HISTORY OF EDUCATION, JULY, 2005, VOL. 34, NO. 4, 427â439 History of Education ISSN 0046â760X print/ISSN 1464â5130 online © 2005 Taylor & Francis Group Ltd http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals DOI: 10.1080/00467600500129617 Reconsidering the roots of current perceptions: Saint Pierre, Helvetius and Rousseau on education and the individual TAL GILEAD 9 Meron Street, Mevassert Zion, Israel. E-mail:
[email protected] Taylor and Francis LtdTHED112944.sgm10.1080/00467600500129617History of Education0046-760X (print)/1464-5130 (online)Original Article2005Taylor & Francis Group Ltd344000000July 2005TalGileadJohn Adams Hall15â23 Endsleigh StLondonWC1H
[email protected] Historians and philosophers of education tend to emphasise the contribution of Rousseau to the development of individualistic trends in modern education. However, other eighteenth- century thinkers also took part in the quest to bring the individual and his happiness to the centre of contemporary educational discourse. The work of some of these thinkers, although highly influential in the time of its publication, has been neglected and consequently forgot- ten. This article examines the place attributed to the individual in the educational works of two of the most prominent of these thinkers, Castel de Saint Pierre (1658-1743) and Claude Adrian Helvetius (1715-1771). In this article, it is argued that Saint Pierre and Helvetiusâ perception of the individualâs place in education is closer to contemporary views than the one found in Rousseau. Introduction Studies in the history of educational ideas tend to focus on the contribution of Rousseau to the development of individualistic trends in modern education. Rousseau, however, was not alone in promoting the happiness and welfare of the individual as educational goals. Other eighteenth-century thinkers also took part in the quest to bring the individual and his earthly happiness to the centre of contemporary educational discourse. The work of some of these authors, although highly influential at the time of publication, was neglected and consequently forgotten. In order to amend what can be seen as a historical injustice, this article examines the individualâs place in the educational theory of two prominent contem- porary authors, Castel de Saint Pierre (1658â1743) and Claude Adrian Helvetius (1715â 71). Both are among the founders of utilitarianism. Their works to be examined are Projet pour Perfectionner LâEducation (A Project for Improving Education)1 by Castel de Saint Pierre published in 1728, and the writings of Helvetius on education, namely De lâEsprit (Essays on the Mind)2 dating from 1758 and De lâHomme (A Treatise on Man)3 that saw light in 1772, one year after Helvetiusâ death. The article focuses on the historical roots of two fundamental ideas or, rather, influen- tial claims that have played a major role in shaping the present understanding of the rela- tionship between education and the individual. Firstly, it looks into the roots of the claim that education should not attempt to change the innate nature of the individual, but should rather take it as given and proceed from there. Secondly, it enquires into the roots of the claim that the key aim of education is to promote the mundane happiness of individuals. At 1 C. I. De Saint Pierre, Projet pour Perfectionner LâEducation-Avec Un Discours sur la sainteté Des Hommes (Paris: Chez Briasson, 1728). 2 C. A. Helvetius, De lâesprit or Essays on the Mind, translated by W. Mudford (London: Jones 1, 1807). 3 Helvetius, Treatise on Man, translated by M. D. Hooper (London: Vernor, Hood & Shape, 1810), Vols 1 & 2. 428 T. Gilead present, Rousseauâs name is strongly associated with these two claims and it is often thought that they originate in his educational writings. This article, by re-examining the historical roots of these claims, shows that more than 30 years before the publication of Rousseauâs Emile in 1762, Saint Pierre already asserted that education should accept the individualâs nature as given. It also reveals that at approximately the same time as Rousseau, Helvetius also maintained that the main aim of education was to increase the earthly happiness of individuals. The article explores the philosophical assumptions and educational convictions that led Saint Pierre and Helvetius to advance the above claims. It is argued that the views and philosophical premises that brought them to these claims were radically different from those which led Rousseau to assert them. These philosophical differences, it should be noted, led them to dissimilar interpretations of the two claims above and as a result their approaches to the education and constitution of the individual radically differed. This article, however, argues that todayâs perception of the individual and his place in the educational system is, in many ways, closer in its philosophical premises to the views held by Saint Pierre and Helvetius than to the views found in Rousseau. Moreover, it is maintained that in our historical period the conceptions that underlie the prevailing acceptance of the two claims above are more akin to Saint Pierreâs and Helvetiusâ conceptions than to Rousseauâs. This article embraces a developmental approach for the reconstruction of Saint Pierre and Helvetiusâ thought. It discusses how one concept leads to another both within and across their thoughts. This is rendered possible because there is clearly a common thread running through the educational writings of the two thinkers. The influence of Saint Pierreâs ideas on Helvetius is evident in the latterâs writings. The article proceeds as follows: the second section examines how Saint Pierre came to assert that the nature of the individual should not be changed. In addition it discusses the educational implications that he derived from this claim. The third section deals with the way in which Helvetius alters and modifies the theories of Saint Pierre to better match the spirit of his day. In addition, it reviews the line of thought that led Helvetius to argue that the primary aim of education is to promote the happiness of individuals within soci- ety. The fourth section discusses the resemblance between