Gender Quotas and the Press in Turkey: Public Debate in the Age of AKP Government

This article was downloaded by: [McMaster University] On: 18 December 2014, At: 19:48 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK South European Society and Politics Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fses20 Gender Quotas and the Press in Turkey: Public Debate in the Age of AKP Government Gül Aldıkaçtı Marshall Published online: 25 Jan 2011. To cite this article: Gül Aldıkaçtı Marshall (2010) Gender Quotas and the Press in Turkey: Public Debate in the Age of AKP Government, South European Society and Politics, 15:04, 573-591, DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2010.524744 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2010.524744 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. 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Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms- and-conditions http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fses20 http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/13608746.2010.524744 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2010.524744 http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions Gender Quotas and the Press in Turkey: Public Debate in the Age of AKP Government Gül Aldıkaçtı Marshall In 2004, an amendment to the Turkish Constitution advocating gender quotas was rejected by parliament. The press actively participated in public debates on the issue. A textual analysis of the coverage of this issue by four national newspapers shows that the press framed gender quotas as either preferential treatment or positive discrimination. Furthermore, they couched these frames within the larger ideological struggle between Islamism and secularism. Gender quotas became a platform for contestation over political, social and cultural power. Keywords: Gender Quotas; Media Framing; Feminism; Turkish Politics Although the issue of gender quotas had been on the Turkish feminist movement’s agenda since the 1990s, it only became the subject of a broader public debate during changes to article 10 of the Constitution in 2004. Taking advantage of the window of opportunity opened by the Turkish state’s willingness to reform in order to begin accession negotiations with the EU (European Union), various women’s groups, mostly feminist, and friendly politicians, mainly from the secularist and centre-left official opposition party, CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi—Republican People’s Party), pushed for the inclusion of a clause in the Constitution which would establish the legal grounds for employing quota measures designed to increase women’s representation in politics. The clause failed when the majority party, the governing conservative and Islamist AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—Justice and Development Party), overwhelmingly voted against.1 This study examines the press coverage of the debate, aiming to reveal how gender quotas and political activism of women’s groups in their favour were framed by the press. It argues that the coverage of gender quotas was determined not only by the position of each newspaper on gender equality, but also by the larger ideological dispute over Islamism versus secularism, and by clashing political interests and alliances between the media and political parties. ISSN 1360-8746 (print)/ISSN 1743-9612 (online) q 2010 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2010.524744 South European Society and Politics Vol. 15, No. 4, December 2010, pp. 573–591 D ow nl oa de d by [ M cM as te r U ni ve rs ity ] at 1 9: 48 1 8 D ec em be r 20 14 Gender Quota Measures Gender quotas are designed to increase women’s political participation, ‘aiming at equality of result, rather than equality of opportunity’ (Bacchi 2006, p. 33). While feminist women’s groups that permeate the parties with woman politicians have been behind the pressure for gender quotas in numerous countries (Kittilson 2006), in others party or government elites have adopted gender quotas for strategic reasons. There are also cases in which quotas are seen as the extension of developing an egalitarian outlook (Krook 2006; 2008). The importance of gender quotas stems from the fact that women are underrepresented in politics. Now, at its historical maximum, the average percentage of woman representatives in parliaments around the world is only about 18.4 (Byanyima 2008). This raises questions about the prevalence of the public/private dichotomy, which is based on the exclusion of women from the public sphere, and the degree to which women’s concerns are addressed in national decision-making bodies. Politics is still very much a male-dominated field and gender quotas provide the fast track for women to acquire equal representation with men in politics (Dahlerup 2006, p. 6). Whether gender quotas can ever lead to equal representation of women and men in politics depends on the degree to which quotas are taken seriously and implemented (Reynolds 1999). Quotas, if implemented, can lead to an increase in the number of women members of parliament. According to Reynolds (1999), the existence of a quota is the best predictor of an increase in the number of women cabinet members. With increased women’s participation in politics, women politicians become role models for younger women. Women of all ages are more likely to discuss politics when they see a higher number of women in politics (Wolbrecht & Campbell 2007). Women’s political representation also increases the likelihood of the implementation of policies that matter to women: policies such as reproductive rights, education, and family responsibility (O’Regan 2000). It is expected that the higher the number of women in ‘policy-making positions’, the higher the possibility that ‘women’s issue policies’ will be brought to the fore and implemented (O’Regan 2000, p. 114). The arguments on gender quotas centre on issues of liberalism, opportunity, competition, citizenship rights, and democracy. Opponents perceive gender quotas as a problematic way to enter and move in politics. According to this view, gender quotas are against the principles of liberalism because they ignore merit and its necessary companion, competition (Bacchi 2006; 2004). Furthermore, it is argued that gender quotas discriminate against men, since an underqualified woman may take the place of a more qualified man. In this ‘gender-blind discourse’ (Dahlerup 2006, p. 8), ‘all that is needed for an equal society is equal treatment of different people’ (Bacchi 2006, p. 34). There are also those who oppose gender quotas primarily because they believe that ‘politics is a men’s business’ (Dahlerup 2006, p. 8). The proponents of gender quotas, on the other hand, argue that these measures are necessary to increase women’s representation so that women’s views, experiences, and 574 G. A. Marshall D ow nl oa de d by [ M cM as te r U ni ve rs ity ] at 1 9: 48 1 8 D ec em be r 20 14 concerns