Ethical ends: Effect of abstract mindsets in ethical decisions for the greater social good

in d St er D Ethical decisions f co ct m ts a r th for the impact on the greater social good. Specifically, with abstract mindsets, people were dishonest to secure larger donations (Study 1) and dishonest to make larger (smaller) donations to charities that sup- ported (threatened) the greater social good (Study 2a, Study 2b) whereas with concrete mindsets, people s to c ike. Reg te Pon ‘‘massive illegal surveillance and intimidation,’’ by J. Edgar Hoover broke into the FBI office, stole files, and released them to the public (Isikoff, 2014). Here the burglary is clearly a dishonest act but exposing surveillance and intimidation is perceived as a greater greater purpose. an ethical must dec justified means. Rather than debating whether one should focus greater good or on oneself, in the current research, we co when individuals will focus on one aspect or the other. Consistent with past work (e.g., Amit & Greene, 2012; Bartels, 2008; Broeders, van den Bos, Müller, & Ham, 2011; Toure-Tillery & Fishbach, 2012) suggesting that such decisions are not necessarily dispositionally constant but instead may be situationally triggered, we suggest that abstract versus concrete mindsets influence whether one will focus on benefits to a greater social good or benefits to oneself. ⇑ Corresponding author. Fax: +1 305 348 3792. E-mail addresses: jrixom@fiu.edu (J. Rixom), [email protected]. edu (H. Mishra). 1 Fax: +1 801 581 3152. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 124 (2014) 110–121 Contents lists availab Organizational Behavior and .e l than for personal gain alone. In essence, these are situations when doing something ‘‘wrong’’ enables people to do something ‘‘right.’’ Consider, for example, burglars who stole 1000 documents from a Pennsylvania FBI office in 1971. Peace activists wanting to reveal ethical principle (donating is good) that benefits a When faced with situations in which violating ple can support a greater good or oneself, one which ends to focus and whether the ends are http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.02.001 0749-5978/� 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. princi- ide on by the on the nsider like financial statement frauds, highlight the abundance of dishonest behaviors that occur when people face ethical decisions. Oftentimes, these unethical behaviors are undertaken to increase personal gain, but at times, unethical behaviors occur for the sake of the greater good. There are many instances when unethical behaviors in one do- main are done to support a greater good in another domain, rather did curb some of the government’s antidemocratic practices. In an- other case of decisions where unethical behaviors directly benefit a greater good, computer hackers recently stole credit card numbers that could have been used for selfish purposes, such as shopping sprees, but instead were used to make large donations to various charities (Vinograd, 2011). In other words, one ethical principle (stealing is bad) was violated in order to directly support another Introduction Ethical decision-making continue academics and mainstreammedia al and employee misconduct to elabora Ethical principles Ethics Dishonesty Honesty Donations Construal level theory Decision making focused more on dishonesty for personal gain (Study 1, Study 2a, Study 2b). � 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. apture the attention of ular reports, from theft zi-schemes and Enron- good. Stated differently, in this situation, dishonesty is a small price paid for the greater good. One can describe such exposé as a charitable act because the burglars did not reveal their identities for more than 42 years; they did not gain any financial or fame- related benefits from the act of writing books. However, the exposé Keywords: ciple) but they violate ethical principles when doing so is a conduit for a greater social good (multiple principles). With concrete mindsets, people violate ethical principles for personal gain with less concern Ethical ends: Effect of abstract mindsets for the greater social good Jessica Rixoma,⇑, Himanshu Mishra b,1 a Florida International University, RB-325, 11200 SW 8th Street, Miami, FL 33199, Unite bDavid Eccles School of Business, University of Utah, SFEBB 7111, 1645 E. Campus Cent a r t i c l e i n f o Article history: Received 29 April 2012 Accepted 19 February 2014 Accepted by Madan Pillutla a b s t r a c t We explore the impact o principles. Whereas abstra concerns, concrete mindse that people abide by rathe journal homepage: www ethical decisions ates rive, Salt Lake City, UT 84112, United States nstrual level on decisions involving conflicts between multiple ethical indsets are associated with a focus on ethical issues and superordinate re associated with financial self-interest. With abstract mindsets, we find an violate ethical principles when only the self would benefit (single prin- le at ScienceDirect Human Decision Processes sevier .com/ locate /obhdp Specifically, we assess the proposition that construal level the- ory can inform our understanding of when one will focus on out- comes that support a greater social good or on outcomes that support oneself and the influence this has on honesty. To do so, we consider situations that involve a single ethical principle and J. Rixom, H. Mishra / Organizational Behavior and H situations that involve a conflict between multiple ethical princi- ples in order to assess the impact of construal level on which prin- ciple will be prioritized. In other words, we assess the role of abstract and concrete mindsets on whether people will focus on remaining honest, being dishonest to support a greater social good, or being dishonest to help oneself. Research on construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003) shows that people’s judgments and decisions differ based on whether an abstract, high-level or concrete, low-level mindset is enacted. Past research demonstrates that an abstract mindset leads people to abide by ethical principles (Agerström & Björklund, 2009; Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2008). However, since an abstract mind- set also focuses one on the superordinate ends (Liberman & Trope, 1998), we suggest that activating an abstract mindset will lead to different behaviors based on the impact on a greater social good. Specifically, we anticipate that by activating an abstract mindset, people will not behave dishonestly for personal gain alone, but we do anticipate that they will be dishonest when doing so pro- vides more support for a greater social good whereas with a con- crete mindset, people will consistently emphasize the subordinate focus of helping oneself. We suggest that this occurs because with an abstract mindset, people focus on the superordi- nate ends or greater social good inferred from the situation and prioritize it over the principle of honesty. This manuscript is organized as follows. First, we review litera- ture on ethical decisions where violating one ethical principle simultaneously supports a different ethical principle that empha- sizes a greater social good. Then, we provide an overview of con- strual level theory and its ability to provide insights into situations where one ethical decision is present and where there is a conflict between two ethical principles. Next, we present three studies based on the principles of honesty and supporting a greater social good. Finally, we discuss the theoretical and practical appli- cations of this research. Theoretical overview Ethical decision-making is a regular part of life. Oftentimes, these decisions involve a single ethical principle such as to steal or not to steal from one’s employer. At other times, two ethical principles are intertwined such that a decision to adhere to or vio- late one ethical principle simultaneously affects a second ethical principle such as to steal or not to steal in order to do more or less to help those in need.2 When the situation involves a single ethical principle, there is no conflict. However, when the situation involves a conflict between two ethical principles, then one principle will take priority over the other. While a conflict may exist between two ethical principles, the situation may not constitute an ethical dilemma in the traditional sense. Unlike the contexts addressed in the current research, moral dilemmas are defined as ‘‘situations in which no moral choice is without undesirable moral consequences’’ (Ditto & Liu, 2012, p. 55). Classic examples include the trolley problem (Foot, 1967) 2 In the current research, we conceptualize unethical behaviors as those that violate hypernorms or widely held standards and principles of ethical behaviors based on social norms or laws (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994; Umphress & Bingham, 2011). Thus, a behavior that violates hypernorms is classified as unethical, even if the consequences of the action support another ethical principle. We classify dishonesty, for instance, as unethical, regardless of whether it benefits or harms either the self or another entity. That is, while the outcome may have ethical or beneficial overtones, the behavior itself is unethical if it violates hypernorms. and footbridge problem (Thomson, 1985) in which one must de- cide whether to kill one person in order for several others to live and the Heinz dilemma (Kohlberg, 1969) where a husband must decide whether to steal expensive medication in order to keep his wife alive. Moral dilemmas such as these pit deontological and consequentialist perspectives against each other, forcing peo- ple to decide whether one presumably unethical act (taking one life or stealing) can be justified if it results in what most people would consider greater ethical ends (saving multiple lives or curing one’s dying spouse). While traditional dilemmas such as these are important, we explore a different type of conflict. The current research explores situations where ‘‘undesirable moral consequences’’ (Ditto & Liu, 2012, p. 55) are not required. We lift this restriction. That is, while with traditional dilemmas, something negative must occur (e.g., one or many must die; steal- ing is required or a loved