the individualism found in contemporary education and that present in the works of Saint Pierre and Helvetius. This is done by contrasting their ideas with those of Rousseau. The fifth and final section raises some questions regarding the relationship between eighteenth-century educational theory and contemporary attitudes towards the individual. Before turning to explore Saint Pierreâs educational thought one additional clarifica- tion is needed. The three authors discussed differentiated between the education of men and women. Rousseau and Saint Pierre even discuss the education of the two genders separately.4 This article focuses on the place of the male individual in the educational writings of the three authors discussed. Consequently, gender-specific terms such as âmanâ and âhisâ will be used here to describe the individual. The relationship between education and the female individual, as it is found in their writings, calls for another investigation. Finally, although the article does not assume a gender-neutral perception of the individual in the writings dating from the eighteenth century, it does assume it when- ever the present is concerned, so that in reference to the present the term individual encompasses both sexes. 4 Rousseau devotes book 5 of Emile to the education of women. Saint Pierre deals with this matter in chapter 14 of his Projet pour Perfectionner LâEducation. This chapter is titled âEducation des fillesâ. Reconsidering the roots of current perceptions 429 Accepting the individualâs nature: Castel de Saint Pierre With one aim in mind, to improve the state of humanity, the French author Castel de Saint Pierre (1658â1743) wrote about science, ethics, politics, economics and education. He conceived plans to advance almost every aspect of social life. He loved to write and produced numerous books, pamphlets, notes and memoranda. When Siegder-Pascal, however, asks himself how it is possible that an original, brilliant and fertile thinker such as Saint-Pierre fell into obscurity, he finds two main causes. The first is Saint Pierreâs unskilful way of writing, manifested in a cumbersome style, lack of elegance and many repetitions. The second is the unfavourable reputation of Saint Pierre among the thinkers of his time. Even Rousseau, who edited his writing, viewed him as a dreamer who had interesting ideas but conceived impractical plans.5 Time, however, argued Perkins, has been good to Saint Pierre. The course of history has revealed the potential present in his ideas.6 Today in the age of the European Union, it is hard to write off Saint Pierreâs plans as utopian just because he believed that Europe could be united in a peace treaty. Although his programme to reform education never approached realization, it contained innovative ideas that made their way into the educational thought of his day and that of future times. Some of these ideas are explored in this section. In his comprehensive study of the educational ideal in eighteenth-century France, Grandiere argued that the year 1725 was a turning point in French educational thought. Prior to that year, not only was the educational system in France under the absolute control of the religious establishment but it was also religious views, beliefs, ideals and ideas that utterly dominated the educational theory of the time. For centuries it was almost unquestionably accepted that the main aim of education was to bring man closer to God. For educational purposes, man was perceived first and foremost as the son of God and the function of education was directly derived from this perception. It was commonly agreed that the central role of education was to make man pious in this world and prepare him for a happy life in the next.7 However, from the year 1725 onwards, following the growing influence of Lockeâs Some Thoughts Concerning Education, a new educational movement emerged alongside the old religious one. For the members of this movement, the point of departure was man as a member of society and no longer man as the son of God. Absorb- ing the emerging modern spirit of their age, the members of this movement placed the emphasis on the mundane aspects of human life. They were increasingly concerned with the happiness of man on earth and in particular with his happiness as a member of society. Consequently, the old religious aims of education were being replaced by new social goals.8 Saint Pierre was undoubtedly one of the leading figures of this new movement. In the first page of his book devoted to education, dating from 1728, he wrote: âthe aim of education is, in general, to make the happiness of the pupil, his parents and the other citi- zens much greater than it could have been without such an educationâ.9 The aim was clearly stated and it was not a religious one. In Saint Pierreâs mind the aspiration to promote earthly happiness had taken the place traditionally occupied by notions related to 5 S. Siegder-Pascal, Les Projets De lâAbbe de Saint-Pierre 1658â1743 (Paris: Librairie Nouvelle de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1900). 6 L. M. Perkins, The Moral and Political Philosophy of the Abbe De Saint Pierre (Geneve: Librairie E. Dorz, 1959). 7 M. Grandiere, LâIdéal Pédagogique en France au Dix-Huitième Siècle (Oxford: Voltaire Foundations, 1998), 38. 8 Ibid., 62. 9 C. I. De Saint Pierre, Projet pour Perfectionner LâEducation-Avec Un Discours sur la sainteté Des Hommes (Paris: Chez Briasson, 1728), 1. 430 T. Gilead religion. It had become the governing aim of education. What Saint Pierre primarily sought was to increase happiness in society through the use of education. Like other members of this educational movement, such as Locke and Buffier,10 Saint Pierre rejected the religious perception of human nature in favour of the pre-Christian one. Locke, the forefather of the movement, argued in his educational treaty, dating from 1693, that âThe only thing we are naturally afraid of, is Pain, or loss of Pleasureâ.11 He added: âour first action being guided more by self-love, than Reason or Reflectionâ.12 Saint Pierre embraced and further developed this perception that by nature, humans are predominantly self-regarding. Concerning the forces that move human agents he wrote: âall motives, all feelings and all driving forces that dictate his actions can be divided into four categories. (1) The feeling of actual pleasure, either corporeal or spiritual, that one wants to sustain. (2) The feeling of actual pain, either corporeal or spiritual, that one wants to end. (3) The desire for or the prospect of a future pleasure that one wants to attain; a prospect which is in itself an actual pleasure. (4) The fear of a future pain that one wants to avoid, which is in itself an unpleasant feeling and an actual pain.