become part of the policy-making process. Women’s increased political representation is directly related to equal citizenship rights and consolidation of democracy. The proponents also criticise the conceptualization of merit, claiming that it excludes women’s skills or judges women’s merit in a discriminatory fashion (Bacchi 2006). The theoretical and political argument surrounding gender quotas in politics provides a meaningful framework for understanding the debates and their press coverage in Turkey. A further task is to render visible the way in which ideological positions and political agendas interlock on both sides of the debate and in their media coverage. This article uncovers these interlocking ideological positions and political interests with respect to gender quotas. More specifically, the article argues that in today’s Turkey the debate over gender quotas is significantly affected by alliances and clashes among the media, the AKP government and other political parties. In a larger framework, these alliances and clashes are shaped by Islamist or secular ideological positions. The debates and their coverage provide the context in which the gender- quota proposal failed. Representational Politics in Turkey and the Feminists’ Demand for Gender Quotas Turkish women obtained the right to vote and stand as candidates for government posts at national elections in 1934. In the early years of the newly established Turkish Republic, under the single party system, there was an unofficial quota to provide some representation for women in parliament. As a result, between 1935 and 1950 the proportion of women parliamentarians remained around 4.5 per cent (Yılmaz 2007). With the introduction of the multi-party system in 1950 and the abandoning of the unofficial quota, the number of women in parliament decreased. After 1960, for the first time, a political party, CHP, opened a women’s branch, and other parties followed suit. Parallel to women’s experience in diverse parts of the world, the women’s branches did not provide many political opportunities for their members at local or national level, beyond the promotion of party politics through the organisation of social activities (Güneş-Ayata 1998). The 1980 military coup brought further obstacles for women, by closing the women’s branches and banning their political activities until 1995. During this period some of these branches continued to exist as charity organisations with loose ties to the parties (Keskin 1997). The proportion of women parliamentarians was less than four per cent between 1983 and 1995 and around four per cent in the 1999 and 2002 elections (Yılmaz 2007). Using gender quotas to increase women’s political participation was not on the political parties’ agendas until 1989. That year, for the first time, SDHP (Sosyalist Demokratik Halkçı Parti—Socialist Democratic People’s Party), which was to change its name to CHP (Republican People’s Party) in 1995, began to use a quota to increase the number of women on the ladders of the party (Güneş-Ayata 1998). In the 1990s, several other parties followed the CHP’s precedent. The proliferation of party quotas may have been due to party competition for increasingly important women’s South European Society and Politics 575 D ow nl oa de d by [ M cM as te r U ni ve rs ity ] at 1 9: 48 1 8 D ec em be r 20 14 votes. Krook (2006) recognises this strategic adoption of party quotas by the party elites as a widespread phenomenon globally. Today in Turkey, despite the fact that a number of political parties have quotas ranging from 10 to 50 per cent, women are underrepresented as party leaders and parliamentarians. In the current parliament, the proportion of women is at its historical maximum, a little over nine per cent. This increase, which resulted from the 2007 national elections, cannot simply be attributed to changing party tactics with regard to candidate lists (e.g. placing women at the top of the lists or using the zigzag model) or the adoption of gender quotas to guarantee seats for women in parliament. It was mainly due to the campaigns by women’s organisations, mostly feminist ones, led by KA-DER (Kadın Adayları Destekleme ve Eğitme Derneği— the Association for Supporting and Training Women Candidates). KA-DER’s advocacy efforts in terms of visible public campaigns and direct attempts to contact politicians since the mid-1990s received growing support from various feminist groups. Collaboration among feminists to support women’s political representation intensified further in the 2000s when the Turkish state embarked on a reform programme to fulfill the conditions necessary for the opening of accession negotiations with the EU. It was during the amendments to the Constitution in 2004 as part of this reform process that a coalition of women and sympathetic women parliamentarians from CHP pushed for the establishment of a legal quota system by including a clause in the revised Constitution. As in many other countries where quota policies are proposed and become part of public debate, the demand for legal quotas to increase women’s participation in politics was based on ‘the perceived association between women’s increased representation and the pursuit of gender-equitable public policies’ (Hassim 2008, p. 159). As the official website of KA-DER stated, ‘Men cannot represent women in political decision-making organs because their problems, interests, and priorities are different [than women’s]’ (2009). Now many Turkish feminists support the theoretical and political stand that gender quotas are necessary measures for democracy and justice. This view was echoed by two women from CHP who proposed that article 10 of the Constitution be revised to include the clause that ‘Women and men are equal. The state has the responsibility to ensure the implementation of these rights. Temporary measures and regulations for this purpose should not be regarded as preferential treatment and privilege.’ A number of women’s NGOs, primarily secular- oriented, supported this proposal by coming to the parliament and talking to the press. Yet, as the article will demonstrate, the coverage they received was mainly from the secular media. In two rounds of voting on 4 May and 7 May 2004, all CHP parliamentarians voted ‘yes’. However, among AKP members, only four in the first round and seven in the second round voted ‘yes’. A male AKP member proposed the clause be changed to and voted on as ‘Women and men are equal. The state has the responsibility to ensure the implementation of these rights.’ The majority of AKP members approved this proposal. CHP members also voted ‘yes’, with the explanation that this is better than nothing. Only one out of 13 women from AKP supported the proposal during the two rounds. 