Election Comp1

ELECTION SET1 1. AGUJETAS V. CA. GR NO. 106560, 23 AUG 96 TORRES, JR., J.: Facts: Petitioners, Agujetas and Bijis, are former Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the Province of Davao. On January 21, 1988 the Provincial Board of Canvassers where petitioners occupy a position proclaimed the winners for Governor, Vice- Governor and for the position of Provincial Board Members for Davao Oriental in the January 18, 1988 election. A complaint was filed in COMELEC by Francisco Rabat (a losing gubernatorial candidate) against petitioners for violation of the OEC and RA 6646 (The Electoral Reform Law of 1987). After preliminary investigation Criminal Case no. 1886 was filed against petitioners for violation of the 2nd par. of Sec. 231 in relation to Sec. 262 of the OEC which alleges that petitioners willfully and unlawfully fail to proclaim Erlinda Irigo as elected Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member candidate who obtained 31,129 votes, the eighth highest number of votes cast in said province but instead proclaimed candidate Pedro Pena who obtained only 30,699 votes. RTC found petitioners guilty. Petitioners appealed in CA but CA affirmed the decision of RTC. Issue(s) W/N the failure to make a proclamation on the basis of the Certificate of Canvass or the mere erroneous proclamations is punishable under Sec. 262 in relation to Sec. 231 (2) of the Omnibus Election Code. Note: According to petitioners, the Omnibus Election Code does not punish the preparation of an incorrect certificate of canvass, nor an erroneous proclamation made by the Board; what it does punish is that, having thus prepared the corresponding certificate, the board for some reason fails to make the corresponding proclamation on the basis thereof. Ruling Petition DENIED. The second paragraph of Section 231 of the Omnibus Election Code reads: The respective board of canvassers shall prepare a certificate of canvass duly signed and affixed with the imprint of the thumb of the right hand of each member, supported by a statement of the votes and received by each candidate in each polling place and, on the basis thereof, shall proclaim as elected the candidates who obtained the highest number of votes cast in the province, city, municipality or barangay. Failure to comply with this requirement shall constitute offense. an election To go by the explanation as proposed by the petitioner would be tantamount to tolerating and licensing boards of canvassers to "make an erroneous proclamation" and still be exculpated by just putting up the inexcusable defense that the "foul-up resulted from the erroneous arrangement of the names of candidates" in one municipality or that "the basis of their proclamation was the erroneous ranking made by the tabulation committee". That would be a neat apology for allowing the board to be careless in their important task by simply claiming that they cannot be held liable because they did their "duty" of proclaiming the winning candidates on the basis of the certificate of canvass — even "erroneous" certificates — which they made. 2. LUNA V RODRIGUEZ. 39 PHIL 208 GR. No. L-13744 November 29, 1918 JOHNSON, J.: Facts: Luna, Rodriguez, and de los Angeles were candidates for the office of Governor of the Province of Rizal. The election was held on June 6, 1916 and the canvassing of votes resulted to the following: Rodriguez with 4,321 votes; Luna with 4,157 and; de los Angeles with 3, 576. Rodriguez having said to receive majority of votes was proclaimed the winner Luna filed an election protest before the CFI of Taytay. Judge McMahon found from the evidence that 50 ballots cast for Eulogio Rodriguez should not have been counted for him, and ordered that number of votes deducted from his total. In the municipality of Binangonan, Judge McMahon found that the inspectors did not close the polls at 6 o'clock p.m., and that a large number of persons voted after that time, and directed that the total vote of Eulogio Rodriguez should be reduced by the number of such votes, without ascertaining how many had been cast for Rodriguez and how many for Luna. By deducting the said votes in the municipality of Taytay and those cast after six o'clock p.m. in the municipality of Binangonan, Judge McMahon concluded that Jose Lino Luna had received a plurality of the legal votes cast at said election and ordered the provincial board of canvassers to correct its canvass accordingly. Issues: (1) What is the effect of holding the polls open after the hour fixed for closing the election? (2) What is the effect of assistance rendered by the inspectors of the election to incapacitated persons, without first requiring of such persons an oath to the effect that they are incapacitated to prepare their own ballots? (3) What is the effect of a failure on the part of the authorities to provide proper voting booths? RULING Question no.1 It has been announced in many decisions that the rules and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the election, but when it is sought to enforce them after the election they are held to be directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part.. Since no complaint was made that any fraud was committed nor that any person voted who had no right to vote, by reason of the fact that the polls were kept open after the hour fixed by the law. It is admitted that the polls were kept open after the hour, by the consent of all parties concerned, for the reasons and purposes above indicated. Note: In the case above S.C. deducted 50 votes from Rodriguez not because the votes were invalid but because Rodriguez himself permitted that such 50 votes be deducted from him. Despite the deduction of 50 votes Rodriguez remained to be the winner in the election by 114 votes against Luna. Question no. 2 We held in the case of Paulino vs. Cailles (R. G. No. 12753, 37 Phil. Rep., 825) that the ballots of incapacitated persons who voted without taking the oath or were assisted by one inspector alone, or by two belonging to the same party, should not be counted if such ballots could be identified. We further held that, in the absence of fraud, all of the ballots of the precinct should not be invalidated by the mere fact that the inspectors did not comply with their duty. Innocent voters should not be deprived of their participation in an election for a violation of the law for which they were in no way responsible and which they could not prevent The incapacitated persons mentioned in said section above noted are usually persons who are unable to acquaint themselves with the provisions of the law. They are, therefore, absolutely dependent upon the advice and counsel of others. Generally, they have no idea whatever as to the form and requirements in casting their ballots. Their ignorance, however, does not relieve them from their responsibility under the law, nor from the effect of their failure to comply therewith. Question no. 3 In the present case, while there is some conflict in the evidence, and while the proof clearly shows that the booths were not constructed in strict accordance with the provisions of the law, we are of the opinion that a large preponderance of the evidence shows that the booths were constructed (defectively perhaps) in a manner which afforded each voter an opportunity to prepare his ballot in absolute secrecy. The officers, however, should be criminally held liable but the votes cast therein remain in the absence of fraud. 