â13 According to Saint Pierre, âthis invin- cible inclination we have for pleasure and this invincible aversion of painâ14 forces man to act in a self-regarding way. Man, he argued, will always favour his own good over that of others. For Saint Pierre, âamour-propreâ or âself-loveâ was our instinctively ingrained inclination. However, the view that by nature the individual is self-regarding necessarily led to the problem of how to balance the egoistic tendencies of all the individuals within society. This problem of harmonizing the personal with the social good is known as the public/ private dilemma. For the educational thinkers that preceded Saint Pierre, such as Vives (1492â1540) and Comenius (1571â1635), the way out of this dilemma was simple: the individualâs nature should be changed. They saw education as a tool that should help the individual transcend his egoistic nature and acquire a higher one.15 Even Locke, who was perhaps the most progressive among the prominent educational thinkers who preceded Saint Pierre, fully embraced this idea. Locke wrote: âthe great principle and foundation of all Vertue and Worth, is placed in this, That a Man is able to deny himself his own desires, Cross his own Inclinations, and purely follow what Reason directs us as best, thoâ the appetite lean the other way.â16 From this he concluded, like many of his predecessors, that through the use of reason man could rise above his self-regarding nature and that once self-love has been subjected to reason and the innate human nature consequently changed, the private/public dilemma would be resolved.17 Saint Pierre, in contrast, questioned the idea that the self-regarding nature of the individual could be changed. To his mind, Locke and his predecessors overestimated the ability of reason to control innate human nature. This view of Saint Pierreâs was based on his assumption that man is primarily a creature of desires and passions. These he believed 10 See in particular C. Buffier, Traite De La Société Civile et Du Moyen de se Rendre Heureux en Contribuant au bonheur des Personnes Avec Qui lâon Vit (Paris: Chez Briasson, 1726). 11 J. Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, edited by J. W. Yolton and J. S. Yolton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 117. 12 Ibid., 170. 13 De Saint Pierre, Projet pour Perfectionner LâEducation, 24. 14 Ibid., 247. 15 See: J. L. Vives, âThe Transmission of Knowledgeâ, in Vives on Education, edited by F. Watson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1913). See also J. A. Comenius, The Great Didactic, translated by M. W. Keating (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1907). 16 Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, 103. 17 Ibid., 136. Reconsidering the roots of current perceptions 431 unbreakably tie him to his own selfish interest. Departing from this view of man, which following the works of Hobbes and others was becoming increasingly widespread at the time, he came to the conclusion that âit is impossible to change human natureâ.18 More- over, Saint Pierre argued that it is not only impossible to change human nature but also detrimental to do so. Since, as we have seen, he thought that self-love was the source of all human motivations, he held that self-love could also have some desirable outcomes. He wrote: âAll virtues and all high level skills can be looked upon as consequences or as effects stemming from prudence or self-love.â19 For Saint Pierre, changing manâs nature was meddling with the roots and springs of virtue and all that is excellent in him. It was in Saint Pierreâs recognition of the positive aspects of the individualâs self-regarding nature, and his willingness to accept this nature as given, that his great innovation lay. He was perhaps not the first thinker to do so, but he was the first who conceived an educational plan around it. In his educational plan, Saint Pierre took self-love, formerly regarded by educationalists as a pernicious sin or the source of anti-social behaviour, and transformed it into an ingredient of human nature whose worth was determined by particular conse- quences.20 However, since Saint Pierre, unlike his contemporary Mendaville, did not believe that the identification of the personal and general interests is spontaneously performed within each individual consciousness, he still had to find a way out of the private/public dilemma. For Saint Pierre, the key to solving the private/public dilemma was found in the term âvirtuous self-loveâ. Virtue, in his view, was nothing but the tendency to promote the happiness of others. He therefore proposed to judge how virtuous an act is according to âthe more or less pleasure and utility that results from it [the action] for others, and for the great- est number of othersâ.21 In defining virtue in such a way Saint Pierre moved away from the traditional conceptions of virtue, which demanded that manâs self-regarding nature should be conquered. Under the traditional conception of virtue, as found in classical and Christian thought, virtue and self-love were thought to be in sharp contradiction. True virtue, it was maintained, required freeing oneself from regard to oneself. Under Saint Pierreâs definition of virtue, however, man could be both virtuous and self-regarding, provided that he contributed to the general good. This perception of virtue, it should be noted, fitted well with Saint Pierreâs conviction that the individual could not elevate himself beyond his self-regarding nature. Relying on the idea that man is inescapably moved by self-love, Saint Pierre argued that if man understood that his