576 G. A. Marshall D ow nl oa de d by [ M cM as te r U ni ve rs ity ] at 1 9: 48 1 8 D ec em be r 20 14 Women members of AKP who said no claimed that the revised Constitution already accepts the equality between men and women and there is no need for further measures. During the amendments to the Constitution, the EU did not directly press the Turkish government and parliament to adopt gender quotas. However, it had in the past iterated its discontent with the underrepresentation of women in decision- making bodies. The European Commission, in its Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession, had stressed that ‘The representation of women in elected bodies and government remains low’ (2003, p.37). This criticism is linked to the EU’s general stand on women’s representation in politics. In the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the EU encouraged states to take measures to increase the number of women’s where they are underrepresented. As Dahlerup accurately points out, ‘Even in an era of globalisation, political debates are conducted primarily within national boundaries’ (2006, p. 12). More than the actual attempts of the EU, the reform process for EU membership created an atmosphere for debate over gender quotas within the national boundaries of Turkey. However, ideological inclinations towards Islamism and secularism between AKP and CHP became pivotal in shaping the debate. Whether it admits it or not, the press not only reported the debates, but also became a participant in these debates through its coverage of the issue from different ideological perspectives and with its support for or opposition to the parties. Study Design This study looks at the amount of coverage given by the press to the issue of gender quotas and engages in a detailed textual analysis to uncover the specifics of press coverage. Textual analysis reveals the meaning behind the text. There is a powerful link between the language used in the text and the ideological foundation. Principally, a textual analysis is a study of ideology and ‘the political importance of textual analysis comes from its power to unveil how ideologies are disseminated and resisted through texts’ (Alat 2006, p. 300). It reveals not only what is there, but also what is absent such as unspoken assumptions, prejudgments, and ideological positions. The use of textual analysis, thus, can be instrumental in uncovering how the ideological positions and political alliances of selected Turkish newspapers affected their coverage of the debates on gender quotas. The press was chosen as a microcosm of the larger media in Turkey. Because many media outlets are monopolised by a few individuals who influence the content ideologically, an analysis of the press sheds light on the larger media’s stand. To provide a representational picture of the public debate and its coverage, four nationally well-known newspapers, Hürriyet, Zaman, Radikal, and Yeni Şafak, are included in the study. Hürriyet and Zaman were chosen for their high circulation rates and contrasting ideological positions: while Hürriyet’s editorial style reflects a secular stance, Zaman’s style is by and large shaped by a conservative religious view. Both papers have an average daily circulation rate of over 500,000. Together they had about 24 per cent of South European Society and Politics 577 D ow nl oa de d by [ M cM as te r U ni ve rs ity ] at 1 9: 48 1 8 D ec em be r 20 14 the market share among the newspapers with a circulation of over 100,000 in 2005 (Christensen 2007), not including the number of people who had free access to these newspapers through the internet. Hürriyet belongs to the Doğan Media Group (DMG), the largest media conglomerate. The latter’s owner, Aydın Doğan, is one of several businessmen who took over the media after neo-liberal economic policies were introduced by the government in the mid-1980s. Like other media moguls in Turkey, Doğan is known to have a ‘clientelist’ relationship with politicians. He has been criticised for using his media outlets, especially the press, to pressure the politicians give favour to his business interests (Christensen 2007). His relationship with the AKP government has soured over time. Doğan and AKP Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have publicly clashed in recent years.2 The DMG also owns Radikal, which has an average daily circulation rate of about 45,000. Radikal is categorised as a higher-quality newspaper than Hürriyet and preferred by an educated and mostly secular readership (Christensen 2007). It is left- leaning and seemingly more open to multiple viewpoints than Hürriyet. Although it does not have a high circulation rate, its coverage helps Doğan create ‘a serious image for his media empire’ (Cristensen 2007, p. 189). Zaman is supported by Fethullah Gülen, head of an Islamist movement. In the 2007 elections, Gülen’s TV channels and newspapers, including Zaman, openly supported AKP and attacked opposition parties and the military (Gunter & Yavuz 2007, p. 293). Yeni Şafak with a circulation of about 115,000 is also a supporter of the AKP government. As the following analysis will show, this clientalist relationship between the media and political parties of Islamist and to a degree secular spectrums in Turkey affects the way the media frame social issues. My analysis of the debates on gender quotas covers a one-month period just before and after the amendment of the Constitution in May 2004. The limitation of the analysis to this period is due to the fact that public discussion on the issue picked up just before and right after the parliamentary votes on 4 May and 7 May 2004. Study Findings The Extent and Type of Coverage Counting the articles published in the four newspapers during this period reveals a total of 93 articles, including columns. Of these, 39 (41.94 per cent) appeared in Radikal, 21 (22.58 per cent) in Yeni Şafak, 19 (20.43 per cent) in Hürriyet, and 14 (15.05 per cent) in Zaman. These figures show that the pro-secularist DMG newspapers Hürriyet and Radikal together (total 62.37 per cent) gave more coverage to the issue than Zaman and Yeni Şafak combined. In terms of the breakdown between news items and comment, in the case of Zaman all but two of the articles were in the form of news. Only one journalist discussed gender quotas in his column (Alpay 2004). There was also one op-ed by Dağı (2004), 578 G. A. Marshall D ow nl oa de d by [ M cM as te r U ni ve rs ity ] at 1 9: 48 1 8 D ec em be r 20 14 at the time an assistant professor at Atılım University. In contrast, Yeni Şafak published 11 columns and ten news reports. In Hürriyet most of the coverage of gender quotas was in columns (11 out of 19 articles). Radikal had 16 columns and 23 news reports on the issue. The high volume of columns and low volume of op-eds in Turkish media may require explanation for those not familiar with the Turkish media. There is no separate op-ed page in Turkish newspapers, although op-eds are published occasionally in some newspapers. However, columns written by journalists occupy a large portion of the newspapers. Opinions of columnists have higher status than news reporting (Finkel 2000). Some columnists are quite influential in shaping