Keeping up Appearances: National Narratives and Nuclear Policy in France and Russia

ARTICLE Keeping up Appearances: National Narratives and Nuclear Policy in France and Russia MATTHEW MORAN AND HEATHER W . W I LL I AMS In the latter part of the 20th century, much academic attention has been devoted to the patterns of change in international power relations. From the legacy of imperialism to the end of the Cold War and the rise of American unipolarity, far-reaching geopolitical shifts have dramatically impacted the structure and composition of the international arena. Coun- tries find themselves at the confluence of far-reaching developments such as the rise of supranational organisations, changes in migratory flux and the redistribution of power and influence between nation-states. This fluid and rapidly-changing international environment has provoked pro- found changes in how nation-states are perceived and perceive them- selves. Questions of status and prestige have taken on new significance as shifts in traditional international power relations have challenged the his- torically-rooted narratives around which national identities are con- structed. But how have nation-states responded to these global changes? What has been the effect on national identities? This article will explore the extent to which nuclear weapons policy in France and Russia reflects an attempt to reconcile narratives of national greatness with a gradual loss of influence and status in the international community. Since the explosion of the first atomic bomb in 1945, nuclear weap- ons have remained unchallenged as the ultimate vehicle of military Dr Matthew Moran, Research Associate at the Centre for Science and Security Studies (CSSS) within the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. Email: matthew. [email protected] Heather W. Williams, Research Fellow on the International Security Programme at Chatham House. Defence Studies, 2013 Vol. 13, No. 2, 192–215, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2013.808101 � 2013 Taylor & Francis power. The bomb dropped on Hiroshima produced an explosion equiv- alent to that produced with 14,000 tons of TNT and killed at least 66,000 people almost immediately – tens of thousands more would die in the aftermath. By contrast, many of the nuclear warheads that now make up the arsenals of nuclear weapon states are in the megaton range with an explosive potential equivalent to that produced by 1 million or more tons of TNT.1 From a material perspective then, Thomas Schel- ling’s 1966 statement continues to hold true: ‘nuclear warheads are incomparably more devastating than anything packaged before’.2 However, while the power of nuclear weapons is based on their material capability, it is not restricted to their explosive potential. The material capability that is at the root of theories of nuclear deterrence also forms the basis for a socio-political construction of nuclear weapons as symbols of power and prestige. Indeed, academics writing on the ethics of nuclear weapons in the pre-constructivist era argued that the prestige of nuclear weapons ‘was not sought primarily as a deterrent but in its own terms, with possible ancillary security benefits.3 Richard Rosecrance, for example, claimed that ‘prestige may be the signal opera- tive motivation for the acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability’.4 While the relative importance of prestige and security as variables moti- vating nuclear weapons acquisition is highly dependent on context, there is no doubt that nuclear weapons are imbued with a certain status and prestige. Robert Malcolmson sums up the situation well: ‘[Nuclear weapons] have now become important symbols: symbols of power, status and national prestige. They convey vital messages to others, messages that bespeak a special sort of domination and subordination...nuclear weaponry is, in essential respects, the principal currency of power in the modern world.5 Given this symbolic power of nuclear weapons and their influence in shaping national identity, nuclear weapons policy provides a useful framework within which to explore the questions of status and prestige that constitute central themes in national narratives. Taking the France- UK military alliance and the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) Treaty as examples, the article will go on to show how policy measures in the nuclear weapons context serve to reinforce historically- rooted self-perceptions regarding status and place, and viceversa. The choice of France and Russia as case studies reflects the shared trajectory upon which these nations find themselves. Both former imperial powers, the legacy of greatpower status contributed much to 193NUCLEAR POLICY IN FRANCE AND RUSSIA the historically-rooted (self) perceptions of greatness by which France and Russia defined – and continue to define – their national identities. However, in both cases, this imperial legacy has, for many years, been juxtaposed with the reality of recent decline in influence and status in international affairs. The retreat from Empire was a traumatic experi- ence for both countries, with the contraction of territorial boundaries representing a physical manifestation of ebbing power. In a more recent example, the rise of countries such as China and India as economic and, indeed, military powers has further undermined the influence of France and Russia on the world stage.6 As such, both countries rely, to a large extent, on their membership in the elite club of nuclear weapon states (NWS) to nourish national narratives of greatness that have been eroded in many ways. The examples of the 2010 France-UK military alliance and the New START Treaty signed by Russia and the United States, both recent developments in the nuclear policies of the respective nations, are also significant. In the context of nuclear weapons – entities that play an important role in national identity construction – interna- tional treaties and initiatives represent milestones in the evolution and manifestation of the narrative. As we will show, these developments are complex and multilayered, both reinforcing the narrative but also reconceptualising it. The article will begin with a brief discussion of national narratives and how these representations of the nation contribute to the construction of national identity and, on a larger scale, the projection of this identity in the international arena. In particular, we will draw attention to the ways in which national narratives both shape and respond to policy decisions in a relationship of interdependence that has important implications for decision-making. The article will then examine each of the case studies in turn before drawing comparisons between the French and Russian contexts. We will show how France and Russia have both used nuclear weapons policy as a means of reconciling a decline in influence with deeply-rooted narratives of greatness. It should be noted from the outset that while this article focuses on the role and influence of less tangible issues such as national narratives and identity, this does not reflect an attempt to detract from or ignore the importance of issues such as security (in a traditional realist sense) which are more concretely expressed through a state’s foreign policy. Russia’s nuclear posture, for example, continues to be motivated by fear of NATO encirclement and the possibility of future coercion, and this fear plays an important role in the elaboration of Moscow’s nuclear policy. And the question of security is, in turn, but one issue forming 194 DEFENCE STUDIES part of a broad and complex web of often overlapping and interlinked factors that all exert an influence on decision-makers. In this context, this essay should be viewed as an attempt to shed light on a less-dis- cussed but equally relevant aspect of the wider debate that aims to explain the reasons why nuclear weapon states maintain and enhance nuclear arsenals. Narrating the Nation: Identity and Perception In his work on the psychology of nuclear proliferation, Jacques Hymans sets out a theoretical model that uses conceptions of national identity to explain why states decide to pursue nuclear weapons. Hymans argues that the decision to acquire nuclear weapons is above all a reflection of the ‘national identity conception’ of the decision-maker. For Hymans, the ‘national