own good and the good of others are inseparable, he will inevitably be led by his own interest to serve the good of others. It was this tendency to promote the good of others out of concern for oneâs own happiness that Saint Pierre termed âvirtuous self-loveâ. But how does acting virtuously contribute to the personal happiness of the individual? How are happiness and virtue connected? Saint Pierre, who took part in a contemporary intellectual project that aimed at liberat- ing Christianity from prejudice and making it more enlightened, reasonable and akin to the philosophical and scientific spirit of his days, was an acute critic of the Church and chal- lenged many of its most essential teaching. Yet, Saint Pierre had embraced the Christian notion of life after death and the system of punishment and rewards, which was linked to it. Nevertheless, as in many other instances, Saint Pierre reinterpreted these creeds in a 18 De Saint Pierre, Projet pour Perfectionner LâEducation, 1. 19 Ibid., 33. 20 Ibid., 252. 21 Ibid., 103. 432 T. Gilead way that better matched his mental outlook. He argued that: âThis truth that there is a second life for punishing the unjust and for rewarding the do-gooders, must result in an almost complete difference in all human conduct.â22 Alienating himself from the view of the Church, then, he proclaimed that our fate in the next world is decided mainly by our actions towards our fellow humans and not by our attitudes towards God. Saint Pierre, who placed the emphasis on Christian morality rather than on piety, maintained that in order to secure his happiness in the next life the individual must act to promote the happi- ness of others. For Saint Pierre, the prospect of eternal punishment or reward provided the ultimate, but not the sole, reason for the individual to act virtuously. Like many of his contemporaries, Saint Pierre embraced a eudaemonistic perception of happiness, namely that to be truly happy one must necessarily be a worthy person. According to Saint Pierre, the sensation of well-feeling, regardless of how long it lasted, was not a sufficient condi- tion for happiness. Hence, for Saint Pierre, happiness contained an objective component stemming from outside the individualâs consciousness. To experience true happiness, he maintained, a person had to be in some sense morally good. Happiness was, therefore, dependent on being virtuous.23 Furthermore, Saint Pierre also believed that the extent of pleasure an individual enjoys is directly linked to the amount of pleasure that the other members of society experience.24 Claiming that in order to promote his own happiness both in this world and the next the individual had to contribute to that of others,25 Saint Pierre argued that the private/ public dilemma could be solved simply by revealing to individuals the right path to happi- ness. He believed that by knowing this path and acknowledging how necessary acting virtuously is to attaining happiness, the individual would act virtuously out of self-love. Here was where education came into play. On the role of education Saint Pierre wrote: âit is only a matter of properly directing this invincible propensity [self-love] by diminishing errors in relation to what they [humans] take to be good and consider to be painfulâ.26 Education, in other words, had to properly direct people to their happiness. In practice this meant that education had to enlighten the individual by teaching him about religion and the benefits of acting virtuously. Nonetheless, Saint Pierre did not try to restore the old religious role of education under a different form. His greatest educational concern was, as mentioned, promoting public happiness. Within his educational thought he perceived religion mainly as a helpful aid for augmenting social happiness and not as an aim in itself. Saint Pierre thought that once the idea of life after death and the moral truths are accepted, the best tool for guiding the interest of the individual was reason.27 Cultivating reason was for him one of the main aims of education. However, as mentioned, Saint Pierre saw man as a creature of passion and did not wholeheartedly trust him to follow his reason. He, therefore, argued that man should also be taught through habits. According to Saint Pierre, constant repetition and repeated experiences are the most reliable ways to verify the proper conduct of the individual.28 Most of Saint Pierreâs discussed educational project was devoted to ways of inculcating beneficial habits in the pupils. 22 Ibid., 4. 23 Ibid., 44. 24 Ibid., 43. 25 Ibid., 41. 26 Ibid., 1. 27 Ibid., 36. 28 Ibid., 11. Reconsidering the roots of current perceptions 433 Although today most of Saint Pierreâs educational ideas are irrelevant and forgotten, his claim that education should not change the nature of the individual but rather take it as its point of departure has gained prominence and has found its way into mainstream education in the Western world. In the next section, we shall see how this idea developed and was joined by other fundamental ideas, regarding the relation between society and the individual, in the work of Helvetius. Helvetius and the society of individuals Although only 30 years separated the publication of Saint Pierreâs book on education and Helvetiusâ De lâEsprit, the intellectual climate in France changed considerably in this period. In Helvetiusâ day, France was caught in an escalating power struggle between reformatory and reactionary forces in education. The religious establishment fought to maintain and prolong its command over education, while others, such as Helvetius himself, did all in their power to subvert it.29 Unlike Saint Pierre, who tried to find a way between old and new positions, Helvetius rejected every religious or traditional idea in favour of its modern counterpart. As Cumming claims, the writing of Helvetius accurately mirrored the most radical tendencies and movements of his age.30 In order to grasp the radicalism of Helvetius, one needs only to examine the events that followed the publication of De lâEsprit. The book, an immediate success, caused a public outcry, was consequently banished and Helvetius himself was condemned and persecuted by the authorities.31 Helvetiusâ later book De lâhomme, which contained a further elaboration and explication of his ideas, became available to the general public only after his death in 1771. One does not need to look far in order to see the similarities between Saint Pierre and Helvetiusâ educational ideas. Helvetius agreed with Saint Pierreâs view that promoting mundane happiness was the primary aim of education and, like Saint Pierre, he believed that it was within the power of education to do so. He wrote: âI am convinced that a good education would diffuse light, virtue and consequently, happiness in society.