public opinion and setting the public agenda (Tunç 2004). As Finkel states ‘any Turkish journalist who has not, after a certain age, become a columnist has failed’ (2000, p. 155). Columnists have reputations to defend. Furthermore, they do not need to be of the same opinion as other columnists at the same newspaper, but they have to support the political position of the newspaper (Tunç 2004). This is true, not only for Zaman, Yeni Şafak, and Hürriyet, but also for the seemingly more liberal Radikal, which in the end belongs to DMG. Although its journalists may sometimes take different positions on certain issues from the Hürriyet journalists who openly criticise AKP, Radikal had, as the analysis will show, a similar framing of the issue of gender quotas and a similar stance towards AKP and CHP. ‘Preferential Treatment’ or ‘Positive Discrimination’? When the newspaper Zaman referred to gender quotas, ayrımcılık, meaning ‘preferential treatment’, was the most frequently used term, tending to evoke a negative nuance. The term kadinlara ayrıcalık, meaning ‘preferential treatment towards women’, was used once. Occasionally, kadınlara pozitif ayrımcılık (positive discrimination towards women) and pozitif ayrımcılık (positive discrimination) were used. These last two were the main terms in Yeni Şafak. In Hürriyet and Radikal, gender quotas were affirmed through the phrase pozitif ayrımcılık (positive discrimination) used in the majority of news and columns. Less often, but still in a confirmatory tone, the following terms were used in Hürriyet: fiili eşitlik (de facto equality), geçici özel önlem (temporary special measure), and fiili önlem (de facto measure). The term kota (quota) was used once. The ways in which gender quotas were referred to by both the DMG newspapers were consistent with the term’s usage by various feminist groups advocating gender quotas. For example, KA-DER in its educational booklet, Geçici Özel Önlem Politikaları: KOTA (Temporary Special Measure Policies: QUOTA), mentioned various affirming ways of referring to gender quotas, such as fırsat eşitliği (equal opportunity), olumlu eylem (positive action), olumlu ayrımcılık (positive discrimination), geçici özel önlem (temporary special measure), and kota (quota). The terms used reflected each newspaper’s stance on the issue of gender quotas and point toward media bias. When Zaman articles overwhelmingly characterised gender South European Society and Politics 579 D ow nl oa de d by [ M cM as te r U ni ve rs ity ] at 1 9: 48 1 8 D ec em be r 20 14 quotas as ‘preferential treatment’, they led to the stigmatisation of women as spoiled, lacking the merit to enter politics, but still receiving special treatment that inherently discriminates against men. For the most part, Zaman avoided treating gender quotas as a justice issue, as ‘an attempt to redress entrenched privilege’ (Bacchi 2006, p. 34). Some articles in Yeni Şafak echoed this stand of Zaman. Others saw gender quotas positively, as a justice issue, but only if applied to all women, including those who were prohibited from entering public institutions with türbans (Islamic headscarves).3 As will be discussed later, only one columnist in Yeni Şafak consistently supported the measure unconditionally and even criticised AKP, which the newspaper openly supports, for failing to take a historical stand on a constitutional gender quota measure. Hürriyet and Radikal were consistent in using the term pozitif ayrımcılık (positive discrimination) in an affirmative tone, indicating that women need a special measure to cope with the discrimination against them in politics. Party Reputations: Who Owns the Issue of Gender Quotas? The analysis of headlines, whose significance lies in their potential to capture the approach of the whole report to the issue covered (Alat 2006; Clark 1992), provided parallel results to the contrasting ways the Islamist and secular newspapers referred to gender quotas. Zaman in its headlines emphasised the fact that the proposal for gender quotas came from the members of parliament of the centre-left and secular CHP, not from the ruling conservative and religious-oriented AKP. The headlines reflected the newspaper’s concern that its readers should know that AKP does not approve of gender quotas as a policy: CHP Members of Parliament asked for government support for ‘preferential treatment for women’. (Zaman 2004a) Women MPs from AKP claim their fellow MPs from CHP are being populist. (Zaman 2004b) AKP Members of Parliament did not let ‘positive discrimination’ pass. (Zaman 2004c) According to Zaman, the ruling AKP had the right attitude towards what should be amended in article 10 of the Constitution: ‘AKP: There won’t be any addition to the EU package on the issue of equality between women and men’ (Zaman 2004d). In line with this attitude, which treated the gender quota measure as an ‘addition’, the following headline read, ‘Parliament did not let “preferential treatment” pass, women and men are made equals under the Constitution’ (Zaman 2004e). The headline indicated that gender equality was upheld in the revised Constitution as a result of an AKP-majority parliament’s blockage of the proposal. Zaman treated gender quotas as a danger to gender equality because they would give preferential treatment to women. According to Zaman, the parliament, led by AKP, made the right decision in excluding gender quotas from article 10 of the Constitution. After all, another headline stressed, ‘Women should not be forced into politics’ (Zaman 2004f). 580 G. A. Marshall D ow nl oa de d by [ M cM as te r U ni ve rs ity ] at 1 9: 48 1 8 D ec em be r 20 14 A number of headlines in Yeni Şafak, especially news headlines, reported changes to the Constitution as positive and a step toward EU membership, indicating AKP success. Gender quotas were not mentioned in most of these (only in the text), implying that what was important was the larger change in the Constitution to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria for EU accession: ‘The criteria are fulfilled, now it is time for the EU’ (Yeni Şafak 2004). On the other hand, a number of columnists used headlines that gave the impression of supporting gender quotas, but added an exclamation mark at the end either to imply that this support was conditional or actually to reveal a different position in the body of the text. Examples were Taşgetiren’s column entitled ‘How about negative discrimination!’ (2004) and Tosun’s column entitled ‘Yes to positive discrimination, no to injustice!’ (2004). The headlines in Hürriyet and Radikal openly treated gender quotas as a necessary policy: as Benmayor in Hürriyet put it, ‘Today is the last chance for equality between women and men’ (2004a). Other examples included ‘Europe’s support for ‘positive discrimination’’ (Hürriyet 2004a) and ‘Equality, not on paper, but in practice’ (Radikal 2004a). According to Tınç from Hürriyet, gender quotas should be a policy not only because Turkey wants to be part of the EU, but also for the benefit of Turkish women: ‘Not for Europe, now, it is for us’ (2004a). CHP was viewed as having a special responsibility to push for the inclusion of the gender quotas clause in the Constitution; the headline in Hürriyet by Küçükşahin was an example: ‘There has to be support from CHP for equality between women and men’ (2004). However, as Göğüş (2004) in Hürriyet indicated with the title ‘Late sun and storm’, the possibility of gender quotas rising like the sun, even if it is late, was smashed by the storm in parliament. Most of Hürriyet’s and some of Radikal’s column and news headlines accused AKP of thwarting the possibility of gender quotas becoming law. A Radikal headline announced a ‘Negative vote for equality’ (2004b); another stated that ‘Conservatives are afraid’ (2004c). In Hürriyet, Doğan’s column headline read, ‘AKP’s Blacks: Women!’ (2004) and Benmayor (2004b) argued that, compared with the current woman minister from AKP, ‘The male minister responsible for women’s affairs had done more.’ Hürriyet also applauded a few members of the AKP who gave support to the proposal: ‘The brave heart in AKP’ (2004b). Both Hürriyet and Radikal headlines approved of the women’s NGOs who pushed for the inclusion of the proposal in the amended article: ‘Women did not give up’ (Tınç 2004b), ‘“Positive” support from the lawyers’ (Radikal 2004d). In their work on news coverage of the presidential candidates in the United States, Petrocik and colleagues (2003–4), Petrocik (1996) and Hayes (2008) demonstrated that a political party comes to own an issue as a result of the positive attention given to the issue by influential party members and party leaders. Both supporters and opponents associate the party with the issue in the long term. This creates a certain reputation for the party. Party reputation arising from issue ownership affects media coverage. The media give favourable coverage to a party, especially to its presidential candidate, during an election campaign if the party sticks with the issues it owns. South European Society and Politics 581 D ow nl oa de d by [ M cM as te r U ni ve rs ity ] at 1 9: 48 1 8 D ec em be r 20 14 The headlines in the Turkish newspapers certainly provided evidence to support the argument about how issue ownership and party reputation affect media coverage. Yet, at the same time, they revealed that the media are not always the outsiders who give favourable or unfavourable coverage to an issue already owned by a particular party. The media themselves play a role in associating or dissociating an issue with or from a party and therefore become major figures in the issue ownership and party reputation process. Zaman’s and to a lesser extent Yeni Şafak’s headlines declared that CHP owned the issue, as its members of parliament proposed the policy for gender quotas. Zaman dissociated AKP from the issue, giving a message to party supporters that the party did not own the issue, and in fact effectively killed the proposal, halting any progress the oppositional party was making. Hürriyet and Radikal headlines, on the other hand, communicated the message that CHP should (because it is a centre-left secular party) and does own the issue of gender quotas. They, however, made sure of dissociating AKP from gender quotas by accusing the party of not having an egalitarian approach toward men and women. Hürriyet condemned AKP for discriminating against its own women members by drawing an analogy between blacks in the US and women in AKP. Radikal informed its readers that it was AKP that rejected the proposal. Framing the Debates on Gender Quotas: Hypocrisy Versus Dissimulation (Takiyye) The difference between the way in which Islamist and secular newspapers referred to gender quotas and their headlines was consistent with the details of the news and columns. A significant portion of space in the newspapers, especially in Zaman and Hürriyet, was devoted to blaming either CHP or AKP for dealing ‘wrongly’ with the issue of gender quotas. All newspapers perceived parliamentary deliberations over gender quotas as a reflection of the shortcomings of either CHP or AKP. The major frames that emerged from the action of blaming were hypocrisy and dissimulation. While the articles in Zaman and Yeni Şafak, especially the columns, accused CHP of being hypocritical, secular newspapers, especially Hürriyet, were dominated by news and columns that criticised AKP for engaging in dissimulation (takiyye). According to Zaman and Yeni Şafak, CHP was hypocritical because its support for gender quotas conflicts with its stance against the türban. Alpay’s column (2004), which was among the few that approved gender quotas in Zaman, supported the policy as a way to increase women’s participation in politics in Turkey. At the end of his column, however, Alpay stressed that he did not find the MPs from CHP sincere because on the one hand they said they wanted to increase women’s participation in politics but, on the other, they blocked the efforts of women who wear the türban to participate in politics and enter universities. This view was echoed by most of the columnists in Yeni Şafak, like Akdoğan (2004), who found it ‘ironic’ that ‘those who ignore negative discrimination among women become the spokespeople for pointing out the discrimination against women’. Zaman framed CHP as hypocritical also by pointing out the party’s attitude towards its own women members. For example, arguing that CHP had recently become 582 G. A. Marshall D ow nl oa de d by [ M cM as te r U ni ve rs ity ] at 1 9: 48 1 8 D ec em be r 20 14 interested in women’s rights merely because it did not want to be labelled as ‘the party against the EU,’ an article in Zaman underlined the criticisms by the women members of the party of its management. These criticisms centred on the systemic exclusion of women from the higher rungs of the party: ‘Ankara University Women’s Problems Research Centre Deputy Director Assoc. Prof. Serpil Üşür said that the women’s branch of CHP was established not with the aim of integrating women into politics, but of carrying the weight of the party’ (Zaman 2005g). The Zaman article did not find CHP honest and accused the party of adopting measures towards gender equality simply to look good to the EU so that it did not lose the votes of people who supported Turkey’s EU membership. In the only op-ed in Zaman, Dağı (2004) argued that gender quotas are a reflection of hurdles that the modern way of life creates for women. These hurdles, such as having a career, push women to compete with men on men’s terms, and as a result ‘the woman sees her “natural” creational purpose, such as her “motherhood,” as an important obstacle in front of her success’. Parallel to Dağı’s position on women’s ‘natural’ abilities, Dursun (2004) in his column in Yeni Şafak claimed that ‘there is a contradictory relationship between the ontology of the woman and politics. Because politics is not a suitable social area of activity that fits woman’s ontology, there cannot be equality in this area.’ Furthermore, in line with Özkan, the only woman columnist in Yeni Şafak who wrote about the issue on 8 May 2004, Dağı (2004) in Zaman stressed that gender quotas promote gender inequality because they give preferential treatment to women, and therefore women should reject such a policy. For these women, the best approach to politics was to elect someone on the basis of individual merit, not gender. This negative stand on gender quotas reflected the position taken by all but one woman member of AKP; it was contrary to the position taken by the woman journalists of Hürriyet and Radikal and the woman parliamentarians from CHP. Interestingly, one journalist in Yeni Şafak unconditionally supported the proposal and openly criticised AKP for not living up to its belief in the democratisation of society. For Bayramoğlu (2004), gender quotas were necessary for the democratisation of society, as they improve women’s participation in public life. In his view, AKP members who were denied entrance into politics for their Islamist worldviews were now repeating the same injustice by taking an identical stance toward women. His argument that ‘AKP’s conservative sickness becomes undeniable’ made Bayramoğlu unique among all the journalists in Zaman and Yeni Şafak. Hürriyet and Radikal’s news and columns condemned AKP for blocking the inclusion of gender quotas in the revised Constitution. For the majority of news and columns, most AKP MPs’ rejection of gender quotas had something to do with their ‘worldview’ or ‘mentality’, which also reflected the party’s worldview. Hürriyet’s news and columns emphasised that the parliamentary debates over gender quotas have the function of a ‘magnifying glass’ that renders AKP’s fundamental worldview visible. For example, Ergin in his column stated that ‘When we hold the magnifying glass we notice this: the worldview of AKP on strengthening women’s status in society is weak and its sincerity is debatable’ (2004). In her column Tınç pointed out, ‘They were South European Society and Politics 583 D ow nl oa de d by [ M cM as te r U ni ve rs ity ] at 1 9: 48 1 8 D ec em be r 20 14 scared. This fear is the result of a mentality which supports women walking three steps behind men’ (2004s). According to Doğan (2004), by opposing gender quotas, AKP sent a reassuring message to its supporters that its religious vision of excluding women from the public sphere would not be disturbed: AKP’s approach to the issue reaches the point of revealing this party’s identity. Thus it is important . . . AKP does not recognise positive action and passes it over lightly by saying that women and men have equal rights. The practical result of this is that women are excluded from social life! . . . AKP’s roots are obvious [meaning conservative and religious], but it wants to locate itself in the centre. However, this attitude towards women removes AKP from the centre. The political dimension of the debate is significant for this reason. In the Parliamentary Commission on the Constitution, AKP members are sending a message to their constituents! . . . The connection between Islam and women! [Punctuation as in original text] Doğan aimed to make the point that while AKP’s recent legal reforms aiming to open accession negotiations with the EU might have given the impression that AKP was more of a mainstream than a religious conservative party, its rejection of the gender-quota policy revealed its Islamist worldview. The party was assuring its fundamentalist religious constituents that a woman’s place is in the home. Hence, emphasised Türenç (2004) in Hürriyet, the magnifying glass shows contradictions within the party at the minimum and dissimulation at the maximum: Because of its worldview, AKP cannot avoid contradictions about any issue that it cannot comprehend. Its contradictions over equality between women and men are also tied to this point. On the one hand, you would believe that women should be covered from head to toe. You would be against her taking active roles in society and would practice this in your own lives. On the other hand, you would try to put articles regarding the equality between women and men in every law starting with the Constitution. These are nothing but dissimulation, and by this, equality between women and men cannot be provided within Turkish society. Like Hürriyet, Radikal’s news and columns emphasised that it was a ‘traditionalist’ and ‘conservative’ worldview that prevented the majority of AKP MPs from supporting the proposal. Berkan (2004) in his column in Radikal stated that ‘the “conservative” majority from Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [AKP] in the parliament made sure that male domination prevails and women, who have equality [with men] on paper, cannot achieve it in practice’. Most Radikal columns and news portrayed gender quotas as necessary measures to diminish the negative effects of structural barriers that prevent equality being attained in practice. The framing of AKP as a dissimulator was similar to the way CHP members described AKP’s attitude towards the proposal. As the quotes from the newspapers revealed, labelling the supporters or opponents of gender quotas in AKP or CHP as hypocrites or dissimulators was a way of criticising the underlying secular or Islamist ideology of the two parties. For Zaman and Yeni Şafak, the hypocrisy of the supporters of gender quotas in CHP rested in their selectiveness with regard to what type of women gender quotas should apply to 584 G. A. Marshall D ow nl oa de d by [ M cM as te r U ni ve rs ity ] at 1 9: 48 1 8 D ec em be r 20 14 (e.g. women who do not wear the türban). For Zaman, the hypocrisy was also about whether CHP itself is sensitive to women’s representation in the management of the party. However, according to Hürriyet and Radikal, the opposition of most AKP MPs to gender quotas revealed the party’s true conservative religious beliefs about the role and conduct of women. The newspapers’ positions make it clear where they stood ideologically and how this affected their news coverage. This case study demonstrates once again that the media can and do play a significant role in creating party reputation based on issue ownership. Framing Feminist Efforts towards Gender Quotas: Polemical Versus Equality-Striving Feminists The contrasting ideological stances of the newspapers was also reflected in their coverage and framing of women’s groups with feminist agendas who had been advocating gender quotas outside parliament. The only coverage feminist advocacy groups received in Zaman was under the headline ‘Parliament’s EU reforms stayed under the shadow of “women’s polemic”’ (Zaman 2004h). A small picture of spectators from women’s organisations in Parliament was accompanied by this short passage: ‘In both the member section and the guest box of the General Assembly Salon, the superiority of women was felt. The representatives from women’s associations nearly filled the entire