identity conception’ refers to ‘an individual’s understanding of the nation’s identity – his or her sense of what the nation naturally stands for and of how high it naturally stands, in comparison to others in the international arena’.7 While Hymans’ argument focuses primarily on the actions of individual leaders within this ‘national identity conception’, his work raises an important issue that has been largely neglected in the literature on nuclear weapons policy: the question of national identity and its role in the policy process. For while questions of security and strategy undoubtedly play a key role in policy decisions, the influence of a nation’s identity and the underlying narrative upon which it is based, constitute equally important – if more subtle and less easily defined – elements contributing to the politico-cultural framework within which the decisions are made. For the purpose of this article, we will approach the question of identity through the conceptual lens of national narratives.8 In his description of narratives, Hayden White says that ‘far from being one code among many that a culture may utilize for endowing experience with meaning, narrative is a metacode, a human universal on the basis of which transcultural messages about the nature of a shared reality can be transmitted’.9 Drawing on elements of history, politics, ideology, indeed every aspect of a nation and its culture, national narratives tell the story of the nation, a story that ‘resonates emotively with people, that glorifies the nation, that is easily transmitted and absorbed’.10 A nation’s narrative comprises various interpretative strands that together form a point of reference for the collective identity of a nation. 195NUCLEAR POLICY IN FRANCE AND RUSSIA In this context it is important to remember that while national narratives feed into the collective identity of a nation, helping to shape and mould national self-perception, these narratives are constructions that reflect the various political balances of power that have shaped – and continue to shape – the nation. Michael Billig evokes this idea in his work on nationalism: ‘different factions, whether classes, religions, regions, genders or ethnicities, always struggle for the power to speak for the nation, and to present their particular voice as the voice of the national whole, defining the history of other sub-sections accordingly’.11 As a result, national narratives represent a double-edged and constantly evolving concept. On one hand the construction of the narrative draws on all aspects of the nation: history, politics, culture, religion, and more. On the other hand, however, this process is also exclusive: elements that challenge or undermine the narrative are discarded, overlooked or ‘forgotten’. It is in this sense that French historian Gerard Noiriel evokes the idea of national amnesia, that is to say a selective and collectively accepted process of construction that omits or reimagines certain traumatic events in a nation’s history.12 The relationship between national narratives and the policy realm is a particularly interesting one. For alongside any security or strategic concerns, the narrative that shapes a nation’s identity ‘helps to define the parameters of what a polity considers its national interests at home and abroad’.13 In this sense, national narratives constitute an intangible force driving the formation of domestic and foreign policies. The social- isation of mainstream political actors within the broader framework of the national narrative, irrespective of individual political or ideological outlooks, inevitably colours their interpretative lenses. Politicians, per- haps above all, are conditioned by the national narrative and are respon- sive to the vision of the nation. Linking their foreign policy aims to ‘national priorities’ – goals that align with the national narrative – allows political actors to harness the power of the collective identity that binds the nation. In this respect, foreign policy measures fit, for the most part, within the parameters of the national narrative. This is not to suggest that the course of a national narrative is fixed. There is no prescribed path and narratives (writ large) are constantly negotiated and contested as they respond to internal and external influences. Crucially, however, the overarching themes of the narrative – national prestige, place on the world stage, etc. – remain constant even if the manner of their telling differs. Ultimately, the national narrative is the product of a symbiotic process: policy decisions nourish and reinforce the ‘story’ of the nation 196 DEFENCE STUDIES but also direct it, in a dynamic and circular process of construction. As we will see, the narratives of both France and Russia revolve around ideas of international greatness, and this is reflected clearly in the nuclear weapons policy of these nations. France’s membership in the elite club of NWS has long been perceived as adding considerable weight to the country’s international influence and supports the deeply- embedded republican notion of France as a nation phare (leading nation).14 Moreover, the independence of the French nuclear weapons programme, particularly technological independence, has, since the time of de Gaulle, constituted a defining aspect of France’s NWS status.15 This said, the 2010 military alliance with the UK produced a significant shift in French nuclear policy that appeared to go against the flow of the national narrative. France sacrificed the complete autonomy of the French nuclear weapons development cycle to align certain aspects of their R&D and procurement with the British. Russia’s nuclear weapons have played a similar role, representing tangible and lasting evidence of Russia’s great power status, established long before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the myriad challenges that this momentous event brought. Following the Soviet collapse, Anne Clunan shows how Russia’s nuclear arsenal assumed even greater significance as it ensured a certain parity with the other great world power, the United States. In this context, the 2010 New START would seem to pose a direct challenge to this narrative as it builds on the original START Treaty of 1991 and commits Russia to making further reductions to its nuclear arsenal.16 So how do these apparent ruptures fit within and indeed shape the national narratives concerned? In the following sections we will argue that at a time when both France and Russia are experiencing significant challenges to their positions as key players in the international arena, nuclear weapons policy has grown in importance, both as a means of countering decline and as a means of reinforcing the national narrative. A Narrative of Grandeur: French Identity and Nuclear Weapons Of all nations, the French Republic boasts one of the most compelling national narratives. Stretching back over two centuries, the modern French conception of the nation has positioned France as the carrier of a universally applicable socio-political model based on the values of liberty, equality and fraternity.17 Marc Sadoun writes of the revolution- ary period around 1789: ‘with this passion, these values and this word [revolution] . . . France lived her own history as that of the entire world’ 197NUCLEAR POLICY IN FRANCE AND RUSSIA and little has changed in this respect.18 This universalist understanding of the republican model is at the root of the enduring idea of France’s historic destiny as a leading nation, and a resultant tendency to view international affairs through the prism of national interests. In this context, the notion of the ‘French exception’ is useful in explaining the particular importance French grandeur has attained in the popular imagination in France. Although questionable as a heuristic device, the French exception can be defined as having ‘its roots in a distinctive republican model, attaching central importance to the prestige of the state, the primacy of politics and the active propagation, at home and worldwide, of certain values, perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be enlightened and progres- sive’.19 The perception of France as a leading nation has become deeply embedded in republican ideology and inextricably linked to national identity. ‘From the Napoleonic conquests to colonial expansion, from the Gaullist refusal of