3. RULLODA V COMELEC, 395 SCRA 535 G.R. No. 154198 January 20, 2003 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Facts: 4. LOONG V COMELEC 257 SCRA 1 HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.: Facts: The first petition seeks to nullify two resolutions of the COMELEC promulgated in pre-proclamation cases filed by petitioner Tupay T. Loong who prayed that the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Talipao, Sulu, be set aside on the ground that the certificates of canvass were manufactured, fictitious and falsified. The other petition assails the suspending of the proclamation of petitioners as winners in the May 8, 1995 elections for Governor and Vice-Governor of the province of Sulu, for Prohibition praying that COMELEC be prohibited from conducting a technical comparison of signatures and thumbmarks affixed in COMELEC CE Forms 1 and 2, and for Mandamus seeking to compel respondent to reconvene and proclaim petitioners Tupay T. Loong and Kimar Tulawie as the duly elected Governor and Vice-Governor, respectively, of Sulu. In the May 8, 1995 elections held in the Province of Sulu, petitioner Tupay T. Loong and private respondent Abdusakur Tan ran for the position of Governor, while petitioner Kimar Tulawie and private respondent Munib Estino were candidates for the position of ViceGovernor. After the canvass of the election returns of sixteen (16) of the eighteen (18) municipalities of Sulu, respondent Provincial Board of Canvasser (PBC) recommended to the COMELEC a recanvass of the election returns of Parang and Talipao. Issue: WON a pre-proclamation controversy is the same as an annulment of election results or declaration of failure of elections. Held: No. Under the present state of our election laws, the COMELEC has been granted precisely the power to annul elections. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as, "The Synchronized Elections Law of 1991," provides that the COMELEC sitting En Banc by a majority vote of its members may decide, among others, the declaration of failure of election and the calling of special elections as provided in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC may exercise such power muto proprio or upon a verified petition. The hearing of the case shall be summary in nature, and the COMELEC may delegate to its lawyers the power to hear the case and to receive evidence. . Very few aspects of our law today can match the dynamism that has characterized the formulation of our jurisprudential rule on pre-proclamation controversies, The debate has, however, constantly revolved around whether or not the COMELEC may go beyond the face of the election returns in determining their authenticity and genuineness. The rule first established in illustrative cases like Nacionalista Party vs. Comelec and Dizon vs. Provincial Board is that the COMELEC cannot go beyond the election returns in canvassing the same. This rule, however, was eroded in subsequent cases since 1966, when in the case of Lagumbay vs. Comelec, we empowered the COMELEC to nullify certain contested returns on the ground of statistical improbability "where the fraud is so palpable from the return itself (res ipsa loquitur — the thing speaks for itself), there is no reason to accept it and give it prima facie value." And then in the 1971 case of Diaz, Sr. vs. Commission on Elections, in the light of the allegations of petitioners therein to the effect that the elections in question were tainted with fraud, terrorism and other irregularities, we sanctioned the COMELEC's procedure of causing the examination by fingerprint and handwriting experts and analysis of the signatures and fingerprints of the precinct books of voters and the CE 39's and voting records, in order to determine whether the reported elections were a sham amounting to no election at all and accordingly deny prima facie value to the election returns and reject them as manufactured or false returns. 5. SAMBARANI V COMELEC, 438 SCRA 319 G.R. No. 160427, September 15, 2004 Carpio, J.: Facts: A Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections were held on July 15, 2002 in Lanao del Sur. Sambarani, Miraato, Abubacar, Mascara and Dayondong ran for re-election as punong barangay in their respective barangay, namely: Occidental Linuk, Pindolonan Moriatao Sarip, Talub, New Lumbacaingud and Tatayawan South. The COMELEC subsequently issued Resolution No. 5479 which sets the date for special elections on August 13, 2002, due to failure of elections in eleven barangays including the five barangays mentioned. On August 14, 2002, Acting Election Officer Esmael Maulay issued a certification that there were no special elections held on August 13, 2002. The petitioners filed a joint petition for holding of another special election. They also contend that the failure of election was due to the failure of Maulay to follow the directive of Commissioner Sadain to use the ARMM’s 2001 computerized voter’s list and voter’s registration records. Since Maulay failed to file a written explanation, the COMELEC moved for the resolution of the case. It directed the DILG to appoint Barangay Captains and Barangay Kagawads in the five barangays mentioned in pursuance to RA 7160. The petitioners filed an instant petition to hold another special election which the COMELEC subsequently denied on the ground that the 30-day period already lapsed. Issue: 1. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its decision in denying the petition to hold another special election. 2. Whether the DILG can appoint barangay and SK officials as directed by the COMELEC. Held: 1. Yes. The COMELEC’s decision denying the petition for another special election is void. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code which is the basis of the COMELEC’s denial of the petition is merely directive and not mandatory. Section 45 also provides that in case of postponement or failure of election the COMELEC shall set the elections within thirty days from the cessation of the causes for postponement. The elections may be held anytime within the thirty day period from the time the cause of the postponement ceased. 2. No. The DILG cannot appoint barangay and SK officials due to Section 5 of the RA 9164 which provides for a hold over period where an incumbent officer may remain in office until their successors have already been elected and qualified. Therefore, the petitioners can assume office in a hold-over capacity pending the assumption of a successor into office. 6. TOLENTINO V COMELEC, 420 SCRA 438 [G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004] CARPIO, J.: Facts: Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001. Thereafter, a vacancy in the Senate occurred and a resolution was passed to fill in such vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections to be held on May 14, 2001. The same resolution further states that the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Guingona which will end on June 30, 2004. On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, claiming that if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results. To support their claim, petitioners cited the special elections simultaneously held with the regular elections in 1951 and 1955 to fill the seats vacated by Senators Fernando Lopez and Carlos P. Garcia, respectively, who became VicePresidents during their tenures in the Senate. Petitioners point out that in those elections, COMELEC separately canvassed the votes cast for the senatorial candidates running under the regular elections from the votes cast for the candidates running under the special elections. COMELEC also separately proclaimed the winners in each of those elections. Issues: The following are the issues presented for resolution: (1) Whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge; (2) Whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held on 14 May 2001. Ruling : The petition has no merit. (1) A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to determine the right of a public officer in the exercise of his office and to oust him from its enjoyment if his claim is not well-founded. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the members of the Senate. The petition, however, does not seek to determine Honasan’s right in the exercise of his office as Senator. Petitioners’ prayer for the annulment of Honasan’s proclamation and, ultimately, election is merely incidental to petitioners’ cause of action. Consequently, the Court can properly exercise jurisdiction over the instant petition. (2) Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001. Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill any vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives “in the manner prescribed by law. To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6645. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as follows: Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. – x x x In case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. (Emphasis supplied) The controversy, however, thus turns on whether COMELEC’s failure, assuming it did fail, to comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, invalidated the conduct of the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 and accordingly rendered Honasan’s proclamation as the winner in that special election void. More precisely, the question is whether the special election is invalid for lack of a “call” for such election and for lack of notice as to the office to be filled and the manner by which the winner in the special election is to be determined. The Court answers in the negative. The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its occurrence, whether made by the legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give such call, is indispensable to the election’s validity. In a general election, where the law fixes the date of the election, the election is valid without any call by the body charged to administer the election. In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes the date at which the special election is to be held and operates as the call for that election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so. This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any call for the election by some authority and the law thus charges voters with knowledge of the time and place of the election.[30] Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity.[31] In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the special election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingona’s appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 could not be held at any other time but must be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on 14 May 2001. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELEC’s failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it. Moreover, the test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the special election is whether the want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill a vacancy, a choice by a small percentage of voters would be void. The required notice to the voters in the 14 May 2001 special senatorial election covers two matters. First, that COMELEC will hold a special election to fill a vacant single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections scheduled on the same date. Second, that COMELEC will proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special election. Petitioners have neither claimed nor proved that COMELEC’s failure to give this required notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the special senatorial election or led them to believe that there was no such special election. Finally, neither is there basis in petitioners’ claim that the manner by which COMELEC conducted the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such requirements exist in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 is that COMELEC “fix the date of the election,” if necessary, and “state, among others, the office or offices to be voted for.” Similarly, petitioners’ reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the filing of certificates of candidacy, and on Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of election returns and tally sheets, to support their claim is misplaced. These provisions govern elections in general and in no way require separate documentation of candidates or separate canvass of votes in a regular and special elections jointly held. Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit. 7. FRIVALDO V COMELEC 174 SCRA 245 G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989 CRUZ, J Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldo’s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegation but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law Dictator’s agent abroad. Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election. Held: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure. Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as a Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. 8. LABO V COMELEC 176 SCRA 1 G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989 CRUZ, J.: Facts: Petitioner in this case was voted first in the Baguio City election for the post of Mayor of said city. An action for a quo warranto proceeding was filed against him by the second highest voted candidate. The Court then ruled that such Proceeding was invalid because no filing fee was paid, hence the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the said proceeding. Thereafter the Comission on Immigration then declared that petitioner Labo is disqualified from said elective office for being an Australian citizen at the time of his election. The second highest voted candidate then contended that since Labo was deemed disqualified by the Comelec, he should therefore be given the contested election position. Petitioner Labo avers that his lack of citizenship was a “futile technicality” and that since he was the highest voted candidate he should still be declared the Mayor on account of him being the choice of the majority by popular vote. Issue Whether or not petitioner Labo’s lack of citizenship is a valid ground for his disqualification from said elective post. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to said position of Mayor as being the second highest voted candidate, if Labo should be disqualified. Held: The Court held that petitioner’s lack of citizenship is not a “futile technicality,” and that at the time he ran for office, his voters supported him thinking that he was qualified to run for said office, including the issue of his citizenship. Since citizenship is an essential requirement for those running for an elective office, his lack of it disqualifies him as such. On the contention of the second highest candidate, he cannot also be declared as the next in line for the position of Mayor, since to allow it would be to countermand the people of Baguio’s exercise of their right to suffrage. 9. VILLABER V COMELEC G.R. No. 148326 November 15, 2001 SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: Facts: Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections. Cagas filed with the COMELEC, a consolidated petition to disqualify Villaber and to cancel the latter's certificate of candidacy. Cagas alleged Villaber was convicted by the RTC for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and was sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the sum of P100,000.00. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence, under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office. On appeal, CA affirmed the RTC Decision. Undaunted, Cagas also asserted that Villaber made a false material representation in his certificate of candidacy that he is "Eligible for the office I seek to be elected " - which false statement is a ground to deny due course or cancel the said certificate pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. In his answers to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly that his conviction has not become final and executory because the affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial court for promulgation in his presence. Furthermore, even if the judgment of conviction was already final and executory, it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude. COMELEC declared Villaber disqualified as "a candidate for and from holding any elective public office" and canceling his certificate of candidacy. The COMELEC ruled that a conviction for violation of B.P. BIg. 22 involves moral turpitude following the ruling of this Court en banc in the administrative case of People vs. Atty. Fe Tuanda. Villaber fIled a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the COMELEC en banc. Issue: whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude. Held: Yes. The COMELEC believes it is. In disqualifying petitioner Villaber from being a candidate for Congressman, the COMELEC applied Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides: "Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. "The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified." (Emphasis ours) As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we have consistently adopted the definition in Black's Law Dictionary as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." In In re Vinzon, the term "moral turpitude" is considered as encompassing "everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty , or good morals." We, however, clarified in Dela Torre vs. Commission on Elections that "not every criminal act involves moral turpitude," and that ''as to what crime involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to determine."16 We further pronounced therein that: "...in International Rice Research Institute vs. NLRC (221 SCRA 760 [1993]), the Court admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral turpitude, and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute." (Emphasis ours) We reiterate here our ruling in Dela Torre that the determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude is a question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute. Petitioner contends that this Court's pronouncement in People v. Atty. Fe Tuanda, insofar as it states that conviction under B.P. BIg. 22 involves moral turpitude, does not apply to him since he is not a lawyer. This argument is erroneous. In that case, the Court of Appeals affirmed Atty. Fe Tuanda's conviction for violation of B.P. BIg. 22 and, in addition, suspended her from the practice of law pursuant to Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. Her motion seeking the lifting of her suspension was denied by this Court on the ground that the said offense involves moral turpitude. In Tuanda, this Court did not make a distinction whether the offender is a lawyer or a non-lawyer. Nor did it declare that such offense constitutes moral turpitude when committed by a member of the Bar but is not so when committed by a non-member. In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent COMELEC in issuing the assailed Resolutions. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner. 10. DE LA TORRE V COMELEC, 258 SCRA 483 G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996 FRANCISCO, J. FACTS: Rolando P. Dela Torre, petitioner was disqualified by the Commission on Elections from running for the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995 elections, citing as the ground therefor, Section 40(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991). Said section provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence are disqualified from running for any elective local position. In disqualifying the petitioner, the COMELEC held that it was established that petitioner was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court of violation of P.D. 1612, (otherwise known as the Anti-fencing Law. Petitioner contends that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as he was granted probation by the MTC on December 21, 1994 which suspended the execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing therefrom. ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude. 2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40 (a)'s applicability. HELD: 1. Yes. Actual knowledge by the "fence" of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one's rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. All told, the COMELEC did not err in disqualifying the petitioner on the ground that the offense of fencing of which he had been previously convicted by final judgment was one involving moral turpitude. 2. No. The legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioner's conviction of fencing which we have heretofore declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40 (a), subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation. 11. MORENO V COMELEC G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006 TINGA, J.: Facts: Norma Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Urbano Moreno from running for Punong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4 Months and 1 Day to 2 Years and 4 Months by the RTC of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998. According to the Comelec en banc, Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment, within 2 years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position. Since Moreno was released from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date and end 2 years thence. The grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective local office. In contrast, Moreno argues that he should not have been disqualified because he did not serve the adjudged sentence having been granted probation and finally discharged by the trial court. He alleges that he applied for and was granted probation within the period specified therefor. He never served a day of his sentence as a result. Hence, the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to him. Issue: Whether Moreno’s sentence was in fact served so as to disqualify him to run for public office Held: In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her teaching profession. Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation. It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation. Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence. During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order. Moreno was not disqualified to run for Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. 12. GREGO V COMELEC G.R. No. 125955 June 19, 1997 ROMERO, J.: facts: On 31 October 1981, Humberto Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff by no less than this Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by a certain Nena Tordesillas. Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the 18 January 1988 local elections. He won and, accordingly, assumed office. After his term, Basco sought re-election in the 11 May 1992 synchronized national elections. Again, he succeeded in his bid and he was elected as one of the 6 City Councilors. However, his victory this time did not remain unchallenged. In the midst of his successful re-election, he found himself besieged by lawsuits of his opponents in the polls who wanted to dislodge him from his position. All the challenges (by one Cenon Ronquillo and another by one by Honorio Lopez II, were, however, dismissed, thus, paving the way for Basco’s continued stay in office. Despite the odds previously encountered, Basco remained undaunted and ran again for councilor in the May 8, 1995, local elections seeking a third and final term. Once again, he beat the odds by emerging sixth in a battle for six councilor seats. As in the past, however, his right to office was again contested. Wilmer Grego filed a disqualification case against Basco before the COMELEC. The COMELEC conducted a hearing of the case on 14 May 1995, where it ordered the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda. Before the parties could comply with this directive, however, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco on 17 May 1995, as a duly elected councilor for the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among several candidates who vied for the seats. Basco immediately took his oath of office before the Honorable Ma. Ruby Bithao-Camarista, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch I, Manila. In view of such proclamation, Grego lost no time in filing an Urgent Motion seeking to annul what he considered to be an illegal and hasty proclamation made on 17 May 1995, by the Manila City BOC. After the parties’ respective memoranda had been filed, the COMELEC’s First Division resolved to dismiss the petition for disqualification on 6 October 1995, ruling that “the administrative penalty imposed by the Supreme Court on Basco on 31 October 1981 was wiped away and condoned by the electorate which elected him” and that on account of Basco’s proclamation on 17 May 1995. Issue: Whether Section 40 (b) of RA 7160 apply retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on 1 January 1992. Held: Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code provides that those removed from office as a result of an administrative case are disqualified from running for any elective local position. while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment.There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates retroactively. That the provision of the Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidate’s removal from office and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the Court from applying the law prospectively. The basic tenet in legal hermeneutics that laws operate only prospectively and not retroactively provides the qualification sought by petitioner. A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not be so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before its passage. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward. Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code is thus not applicable to the present case. 13. REYES V COMELEC, 254 SCRA 514 G.R. No. 120905, March 7, 1996 Mendoza, J.: Facts: This is a consolidated case of Reyes and of Garcia which involved same resolutions of the COMELEC. The case of Reyes is based on the resolution of the COMELEC declaring his disqualification from running for local office and on the resolution dated July 3, 1995 which denied his petition for reconsideration. An administrative complaint was filed against him for collecting money from each market stall holder and these were not reflected in the book of accounts of the municipality; and that he also took 27 heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program. He was held guilty as charged and was ordered to be removed from office. But before the Sanggunian rendered judgment, Reyes filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the RTC of Oriental Mindoro which alleged that he was not given a chance to be heard in the proceedings which was already terminated. After the expiration of the restraining order, an attempt was made to serve the judgment to the petition but he refused to accept the decision. On March 20, 1995, Reyes filed a certificate of candidacy. But even with a petition for disqualification as candidate for mayor on the basis of Art. 40 (b) of RA 7160, Reyes was still voted for in the May 1995 elections. Despite the resolution from the COMELEC which affirms the disqualification of Reyes, the Municipal Board of Canvassers who are unaware of the disqualification, proclaimed Reyes as the dulyelected mayor. The July 3, 1995 Resolution of the COMELEC declared that Reyes is disqualified as a candidate and to set aside his proclamation. On the other hand, Garcia’s case is for the annulment of the July 3, 1995 resolution which denied his motion to be proclaimed as the elected mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro since Reyes was already deemed disqualified. Garcia contends that he obtained the second highest number of votes in the election and since Reyes was already disqualified, he should be proclaimed as the duly-elected mayor of Bongabong. Issue: 1. Whether or not Reyes is disqualified from running for reelection. 2. Whether or not Garcia should be proclaimed the duly-elected mayor due to Reyes’s disqualification. Held: 1. Yes. Reyes is disqualified to run for reelection. Article 40 (b) of RA 7160 provides that “those removed from office as a result of an administrative case” is disqualified from running for any elective local position. And since Reyes was held guilty of an administrative case, he is therefore disqualified from running for office. 2. No. Although Garcia obtained the second highest number of votes in the election, it is a rule that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. And that Garcia’s contention that Reyes’s votes should be invalidated was also denied for it is held by the Court that the finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to the time of the elections. DISSENTING OPINION: Padilla,J.: “When a first placer is disqualified, the qualified candidate with the highest number of votes should be proclaimed. Garcia should have been proclaimed the elected mayor or Bongabong because he was a candidate with the qualifications for the office who received the highest number of votes after Reyes.” 14. MERCADO V MANZANO, 307 SCRA 630 G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999 MENDOZA, J.: Facts: This is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari, brought about by petitioner herein, contesting the qualifications of private respondent Manzano to run and to qualify for an elective office. Both Mercado and Manzano ran for and contested the position of Vice- Mayor for the City of Makati with Manzano wining by a margin of 2,959 votes over petitioner herein. Petitioner then filed a complaint before the Comelec Second Division, stating therein the respondent’s dual citizenship as manifested by his American passport while purporting to be a Filipino citizen. Petitioner’s motion to Intervene was likewise denied on account of him, according to Comelec Second Division, not being a proper party in interest. A motion for reconsideration was then filed before the Comelec en banc which reversed the Second Division’s Resolution, stating therein that “dual allegiance” and not dual citizenship were the ground for disqualification. Hence, this petition before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold elective office on account his dual citizenship. Whether or not Mercado is a proper party, within the contemplation of the law to file a Motion for leave to file an Intervention. Held: Petition for Certiorari was dismissed. The Court held that petitioner had a right to intervene on account of his being being both a registered voter and candidate for the contested position of Vice- Mayor he is therefore deemed a proper party to intervene in said action, having an interest that is directly related to the action. As for Manzano’s qualification to run for and hold an elective office, the phrase “dual citizenship” under Republic Act 7160, which cites it as one of the grounds for disqualification, was actually meant to refer to “dual allegiance” a different concept altogether. Manzano’s allegiance to the Philippines was manifested by his registering and voting for three consecutive elections in Makati, prior to his running for the said elective post. 15. LOPEZ V COMELEC G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008 REYES, R.T., J.: FACTS: Eusebio Lopez was a candidate for the position of Barangay Chairman in Iloilo City. His candidacy was assailed on the ground that he is an American citizen. Lopez contended that he is a dual citizen, Filipino and an American at the same time, by virtue of R.A. 9225—The Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. He also argues that his filing of the certificate of candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of his foreign citizenship. After gaining a favorable number of votes in the election canvass, the COMELEC disqualified him from running and assuming the office of Barangay Chairman. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Lopez is qualified to run and assume the office of Barangay Chairman. HELD: Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the R.A. 9225. This law explicitly provides that should one seek elective public office, he should first "make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath." Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. There is no evidence presented that will show that respondent complied with the provision of R.A. No. 9225. 16. PAMATONG V COMELEC G.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004 TINGA, J.: Rrev pamatong had his application for candidacy denied by the comelec. Upon motion for reconsideration filed to Comelec, said application was stil denied hence this petition for certiorari where pamatong petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987. petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, becuase he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president. W/N petitioner was denied of his right to run for public office NO. The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self-executing. the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. Moreover, the phrase ensure equal access only amended the original wording which was BROADEN brought about by Hilario davide to clarify said provision for if you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the government would be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to accommodate as many people as are also possible. the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates is to assure the public that such candidates are qualified enough to serve our interests and needs. There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for national positions because the election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a national campaign are allowed to run. The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the compelling State interest to ensure orderly and credible elections by excising impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that distract and detract from the larger purpose The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order. 17. LORETO-GO C COMELEC G.R. No. 147741 May 10, 2001 PARDO, J.: Facts: Petitioner was the incumbent representative of the Fifth District, province of Leyte, whose term of office will expire at noon on 30 June 2001. On 27 February 2001, petitioner filed with the municipal election officer of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte, a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte. On 28 February 2001, at 11:47 p.m., petitioner filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, with office at Tacloban City, another certificate of candidacy for governor of the province of Leyte. Simultaneously therewith, she attempted to file with the provincial election supervisor an affidavit of withdrawal of her candidacy for mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. However, the provincial election supervisor of Leyte refused to accept the affidavit of withdrawal and suggested that, pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, she should file it with the municipal election officer of Baybay, Leyte where she filed her certificate of candidacy for mayor. At that later hour, with only minutes left to midnight, the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy or withdrawal thereof, and considering that the travel time from Tacloban to Baybay was two (2) hours, petitioner decided to send her affidavit of withdrawal by fax to her father at Baybay, Leyte and the latter submitted the same to the office of the election officer of Baybay, Leyte at 12:28 a.m., 01 March 2001. On the same day, at 1:15 p.m., the election officer of Baybay Leyte, received the original of the affidavit of withdrawal. On 05 March 2001 respondent Montejo filed with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte, at Tacloban City a petition to deny due course and/or to cancel the certificates of candidacy of petitioner. Respondent Antoni filed a similar petition, namely, that for mayor of Baybay, Leyte, and that for governor of Leyte, thus, making her ineligible for both. The ground to deny due course and/or to cancel the said certificate of candidacy is anchored on Section 73. 'No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filed in the same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. 'No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.' In the meantime, the Law Department, COMELEC, under Director Jose P. Balbuena, made a study of the cases without affording petitioner an opportunity to be heard or to submit responsive pleadings. On 05 April 2001, they submitted a report and recommendation to the COMELEC en banc which all the same decided against the petitioner. On 23 April 2001, the COMELEC en banc approved the recommendation of the Director, Law Department and adopted the resolution which disqualified the petitioner for both positions. ISSUE: 1. Is petitioner disqualified to be candidate for governor of Leyte and mayor of Baybay, Leyte because she filed certificates of candidacy for both positions? 2. Was there a valid withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy for municipal mayor of Baybay, Leyte? RULING: 1. No. The court annuled the COMELEC resolution declaring petitioner disqualified for both positions of governor of Leyte and mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. The filing of the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March 2001 was a substantial compliance with the requirement of the law. Petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte was effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her certificate of candidacy for governor. 2. Yes. There is nothing in Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said municipality. In the light of Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20 November 2000 which requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed, such requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. An administrative resolution can not contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law. Hence, the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such candidacy. the COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declare petitioner ineligible for both positions for which she filed certificates of candidacy. Moreover, the petitioner was denied procedural due process in approving the report and recommendation of the Law Department, deprived the petitioner of procedural due process of law pursuant to findings done in an ex-party study of the cases. 