guest box’ (Zaman 2004h). The negativity of the headline was toned down by the picture and this passage. Like Zaman, Yeni Şafak had one article that mentioned women’s NGOs and this was only in the headline; the content did not give any space to the efforts of women’s groups. The nearly non-existent coverage given to women’s groups in both newspapers may be explained by the latter’s attempts to confine gender quotas to an issue of dispute between two political parties— among which, according to Zaman, AKP was the clear winner. In addition, Zaman undoubtedly attempted to dissociate AKP from gender quotas and wanted to make sure that the party’s reputation stemmed from disapproving of gender quotas and avoiding issue ownership of gender quotas. Hürriyet and Radikal, on the other hand, gave considerably more space to the advocacy efforts of feminist women’s groups. Six out of 19 articles in Hürriyet and six out of 39 articles in Radikal directly referred to advocacy and lobbying efforts by women’s NGOs. They emphasised that members of CHP were not alone in raising the issue of gender quotas; CHP members and women’s organisations worked together. For instance, Tınç (2004a) in Hürriyet stressed that CHP Members of Parliament are today bringing the proposal that is also supported by women’s organisations to the parliament . . . Women’s organisations and CHP parliament members want another sentence to be added: ‘for this purpose, temporary measures and regulations shall not be considered as preferential treatment or privilege.’ Several of the articles highlighted where women’s groups were surpassing CHP in their efforts. For example, Benmayor (2004c) in Hürriyet pointed out that ‘the Association South European Society and Politics 585 D ow nl oa de d by [ M cM as te r U ni ve rs ity ] at 1 9: 48 1 8 D ec em be r 20 14 for Supporting and Training Women Candidates called on the president to veto Article 10, which did not include “de facto equality” between women and men’. Some of the Radikal articles included interviews with representatives of women’s organisations. Noticeably, Hürriyet and Radikal framed them as women striving for equality who, together with their allies in parliament, most of whom were from CHP, advocated gender equality by pressuring the state. Conclusions The media coverage of the issue of gender quotas in Turkey produced two main themes that fit into the theoretical discourses that Dahlerup (2006) identified: recruitment to politics should be ‘gender blind’, versus gender quotas provide a ‘fast track’ for women to become involved in politics. The ‘gender-blind’ discourse was dominant in Zaman’s coverage of the issue. While some articles in Yeni Şafak supported the ‘gender-blind’ discourse, others put forth a discourse of conditionality, which was not part of Dahlerup’s model. Hürriyet and Radikal’s articles, however, primarily embraced the ‘fast track’ discourse. Zaman’s framing of gender quotas as ‘preferential treatment’ stigmatised them as ‘special help’ for people who cannot achieve a political position on their own. The idea here was that ‘preferential treatment’ is not gender blind and therefore diminishes ‘merit-based’ entry into politics (Bacchi 2006). The headline ‘Parliament did not let “preferential treatment” pass, women and men are made equal under the Constitution’ (Zaman 2004a) summarised this point of view. Yeni Şafak, while reflecting the ‘gender-blind’ discourse in some of its coverage, underlined a discourse of conditionality by emphasising that gender quotas should be used to increase the political representation of all women, including those wearing türbans who at present cannot enter Parliament because of their attire. Thus, ‘the politics-is-a-men’s business’ discourse was not the dominant discourse, as some might expect from these religious- oriented and conservative newspapers. Dağı’s article in Zaman, which emphasised that women should focus on motherhood as their ‘natural’ role and stop competing with men, and Dursun’s article in Yeni Şafak, which saw the low number of women in politics as a sign of their ontological deficiency, were the two that supported ‘the politics-is-a-men’s business’ discourse. Not a single news article or column took this stand in Hürriyet and Radikal. Hürriyet and Radikal, by and large, maintained the ‘fast track’ discourse with emphasis on women’s underrepresentation in social life in general and in politics in particular. The advancement of women that would come from women’s increased representation in politics was attached to development and modernisation. As Türenç stressed in his column, women’s greater representation in politics is about being ‘contemporary and civilised’ (2004). Equality between men and women can only be realised within ‘contemporary’ and ‘civilised’ forms of thought and conduct. Women and men might be equal on paper, but in reality they are far from equal. Gender quotas are, then, a necessary practical measure to solve the problem of discrimination against 586 G. A. Marshall D ow nl oa de d by [ M cM as te r U ni ve rs ity ] at 1 9: 48 1 8 D ec em be r 20 14 women. That is why special measures such as gender quotas should be part of the Constitution. The coverage of gender quotas by the newspapers analysed revealed not only their stands on whether or not this policy was necessary, but also to a certain extent their alliances with political parties as well as the ideological positions of the newspapers and the political parties. The newspapers, especially Zaman and Hürriyet, showed clear signs of either support for or opposition to the ruling AKP or opposition CHP. When doing this, the newspapers actively took part in creating party reputation based on issue ownership rather than simply reflecting the issue ownership efforts of the parties. Most of the coverage in Zaman, and to a lesser degree Yeni Şafak, deliberately dissociated AKP from gender quotas, aiming to satisfy religious conservative readers, many of whom were also AKP supporters. Hürriyet and Radikal, on the other hand, made it clear that this was an issue that CHP owned, recognising, at the same time, the support of a few AKP members for gender quotas. The newspaper–party alliances and issue ownership were not independent from the ideological positions of the newspapers and parties. The Islamist ideology of Zaman, Yeni Şafak (with one exception), and AKP stood against the secular ideology of Hürriyet and CHP. Even Radikal, with a seemingly more liberal stance than Hürriyet, associated AKPs failure to pass the gender quota proposal with its conservative origin and did not find it surprising that AKP did not vote for the measure. The issue of gender quotas, then, became a platform for ongoing contestation over political, social, and cultural power between the two polar opposites in today’s conflict-ridden but democratic Turkey. It became a case through which one could observe the intricacies of ideological and political agendas, interests, and ambitions. Furthermore, the coverage of gender quotas can easily be identified as ‘news slant’ (Entman 2007), as the framing of the issue uncovered how the newspapers favoured one side or the other in political and ideological disputes. The framing of gender quotas may also be identified as ‘content bias’. Entman explained that one may expose content bias by looking at ‘patterns of slant that regularly prime audiences, consciously or unconsciously, to support the interests of particular holders or seekers of political power’ (2007, p. 166). From the coverage of the issue emerged an example of ‘content bias’ as the newspapers became major players in the allocation of political power by supporting a particular political and ideological orientation and a political party and, at the same time, using this support to influence the public. Moreover, it was the secular print media, rather than the Islamist print media, that gave positive coverage to feminist activism and issues that feminist groups brought to the public’s attention. Hürriyet and Radikal, whose dominant ‘fast track’ discourse was in line with the feminist position on a constitutional quota system, viewed women’s activism as an indispensable tool for achieving gender equality. In contrast, Zaman, whose dominant ‘gender-blind’ discourse was at odds with the feminist view, reduced feminist action to being ‘polemical’. The newspaper gave the impression to its readers that, by asking for the inclusion of the gender quotas clause in the Constitution, feminist groups were simply creating conflict and disturbing both the smoothly South European Society and Politics 587 D ow nl oa de d by [ M cM as te r U ni ve rs ity ] at 1 9: 48 1 8 D ec em be r 20 14 evolving reform process led by AKP and the already existing equality between men and women. This framing and the little coverage given to the efforts of the feminist groups revealed Zaman’s attempts to marginalise feminist activism. Although Yeni Şafak did not frame feminist efforts as polemical, it primarily ignored women’s efforts outside parliament, thereby contributing to their marginalisation. Hence, the newspapers’ framing of feminist activism on gender quotas should be evaluated within this web of political and ideological positions and interests, which were ultimately about the distribution of power among Islamists and secularists. In sum, the coverage of the issue of gender quotas and of feminist efforts to influence the amendments to the Constitution raise a crucial historical and sociological point about present-day Turkey: matters regarding gender equality are often connected to disputes over secularism and Islamism as well as to political alliances and agendas. Examining a gender-based policy issue necessitates uncovering and untangling these layers of intertwined ideological and political disputes, alliances, and agendas. Notes [1] AKP formed the government following the 2002 national elections, in which it received 34.4 per cent of the votes and acquired 365 seats in parliament. CHP received 19.4 per cent of the votes, securing 177 seats and becoming the official opposition. Due to the ten per cent threshold for parliamentary representation, CHP and AKP were the only two parties represented in the 2002 parliament. AKP was subsequently re-elected in the 2007 election. [2] In 2008, the DMG was the first to report a corruption case in Germany involving several board members of a charity. One member convicted of fraud admitted that the charity’s aim was to support AKP. After this event, denying any relationship with the charity, Erdoğan publicly attacked Doğan and asked his supporters to boycott Doğan media outlets. Soon after, the government heavily fined DMG for tax evasion (Daloğlu 2009), leading to criticism from the EU and raising concerns about freedom of expression under the current government. [3] The türban has been the most significant issue around which the Islamist women’s movement, which emerged in the early 1980s, has mobilised. Islamist women have organised numerous protests, held meetings, and made alliances primarily with members of AKP and other conservative right-wing parties to lift the ban on wearing the türban in state institutions. In February 2008, parliament, with the majority vote of AKP and the Nationalist Party, decided to lift the ban only in universities. This decision has so far resulted in mixed reactions from university managements. While some universities have begun to allow students to enter university premises wearing the türban, others have continued to ask students to take their türban off when entering university campuses. References Akdoğan, Y. 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Marshall D ow nl oa de d by [ M cM as te r U ni ve rs ity ] at 1 9: 48 1 8 D ec em be r 20 14 Yeni Şafak (2004) ‘Kriterler tamam, sıra AB’de’ [Criteria are completed, now it is time for the EU], 10 May, available online at http://yenisafak.com.tr Yılmaz, S. (2007) ‘Women’s political representation in Turkey and Quotas’, available online at: http:// www.iknowpolitics.org Zaman (2004a) ‘CHP’li milletvekilleri ‘kadınlara ayrıcalık’ için iktidardan destek istedi’, [Parliament members from CHP asked for the support of the government for ‘preferential treatment for women’], 3 May, p. 6. Zaman (2004b) ‘AK Partili kadın milletvekillere göre, CHP’li hemcinsleri populist davranıyor’, [According to the women parliament members from AKP, their fellow parliament members from CHP are being populist], 4 May, p. 6. Zaman (2004e) ‘AK Partili vekiller, ‘pozitif ayrımcılığa’ geçit vermedi’ [Parliament members from AKP did not let ‘positive discrimination’ pass], 5 May 2004, p. 6. Zaman (2004d) ‘AK Parti: kadın-erkek eşitliği konusunda AB paketine ilave olamaz’ [AKP: there won’t be any addition to the EU package on the issue of equality between women and men], 4 May 2004, p. 6. Zaman (2004e) ‘Meclis “ayrımcılık” yapmadı, Anayasa’da kadın-erkek eşitlendi’ [Parliament did not let ‘preferential treatment’ pass, women and men are made equals in the Constitution], 8 May, p. 7. Zaman (2004f) ‘Kadın siyasete zorla itilmemeli’ [Women should not be forced into politics], 13 May, p. 13. Zaman (2004g) ‘Dokunulmazlık ısrarını erteleyen CHP’nin yeni hedefi kadın hakları’ [Postponed its insistence on immunity, CHP has women’s rights as new focus], 2 May, p. 7. Zaman (2004h) ‘Meclis’in AB reformları ‘kadın polemiği yüzünden gölgede kaldı’ [Parliament’s EU reforms stayed under the shadow of “women’s polemic”], 5 May, p. 6. Gül Aldıkaçtı Marshall is an assistant professor in the Department of Sociology at University of Louisville. Her current research focuses on the dynamics of the relationship between feminist grassroots activism, the state, and supranational bodies. Her work has been published in edited volumes and in journals including Gender & Society, Social Politics, and Women’s Studies International Forum. South European Society and Politics 591 D ow nl oa de d by [ M cM as te r U ni ve rs ity ] at 1 9: 48 1 8 D ec em be r 20 14