the Cold War divide to the development of Francophonie, France has presented itself as a model to follow for the rest of the world.’20 In his seminal study, Robert Gildea writes: ‘In order to assert its claim to influence world affairs, France has constructed a national political culture based on the notions of greatness, honour and her rank in the league-table of nations’.21 As a result, the idea of French pre-eminence constitutes the defining theme of the French national narrative. Of course, the construction of this identity has not gone unchal- lenged. The French national narrative has faced continued contestation in light of the country’s progressive decline on the world stage. The 20th century, in particular, saw a succession of losses, submissions and failures including collaboration and two colonial wars that left France ‘haunted by its decline’ as it entered the second half of the century.22 Internationally, military defeat and the loss of empire, among other things, eroded France’s position and influence and, inevitably, this decline undermined the narrative of greatness upon which French identity was based.23 In this context, the successful test of a nuclear device in February 1960 represented a pivotal moment in the evolution of the French Republic. When General Charles de Gaulle assumed power at the beginning of the Fifth Republic, his goal was to reinvigorate a nation (and narrative) in decline, to ‘restore the honour of the nation and affirm its grandeur and independence’.24 And the principal vehicle of this renewal was the French nuclear weapons programme.25 With nuclear weapons, de Gaulle wanted to give back to France her rang, her 198 DEFENCE STUDIES ‘rank as [a] great power’.26 Possession of the atomic bomb placed France alongside the United States, Russia and the United Kingdom at the forefront of international affairs and ‘served to confirm France in her Historic mission to greatness’.27 In conventional military terms, France could not compete with the superpowers. However, the nuclear bomb held enormous symbolic weight as ‘an instrument of deterrence and a political weapon enabling France to join the great powers’ club.28 This weight was officially recognised in a 1966 report on defence policy published by the French government: ‘[nuclear weapons] allow France to make her voice heard in the international arena, in the sense that she represents a destructive power with sufficient credibility to be in a posi- tion to exert pressure’.29 In this context, nuclear weapons played a key role in the reconsolidation of the national narrative, allowing France to re-engage with its historical and ideological legacy. Since the time of de Gaulle, nuclear weapons have remained a powerful anchor of French national identity and, although their devel- opment has been challenged at times in the political arena – President François Mitterrand, for example, implemented a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing in 1992 – their central role in the national narrative has never faced any existential threat. In his description of the ‘French nuclear idiosyncracy’, Benoît Pelopidas claims that from the 1970s onwards the position of nuclear weapons as a cornerstone of French security policy and identity has been accepted by all presidential candi- dates with the exception of the environmentalists.30 The successors to de Gaulle have, in general terms, reproduced and reinforced the role of nuclear weapons in the national narrative. France may have been the first nuclear weapon state, along with Britain, to sign the Comprehen- sive Test Ban Treaty in 1998 under the Chirac presidency, for example, however this was not before President Jacques Chirac had reversed Mitterrand’s moratorium in the face of widespread international criti- cism, thus confirming the strong links between the French political elite and these tools of symbolic power. The Franco-British Military Alliance: A Rupture in the National Narrative? With this link between national identity and nuclear weapons well-established through a circular pattern of reinforcement that has been framed by Gaullist political culture since the 1960s, the 2010 military alliance with the United Kingdom represented a major shift in French nuclear policy. This alliance, announced by then French 199NUCLEAR POLICY IN FRANCE AND RUSSIA President Nicolas Sarkozy and UK Prime Minister David Cameron on 2 November 2010, involves the development of cooperative research facilities with the goal of enabling the upgrade of the nuclear weapons infrastructures in both France and the United Kingdom.31 The joint programme, TEUTATES, will consist of two key compo- nents. The first, ÉPURE, located in Valduc, France, is to be a joint radiographic and hydrodynamics facility while the second, the Technol- ogy Development Centre (TDC), is to be a site for a joint radiography and diagnostics technology programme and will be based at the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) in the United Kingdom. Under the terms of the alliance, the facilities will comprise ‘separate areas for solely national and joint use’.32 Significantly, the treaty ‘permits the exchange of classified information, and it might be supposed that the day-to-day effect not only of joint experiments but simply of sharing a facility will be to share and converge in working practices, assumptions and practical knowledge, similar to the ‘‘peer review’’ dynamic between the United Kingdom and United States’.33 Costs are divided so that France will cover the initial development outlay for ÉPURE, whereas Britain will meet the costs of the TDC. In 2015, all additional funds required to develop the facilities, in either Valduc or Aldermaston, will be split equally unless the work is specifically for one national programme. At first sight, this alliance appears to represent a rupture in the national narrative. The decision to cooperate on the most sensitive of national projects – a nuclear deterrent – would appear to challenge the central role given to nuclear weapons in the narrative framing the nation’s identity. For de Gaulle, sovereignty and the independence of the state were inextricably linked to international grandeur, and the 2010 alignment with the United Kingdom on matters relating to procure- ment and R&D, two aspects of France’s nuclear programme tradition- ally regarded as autonomous, would appear to be in direct opposition to these principles. So what were the motivating factors behind the alliance? Does the agreement indeed represent a thematic change of course for the national narrative? What does the alliance mean in terms of French prestige and status on the world stage? Paradoxically, rather than representing a rupture with France’s national narrative, the 2010 military alliance may be viewed as a means of strengthening the dominant themes of the narrative. There are two primary reasons supporting this interpretation. First, the alliance has important financial implications for both France and the United Kingdom. In recent years, both countries have seen their budget deficits increase dramatically in the context of the 200 DEFENCE STUDIES worst economic crisis since World War II. In 2008, when economic deterioration was only beginning to take hold, President Sarkozy announced that France would reduce its number of airborne nuclear weapons by one-third, leaving the country with less than 300 war- heads.34 The cuts reflected the changing economic circumstances and the enormous cost of maintaining the national nuclear arsenal, even if the president framed this reduction in the context of disarmament and force modernisation.35 And with the deepening of the crisis, the finan- cial question has assumed additional significance. Viewed from this per- spective, the 2010 agreement has a clear financial logic: aligning research goals and sharing technological development means that the quality of the French nuclear deterrent can be maintained and enhanced at signifi- cantly less cost to the state. Moreover, Matthew Harries argues that this was ‘the first time that acute financial pressures, symptomatic of severe structural deficiencies, appeared at a time when the strategic and politi- cal context allowed Britain and France to consider such cooperation acceptable’.36 Trends such as a gradual rapprochement between France and the United Kingdom in matters of defence and the convergence of