18. CODILLA V COMELEC December 10, 2002 PUNO, J: G.R. No. 150605 2001, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the disqualification case. Consequently, petitioner was included in the list of candidates for district representative and was voted for. The initial results showed that petitioner was the winning candidate. Pursuant to a Second Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation filed by Locsin, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte Order directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in case he obtains the highest number of votes by reason of "the seriousness of the allegations in the petition for disqualification. As a result, petitioner was not proclaimed as winner even though the final election results showed that he garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin's 53,447 votes. On June 14, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its Resolution in SPA No. 01208 which found the petitioner guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification. It directed the "immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes xxx." On June 20, 2001, petitioner seasonably filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration. On June 21, 2001, petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Proclamation docketed as SPC No. 01-324, assailing the validity of the proclamation of respondent Locsin who garnered only the second highest number of votes. On August 29, 2001, then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a "Vote and Opinion and Summary of Votes" reversing the resolution of the Second Division and declaring the proclamation of respondent Locsin as null and void. Respondent Locsin did not appeal from this decision annulling her proclamation. Instead, she filed a "Comment and Manifestation with the COMELEC en banc questioning the procedure and the manner by which the decision was issued. Locsin, through the opinion by House of Representatives Executive Director and Chief Legal Counsel averred that COMELEC has no jurisdiction to nullify the proclamation of respondent Locsin after she had taken her oath and assumed office since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House. On September 12, 2001, acting upon an order issued by COMELEC en banc, petitioner Codilla was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, having obtained a total of 71,350 votes representing the highest number of votes cast in the district. On September 14, 2001, petitioner wrote the House of Representatives, thru respondent Speaker De Venecia, informing the House of the August 29, 2001 COMELEC en banc resolution annulling the proclamation of respondent Locsin, and proclaiming him as the dulyelected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. These notwithstanding, and despite receipt by the House of Representatives of a copy of the COMELEC en banc resolution on September 20, 2001, no action was taken by the House on the letter-appeal of petitioner. Issue: 1. Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin by the COMELEC Second Division is valid Facts: Petitioner and respondent Locsin were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte during the May 14, 2001 elections. Josephine de la Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, filed directly with the COMELEC main office a Petition for Disqualification1 against the petitioner for indirectly soliciting votes from the registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte. It was alleged that the petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte. On May 11, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division sent a telegram informing the petitioner that a disqualification case was filed against him and that the petition was remanded to the Regional Election Director for investigation. At the time of the elections on May 14, 2.Whether said proclamation divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its validity Held: 1. No. The petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading to the proclamation of respondent Locsin, by relying on the findings gathered in an ex-parte study of the case and failure to notify the petitioner of the petition for his disqualification through the service of summons nor of the Motions to suspend his proclamation The COMELEC Second Division also did not give ample opportunity to the petitioner to adduce evidence in support of his defense in the petition for his disqualification. More importantly, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner is not based on substantial evidence, it erred in deciding for the disqualification based on Section 261 and not on Sec 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. Most of all, the proclamation of respondent Locsin violates the settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. In every election, the people's choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must at all times be given effect. 2. No. The fact that the Petition for Nullity of Proclamation was filed directly with the COMELEC en banc is of no moment. Even without said Petition, the COMELEC en banc could still rule on the nullity of respondent's proclamation because it was properly raised in the Motion for Reconsideration. Clearly, the validity of respondent Locsin's proclamation was made a central issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner. Without doubt, the COMELEC en banc has the jurisdiction to rule on the issue. Moreover, it was in fact the HRET that did not have jurisdiction. At the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter. 19. BATUL V BAYRON, G.R. No. 157687 February 26, 2004 CARPIO, J.: The Facts: Batul and respondent Lucilo R. Bayron were candidates for vice-mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan in May 14, 2001 elections. Upon losing in such election, Bayron protested the election results in the 392 precincts of Puerto Princesa City, claiming that anomalies and irregularities marred the conduct of the elections. Batul filed an Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim denying all the material allegations in Bayron’s protest, and claimed that it was Bayron who committed fraud and other irregularities in the protested precincts. Acting on such protest, Bayron filed his formal Offer of Evidence which included the Final Reports of the 4 Revision Committees and a summary tabulation showing him with 17,248 votes against Batul’s 16,581 votes or a winning margin of 667 votes. Batul filed his Comment/Opposition to respondent Bayron’s Offer of Evidence. On 10 June 2002, the COMELEC First Division admitted Bayron’s exhibits. The COMELEC First Division directed Batul to present his evidence on July 29, 2002. On this date, