. General Headquarters should remain responsible for coordination of all logistic plans and provision of 4th and 3rd lin resources/facilities upto Replenishment Points. Authorization of stocks for holding and strike corps should be made clear at planning stage and concerned corps to have full liberty to move /place these stocks to support their operational plans. Compatibility With Terrain and Operational Requirement. The system should be made compatible to meet the requirements of each area, the peculiarities of our terrain should be recognized by having separate scales, type of logistic units for holding/ strike corps. Enhancing Mobility. With the changed strategin orientation there is a dire need to increase the mobility. The recommendations are:(1) Upto Replenishment points. Different means of communication should be used like transport ac, railway, heavy vehicles instead of 2.5 ton trucks. Pipelines should be laid upto replenishment points for Petroleum, oil and lubricants. (2) Holding Formations. Sufficient amount of first and second line transport should be provided to avoided dumping as it provides lucrative targets and difficult to shift when need arises. (3) Strike Formations. The first line transport of fighting mobile units should be track based to keep pace with fighting elements. Sufficient number of 2nd line transport should be provided to keep all commodities mobile. Indigenization. In the event of Naval blockade during critical moments of war, the country can only survive if we are self sufficient. Therefore, the efforts should be made at national level to attain self sufficiency in all type of commodities and defence equipment. The existing defense factories can be upgraded for manufacturing of tanks, guns, ac and all types of munitions. Modernization and Utilization of Railways. Railways being more efficient and cheap way of transportation has important place in the logistic system. Therefore, an elaborate railway network upto a. b. c. d. e. RESTRICTED 27 1 RESTRICTED communication/combat zones along with modernization programme should be undertaken to speed up the logistic supplies in the field. Depot/ Replenishment Points Network. In future wars, depots will be too vulnerable and cumbersome to be efficient. Instead, network of small depots will have to be established well ahead and scattered to cater for various eventualities, reducing vulnerability and increasing mobility in terms of shifting if required. The replenishment points should have sufficient quantities of immediate needs of fighting echelons with proper command structure/communication. Communications. One of the foremost pre-requisite for efficient logistic system is the situational awareness of logistic requirements For this, a comprehensive and reliable communication arrangements between the operational and logistic elements within the army and within logistic echelons and their controlling headquarters should be established. Adoption of New Log Trends. The new RML concepts are based on reducing the logistic load to only the essential requirement in shortest possible time, at the fastest speed and in the correct quantity. Pak Army should also introduce some of the new emerging technologies which can act as force multiplier to improve log system. The recommendations are:(1) Induction of weapon system and equipment which are easy to repair, have self healing capability, builtin ultra reliability features, increased fuel efficiency, have more accuracy and lethality to reduce ammunition requirements. This will in turn reduce the logistic burden. (2) Technologies like field kitchens, refrigerated vans, fork lifters, various types of containers, bowzers and mobile field hospitals. Thus providing speedy logistic support. (3) Improvement in combat ration by introducing meal ready to eat(MRE) with more nutrition value and less voluminous and weight. (4) To reduce the large inventories and advance dumping of logistic requirement, real-time situational awareness and end-to-end connectivity from battle front to industrial base should be ensured to meet actual operational requirements. However, it is only possible if all logistic tiers are fully integrated. f. g. h. RESTRICTED 28 1 RESTRICTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Mr.Lothar Ibriigger (Germany), “The Revolution in Military Affairs” (online) Available http://www.naa.be/publications/comrep/1998/ar299stc-e.html#footnotes 2. Theodar W.Galdi. “Revolution in Military Affairs” CSR Report for Congress http://www.fas.org/man/crs/95-1170.htm#N_3_ 3. http://www.csbaonline.org/2Strategic_Studies/1Revolution_in_Military_Affairs/ 4. David Kirkpatric, “Revolution in Military Technology and their Consequences”Rusi Journal August 2001, P 70 5. Mr.Lothar Ibriigger (Germany), “The Revolution in Military Affairs” (online) Available http://www.naa.be/publications/comrep/1998/ar249stc-e.html 7. Mask J.O’ Konski,US Army “Revolution in Military Affairs:an overview” 1998, online article. 8. US Army Field Manual 63-1 p2-13 9. US Army Field Manual 43-12 p2-6 10. ibid. p4-5 11. Log Mag 98 p10 12. Thomas J. Edward and Dr. Rick Edem, “Velocity Management and the Revolution in Military Affairs. 13. Roy Wallace and Dr. Christopher R. Hardy, “Seamless Logistic System” http:///www.almc.army.mil/ALOG/issues/JanFeb99/Ms362.htm 14. Lt Gen(Retired) Sardar FS Lodhi, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine” Def Journal Apr99, http://wwwdefencejournal.com/apr99.htm 15. Lt col Muhammad Ali Jan, “ Incompatibilities of our Defence Doctrine” The Citadel ___ P 47-49 16. Group research paper(Staff College 1999), “ Indian Surveillance Capabilities and our Response” The Citadel 2/2000, P 90-109. RESTRICTED