one will die), in the current research eth- ical principles do not have to be violated to help a greater social good but, violating an ethical principle does allow one to do even more for the greater social good. In other words, the conflict that exists between two ethical principles is self-imposed rather than being imposed solely by the situation. People are freed up to abide by both ethical principles but since there is a conflict (i.e., abide by both principles or violate one principle to do even more good) they must decide which one takes priority and that will ultimately influence behaviors. Within such conflicts, the beneficiary may also differ such as violating a principle for personal gain alone or for the sake of an- other. A white lie may be told not for one’s own gain but to help another person financially (Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Gneezy, 2005) or principles of fairness may be violated by unequally distributing resources in order to help a person to whom empathy is felt (Bat- son, Batson, et al., 1995; Batson, Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995). Beyond an individual beneficiary, ethical principles may also be violated for the sake of more abstract notions such as fairness. Re- cent work, for instance, has found that by manipulating wealth- based inequity experimentally (e.g., wealthy graders/poor problem solvers), people will behave dishonestly in an attempt to do more to restore equality (Gino & Pierce, 2009, 2010). The participants did not have to violate any ethical principles. They could have remained honest and done a little to restore equality (i.e., moder- ate earnings for both poor and wealthy solvers) but instead they violated the principle of honesty in order to do even more toward restoring financial equality (i.e., dishonest to give more (less) money to poor (wealthy) problem solvers). Pertinent to the current work, situational factors may also influence the extent to which one deems there to be value in pro- tecting a greater organizational good. In a recent conceptual paper, Umphress and Bingham (2011) posit that identification with an organization and a desire to reciprocate an employers’ considerate treatment are situational factors that influence whether employees violate ethical principles to do more to help an abstract, greater organizational good. Violating these principles can take many forms from placing deceptive information into a bid in order to ob- tain a contract (Vardi & Wiener, 1996) to lying about one’s identity in order to gather competitive information. Flight attendants have even acknowledged lying to customers when they believed that it would help protect the airline’s image (Scott, 2003). This deceit was said to have taken place over concerns for the detriment that could occur to the greater organizational good if the company’s reputation was severely damaged (e.g., falling shareholder value, co-worker job loss), rather than concerns directly regarding per- sonal gain. Across these scenarios, a common theme emerges; specifically, uman Decision Processes 124 (2014) 110–121 111 when there is only one ethical principle at play, people must decide whether to abide by or violate the principle but when two ethical principles present a conflict, people negotiate between potential d H outcomes and ultimately which principle takes priority over the other. While some people may not violate ethical principles to help themselves alone, they may desire to do even more for the sake of a greater social good and will do so even though it means violating another ethical principle. An emphasis on such ethical ends is a focus of both this type of decision and of an abstract mindset (Liberman & Trope, 1998). Therefore, we turn to construal level theory for insight into when people will adhere to ethical princi- ples and when they will violate these principles for either self-gain or for the benefit of a greater social good. Construal level theory Construal level theory argues that people mentally represent events in either abstract, high-level forms or in concrete, low-level forms (Trope & Liberman, 2003). Focusing on abstract, global rep- resentations or overall gist of the situation, as opposed to concrete, specific representations, greatly influences judgments and deci- sions from categorization (Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002) and creativity (Förester, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004) to gambling (Sagristano, Trope, & Liberman, 2002) and politeness (Stephan, Liberman, & Trope, 2010) and has recently been extended into the realm of moral decisions. At first blush, it appears that construal level theory would pre- dict that with an abstract mindset, people would not violate any ethical principles, regardless of the outcome. For instance, past re- search that applied construal level theory to the context of ethical and moral scenarios found that when a situation is abstract as op- posed to concrete in nature, ethical principles are salient and more importance is placed on abiding by these ethical principles (Agers- tröm & Björklund, 2009; Eyal & Liberman, 2012; Eyal et al., 2008). This occurs because moral principles represent the more general elements of the situation and thus align more with an abstract rather than a concrete mindset (Eyal et al., 2008). Although the basis of these findings come from judgments of another person’s actions rather than from the choices that one personally makes when faced with actual decisions involving ethical principles, it suggests that activating an abstract mindset will lead people to abide by ethical decisions, regardless of the consequences. However, this prior research has only considered single ethical decisions such as whether another person should steal or not steal rather than situations that involve a conflict between two distinct ethical principles, such as those explored in the current research. When there is a conflict between adhering to ethical principles in order to do a little for a greater social good or violating ethical principles in order to do a lot for a greater social good, the greater social good benefits regardless, albeit to different degrees. To illus- trate, if honesty leads to a donation to an admirable charity but dis- honesty leads to an even larger donation, then adhering to the principle of honesty would still result in a donation but violating the principle of honesty would lead to an even larger donation. Past work suggests that when faced with one ethical decision where there is no conflict, an abstract mindset will lead one to ad- here to ethical principles and to remain honest (Agerström & Björklund, 2009; Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2008) but it is silent on what approach will be used when there is a conflict between eth- ical principles. We suggest that when there are competing ethical principles, one principle will take priority over the other; specifi- cally, the principle associated with helping the greater social good will take precedence over or be at a higher level than the principle of honesty. Emphasizing the ends or superordinate goals as opposed to the means or subordinate aspects of a situation are central compo- 112 J. Rixom, H. Mishra / Organizational Behavior an nents of abstract mindsets (Fujita, Henderson, Eng, Trope, & Liberman, 2006; Liberman & Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2003). The ‘‘why’’ of the situation is more relevant when an ab- stract rather than a concrete mindset is activated. Thus, when the outcome of a decision has the potential to benefit a greater so- cial good, these ends are likely to be more salient with an abstract rather than a concrete mindset. In alignment, taking a distant, ab- stract perspective activates the idealistic self, which emphasizes choices that conform to ethical principles and values rather than to pragmatic concerns (Kivetz & Tyler, 2007). When more than one ethical principle is involved, the principles that do the most to support the idealistic self may take precedence. It has been suggested thatwhenethical principles are viewedas a hierarchy, the notion of helping a greater or bigger purpose may se- cure a higher, more abstract place in the hierarchy relative to other principles (Broeders et al., 2011). For instance, framingmoral dilem- mas in the context of ‘‘saves lives’’ was found to align more with an abstract mindset so that when the event is said to occur in the dis- tant, abstract future, people report a greater likelihood of letting one person die in order to save many lives (Broeders et al., 2011). Accordingly, the opportunity to provide more support to a greater social good may align more closely with an abstract mindset and provide the justification necessary to violate another ethical princi- ple. That is, the greater social good serves as a superordinate, focal concern that overshadows the steps required to achieve those ends. We anticipate that when an abstract mindset is activated, peo- ple will not violate ethical principles for personal gain alone but will violate ethical principles when doing so enables them to do even more for a greater social good. When only the self will benefit, there is just one ethical principle at stake, for instance, to lie or not to lie. There is no conflict and thus no hierarchy of ethical deci- sions. The ‘‘why’’ of the situation—to help oneself—may appear insufficient to justify violating the only ethical decision at stake, so activating an abstract mindset will lead people to abide by eth- ical principles. This aligns with the predictions of earlier work involving judgments of ethical scenarios through the lens of construal level theory. On the other hand, when there is a conflict such that violating an ethical principle allows one to do more for a greater social good, people must decide whether to adhere to or violate that principle. With an abstract mindset, people focus on the superordinate ‘‘why’’ of the situation (Fujita, Henderson, et al., 2006; Liberman & Trope, 1998) which may overshadow other considerations. In the context of ethical decisions, this superordinate element—to do even more for a greater social good—may overshadow or justify the decision to violate an ethical principle. That is, while both charity