attitudes towards deterrence, for example, have fundamentally altered the relationship between these two countries.37 Second, nuclear weapons continue to occupy an important position in the French national identity. Linked to prestige, status and national great- ness in the popular imagination, France’s role as a member of the elite club of NWS is deeply embedded in the national narrative. In military terms, this role is translated by a continued insistence on the importance and relevance of the French nuclear deterrent. The 2008 White Paper on Defence and National Security stated that ‘nuclear deterrence remains a fundamental element of French strategy’ aiming to guarantee ‘that in all circumstances, France, its territory, its people, its republican institutions are protected from aggressive actions or threats placing them in direct peril’.38 This position was echoed in a 2010 Senate report on disarmament and nonproliferation authored by Jean-Pierre ChevÒnement.39 In this context and despite official rhetoric emphasising reductions and moves towards disarmament – France has taken concrete steps in the form of dismantling its test sites and fissile production facilities, dismantling the ground component of the nuclear triad in 1996, and voicing its support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) among other things – the French have no intention of relinquishing their nuclear weapons. In March 2010, Sarkozy stated that France would not ‘abandon the French deterrent without being sure that the same thing was happening everywhere’, a prospect that is almost inconceivable at present.40 201NUCLEAR POLICY IN FRANCE AND RUSSIA The UK-France alliance fits with the French outlook in this respect. The treaty’s duration is currently set at 50 years (sooner only if mutu- ally agreed), effectively locking both France and the United Kingdom into the nuclear weapons club for the foreseeable future through a leg- ally binding agreement. This is an important development as it ensures both European nuclear powers are on a similar trajectory at a time when the economic climate has given renewed impetus to calls for reductions and movement towards disarmament. In this context, Harries writes that ‘the prevailing sentiment about this new axis of cooperation is that France, whose attitude to the recent nuclear disarmament revival lies somewhere between the quizzical and the rejectionist [. . .], has a strong interest in binding the United Kingdom in the nuclear club for the foreseeable future, to avoid being left as the only nuclear power in Europe’.41 Ultimately, while the UK-France agreement initially suggests a rup- ture in the national narrative and a break with the independence that characterised Gaullist conventions, the underlying reasoning actually aims to reinforce the central theme of the narrative. President Sarkozy sacrificed the complete autonomy of the French nuclear weapons devel- opment cycle, but in a rapidly changing economic and geopolitical climate, this appears necessary if the deterrent is to be maintained. In the nuclear context, France does not have sufficient resources to go it alone as a major global player. Forgoing the strictly nationalistic nuclear tendencies of Gaullism thus allows France to maintain the symbolic sta- tus of the Republic as a nuclear power. Paradoxically then, Sarkozy challenged the historical structure on which France’s international status rests in order to maintain the prestige and, indeed, identity that this structure has produced. By sharing the costs of nuclear maintenance and development with the UK while retaining operational indepen- dence, France can ensure its continuation as a key player in the nuclear community and, by extension, in the international arena more generally. Great Power Continuity: Russian Identity and Nuclear Weapons Similar to France, Russia’s national narrative is highly dependent upon the notion of linear historical continuity with regard to themes of status and influence, in this case since the time of Peter the Great, if not ear- lier. For Russia, past, present, and future are bound together by the idea of Russia’s perpetual status as a great and enduring world power, facing evolving threats, but with a consistent message of importance. Dmitri Trenin, among others, summarises this enduring attachment to the 202 DEFENCE STUDIES continuity of Russia’s great power status in what he refers to as the ‘Great Game mentality’, namely, the failure to move beyond 19th century ideas of dominance and empire.42 While the borders of the Russian empire have expanded and contracted to varying degrees throughout history, Russia’s great power status has remained constant (particularly in terms of self-perception) regardless of its status or size as an empire. This said, territorial integrity is inextricably linked to notions of power and status in Russia and the maxim of continuity. Throughout the country’s history, territory has held near-sacred signifi- cance, ranging from Catherine the Great’s ambition to reclaim all the territory of Peter the Great in the 18th century, to Russians’ refusal to surrender to either Napoleon or Nazi Germany, to the famous battles of World War II. In terms of policy, this preoccupation with territory has fostered a deep anxiety with regard to further wreckage upon Russian borders and incursions into Russian ‘spheres of influence’.43 The Russian narrative has also been heavily influenced by what might be termed a ‘backwardness paradigm’. In social and cultural terms, Russia identifies with neither the West nor East and cannot be subsumed into a greater geographic region, as China often is with ‘East Asia’, for example. Russia is its own pole with a unique identity. This said, representations of Russian identity are often synonymous with backwardness and a disconnect with Western notions of modernity, much of which can be attributed to stereotypes arising from a particular geographical makeup. Russia is frequently portrayed in terms of a harsh climate and vast, sparsely-populated territories. These natural limitations have isolated Russia from – or at least delayed its exposure to – Western advancements, not only physically, but also culturally through the construction of a largely inward-looking society that seeks to resist Western cultural hegemony. Sttjepan Mestrovie shows, for example, how Russians have ‘exhibited cultural resistance to Western democrati- zation and the imposition of free markets’.44 Given geopolitical realities and economic modernisation, however, Russia is frequently forced to comply with Western developments and paradigms, whether technological or political in nature, or risk falling behind other nations. Experts such as Trenin repeatedly cite the need for Russia to overcome its strategic and economic backwardness by modernising and shaking off an inhibiting attachment to former spheres of influence.45 Throughout history, Russian national and foreign poli- cies have been characterised by efforts to overcome this ‘backwardness’. In a speech to industrial leaders in 1931, Stalin famously said ‘One fea- ture of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered 203NUCLEAR POLICY IN FRANCE AND RUSSIA for falling behind, for her backwardness [. . .] All beat her – for her backwardness: for military backwardness, for cultural backwardness, for political backwardness [. . .] That is why we must no longer lag behind’.46 And this mentality remains at the heart of contemporary Russian policy. At the same time, however, this trait of backwardness has become a source of pride within Russian identity, linking the Russian people with a romantic, if somewhat depressing, image of resourcefulness and fortitude – Doctor Zhivago would not have been quite so poignant in England. Much as minority groups often claim ownership of previously derogatory identifying terms, so Russia simultaneously seeks to shake off its ‘backwardness’ and wears it as a badge of honour, in the sense that it is a powerful symbol of their unique and non-Western identity. Modern day Russia, like the Soviet Union and many tsars beforehand, will not readily yield to cultural or political hegemony and this resis- tance has become firmly embedded in the national narrative. It would be perfunctory to categorise Russia’s national narrative as nostalgia. While national narratives are constructed from elements of the past, they also shape future paths and therefore must inevitably look beyond any short-term anxiety or fears that the future of the nation will not live up to its past. This need to move beyond nostalgia and use the national narrative as a means of giving shape to the country’s future was evident in President Dmitri Medvedev’s 2009 article, ‘Go Russia!’, in which he urged ‘Nostalgia should not guide our foreign policy . . .. Russia is one of the world’s leading economies, a nuclear power and a permanent member of the UN Security Council’.47 According to a recent poll, ‘imperial nostalgics’ in Russia have dropped from 25 to 15 per cent in recent years, and of those remaining the majority long for the paternalism and economic security of the Soviet era rather than the sense of empire.48 Nostalgia may be a short-term consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union, but the Russian nationalism that under- pins this nostalgia is the long-term driving force. In that sense, it is also a political tool. Historically, Russia has used its national narrative as a means of domestic control and closely equated stability at home with great power status abroad.49 One means of increasing support at home is through the evocation of nationalism, which is on the rise due to a combination of factors, including increased immigration and govern- ment spending on peripheral regions. The recent elections highlighted as much with the relative success of nationalist-based political movements, such as the ‘SS’, and a recent poll that found 60per cent of Russians agree with the statement ‘Russia for Russians’.50 204 DEFENCE STUDIES Economic realities consistently challenge Russia’s message of great power status. In the 1990s Russia’s economy collapsed as it struggled to transition to capitalism and resulted in the 1998 financial crisis when it defaulted on its loans, the rouble collapsed, and inflation came close to 100 per cent. For many Russians this period evoked embarrassment and nostalgia in equal measure.51 More recently, Russia was also particularly hard hit by the 2008 economic crisis when its GDP fell by more than 10 per centin one year. Crucially, these challenges to Russian status and power on the world stage reinvigorated nationalist sentiment and gave new impetus to the dominant themes of the national narrative. Ivanov argues that in order to maintain the perception of great power status and continuity, both at home and abroad, Russia felt compelled to par- ticipate in all major international developments after the end of the Cold War, ‘often incurring a greater domestic cost than the country could bear’.52 These interventions assumed additional significance in the context of the link between national narratives and political legitimacy and support. The national narrative holds enormous potential as a source of political capital, particularly in terms of popular support for domestic political actors faced with economic decline and nostalgia for economic security. Of course, economic collapse has not been the only challenge to the Russian national narrative. Much attention has been devoted to the ‘effort of memory’ in recognising the evils of the Soviet empire.53 Gorbachev’s glasnost preceded the fall of the Soviet Union but the princi- ple of openness carried over to the post-Soviet era through groups such as Memorium, liberal journalism, and exposure to previously censured material, such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. These changes threw open the history of the Soviet Union for public scrutiny and begged difficult questions of historical identity. How do the purges, or the massacre of Polish officers in the Katyn Forest, or the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact fit into Russia’s national narrative? Rather than resort to guilt or amnesia, Russia either ignores contradictory material or excuses these acts as done in the name of stability and great power status. For example, the 2007 Russian history textbook commissioned by President Vladimir Putin taught children that ‘In the circumstances of the Cold War. . . democratization was not an option for Stalin’ (Ostrovsky 2008).54 Faced with myriad challenges to the coherence of its national narra- tive, nuclear weapons play a central role as political and symbolic anchors for the themes of power and greatness that feature so promi- nently in Russia’s national identity. President Medvedev was explicit in his reference to the importance of nuclear weapons as important and 205NUCLEAR POLICY IN FRANCE AND RUSSIA enduring symbols of Russian greatness in an era of post-Soviet decline.55 Nuclear weapons provide a welcome continuity to the national narrative, forging a powerful link between Russia’s historical great power status and what remain the world’s most powerful military weapons. Since Russia first tested a nuclear weapon in 1949, the coun- try’s nuclear programme has constituted a tangible example of Russia’s technological advancement and a counterbalance to the power and influ- ence of both the United States and Europe. And this perception was not limited to domestic audiences. A US Central Intelligence Agency report written soon after the Soviet Union first tested an atomic bomb claimed that ‘The capacity to produce atomic weapons bolsters Soviet prestige and greatly increases Soviet capabilities for exerting psychologi- cal pressure on Western Europe.’56 Russia’s nuclear weapons demon- strate that it can compete with the West on its own terms, reinforcing the aforementioned notion of Russia’s unique evolutionary trajectory. The end of the Cold War ushered in a period of military decline for Russia and as it continues to struggle to rebuild its conventional capabil- ities, Russia is ever more reliant on its nuclear weapons as a symbol of enduring military strength (for both international and domestic consumption) and as a symbolic means of compensating for decline in other aspects of society. New START Treaty: Reducing Weapons and Prestige? Given the central role of nuclear weapons in the Russian national narra- tive, a treaty to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the country’s arsenal appears contradictory. The 2010 New START Treaty (hereafter NST) is the latest iteration of US-Russia strategic arms reductions, following START I (1991) and the Moscow Treaty (2002). The NST requires both the United States and Russia to reduce their strategically deployed nuclear warheads to 1,550, launchers to 700, and strategic delivery vehicles to 800. The Treaty allows for 18 inspections per year and five telemetric exchanges.57 The Treaty is not a major departure from past treaties, in that it entails modest reductions, comprehensive verification, and focuses on strategic weapons only. In her Senate testi- mony, US lead negotiator Rose Gottemoeller (2010) stated as much in that ‘The Treaty is a continuation of the international arms control and non-proliferation framework that the United States has worked hard to foster and strengthen for the last 50 years.’58 For Russia, there is an important domestic component to arms control which presented a challenge to the NST and will continue to 206 DEFENCE STUDIES be a hurdle for further arms control, regardless of practical or financial reasoning. Nuclear weapons play to Russian nationalism, an important consensus-building tool in Russian elections. Depending on the legiti- macy of Russia’s democracy and public opinion, further arms reductions have the potential to be a political and electoral hazard. Alexei Arbatov summarises this issue in the context of NST and the impact of Russian public opinion: Those Russian people who are interested in this subject largely have great doubts about the new treaty because nuclear weapons are for Russian people now much more important than decades ago – I would say more important [. . .] Nuclear weapons are one of the few legacies of the superpower status of the Soviet Union of which Russia is the heir and now, in particular, after the economic crisis greatly diminished role of gas and oil exports as an instrument of Russian foreign policy influence and role in the world; nuclear weap- ons, relatively, have become much more important .59 Given this domestic political importance, along with the link to national identity, how do the NST reductions and verification measures fit into the Russian national narrative? In the case of the NST, nuclear weapons still prove to be instru- mental in Russian policy and contribute to the national narrative in at least three ways. First, the NST offers an opportunity for Russia to con- tinue to play a great power role in international affairs and publicises its nuclear capability. In general terms, former Minister for Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov highlights the functional relevance of the idea of continuity in Russian policy in saying that ‘Despite the radical change in Russia’s geopolitics, it has only been possible to build an effective foreign policy by anchoring it on the firm foundation of historical continuity.’60 The Treaty is a rather conspicuous reminder that Russia has the world’s larg- est nuclear arsenal and is capable of deterrence, along with untold destruction. This narrative is targeted at both international and domestic audiences. As Sagan observed, nuclear weapons ‘are political objects of considerable importance in domestic debates and internal bureaucratic struggles and can also serve as international normative symbols of modernity and identity’.61 Arms control, like weapons themselves, con- stitutes prestige. In addition, the NST is a tool for continuity, a key theme in Russia’s national narrative. Many critics of the NST argue it is a Cold War legacy and continuation of past practices. For its part, Russia takes pride in its legacy of arms control and touts it as evidence of 207NUCLEAR POLICY IN FRANCE AND RUSSIA Russia’s commitment to international stability and its enduring role as a leader in non-proliferation. The 2008 Foreign Policy Concept, for example, states: ‘Russia has been consistently favouring new agreements with the United States on disarmament and arms control in the inter- ests of preserving continuity in this process, (and) strengthening confidence building and transparency measures’.62 Second, Russia used the negotiations as an opportunity to demon- strate its policy of balancing US supremacy and refusing to concede to Western demands, particularly on missile defence. Russia attempted to use the NST as an opportunity to limit US plans for missile defence in Europe by linking strategic offense with strategic defence. While the United States conceded to comparable language in the Treaty’s pream- ble,63 it did not accept that the treaty would constrain its missile defence. In response, Russia issued a unilateral statement that if the United States proceeded with its missile defence in Europe, Russia would consider that a violation of the NST and withdraw. Throughout this debate, and subsequently, Russia portrayed itself as standing up to US pressure and counter-balancing US unilateralism, which it sees as the greatest threat to international stability, such as in the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept. Russia continues to portray itself as unique from the West and a great power counterbalance, partially for the sake of the nar- rative and public opinion. In Senate hearings on NST, for example, Brent Scowcroft acknowledged that the missile defence debate was primarily political and directed at domestic audiences on both sides.64 And finally, nuclear reductions are a cost-saving measure that will contribute to Russia’s economic growth and attempts to rebuild its conventional capabilities. Many reports suggest Russia sought deeper reductions than the ultimate 1,550 warheads because it was struggling to maintain the arsenal. During the Cold War, financial constraints ulti- mately led to Gorbachev’s reshaping of Soviet foreign policy and inter- est in arms control and reductions. Similar to France, Russia can no longer afford to maintain its strategic arsenal and uses its weapons as a useful bargaining chip. National Narratives and Nuclear Policy: Status, Prestige and Preservation The above case studies demonstrate similarities in the construction of national narratives in France and Russia that provide an insight into the complex and in some ways interdependent relationship between nuclear weapons policy and nationalism. Clearly, the national narrative of each 208 DEFENCE STUDIES country follows a unique trajectory. However, through their symbolic weight nuclear weapons provide both of these countries with a common means of reconciling the reality of progressive decline with historically- rooted themes of international power and influence. Two principal and closely-linked points serve to highlight this process. First, nuclear weapons constitute a cornerstone of the national narra- tives in France and Russia, providing a means of ensuring the historical continuity of the notion of greatness that is an integral element of national identity in both countries. For France, this identity is rooted in grandeur and the universal principles of French republicanism that have endured despite the traumatic loss of empire and the humiliation of successive military defeats throughout the 20th century. Similarly, Rus- sian identity looks beyond the sins and collapse of the Soviet Union to focus on the longevity of Russia’s status as a non-Western great power. For both of these countries, nuclear weapons represent a bastion of national greatness, a concrete reminder of and link to a glorious past. In 1960, Paul Nitze wrote: ‘Today it would appear that the most important tool of foreign policy is prestige’, and this statement holds resonance for power relations in the contemporary international order.65 The prestige associated with membership of the elite club of nuclear weapon states (NWS) does much to compensate for national decline in other areas. In the cases of France and Russia, nuclear weapons provide a powerful means off reproducing the image of national greatness through evocations of technological advancement, military power and international influence. In this way, the continuity of the narrative is upheld despite the many challenges to its credibility and legitimacy. Moreover, national and international initiatives, statements and treaties relating to nuclear weapons policy serve as global political and diplo- matic manifestations of the symbolic power of nuclear weapons. Given their status as NWS, both France and Russia benefit from an implicit link to this symbolic power which, in turn, reinforces the role and power of nuclear weapons in the national narrative. In this context and somewhat paradoxically, even debate over nuclear disarmament can be viewed as contributing to the power and status of nuclear weapons in the national narrative. Arguments in favour of nuclear disarmament nec- essarily rest on the devastation that nuclear weapons would cause should they be used and this serves to highlight the enormous power and responsibility that this capability confers upon NWS. Second, nuclear weapons in both France and Russia serve as a political and symbolic counterweight to the power and influence of the United States. At the end of the Cold War, the United States emerged 209NUCLEAR POLICY IN FRANCE AND RUSSIA as the sole superpower in a unipolar international environment. Militarily advanced, economically powerful and politically influential, the United States cast a long shadow over the international community. Inevitably, this rebalancing of power and influence was a difficult expe- rience for France and Russia. Russia saw its historical rival expanding in influence even as its own power waned while for France, the ascen- dancy of the United States simply served to highlight the gradual decline of its own power and influence on the world stage. It is for this reason that for many years, ‘while post-imperial Britain sought greater closeness with America, post-imperial France raised a fronde against Washington’s hegemonic ambitions’.66 In practical terms then, nuclear weapons allow France and Russia to compensate for the conventional military superiority of the United States and allowed both countries a forum in which to compete for equal recognition. More importantly, possession of nuclear weapons provides both France and Russia with a firm guarantee of a dominant role in international affairs, ensuring that both countries remain at the heart of debate on issues and concerns relating to international security. Through their political and symbolic power – not to mention the military weight afforded by their aforementioned material capability – nuclear weapons position France and Russia at the centre of the interna- tional community. On a larger scale, this process has implications that reach far beyond the localised identity dynamics at work in France and Russia. In terms of the recently-renewed impetus behind the concept of Global Zero, exemplified by President Barack Obama’s 2009 Prague speech in which he committed the United States to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, the role of nuclear weapons in supporting national narratives in France and Russia poses a significant obstacle. In the broadest sense, French and Russian narratives demonstrate both the improbability of nuclear disarmament and, in the case of Russia, chal- lenges to further reductions. Nuclear weapons have become ingrained in the national identities in these countries and serve an important func- tion as nationalistic tools that bolster national self-perceptions of world status and influence. In this context, moves to reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons from the national arsenals would appear to hold little benefit for domestic political coalitions. The debate on Global Zero fails to consider the complex challenges posed by issues of national identity, prestige and status. This is under- standable, since these issues are abstract and not easily defined. The national narrative lens, however, demonstrates that Global Zero is neither desirable nor feasible for many NWS. Nick Ritchie rightly 210 DEFENCE STUDIES observes that ‘a successful process of relinquishing nuclear weapons will require the disassembly of the political, cultural, economic and techno- logical system that produces nuclear weapons’.67 The premise of Rit- chie’s argument is that disarmament is desirable and that there can be alternatives or substitutes to the symbolic and political role of nuclear weapons. This, it would seem, is the ultimate paradox: decision-makers committed to nuclear disarmament would need to find, alongside all the technological, diplomatic and political challenges the issue already raises, a means of completely changing the national narratives of NWS while allowing it to stay the same. That is to say, in NWS such as France and Russia where nuclear weapons facilitate the reproduction of national self-perceptions of greatness, the national narrative would have to be provided with an alternative supporting structure that would allow the core message of the narrative to remain the same. However, this view would appear excessively utopian. Nuclear weapons remain the currency of ultimate power, both in real and symbolic terms and, under current geopolitical conditions cannot be replaced. To eliminate nuclear weapons from national arsenals would, therefore, leave a shortfall in terms of identity and require a complete reconceptualisation of the national narrative. Conclusion Nuclear weapons have become deeply ingrained in the national narratives of NWS, particularly those challenged by decline in territory, economic stability, or geopolitical stature. In the case of France, General de Gaulle used nuclear weapons as a means of reinvigorating the grand notion of an historic destiny that is a central element of French republican ideology. Bringing together themes of technological advancement, military power and political influ- ence, nuclear weapons have, since the 1960s, provided the French narra- tive of grandeur with credibility and legitimacy. As such, they exert an important influence on the policy arena. Nuclear weapons are represen- tative of a certain vision of France and decision-makers are unwilling to challenge this vision. This outlook explains the UK-France nuclear agreement which allows France to maintain, and even enhance the qual- ity of its deterrent and, at the same time, nourish the national narrative’s core message of international power and relevance. In a similar vein, Russia has invested heavily in the symbolic power of nuclear weapons as a means of reproducing the themes of power, prestige and influence. In this context, the NST complements and 211NUCLEAR POLICY IN FRANCE AND RUSSIA reinforces Russia’s national narrative. Participation in negotiations with the United States on the reduction of nuclear weapons offers Russia the opportunity to take centre stage on the most important of issues, and represents a constant reminder of Russia’s past as a superpower in possession of the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. Ultimately, through their symbolic weight and political significance, nuclear weapons provide France and Russia with a means of reconciling the reality of progressive decline with the historically-rooted themes of international power and influence that dominate their national narratives. Nuclear weapons policy in both countries reflects this fact. NOTES 1 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke/ New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2003) p.xviii. 2 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven/ London: Yale U P 1966) p.19. 3 Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East (Princeton UP 2007) p.35. 4 Richard N. Rosecrance, Problems of Nuclear Proliferation: Technology and Politics (Berkeley, CA/ Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press 1966) p.35. 5 Robert Malcolmson, Nuclear Fallacy: How We Have Been Misguided since Hiroshima (Ontario: McGill U P 1985) p.67. Somewhat paradoxically, the symbolic power of nuclear weapons was reinforced by the advent of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The entry into force of this treaty in 1970 provided nonprolif- eration efforts with a robust legal framework and gave impetus to a global nonprolifera- tion norm. At the same time, however, the NPT also formalised the binary opposition between NWS and those states without the bomb. Nuclear weapons became cemented as currency of power that was made all the more valuable by its exclusivity. 6 Recent years have seen aggressive expansion on the part of the Chinese military. See Robert D. Kaplan, ‘The Geography of Chinese Power: How Far Can Beijing Reach on Land and at Sea?’, Foreign Affairs 89/3 (2010) pp.22–41; and John J. Mearsheimer, ‘The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3/4(2010) pp.381–96. 7 Jacques Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: CU P 2006) p.13. 8 It is important to note that the idea of a national narrative constitutes an example of what W.B. Gallie terms ‘essentially contested concepts’, that is to say evaluative concepts that are legitimately interpreted in fundamentally different ways and therefore not reducible to a single, all-encompassing definition. See Walter B. Gallie, ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1956) pp.167–98. 9 Hayden White, ‘The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality’, Critical Inquiry Policy 7/1 (1980) pp.5–27. 10 Duncan Bell, ‘Mythscapes: memory, mythology and national identity’, British Journal of Sociology 54/1, pp.63–81. 11 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage Publications 1995) p.71. 12 See Gerard Noiriel, ‘Immigration: Amnesia and Memory’, French Historical Studies 19/2 (1995) pp.367–80. 13 Ilya Prizel, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine (Cambridge: CU P 1998) p.14. 14 See Philip Gordon, A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy (Princeton U P 1993). 212 DEFENCE STUDIES 15 Research has shown that the French received ‘limited assistance’ from the United States in the 1970s when the Nixon administration ‘secretly reversed a policy of opposition to, and non-cooperation with, the French nuclear program that began to emerge during the final years of the Eisenhower administration’. Of particular interest is the process of ‘neg- ative guidance’ that was adopted to allow the US to offer advice on warhead design with- out contravening the US Atomic Energy Act. See William Burr, ‘US Secret Assistance to the French Nuclear Program, 1969–1975: From ‘‘Fourth Country’’ to Strategic Partner’, . However, Bruno Tertrais points out that ‘US-French nuclear cooperation did not really amount to secretly running a policy that was the opposite of the public stance taken by both governments. France was already a nuclear power, acknowledged as such by the Treaty on the Non-Prolifera- tion of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)’ and the US did not provide anything that France would not have been able to develop on its own. In this context, US assistance does not detract from the narrative of independence that surrounds the French programme. See Bruno Tertrais, ‘US-French Nuclear Cooperation: Stretching the Limits of National Strategic Paradigms’, . 