â32 He added: âThe more perfect the education the more happy the people.â33 Helvetius also embraced Saint Pierreâs claim that education should accept the self-regarding nature of the individ- ual as given. First, like Saint Pierre before him, he was persuaded that the individual was irrevocably bound to self-love. He wrote: âself-love, a sensation necessary to the preserva- tion of the species, is engraven by nature in a manner not to be erasedâ.34 Second, he also shared Saint Pierreâs belief that the passion and desires that stem from self-love are the source of all human motivation. If self-love was controlled, he thought, it would result in manâs stagnation, which would ultimately prevent him from achieving happiness. He noted: âDesire is the moving principle of the soul, without desire it stagnates! We must desire to act and act to be happy.â35 For Helvetius, as for Saint Pierre, the ability to promote happiness was directly related to the preservation of the self-regarding nature of the individual. Happiness, it should be noted, was for Helvetius the epitome of human life. 29 M. Grandiere, LâIdéal Pédagogique en France au Dix-Huitième Siècle (Oxford: Voltaire Foundations, 1998), 223. 30 I. Cumming, Helvetius-His Life and Place in the History of Educational Thought (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955), 206â15. 31 For further details on this affair see: D. W. Smith, Helvetius-A Study in Persecution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965). 32 Helvetius, De lâesprit or Essays on the Mind, 362. 33 Helvetius, Treatise on Man, Vol. 2, 418. 34 Helvetius, De lâesprit or Essays on the Mind, 185. 35 Helvetius, Treatise on Man, Vol. 2, 259. 434 T. Gilead Like many of the utilitarians that followed him he held that happiness alone is intrinsically good and that all other things are good only because they contain, or are a means towards, happiness. He concluded âall men tend only towards their happiness, that is a tendency from which they cannot be diverted; that the attempt [to change it] would be fruitless, and the success dangerousâ.36 Following Saint Pierre, then, Helvetius held that education could not and should not change the self-regarding nature of the individual. He wrote: âabandon the ridiculous project [of changing human nature]; study the human heart, exam- ine the springs by which it is movedâ.37 Nonetheless, despite the common aspects found in Saint Pierreâs and Helvetiusâ educational theories, their intellectual outlooks were as far apart as the mental spirits of their respective ages. While Saint Pierreâs mind was still governed by the religious atmo- sphere of the past, the mind of Helvetius was completely embedded in contemporary scientific thought. Helvetius, who wanted to make the study of man and his education into an experimental science, based his educational theory on exclusively worldly foundations. Religion and the idea of life after death had, therefore, no place in Helvetiusâ educational programme. Dismissing religion for being unscientific, he avoided incorporating any reli- gious-inspired ideas into his understanding of human nature and the educational plan that he founded upon it. In a time when organized religion and novel philosophies clashed, Helvetius wholeheartedly joined forces with the latter. Helvetiusâ educational philosophy, nevertheless, can be looked upon as an attempt to uphold the outline of Saint Pierreâs educational thought while adjusting it to the new scientific modes of thought. But this attempt led Helvetius to a new understanding of the place of the individual in the educa- tional system. Willing to take to its logical conclusions his double project of demystifying human existence and placing it on worldly grounds, Helvetius argued that: âcorporeal pains and pleasures are the unknown principles of human actionsâ.38 He devoted an entire section of his De LâHomme, entitled âCorporeal Sensibility is the Sole Cause of our Actions, our Thoughts, our Passions, and our Sociabilityâ,39 to proving that all forms of pain and plea- sure are reducible to their bodily kind. Helvetius, therefore, unlike Saint Pierre, utterly rejected the idea that man has a spiritual side. âManâ, argued Helvetius, âis a machine, which being put in motion by corporeal sensibility, ought to perform all that it executesâ.40 Following this line of reasoning, Helvetius maintained that happiness was ultimately the product of sensual pleasure alone. This view of happiness in conjunction with his refusal to embrace the idea of life after death led Helvetius to regard happiness as a purely subjec- tive sensation experienced by the individual. The details of Helvetiusâ theory did not permit him to incorporate an objective criterion into his perception of happiness and excluded the possibility of a eudaemonistic conception of happiness. The view that happiness is purely subjective, however, leads us, as Besse claims, to regard social happiness as no more than the happiness of the individuals composing it.41 Since, for Helvetius, happiness, at the bottom line, was always a product of sensuality, society as an entity could never be happy. For him, it was unintelligible to speak of any form of happiness other than that of individuals. Consequently he wrote: âthe public felic- 36 Ibid., 124. 37 Helvetius, Treatise on Man, Vol. 1, 41. 38 Ibid., 123. 39 Ibid., 124. 40 Ibid., 123. 41 G. Besse, âDâUn Vieux Problème: Helvetius et Rousseauâ, Revue De LâUniversite de Bruxelles, 3 (1972), 132â42. Reconsidering the roots of current perceptions 435 ity consisting of all the individuals, in order to know what constitutes the happiness of the whole, we must first know what constitutes the happiness of each individualâ.42 Logically, the educational implications that spring from such a stand are easy to draw. It is clear that if the aim of education is to increase the happiness in society, and that if the happiness of society is measured solely through that of the individuals, then the aim of education is to increase the happiness of those individuals. Helvetius embraced this conclusion and argued that education must be directed towards âthe greatest public utility; that is, the greatest pleasure, and the greatest happiness, of the largest number of citizensâ.43 In itself, the idea that education should promote the happiness of the individual was neither original nor new. This idea can be traced back to the educational writings of Vives in the sixteenth century, and maybe even further down in history.44 However, in the work of Helvetius this idea receives a new importance and a crucial turn. First, led by the notion that society is only an âassemblage of individualsâ,45 he placed the individuals at the heart of education. He therefore claimed, like Rousseau, that the governing aim of education, the one to which all other aims were subordinated, was to increase the happiness of individuals. In Helvetiusâ educational theory, individuals gained an unprecedented signifi- cance. Second, by joining together three propositionsâ(a) that education should seek to increase the happiness of the individuals, (b) that the nature of the individual should not be changed and (c) that happiness is reducible to corporeal pleasureâHelvetius, as mentioned, came to the conclusion that the aim of education was to increase, directly or indirectly, the corporeal pleasure of individuals. In historical terms, this conclusion contains a revolutionary view. Traditionally, whenever education was concerned, the happiness of the individual was never regarded as purely subjective. It was always seen as dependent on and derived from an objective source that was external to the individual. For example, Locke related the happiness of the individual to society46 and Saint Pierre to the after-life and to society.47 This enabled a distinction to be made between the individualâs actual interest, the individualâs solely subjective desires, and his true interest, his higher or enlightened interest as derived from an external and objective source. The customary aim of education was to teach the individual to pursue his âtrue interestâ. However, since for Helvetius happiness was purely subjective, the distinction between actual and true interest lost its validity. Happiness was to be achieved through gratifying the actual inter- est of the individual.48 Consequently, in Helvetiusâ educational theory the focus is turned to meeting the individualâs actual interest or, differently put, to desiring satisfaction. Conceptually and historically, this marked a significant change. Providing new insights into the relationship between individualsâ happiness and educa- tion, Helvetius paved the way for the development of educational systems that give primary concern to the actual pleasures, wants and needs of individuals. This line of reasoning, however, leaves unsolved the problem of how to balance the interests of the solitary indi- vidual with that of the greatest number of individuals, and this without having to change the individualsâ nature. As mentioned, Saint Pierre turned to religion, life after death and the individualâs true interest in order to solve the public/private divide. Helvetius, however, could not do that. Helvetius, who thought that âthe far greater part of mankind is that of men 42 Helvetius, Treatise on Man, Vol. 2, 270. 43 Helvetius, Treatise on Man, Vol. 1, 44. 44 J. L. Vives, âThe Transmission of Knowledgeâ. 45 Helvetius, De lâesprit or Essays on the Mind, 37. 46 Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, 195. 47 De Saint Pierre, Projet pour Perfectionner LâEducationâ, 4. 48 Helvetius, Treatise on Man, Vol. 1, 130. 436 T. Gilead so entirely devoted to their own interest, that they never consider the welfare of the wholeâ,49 knew that the private/public dilemma would not be solved on its own. He was also aware of the importance of finding a solution for it. He wrote: âin a state there is nothing more dangerous than a body whose interest is not connected with the general interestâ.50 His proposed solution was that the state forcibly aligns the interests of the individual with those of the whole. The state, through the use of education, should teach the individual that his happiness is dependent on that of the whole. This, according to Helvetius, did not demand a change in the individual nature. He argued that if the state, through the use of education and legislation, binds the public and private good the individual will be compelled by his nature to follow the former.51 For Helvetius, an education that links the private and public good constitutes the ultimate solution for the problem of egotism and the private/public dilemma. The details of Helvetiusâ educational theory, its shortcomings and its importance have been discussed elsewhere.52 However, its implication with regard to the status of the individual must be emphasized. Helvetiusâ only concern was with the happiness of the greatest number. This led him to view individuals in abstract terms, namely as units in a whole that have no significance in themselves. Campbell summed up well the position of the individual in Helvetiusâ philosophy. He stated that, since it is by means of this force that the individual pleasure is made dependent on the state, the individual must be social- ized at the price of all spontaneity or individuality. He is reduced to being one among a multitude of identical units within a corporate body. There is nothing unique even in the individualâs happiness, because his pleasure is identical with that of all the other units. The sole standard of happiness is the quantity of pleasure.53 Being familiar with Saint Pierreâs and Helvetiusâ ideas regarding the place of the indi- vidual in education, we can now proceed to examine how their ideas on this matter