and honesty are ethical principles, charity involves going one-step further by requiring one to make sacrifices for others. The more cherished the object one gives up, the more selfless the act becomes. In an abstract mindset, when honesty is pitted against charity, honesty becomes the sacrifice that one can make to help others. Here one sacrifices one’s own valued ethical principle of honesty to help a greater social good. In sum, following only an honest approach in an abstract mindset may not appear as selfless or justifiable as being dishonest to help a greater social good. Accordingly, we anticipate that when ethical principles conflict in this manner, activating an abstract mindset will lead to violating ethical principles specifically for the benefit of the greater social good with less regard for whether the decision simultaneously harms, helps, or has no impact on one’s own personal outcome because the emphasis is focused outwardly on benefiting a greater good rather than inwardly on oneself. To this point, our focus has been on the anticipated change in behaviors when an abstract mindset is activated, but what about a concrete mindset? When a concrete mindset is activated, we do not expect much fluctuation in behaviors as a function of the uman Decision Processes 124 (2014) 110–121 impact on a greater social good. Instead, we anticipate that an abstract mindset and a concrete mindset will lead to different pro- cesses. In other words, while we anticipate that the beneficiary While we emphasize situations involving a conflict between the principles of honesty and doing more to help a greater social good, J. Rixom, H. Mishra / Organizational Behavior and H may moderate decisions about violating ethical principles when an abstract mindset is activated, we do not anticipate much variation when a concrete mindset is activated. With a concrete mindset, less emphasis is placed on ethical principles (Agerström & Björklund, 2009; Eyal & Liberman, 2012; Eyal et al., 2008) so the greater social good is unlikely to hold as much weight as it would with an abstract mindset. This limited fo- cus on ethical implications is supported by findings that people using a near, concrete view are more likely to construe events in terms that are ‘‘devoid of moral implications’’ (Eyal & Liberman, 2012, p. 189). Instead, the emphasis is placed on subordinate or proximate concerns (Fujita, Henderson, et al., 2006; Liberman & Trope, 1998). So while notions of supporting a greater good are more closely aligned with an abstract mindset (Eyal et al., 2008), financial self-interest is more aligned with a concrete mindset (Hunt, Kim, Borgida, & Chaiken, 2010; Kivetz & Tyler, 2007) and thus may stand out more as a concern of interest. With the impact of one’s actions on a greater social good registering less importance with a concrete relative to an abstract mindset, behaviors in the decision contexts that we explore are more likely to remain stea- dily in favor of self-interest when a concrete mindset is activated. While most people would like to view themselves as honest (Toure-Tillery & Fishbach, 2012), it is found that people generally engage in some level of dishonesty when given the opportunity (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008; Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011). For instance, people believe the actions taken at the begin- ning and end of a sequence are more indicative of personal stan- dards and so they are more likely to adhere to ethical principles at the beginning and end of a sequence but to violate those same ethical principles in the middle of the sequence (Toure-Tillery & Fishbach, 2012). This allows them to walk away from the situation feeling positive about their ethical self-image while still experienc- ing the personal-benefits that came from violating ethical princi- ples (e.g., cheating to save time). While the current research does not involve decision sequences, with a concrete mindset, people are also more lenient toward violators of ethical principles (Eyal et al., 2008), so we anticipate that dishonesty will occur more reg- ularly when a concrete mindset is activated. We further suggest that since self-interest is a more subordinate and proximate con- cern than helping a greater social good, when a concrete mindset is activated, people will engage in behaviors with consequences that are most likely to benefit the self. To summarize, we anticipate that activating an abstract relative to a concrete mindset will lead to different decisions when faced with single or multiple ethical principles. We propose that when people face a decision involving a single ethical principle and an abstract mindset is activated, they will not violate the ethical prin- ciple for personal gain alone. However, we do not anticipate that an abstract mindset will always lead to a strict adherence to ethical principles. Instead, when there is a conflict between two ethical principles, activating an abstract mindset will lead people to prior- itize one principle over the other. More specifically, they will focus on the greater social ends inferred from the situation and will pri- oritize doing even more to help the greater social good over the principle of honesty. Violating the ethical principle of honesty will occur in the direction that provides the most support for the great- er social good, whether this harms, helps, or has no impact on the person’s own outcomes. When a concrete mindset is activated, however, we anticipate that people will violate the ethical princi- ple of honesty to roughly the same extent in the direction that pro- vides the most personal gain. In essence, with a concrete mindset, people will emphasize outcomes that concern personal gain rather than focusing heavily on the impact on a greater social good. We assess these propositions across three studies. we also include conditions in which dishonesty only benefits one- self. These conditions present a single ethical decision (to be hon- est or dishonest) when only the self will benefit from dishonesty. This serves two purposes. First, it allows us to see whether actual behaviors are consistent with the patterns associated with past re- search. Second, it enables us to assess whether introducing a great- er social good into the mix does lead to behavior changes based on the beneficiary in the context of construal level. We use an established cheating paradigm (Mazar et al., 2008) to assess whether people abide by the principle of honesty when dis- honesty affects one’s own financial gain, a greater social good through a monetary donation, or both. Across the studies, the task design allows the participants to be honest and still support the greater social good such as supporting an admirable charity or withholding funds from an unadmirable charity. However, partici- pants also have the opportunity to be dishonest, which can lead to a larger benefit for the greater good either through donating even more to the admired charity (Study 1 and Study 2a) or even less to the unadmired charity (Study 2a). Payments to the participants or charities were based on actual or stated performance (depending on condition) on a timed task. Providing actual monetary incentives increased the relevance of the ethical decisions in a non-hypothetical context. The Make-A- Wish Foundation received all monetary donations made through- out the studies. Study 1 The primary aim of Study 1 is to assess the impact of activating either an abstract or a concrete mindset on ethical decision-mak- ing when the beneficiary is oneself relative to an admired charity serving a greater good. We assess this in the context of honesty using a cheating paradigm (Mazar et al., 2008). In all conditions, the monetary payment to participants was dependent on their ac- tual or stated performance on a timed puzzle task. Dishonesty was inferred if the stated performance of a condition in which dishon- esty was possible was significantly higher or lower than the actual performance of the control conditions in which dishonesty was not possible (Mazar et al., 2008; Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009). Using this context, participants decide whether to be honest or dishonest when the decision influences their own earnings or when the decision influences the amount donated to the Current studies The intent of our studies is to assess the notion that an abstract relative to a concrete mindset differentially influences behaviors for ethical decisions that affect a greater social good or oneself. In other words, we evaluate the role of construal level theory in accounting for why people who have an opportunity to support a greater social good without violating any ethical principles may instead decide to violate an ethical principle in order to do even more for the same social good. We suggest that a focus on the superordinate or ultimate ends associated with the greater social good—a feature of an abstract mindset—will take priority over the principle of honesty. Therefore, across studies, we activate either an abstract or a concrete mindset using established primes (Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope, 2004; Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-Sagi, 2006) and we assess actual behaviors involving real money in Study 1 and Study 2a. uman Decision Processes 124 (2014) 110–121 113 Make-A-Wish Foundation, an admirable charity that supports a greater social good (helping terminally ill children), depending on condition. We anticipate that when faced with the single ethical sheet aside. Then, they proceeded to an ostensibly different task in which they completed an abstract or concrete mindset prime. To activate either an abstract, high-level or a concrete, low-level mindset, participants completed a construal level prime (Fujita, Trope, et al., 2006).3 After the mindset prime, participants read pay- ment instructions, which varied by condition. The instructions in the control conditions asked participants to give the matrix sheet to the researcher. Dishonest behavior was not possible because the re- searcher directly graded the matrix sheet. Earnings were handed to the participant (self-benefit) or earnings were placed in an envelope (charity-benefit) for the Make-A-Wish Foundation in front of the d Human Decision Processes 124 (2014) 110–121 principle of whether to be honest or dishonest for personal gain alone, participants primed with an abstract mindset will abide by the principle of honesty. They will not be dishonest for personal gain alone. However, when there is a conflict between the principle of honesty and the desire to do even more to support a greater so- cial good, we propose that when an abstract mindset is activated, the greater social good will be prioritized over the desire to remain honest. In other words, while we anticipate that when an abstract mindset is primed, participants will not be dishonest for personal gain alone, we do anticipate that they will be dishonest when doing so enables them to provide additional support for a greater social good, in this case, the Make-A-Wish Foundation. When a concrete mindset is primed, however, we do not anticipate a switch in behaviors based on the beneficiary and instead anticipate that concerns over personal gain will be prioritized, leading to roughly the same level of dishonesty across beneficiaries. Method Participants and design Two hundred ninety-one undergraduate students (mean age 23.92 years, 36.9% female) participated in the study for partial course credit. In Study 1, participants learned at the beginning of the study that they would earn money either for themselves or for a charity, depending on condition. Therefore, it was feasible that in the control conditions in which dishonesty was not possi- ble, actual performance could still vary based on the beneficiary (i.e., extend more/less effort for the charity relative to the self). While we did not predict a priori (nor did we find) any differences in actual performance among the control conditions, we accounted for this possibility by including control conditions that earned either for themselves or for the admirable charity. Accordingly, participants were randomly assigned to one of eight between- participants conditions within a 2 (CLT prime: abstract vs. con- crete) � 2 (beneficiary: self vs. charity) � 2 (dishonesty: not possi- ble (control) vs. possible) design. Earnings were actual money paid directly to the participant (self-benefit conditions) or to the charity (charity-benefit conditions). Participants in the control conditions were unable to dishonestly over- or under-report performance. The dependent variable was the actual (control conditions) or sta- ted (dishonesty possible conditions) number of correctly solved puzzles on a timed task. Dishonesty was inferred when the average performance in a condition in which dishonesty was possible was significantly higher or lower than the control. Procedure Upon arrival, participants sat at desks with a computer and read that they would complete a series of unrelated paper- and com- puter-based tasks. First, participants read that they would com- plete a timed puzzle task. Each solved puzzle was worth 25 cents, up to $5 total. In the self-benefit conditions, participants read that they would earn money for themselves. In the charity- benefit conditions, participants read that they would earn money for the Make-A-Wish Foundation. Next, participants took out a clipboard with a sheet of paper that had 20 matrices, each with 12 three-digit numbers (Mazar et al., 2008). They had 5 min to find the two numbers on each ma- trix that added up to 10. When the 5 min were over, participants in the conditions where dishonesty was possible saw the correct an- swers on the computer and graded their own performance. The participants in the control conditions did not grade their own per- 114 J. Rixom, H. Mishra / Organizational Behavior an formance and did not have an opportunity to be dishonest. All par- ticipants then read that payment would occur at the end of the study and were instructed to set the clipboard with the matrix participants. Dishonesty was possible in the other conditions because partic- ipants graded themselves, destroyed the evidence, and payment was for the number of matrices that they reported solving. Partic- ipants in the self-benefit (charity-benefit) conditions read a remin- der that they (the Make-A-Wish Foundation) would earn a quarter for each correctly solved matrix for a maximum of $5. After reading the payment instructions, participants went behind a partition, out of the researcher’s view. While behind the partition, they counted the number of correctly solved matrices, tore up the matrix sheet, threw the pieces into a recycling bin, and indicated the number of solved puzzles and the payment amount on a form. Participants then handed the payment form to the researcher. In the self-bene- fit conditions, the researcher handed the amount indicated on the payment form to the participant. In the charity-benefit conditions, the researcher assured the participants of the donation and placed the earnings in an envelope. The donation to the Make-A-Wish Foundation occurred after the data collection period. Finally, participants returned to the computer to answer demo- graphic questions. In the charity-benefit conditions, participants also indicated the extent to which they believed that the donation would be made to the Make-A-Wish Foundation on a scale from 1 (No, definitely will not be made) to 7 (Yes, definitely will be made). Results and discussion Of the original 291 participants, four participants were ex- cluded from the analyses due to technical problems. Data from the remaining 287 participants are included in the following analyses. Manipulation checks Two independent judges evaluated the level of construal for each participant based on their responses in the priming task (Fujita, Trope, et al., 2006).4 Disagreements were resolved by discus- sion (initial agreement was 95.5%). Higher total scores indicate a higher-level, more abstract mindset. The analysis revealed that the prime successfully manipulated construal level. Participants who generated category labels had significantly more abstract responses 3 In this priming task, a series of 40 words were presented two at a time to participants on the computer. In the abstract prime condition, participants generated a category label for each provided word. They were instructed to ask themselves the question, ‘‘[Provided word] is an example of what?’’ and to come up with the most general category to which each word belonged. For instance, for the provided word, ‘‘dog,’’ participants might type, ‘‘animal’’ as the category label. Participants in the concrete prime condition came up with a word that was an example of the provided word. This was done for the same series of 40 words by answering the question, ‘‘An example of [provided word] is what?’’ They were instructed to generate the most specific example possible. For instance, for the provided word, ‘‘dog,’’ participants might type, ‘‘poodle’’ as the example. 4 When the provided word was an example of the participant’s response (e.g., participant indicated ‘‘animal’’ when the provided word was ‘‘dog’’), the response was coded as 1. When the participant’s response was an example of the provided word (e.g., participant indicated ‘‘poodle’’ when the provided word was ‘‘dog’’), the response was coded as �1. Responses not fitting either criterion were coded 0. (M = 31.12) than those who generated exemplars (M = �30.36), t(285) = 34.88, p < .001. Among participants earning for the charity, there were no dif- ferences between conditions in terms of the belief that the money would be donated to the Make-A-Wish Foundation, F(3,141) = .071, p = .975, and the average believability was signifi- cantly above the scale mid-point (M = 6.09), t(144) = 18.25, p < .001. To maintain anonymity, participants’ payment sheets and their answers on the computer were not associated with one another so we are unable to assess the number of correct answers (actual or stated) as a function of donation believability. Number of matrices solved (honesty) To assess whether there were any unintended differences among the control conditions, we first analyzed the total number of solved matrices using a 2 (CLT prime: abstract vs. concrete) � 2 (beneficiary: self vs. charity) � 2 (dishonesty: not possible (con- trol) vs. possible) ANOVA. The analysis revealed a significant three-way interaction F(1,279) = 3.711, p = .055, g2p = .013. We did not anticipate differences within the control conditions and the 4 r o f J. Rixom, H. Mishra / Organizational Behavior and H 4.08a 4.15a 6.00 4.31 5.25 5.92 0 1 2 3 Concrete Abstract N um be Fig. 1. Influence of construal level on number of matrices solved (control) or reported to have been solved correctly in Study 1 as a function of construal level mindset (abstract or concrete) and payment condition (control, self-benefit, charity-benefit). aControl conditions were collapsed across beneficiary. There were no significant differences in the concrete mindset condition between the number of lack of a significant interaction between dishonesty and benefi- ciary (p = .637) and between dishonesty and CLT prime (p = .411) suggested that this was the case. To examine directly whether there were differences in actual performance between the four control conditions, we conducted a 2 (CLT prime: abstract vs. con- crete) � 2 (beneficiary: self vs. charity) ANOVA. As anticipated, within the control conditions, there were no significant differences based on CLT prime or beneficiary. Since our primary interest is the impact of construal level on decisions involving ethical principles and there are no significant differences within the control condi- tions, we collapse across beneficiary, combining those who com- pleted the abstract prime into one control group and those who completed the concrete prime into another control group. Next, we turned to the primary analysis to assess the impact of construal level on honesty when the self or the charity would ben- efit by conducting a 2 (CLT prime: abstract vs. concrete) � 3 (deception: not possible (control) vs. possible for self-benefit vs. possible for charity-benefit) ANOVA. The analysis revealed a signif- icant interaction, F(2,281) = 3.12, p = .046, g2p = .022 and a signifi- cant main effect of deception condition, F(2,281) = 6.67, p = .001, 5 6 7 8 M at ric es Error Bars: +- 2 SE Control Self-Benefit Charity-Benefit matrices actually solved when the self (M = 3.94) or the charity (M = 4.22) benefited or in the abstract mindset condition when the self (M = 4.19) or the charity (M = 4.11) benefited. g2p = .045 (see Fig. 1). Planned contrasts provided additional insight. First, consistent with our previous analysis, when dishonesty was not possible (control), there were no significant differences in the number of correctly solved matrices based on construal level (MAbsControl = 4.15 vs. MConControl = 4.08), F(1,281) = .04, p = .834. Next, we assessed our earlier predictions when dishonesty was possible. Dishonesty was inferred when the average claimed per- formance of a given condition was significantly higher or lower than the respective control. In alignment with the predictions of previous literature, we found that with an abstract mindset, there were no significant differences in the number of matrices reported solved between the control condition (M = 4.15) and the condition in which dishonesty was possible for personal gain (M = 4.31), F(1,281) = .12, p = .734, suggesting that participants were honest in their reporting. However, with a concrete mindset, the average number of matrices reported solved was significantly higher (M = 6.00) compared to the control condition (M = 4.08), F(1,281) = 6.12, p = .018, g2p = .056 suggesting that participants overreported performance. Consistent with our expectations, when it was possible to be dishonest in order to influence the amount do- nated to an admirable charity, participants primed with an abstract mindset reported solving significantly more matrices (M = 5.92) than those in the control condition (M = 4.15), F(1,281) = 5.76, p = .021, g2p = .051. When a concrete mindset was activated, the number of matrices reported solved did not significantly differ based on the beneficiary (MConSelf = 6.00 vs. MConCharity = 5.25), F(1,281) = .58, p = .449. Finally, we explored the proportion of participants within each condition who reported solving (actually solved for control condi- tions) a low number (0–2), average number (3–5), high number (6– 10), or very high number (11–20) of matrices (see Table 1). We found that when an abstract mindset was activated, only 25.0% of participants reported solving six or more matrices when dishon- esty would lead to personal gain but that 41.6% reported solving six or more matrices when dishonesty would provide a larger donation to the Make-A-Wish Foundation, with most of this high reporting falling into the six to ten matrices range. These findings support prior research suggesting that when people are dishonest, they tend to be somewhat rather than completely dishonest (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008; Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011). Together, these findings are consistent with the notion that with an abstract mindset, a focus on supporting a greater social good is prioritized over the desire to remain honest. Specifically, we find that when an abstract mindset is primed, people are dis- honest to provide even more money to a charity that supports a greater social good, in this case, helping terminally ill children, but not to help themselves alone. Based on the control condition, honest reporting by those primed with an abstract mindset would lead to an average donation of $1.04 but when there was a conflict between remaining honest and doing even more for the greater social good, the greater good was prioritized and dishonest over- reporting led the average donation to increase to $1.48. Consistent with propositions from prior research, we also find that when dishonesty would lead to personal financial gain, activating an abstract (concrete) mindset resulted in honesty (dishonesty). Additionally, when activating a concrete mindset, we did not see significant changes in the level of dishonesty based on the benefi- ciary, which aligns with a connection between a concrete mindset and self-interest rather than social concerns. Study 2 uman Decision Processes 124 (2014) 110–121 115 In Study 2a, we replicate and extend the findings from Study 1 and in Study 2b, we explore the ends on which people with an abstract or a concrete mindset focus. epo nefi ol = 36 coll d H Study 2a Study 2a has two primary objectives. The first objective is to investigate decisions when payments to both the participant and charity are affected concurrently by honest or dishonest behaviors. This enables us to assess our proposition that activating an abstract mindset will lead to dishonest behaviors for the sake of the greater social good and that this will hold even when doing so simulta- neously leads to lower or higher personal gain. This design also al- lows us to assess the proposition that with a concrete mindset, the emphasis is placed on personal gain, leading to dishonesty primar- ily to financially benefit oneself. In Study 1, participants in the charity-benefit conditions worked directly on behalf of the charity. All of their actual or stated earnings went to the charity so the decision to be honest or dishon- est had no impact on the participant’s personal finances. In Study 2a, we introduce a trade-off such that participants receive money for each solved puzzle and a charity receives money for each unsolved puzzle. Thus, reporting a larger (smaller) number of solved puzzles results in more (less) money for the participant and simultaneously less (more) money being donated to the char- ity. Participants who dishonestly underreport performance will earn less while simultaneously making a larger donation and those who dishonestly overreport performance will earn more while simultaneously making a smaller donation. Table 1 Influence of construal level on the proportion of participants who solved (control) or r construal level mindset (abstract or concrete) and payment condition (control, self-be Conditions Concrete Control Abstract Contr Number of solved matrices Self- benefit (n = 35) Charity- benefit (n = 36) Concrete Control collapseda (n = 71) Self-benefit (n 0–2 Matrices 31.4% 13.9% 22.5% 11.1% 3–5 Matrices 42.9% 61.1% 52.1% 72.2% 6–10 Matrices 25.7% 25.0% 25.4% 16.7% 11–20 Matrices 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% Mean matrices solved 3.94 4.22 4.08 4.19 a In the control conditions, dishonesty was not possible. Control conditions were 116 J. Rixom, H. Mishra / Organizational Behavior an The second objective is to evaluate the impact of construal level on honesty when dishonesty affects the donation amount for a charity that serves an admirable cause (good charity) or a contemptible cause (bad charity). The ‘‘good’’ charity was the Make-A-Wish Foundation and the ‘‘bad’’ charity was the fictitious Resource Use Fund, which was said to pay legal expenses for those charged with environmental damage. Securing larger donations for an admirable charity would serve the greater social good. Con- versely, in the bad charity condition, ensuring smaller donations for the charity would serve the greater social good. In both cases, dishonesty—albeit in different directions—further facilitates a great- er social good. The design of Study 2a enables us to assess the proposed switch when an abstract mindset is activated from adhering to the princi- ple of honesty when it is the only principle of concern to a focus on a greater social good when there is a conflict between helping the greater good and remaining honest. Strict adherence to ethical principles would lead to honesty, regardless of the impact on a greater social good. When, however, a greater social good is prior- itized over honesty, we would find a pattern of underreporting per- formance in order to provide even more support for the good, admirable charity and overreporting performance in order to give less support to the bad, unadmirable charity that threatens the greater social good. Consistent with the findings from Study 1, we anticipate that when only the self will benefit from dishonesty, participants primed with an abstract mindset will remain honest, that is, the average number of correctly solved puzzles will not significantly differ from that of the control. When there is a conflict between honesty and providing more support for a greater social good, however, we anticipate that when an abstract mindset is activated the greater social good will be given priority over honesty. In other words, when an abstract mindset is activated, we anticipate that participants will underreport (overreport) performance, leading to more money being given to (withheld from) the good (bad) charity which simultaneously leads to smaller (larger) personal earnings relative to the control. When a concrete mindset is acti- vated, we anticipate that the emphasis will be placed on personal gain and that on average participants will overreport performance for personal gain whenever dishonesty is possible, whether the dis- honesty affects only oneself, a good charity, or a bad charity. Method Participants and design Two hundred seventy undergraduate students (mean age rted to have solved correctly a certain number of matrices in Study 1 as a function of t, charity-benefit). ) Charity- benefit (n = 37) Abstract control collapseda (n = 73) Concrete self-benefit (n = 35) Abstract self-benefit (n = 36) Concrete charity- benefit (n = 36) Abstract charity- benefit (n = 36) 13.5% 12.3% 22.8% 25.0% 30.6% 16.7% 67.6% 69.9% 28.6% 50.0% 22.2% 41.7% 18.9% 17.8% 40.0% 25.0% 38.9% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 8.6% 0.0% 8.3% 8.3% 4.11 4.15 6.00 4.31 5.25 5.92 apsed across beneficiary. uman Decision Processes 124 (2014) 110–121 23.91 years, 33.7% female) took part in the study for partial course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to either an abstract or a concrete prime condition and to one of four payment conditions: control, self-benefit only, self-benefit with remaining donated to the good charity, or self-benefit with remaining donated to the bad charity. Study 2a used the same matrix task as in Study 1 but the pay- ment instructions, timing of information about the charity, and construal level prime differed. As in the previous study, the depen- dent variable was the actual (control conditions) or reported (all other conditions) number of correct answers and dishonesty was inferred when the average performance of a given condition was significantly higher or lower than the control. Procedure Participants sat at individual desks and read on the computer that they would be completing a few unrelated paper- and com- puter-based tasks. The instructions informed participants that they would complete a timed puzzle task. They would earn 25 cents for each solved puzzle, up to $5 total. In each condition, the partici- pants received these earnings. Each participant then had 5 min to complete the same matrix task described in the Study 1 procedure section. Following the ma- trix task, participants in the conditions in which dishonesty was possible—but not in the control—saw the correct answers on the computer and graded their own performance. All participants read that payment would take place at the end of the study and were asked to set aside the matrix sheet. Next, participants started a seemingly different task in which they completed an established abstract or concrete mindset prime. The abstract, high-level or concrete, low-level construal prime definitely will not be made) to 7 (Yes, definitely will be made). Par- ticipants in the bad charity condition also indicated, to the best of their knowledge, whether the Resource Use Fund was a real non- icantly higher than the number solved in the control condition J. Rixom, H. Mishra / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 124 (2014) 110–121 117 based on Freitas et al. (2004) was completed on the computer.5 Fol- lowing the priming manipulation, participants read the payment instructions, which varied by condition. In the control condition, dis- honesty was not possible because participants handed the matrix sheet to the researcher who then graded the matrices and paid the participants based on their actual performance. In the other conditions, dishonesty was possible. Participants graded themselves, destroyed the evidence, and were paid for the number of matrices they reported solving. The details of the payment, however, differed from those used in the previous study. In the self-benefit-only conditions, there was a reminder telling participants that they would earn a quarter for each correct answer for a maximum of $5. No mention was made of what would happen to the unearned money. Participants then went behind a partition outside of the researcher’s view, counted the number of correctly solved puzzles, tore up the matrix sheet, threw the pieces into the recycling bin, and wrote both the number correct and the amount to be paid on a payment form. They then handed the pay- ment form to the researcher who paid them the amount on the form. In the donation conditions, participants read that $5 had been set aside. They would still earn a quarter for each correct answer but the unearned portion of the $5 would be donated to charity. This was the first time that the charity was mentioned to partici- pants. While not explicitly stated, claiming few (many) correctly solved puzzles would result in smaller (larger) personal earnings and simultaneously in larger (smaller) donations. The charities were the Make-A-Wish Foundation (good charity) or the Resource Use Fund (bad charity). Following the instructions, participants went behind the partition, counted the number of solved puzzles, destroyed and disposed of the matrix sheet, and filled out the pay- ment form. On the payment form, they indicated the number of solved puzzles, the amount they were to be paid, and the amount to be donated, which summed up to $5. Participants then gave the payment form to the researcher who paid them the indicated amount and placed the donation in an envelope labeled with the charity’s name. All donations were given to the Make-A-Wish Foundation after the data collection period. Participants then went back to the computer to answer demo- graphic questions. The participants in the charity conditions also indicated the extent to which they believed that the donation would be made to the Make-A-Wish Foundation or the Resource Use Fund, depending on condition, using a scale from 1 (No, 5 To activate an abstract mindset, participants read a brief passage about ‘‘why’’ somebody would participate in a research study. Then they saw the question, ‘‘Why do I maintain good physical health?’’ on the top of the next screen. At the bottom of the screen was the statement, ‘‘Improve and maintain physical health.’’ Connecting the question at the top and the statement at the bottom were four empty boxes with upward-pointing arrows labeled, ‘‘Why?’’ Participants filled in the bottom box and worked up to the top box. In the concrete mindset conditions, participants briefly read about ‘‘how’’ somebody would participate in a research study. On the next screen they saw the statement, ‘‘Improve and maintain physical health,’’ at the top and the question, ‘‘How do I maintain good physical health?’’ at the bottom. Connecting the statement at the top and the question at the bottom were four empty boxes with downward-pointing arrows labeled, ‘‘How?’’ Participants filled in the top box and worked down to the bottom box. (M = 4.06), F(1,262) = 11.36, p = .001, g2p = .147, suggesting that overreporting occurred in the self-benefit-only condition. Consis- tent with Study 1 and previous research, participants with an 6 Responses superordinate to the preceding ones were coded 1 and subordinate responses were coded �1. Responses not fitting either criterion were coded 0. 7 To maintain anonymity, there were no identification codes linking participants’ profit organization (No or Yes). Following the data collection peri- od, all participants were debriefed and assured that all donations were provided to the Make-A-Wish Foundation. Results and discussion Manipulation checks Two independent judges coded the ‘‘why’’ and ‘‘how’’ responses (Fujita, Trope, et al., 2006).6 Disagreements were resolved by discus- sion (initial agreement was 96%). The analysis revealed that the prime successfully manipulated construal level. Participants who re- sponded to ‘‘why’’ prompts generated statements that reflected an abstract mindset (M = 3.63) compared to those who responded to the ‘‘how’’ prompts (M = �3.53), t(268) = �79.89, p < .001. Belief in the donation was high and significantly above the scale mid-point in both the good, Make-A-Wish Foundation (M = 6.47), t(72) = 18.83, p < .001, and the bad, Resource Use Fund (M = 6.15), t(59) = 11.79, p < .001 conditions. The extent to which participants believed that the donation would be made did not significantly dif- fer based on whether the charity involved was good (M = 6.47) or bad (M = 6.15), t(131) = 1.44, p = .153. Results also show that 91.7% of the participants in the bad charity condition indicated that to the best of their knowledge, the Resource Use Fund was a real nonprofit organization. This did not significantly differ for the ab- stract (M = 90.0%) relative to the concrete (M = 93.3%), v2(1) = .218, p = .640, mindset conditions.7 Together, these findings lend support that the charity manipulations were successful across conditions. Number of matrices solved (honesty) An ANOVA revealed a significant interaction, F(3,262) = 12.72, p < .001, g2p = .127, and significant main effects of both construal le- vel, F(1,262) = 8.01, p = .005, g2p = .03, and payment condition, F(3,262) = 35.16, p < .001, g2p = .29, (see Fig. 2). We then assessed our planned contrasts to gain further insight based on our expecta- tions. When dishonesty was not possible (control), the number of correctly solved puzzles did not vary based on construal level (Mconcrete = 4.06 vs. Mabstract = 4.03), F(1,262) = .003, p = .953. Next, we assessed the extent and direction of dishonest behavior when deception was possible. Dishonesty was inferred when the average stated performance of a given condition was significantly lower (underreporting) or higher (overreporting) than the respective control. When faced with the decision of whether to be honest or dishonest for personal gain alone, when an abstract mindset was activated, there was no significant difference between the number of matrices reported solved (M = 4.12) and the control condition (M = 4.03), F(1,262) = .03, p = .87, suggesting that participants hon- estly reported performance in the self-benefit-only condition. However, when a concrete mindset was primed, the number of correctly solved matrices that was reported (M = 6.42) was signif- payment forms to their computer-based answers; therefore, we can assess these follow-up questions on an aggregate level by condition, but we cannot explore how these answers correspond to actual behaviors on an individual level. number of matrices (see Table 2). We found that when an abstract mindset was activated, 58.4% of participants reported solving a low number of matrices when unearned money was donated to the Make-A-Wish Foundation while 80.0% reported solving six or more matrices when unearned money was said to be donated to the Re- source Use Fund. When a concrete mindset was activated, how- ever, the proportion of participants who reported solving six or more matrices was relatively high whether the decision influenced the amount donated to the Make-A-Wish Foundation (59.4%) or the Resource Use Fund (66.7%). That is, consistent with the findings from Study 1, many participants appear to have been slightly dis- honest when given the opportunity to do so, although the direction varied based on whether an abstract or a concrete mindset was4.06 4.03 6.42 4.12 6.95 8.47 10.73 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 N um be r o f M at ric es Error Bars: +- 2 SE Control Self Only Self and Good Charity Self and Bad Charity 118 J. Rixom, H. Mishra / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 124 (2014) 110–121 abstract (concrete) mindset were honest (dishonest) when only they themselves would gain from dishonesty. In alignment with our earlier findings, when an abstract mind- set was activated, participants were dishonest to provide addi- tional support for the greater social good. When the charity was good, participants underreported the number of correctly solved matrices (M = 2.36) and hurt themselves financially which ensured larger donations relative to the control (M = 4.03), F(1,262) = 13.09, p = .001, g2p = .173. Conversely, for the bad charity, participants in the abstract mindset condition overreported the number of correct matrices (M = 10.73) compared to the control (M = 4.03) and gained financially while simultaneously reducing donations to a charity that threatened the environment, F(1,262) = 40.96, p < .001, g2p = .394. With the activation of a concrete mindset, self-gain occurred across conditions in which dishonesty was possible. Participants reported solving a significantly higher number of matrices and gained financially compared to the control condition (M = 4.06) when the charity was good (M = 6.95), F(1,262) = 18.58, p < .001, g2p = .210, and when it was bad (M = 8.47), F(1,262) = 21.61, p < .001, g2p = .255, suggesting that participants were dishonest for personal gain. Together, these findings support our argument 2.36 0 Concrete Abstract Fig. 2. Influence of construal level on number of matrices solved (control) or reported to have been solved correctly in Study 2a as a function of construal level mindset (abstract or concrete) and payment condition (control, self-benefit only, self-benefit with donation to good charity, self-benefit with donation to bad charity). that activating an abstract mindset results in dishonesty in the direction that does the most to support the greater good but when activating a concrete mindset, dishonesty consistently occurs in the direction that leads to the largest personal financial gain. Finally, we assessed the proportion of participants in each con- dition who reported solving (actually solved for control conditions) a low (0–2), average (3–5), high (6–10), or very high (11–20) Table 2 Influence of construal level on the proportion of participants who solved (control) or repor construal level mindset (abstract or concrete) and payment condition (control, self-benefi charity). Condition Number of solved matrices Concrete controla (n = 35) Abstract controla (n = 35) Concrete self only (n = 33) Abstrac Self onl (n = 34) 0–2 Matrices 20.0% 22.9% 9.1% 23.5% 3–5 Matrices 62.9% 60.0% 36.4% 55.9% 6–10 Matrices 17.1% 17.1% 42.4% 20.6% 11–20 Matrices 0.0% 0.0% 12.1% 0.0% Mean matrices solved 4.06 4.03 6.42 4.12 a In the control conditions, dishonesty was not possible. activated. Consistent with and extending the results from Study 1, the findings from Study 2a demonstrate that when primed with an ab- stract mindset, people generally abide by the principle of honesty when only they would benefit from dishonesty but they are more inclined to be dishonest when doing so further supports a greater social good. Specifically, we find that those who have an abstract mindset activated dishonestly underreport performance, which enables them to lend additional support to sick children even though it simultaneously lowers their personal earnings. They will also dishonestly overreport performance, which withholds dona- tions from a bad charity that threatens the environment while simultaneously increasing their own earnings. In other words, when faced with decisions involving principles that are intrinsi- cally linked such that violating one principle facilitates additional support for another principle, one principle is prioritized over the other. In our study, we find support for the notion that when an ab- stract mindset is activated, people prioritize the desire to provide support for the greater social good inferred from the situation over the desire to remain honest and this occurs whether it simulta- neously results in higher or lower personal earnings. When a concrete mindset was primed, however, the direction and degree of dishonesty did not vary substantially by condition. Instead, when dishonesty was possible, participants primed with a concrete mindset consistently overreported performance and in- creased personal earnings even when it simultaneously lowered donations to an admired or unadmired charity. Together, these findings provide support for our proposition that a concrete mind- set will lead to a focus on subordinate, personal gain, while an abstract mindset will lead one to prioritize honesty when only one- self would benefit from dishonesty but to prioritize the superordi- nate, greater social good over honesty when dishonesty benefits this higher-level good. In Study 2b, we further assess the different decision-making processes between those who have an abstract or a concrete mind- set activated when the situation involves a potentially harmful charity. While there was a potential to use thought protocols ted to have solved correctly a certain number of matrices in Study 2a as a function of t only, self-benefit with donation to good charity, self-benefit with donation to bad t y Concrete good charity (n = 37) Abstract good charity (n = 36) Concrete bad charity (n = 30) Abstract bad charity (n = 30) 0.0% 58.4% 3.3% 0.0% 40.6% 33.3% 30.0% 20.0% 45.9% 8.3% 43.4% 33.3% 13.5% 0.0% 23.3% 46.7% 6.95 2.36 8.47 10.73 This allows us to examine how people who have an abstract or stract as opposed to a concrete mindset, people will suggest that Fund. After completing the construal level prime, participants read a scenario reflective of the previous study and indicated the extent to which they believed overreporting occurred from a desire to in- crease personal profits or to withhold money from the charity. nd Human Decision Processes 124 (2014) 110–121 119 overreporting occurred more from a desire to withhold money from the charity rather than out of a desire to increase personal earnings. Method Participants and design Two hundred two participants (mean age 34.99 years, 45.0% fe- male) took part in the study online and were randomly assigned to one of four between-participants conditions in a 2 (construal level concrete mindset activated can focus on different ends, which influences how they make their decisions when confronted with personal or donation-related decisions. Study 2b Our findings suggest that with a concrete mindset, participants prioritize subordinate, personal gain over honesty but that with an abstract mindset, participants prioritize the superordinate, greater social good over honesty when dishonesty can benefit oneself or a greater social good. That is, with a concrete mindset, overreporting occurred whenever dishonesty was possible, suggesting that the priority was on personal monetary gain. Similarly, with an abstract mindset, in Study 2a there was a tendency to underreport perfor- mance when the charity was good but to overreport when the charity was bad. With the good charity, it is unlikely that underre- porting occurred due to a desire to hurt oneself financially but in- stead, it likely occurred out of a desire to support the greater good inferred by the situation. However, when the charity was bad, par- ticipants in both the abstract and the concrete mindset conditions overreported performance. With an abstract mindset, we posit that people focused on sup- porting the greater social good inferred from the situation and overreported in the bad charity condition in order to withhold money from the charity that threatened the environment. Whereas with a concrete mindset, we posit that the emphasis was on per- sonal gain, which was also accomplished by overreporting when the charity was bad. That is, while the outcome was the same (smaller donations but larger personal earnings), the emphasis that led to those outcomes differed based on construal level. To assess this more closely, we conducted Study 2b. In the current study, we explore whether people primed with an abstract versus a concrete mindset differ in their perceptions of why one would overreport when the charity is good or bad based on a scenario reflective of Study 2a. Our primary interest centers on the situation involving the bad charity, but we included the good charity condition as a point of comparison. When the charity is good, we anticipate that people primed with an abstract or concrete mindset will not differ in the extent to which they per- ceive that overreporting occurred out of a desire for personal gain rather than a desire to withhold money from the charity. However, when the charity is bad, we anticipate that by activating an ab- within Study 2a to examine whether abstract and concrete mind- sets led to different reasons for why participants made a particular decision, a concern was that the responses would have reflected justification of one’s actions and participants would not have been willing to admit to dishonesty for personal gain. To control for this potential issue, we instead have participants judge the actions of others who made a similar decision within a hypothetical context. J. Rixom, H. Mishra / Organizational Behavior a prime: abstract vs. concrete) � 2 (charity: good vs. bad) design. As in the previous study, the good charity was the Make-A-Wish Foundation and the bad charity was the fictitious Resource Use Procedure Participants were first primed with either an abstract or a con- crete mindset with the same priming method (Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope, 2004) used in Study 2a. Next, participants read a scenario based on the previous study. They imagined that a person did a task that involved answering 20 questions and that the person would receive 25 cents for each correct answer. The person in the scenario graded their own answers and destroyed the paper so nobody else would know how well they had actually done. Next, participants read that before the person received payment for the task, they found out that the maximum payment of $5 was set aside and the person in the scenario would receive 25 cents for each solved puzzle but the charity would receive the remaining portion of the $5 that the person did not receive. The charity was either the Make-A-Wish Foundation (good) or the Resource Use Fund (bad) and they read a brief description of the charity. The participants then read that the person could report the number of puzzles they actually solved (some money for themselves and the charity), a higher number than they actually solved (more money for themselves and less for the charity), or a smaller num- ber than they actually solved (less money for themselves and more for the charity). Next, participants read that the person in the sce- nario decided to report solving more puzzles than they actually did which would result in more money for themselves and a smaller donation. Finally, participants indicated why the person made this decision on a nine-point scale where the low end was labeled ‘‘to get more money for themselves’’ and the high end was labeled ‘‘to withhold or keep some money from the Make-A-Wish Founda- tion (Resource Use Fund).8’’ The participants in the bad charity con- dition then read that the Resource Use Fund is not real and all participants answered demographic questions. Results and discussion Manipulation checks As in the previous study, two independent judges coded the ‘‘why’’ and ‘‘how’’ responses (Fujita, Trope, et al., 2006).9 Disagree- ments were resolved by discussion (initial agreement was 96.8%). The analysis revealed that the prime successfully manipulated con- strual level. Participants who responded to ‘‘why’’ prompts gener- ated statements that reflected an abstract mindset (M = 3.57) compared to those who responded to the ‘‘how’’ prompts (M = �3.66), t(200) = 75.27, p < .001. Focus of overreporting decision An ANOVA revealed a significant interaction F(1,198) = 6.91, p < .01, g2p = .034, and significant main effects of both construal le- vel, F(1,198) = 10.40, p < .01, g2p = .050, and charity condition F(1,198) = 109.30, p < .001, g2p = .356. We then assessed our 8 Participants also answered two additional questions based on the scale end- points used in the more parsimonious question reported in the main text. In one question, they indicated the extent to which they would say that the person reported solving more than they actually did because they wanted to get more money for themselves and in the other question because they wanted to withhold or keep some money away from the Make-A-Wish Foundation (Resource Use Fund). Both questions were asked on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (completely). 9 Responses superordinate to the preceding ones were coded 1 and subordinate responses were coded �1. Responses not fitting either criterion were coded 0. sire to increase personal gain. These findings in conjunction with good. We find that with an abstract mindset, people prioritize the 120 J. Rixom, H. Mishra / Organizational Behavior and H desire to do even more for the greater social good over honesty. We feel that this provides a reasonable framework from which to con- sider the question of when the greater social good is seen as a superordinate, focal concern that overrides other ethical principles such as honesty. Theoretical and practical implications Our results contribute by extending the research on construal level theory in relation to ethical decision-making when more than one ethical principle can be viewed as being in conflict. Previous research suggests that an abstract, high-level construal leads to strict adherence to moral principles (Agerström & Björklund, 2009; Eyal et al., 2008). Much of the past work, however, focuses on judgments of the morality of various scenarios rather than ac- tual decision-making. When past research tested actual decisions, the decision to violate or adhere to ethical principles only influ- enced oneself—there was no greater social good that could benefit more from violating rather than adhering to ethical principles (Agerström & Björklund, 2009). We find that when faced with a single ethical principle when only personal gain is at stake, people are inclined to adhere to that ethical principle when an abstract mindset is activated. However, our studies also extend the theory into previously overlooked deci- sion contexts and demonstrate that an abstract mindset does not always lead people to abide by ethical principles, even when the behavioral findings across conditions within the prior studies suggest that with an abstract mindset, people prioritize the super- ordinate, higher-level desire to support the greater social good over honesty whereas with a concrete mindset, people prioritize the subordinate, lower-level desire for personal gain over honesty. General discussion and implications Across these studies, our findings corroborate the proposal that when only one ethical principle is at play, when an abstract mind- set is activated, people tend to abide by the ethical principle of honesty rather than on increasing personal gain. However, when two ethical principles conflict such that violating the principle of honesty will simultaneously do even more to help a greater social good, people must choose whether to remain honest or to be dis- honest in order to provide additional support for the greater social planned contrasts to gain further insight into the focus emphasized by participants. As anticipated, when the charity was good (Make- A-Wish Foundation), the overreporting was viewed as being done primarily out of a desire to get more money for oneself and this did not significantly differ based on whether an abstract (M = 1.42) or a concrete (M = 1.23), F(1,198) = 1.10, p = .297, mind- set was activated. However, when the charity was bad (Resource Use Fund), there was a significant difference between the views for those primed with an abstract versus a concrete mindset. Specifically, we find that those with an abstract mindset perceive that the person was more likely to have overreported due to a de- sire to withhold money from the bad charity (M = 5.50) than were the participants primed with a concrete mindset (M = 3.67), F(1,198) = 9.53, p < .01, g2p = .087. 10 When the charity was bad, those with an abstract mindset were more inclined to feel that overreporting occurred out of a desire to withhold money from the charity that threatened the greater good inferred from the scenario whereas those with a concrete mindset were more likely to believe that overreporting was driven by a de- 10 Similar results were found when the two additional questions were analyzed. adhering to the principles would still result in a positive outcome (albeit to a lesser extent). Instead, they behave dishonestly when doing so provides more money to a charity that helps a greater so- cial good or less money to a charity that could potentially harm a greater social good. We find that in these contexts, where a desire to behave honestly conflicts with a desire to do more for a social good, that the greater social good takes priority whether the deci- sion simultaneously decreases, increases, or has no impact on one’s personal earnings. Oftentimes, conflicts between ethical principles are explored in the context of true moral dilemmas. With moral dilemmas, an undesirable act must occur (e.g., death of one, stealing) in order for a desirable outcome to occur (e.g., saving many lives, healing one’s spouse) (Foot, 1967; Kohlberg, 1969). In our research, how- ever, we used situations where undesirable acts do not have to oc- cur for there to be desirable outcomes. Honesty would still result in some funds being donated (withheld) from an admirable (unad- mirable) charity but dishonesty had the potential to lead to even more funds being donated (withheld). Therefore, our research also adds to the literature by highlighting the value of situational factors that may strengthen the focus on a desire to support a greater social good and result in the violation of other ethical prin- ciples. We find that this occurs even when violating these ethical principles is not a requirement of helping a greater good as is the case in traditional moral dilemmas. We also contribute to the literature in which people will over- look violating ethical principles such as honesty in order to achieve desirable outcomes. For instance, people who are dishonest are found to be more forgetful of moral rules such as the items in an honor code (Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011) and are able to selec- tively overlook and self-justify the wrongness of their actions (Bandura, 1999; Bersoff, 1999). In research considering the rela- tionship between the ends and the means, it is found that when another person’s unethical behaviors result in positive outcomes, people judge those unethical acts less harshly (Gino & Pierce, 2010; Gino, Shu, & Bazerman, 2010). Consistent with this past re- search, we show that construal level is another situational factor that may influence whether people will focus more on the desir- able outcomes associated with a greater social good rather than the need to violate ethical principles in order to achieve those outcomes. Our findings also have practical implications for situations where unethical behaviors can support a greater social good and the situational elements in the environment encourage construing the event in more abstract forms. Decisions that influence a larger social good may easily occur in the distant rather than the near fu- ture. Greater temporal distance is associated with an abstract, high-level construal while temporal closeness is associated with a concrete, low-level construal (Trope & Liberman, 2003). Thus, this distant temporal orientation may activate an abstract constru- al of the overall situation. An environmental activist, for instance, may focus on the long-term, eventual impact of pollution on the environment and this distant, abstract orientation may result in an emphasis on the superordinate, ultimate social good (saving the environment) which overshadows the subordinate, proximate means (vandalism) undertaken to serve the greater social good. On a more day-to-day basis, distant locations such as another part of the country or world are construed at more abstract levels than near locations (Fujita, Henderson, et al., 2006). 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(2011). ‘Anonymous’ hackers target US security think tank. Associated Press. . Ethical ends: Effect of abstract mindsets in ethical decisions for the greater social good Introduction Theoretical overview Construal level theory Current studies Study 1 Method Participants and design Procedure Results and discussion Manipulation checks Number of matrices solved (honesty) Study 2 Study 2a Method Participants and design Procedure Results and discussion Manipulation checks Number of matrices solved (honesty) Study 2b Method Participants and design Procedure Results and discussion Manipulation checks Focus of overreporting decision General discussion and implications Theoretical and practical implications References