16 Anne L. Clunan, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence: Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP 2009). 17 For a detailed analysis of the French republican model and the evolution of French national identity see Maurice Agulhon, The French Republic: 1879–1992 (Oxford: Blackwell 1993); Robert Gildea, The Past in French History (New Haven/ London: Yale U P 1994); Jack Hayward, The One and Indivisible French Republic (London: Weidenfeld 1973); and Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times, 5th Edition (New York: Norton 1998). 18 Marc Sadoun (ed.), La Démocratie en France. Idéologies (Paris: Gallimard 2000) p.2. 19 Emmanuel Godin and Tony Chafer (eds.), The French Exception (London: Berghahn 2005) p.xv. 20 Ibid. p.xv. 21 Gildea, The Past in French History (note 16) p.112. 22 Robert Frank, La hantise du déclin. La France, 1920-1960: finances défense et identité nationale (Paris: Belin 1994). 23 In particular, the Suez crisis of 1956 ‘and what it revealed about the lack of French power’ was an important driver behind the decision to pursue nuclear weapons. More- over, this event served as a ‘bridging event’ of sorts that contributed to positioning the idea of nuclear weapons as means of renewing French power and influence on the world stage. See Venance Journé, ‘France’s Nuclear Stance: Independence, Unilateralism, and Adaptation’, in Catherine McArdle Kelleher and Judith Reppy (eds.), Getting to Zero: The Path to Nuclear Disarmament (Stanford UP 2011) p.126. 24 Lawrence Kritzman, ‘A Certain Idea of de Gaulle’, Yale French Studies 111 (2007) pp.157– 68. 25 While the French nuclear weapons programme had its roots in the Fourth Republic, de Gaulle invested the project with great importance and championed the development of an indigenous nuclear weapon. 26 Beatrice Heuser, Nuclear Mentalities? Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press 1998) p.100. 27 Ibid. 28 Serge Berstein, The Republic of De Gaulle, 1958–1969 (Cambridge: CU P 1993) p.170. 29 The original French-language report from 1966 was published again in 1968 under the title ‘French Defence Policy’. See ‘French Defence Policy’, Survival 10/1 (1968) pp.12–16. All translations are the authors’ own. 30 French nuclear idiosyncracy constitutes an understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in French society comprised of four strands: ‘the ‘‘sanctuarizing’’ power of nuclear weap- ons; their rationalizing virtue; their equalizing power; and the idea that nuclear energy is a safe, clean and progressive source of energy’. See Benoît Pelopidas, ‘French nuclear 213NUCLEAR POLICY IN FRANCE AND RUSSIA http://stage-wilson.p2technology.com/publication/us-secret-assistance-to-the-french-nuclear-program-1969-1975-fourth-country-to-strategic http://stage-wilson.p2technology.com/publication/us-secret-assistance-to-the-french-nuclear-program-1969-1975-fourth-country-to-strategic http://wmdjunction.com/110726_us_french_cooperation.htm idiosyncrasy: How it affects French nuclear policies towards the United Arab Emirates and Iran’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 25/1 (2012) pp.143–69. 31 Transcript of the UK-France Summit press conference, 2 Nov. 2010, < www.number10. gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2010/11/uk-france-summitpress-conference-56551>. 32 Ibid. Article 5, Para 1. 33 Matthew Harries, ‘Britain and France as Nuclear Partners’, Survival 54/1 (2012) pp.7–30. 34 ‘France to reduce nuclear warheads’, BBC News, 21 March 2008. 35 Matthew Moran and Matthew Cottee, ‘Bound by History: Exploring Challenges to French Nuclear Disarmament’, Defense and Security Analysis 27/4 (2011) pp.341–57. 36 Harries, ‘Britain and France as Nuclear Partners’ (note 33) p.15. 37 For a comprehensive examination of the evolution of the Franco-British partnership see Harries, ‘Britain and France as Nuclear Partners’ (note 33). 38 Défense et Sécurité Nationale, Livre Blanc (Paris: Odile Jacob 2008). 39 Jean-Pierre ChevÒnement, Rapport d’Information: Désarmement, non-prolifération nucléaires et sécurité de la France (Paris: Commission des affaires étrangéres, de la défense et des forces armées 2010). 40 ‘Russia and US close in on nuclear disarmament deal’, AFP, 1 March 2010. 41 Harries, ‘Britain and France as Nuclear Partners’ (note 33) p.20. 42 Dmitri Trenin, ‘Russia Reborn’, Foreign Affairs 88/6 (2009) pp.64–78. 43 Russian Ministry of Defence, ‘The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation’ (2010), < www.carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf>. 44 Stjepan G. Mestrovie, Anthony Giddens: The Last Modernist (London/ New York: Routledge 1998) p.156. 45 See Trenin ‘Russia Reborn’ (note 42) and Dmitri Trenin, Post-Imperium: A Eurasian Story (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2011). 46 Veljko Vujacic, ‘Stalinism and Russian Nationalism: A Reconceptualization’, in Marlene Laruelle (ed.), Russian Nationalism and the National Reassertion of Russia (Abingdon/ New York: Routledge 2009) p.158. 47 Dmitri Medvedev, ‘Go Russia!’ 10 Sept. 2009, . 48 Trenin Post-Imperium (note 42) p.40. 49 George Kennan observed this in the 1940s when a Russian friend told him, ‘The more successful we are, the less we care about foreign opinion. This is something you should bear in mind about the Russian. The better things go for him, the more arrogant he is.’ George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925–1950 (New York: Pantheon 1967) p.197. 50 ‘Candidates exploit nationalism in Russia poll’, Al Jazeera, 1 March 2012. 51 Arkady Ostrovsky, ‘Flirting with Stalin’, Prospect 150 (2008). 52 Igor S. Ivanov, The New Russian Diplomacy (Washington DC: Nixon Center and Brook- ings Institution Press 2005) pp.13–14. 53 Delpech wrote of this in the context of Chinese reform: ‘Europe could encourage acknowledgement of the crimes the Communist authorities have committed against the Chinese people since 1949. It is past time to undertake that effort of memory, owed to the millions of the dead who have never received the attention granted their companions in misfortune in the Russian gulag.’ See Therese Delpech, Savage Century: Back to Barbarism (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2007) p.143. 54 Cited in Ostrovsky (note 51). 55 Medvedev, ‘Go Russia!’ (note 47). 56 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (New York: Cornell U P 1989) p.174. 57 Telemetric exchanges entail the sharing of data on missile flight tests. 58 Rose Gottemoeller, Testimony to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 15 June 2010, < www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/143159.htm>. 59 Alexei Arbatov, ‘Advancing US-Russian Security Cooperation’, Remarks to Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 1 April 2010, < www.carnegieen- dowment.org/files/0402carnegie-russia1.pdf>. 60 Ivanov, The New Russian Diplomacy (note 52) p.4. 214 DEFENCE STUDIES http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2010/11/uk-france-summitpress-conference-56551 http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-transcripts/2010/11/uk-france-summitpress-conference-56551 http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/298 http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/143159.htm http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/0402carnegie-russia1.pdf http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/0402carnegie-russia1.pdf 61 Scott D. Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Bombs? Three Models in Search of a Bomb’, International Security 21/3 (1996) pp.54–86. 62 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’ (2008), . 63 Preamble text reads: ‘Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties. . ..’ 64 Brent Scowcroft, Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 10 June 2010, . 65 Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1967) p.209. 66 Trenin, Post-Imperium (note 45) p.14. 67 Nick Ritchie, ‘Relinquishing Nuclear Weapons: Identities, Networks and the British Bomb’, International Affairs 86/2 (2010) p.467. 215NUCLEAR POLICY IN FRANCE AND RUSSIA http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=0d3e77de-5056-a032-5203-57b0d855ef7a