stand in relation to those of Rousseau and contemporary education. The eighteenth-century roots of contemporary individualism in education When it comes to education, argues Grossman, the theories of Rousseau and Helvetius represent two contradicting branches in Enlightenment thought.54 Although it would be impossible to determine, within the present context, the extent to which the educational views of Saint Pierre, Helvetius or Rousseau have influenced or even resemble currently prevailing ideas regarding the relationship between education and the individual, some light could be shed on this matter by comparing the line of thought that led Rousseau to advance the two claims that form the focus of this article with the one that brought Saint Pierre and Helvetius to do the same. Each of these claims will be examined separately. However, since Rousseau is not our main interest here, the discussion of his idea will be restricted to the relevant claims. The general features of his educational theory will not be explored. 49 Helvetius, De lâesprit or Essays on the Mind, 37. 50 Ibid., 117. 51 Ibid., 171. 52 For more a detailed discussion of Helvetiusâ educational theory see: I. Cumming, Helvetius-His Life and Place in the History of Educational Thought (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955); See also: A. Keim, Helvetius-Sa Vie et Son Oeuvre (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1907). 53 B. Campbell, âHelvetius and the Roots of the âClosedâ Societyâ, American Political Science Review, 68 (1974), 153â68. 54 M. Grossman, The Philosophy of Helvetius (New York: Teachers CollegeâColumbia University, 1926), 146. Reconsidering the roots of current perceptions 437 âThe only natural passionâ, argued Rousseau, âis self-love or selfishness taken in a wider senseâ.55 Like Saint Pierre and Helvetius, Rousseau believed that by nature the indi- vidual was self-regarding; like them he was convinced that this self-regarding nature could not be changed; and like them he claimed that education, even if it could, should not change it. Yet, while Saint Pierre and Helvetius, as we have seen, held these views for similar reasons, the line of thought that led Rousseau to them was considerably different. Rousseau was convinced that self-love should not be changed because it âis good in itself and in relation to ourselvesâ.56 This view originated in Rousseauâs conviction that man was a social creature. He wrote: âthe childâs first sentiment is self-love, his second, which is derived from it, is love of those about himâ.57 Rousseau believed that we naturally enlarge the love of ourselves into the love of others. âExtend self-love to othersâ, he argued, âand it is transformed into virtue, a virtue which has its root in the heart of every one of usâ.58 Rousseau was persuaded that, uninterrupted by external interfering elements, self-love spontaneously developed into an innate moral sense. He therefore did not want to change the self-regarding nature of the individual mainly because he feared that this would distort the individualâs innate tendency to be moral and happy. In other words, Rousseau claimed that education should accept the individualâs nature as given because he held that it was good per se. In the opening pages of the second volume of Treatise on Man, Helvetius rejected Rousseauâs idea that man is born good.59 He argued, in contrast, that âNo individual is born good or badâ.60 He is made one way or the other, he maintained, by the social condi- tions and education that direct his self-regarding nature. Saint Pierre also held the view that by nature the individual was neither good nor bad and that self-regarding nature could make him either one, although, unlike Helvetius, he believed that if the individual knew his true interest, he would be compelled by his self-love to promote the good of others.61 Neither thinker, then, assumed that humans are instinctively social, and both agreed that when unguided, the self-regarding nature of the individual is more likely to become socially pernicious than socially beneficial. This stand was in sharp contrast with Rous- seauâs âgood per seâ presumption. It was not that Rousseau excluded the possibility that self-love would have unwanted consequences. He was well aware of the social dangers engulfed in the self-regarding nature of the individual. But for him, only when deformed by exterior influences could self-love result in such unwanted consequences. Saint Pierre and Helvetius, let us recall, claimed that education should accept the self-regarding nature of the individual as given because, firstly, they thought that self-love was the spring of human motivation and, therefore, necessary for individualsâ happiness and, secondly, because they held that when properly directed self-love could become socially beneficial. Under the adequate social and educational condition, they argued, the self-regarding nature of the individual is the key for increasing happiness in society. Their acceptance of the individualâs nature was, therefore, grounded in utilitarian consideration. This difference in the reasons for which Rousseau, on the one hand, and Saint Pierre and Helvetius, on the other, claimed that education should accept the individualâs nature explains why they held dissimilar approaches to his education. While Rousseau asserted 55 J. J. Rousseau, Emile, translated by B. Foxely (London: Everyman, 2001), 66. 56 Ibid., 66. 57 Ibid., 209. 58 Ibid., 257. 59 Helvetius, Treatise on Man, Vol. 2, 270. 60 Ibid., 11. 61 De Saint Pierre, Projet pour Perfectionner LâEducation, 1. 438 T. Gilead that education should protect the self-regarding nature of the individual from outside inter- ference and influences, Saint Pierre and Helvetius sought to guide it, enlighten it and forc- ibly shape it by the use of education. As for the second claim that concerns the aim of education, both Saint Pierre and Helvetius held that education should aim at increasing the sum total of happiness in soci- ety. They both agreed that the first aim of education was to promote the common good. Nevertheless, as we have seen, Saint Pierre and Helvetius held different views regarding what the common good is and how it relates to the happiness of individuals. Saint Pierre, who argued that education should help to make society happier, did not claim that the primary aim of education was to increase the happiness of individuals. Holding the belief that happiness means more than individualsâ subjective sensations, he understood social happiness to be synonymous with the promotion of the public good. According to Saint Pierre, the level of happiness in society was determined not by that of the individuals composing it but rather by how well those individuals promoted the common good. His education, therefore, concentrated on ways to increase the public good and not on ways to maximize the sum of private goods. For him, increasing the happiness of individuals was more of a means to a greater end than an end in itself. Helvetius, like Saint Pierre, aimed at the common good, but his view that the public good was nothing but the aggregated happiness of individuals led him to place the individuals at the centre of his educational thought. He consequently argued that the first aim of education was to promote the great- est happiness of the greatest number of individuals since, for him, the common good and the good of the individuals were one and the same. However, despite these differences, both thinkers took the promotion of the common good as their point of departure. Rousseau, on the other hand, had a radically different stand. âTrue happinessâ, he asserted, âconsists in decreasing the difference between our desires and our powers, in establishing a perfect equilibrium between the power and the willâ.62 For Rousseau, then, happiness was a product of internal qualities found in the individual. For this reason and for many others, such as his hatred of contemporary society, his main educational work focused on the formation of a happy individual. In Emile, priority is given to the individ- ualâs good and not, as in Saint Pierre and Helvetius, to the public good. This culminated in significantly different perceptions of both the role of education and the place of the individual in it than those held by Saint Pierre and Helvetius. While Saint Pierreâs and Helvetiusâ education aimed at social efficiency, understood as the progress of accumu- lated happiness, that of Rousseau aimed at the individualâs development. While Saint Pierre and Helvetius reduced the individual to being an instrument of progress, first to himself and then to others, Rousseau regarded him as a complete human agent. Although, unlike Saint Pierre, Helvetius claimed with Rousseau that the main aim of education was to promote the happiness of individuals, the points of departure of the two thinkers were diametrically opposed. Helvetius sought to promote the happiness of the sole individual through that of the whole. Rousseau looked to increase the happiness of the whole through that of the particulars. It can be said that Helvetiusâ education was for the happiness of the individuals whereas Rousseauâs was for the happiness of the individual. Finally, there is one more substantial difference between Helvetius and Rousseau that should not be overlooked. Rousseau is famous for advancing the idea that education must take into account the actual interests of the individual.63 In order for an education to be successful, he maintained, it must appeal to the interests of the individual as he perceived 62 J. J. Rousseau, Emile, 52. 63 Ibid., 100. Reconsidering the roots of current perceptions 439 them. His whole system of education was based on alluring the child into learning by demonstrating to him the usefulness and importance of what is taught. Nevertheless, while Rousseau perceived the actual interest of the individual to be an important educational tool, he aimed at teaching the individual to pursue his true interests, which are in Rousseauâs case the individualâs interests as derived from nature.64 Rousseau, like Saint Pierre and many others before him, subordinated the actual interests of the individual to his true interests, which are seen as the key to true happiness. Therefore, when Rousseau claimed that education should promote the happiness of the individual,65 he did not think that this necessarily involved gratifying his actual interests. As mentioned, Helvetius did not follow the same path, and although he thought that the actual interests of the indi- vidual should be manipulated in order to secure the happiness of the greatest number,66 he held that meeting the actual interests of the individual was the only way to happiness and, therefore, the ultimate end to which education should strive.67 Concluding questions The two claims discussed in the article have found their way into mainstream contempo- rary education. Our educational institutions no longer try to change the nature of the indi- vidual but rather accept it as their point of departure. In our day, increasing the happiness of individuals is perceived to be a central educational aim. But where are the roots of these ideas? The answer may be found in knowing the line of thought that led us to adopt these individualistic views. Do we believe in the goodness of the individualâs nature? Or do we safeguard it simply because under existing conditions it can easily be made socially bene- ficial? Do we protect the individualâs nature from external interference? Or do we try to guide it? Are we mainly interested in the happiness of the sole individual? Or are we inter- ested in that of the greatest number? Is our primary goal social efficiency? Or is it individ- ual development? Do we still aim at what we view as the true interest of the individual or are we just trying to gratify his actual interests? A glance at our culture, political institu- tions, economic system and the way they interrelate with education reveals the answers. The proximity between our way of thinking and that of Helvetius (and to a certain extent that of Saint Pierre) is made clear. Can it be, then, that this proximity is not accidental but stems from the fact that Saint Pierre and Helvetius have played a bigger role than we acknowledge in shaping contemporary views? 64 Ibid., 52. 65 Ibid., 348. 66 Helvetius, Treatise on Man, Vol. 1, 42. 67 Ibid., 44.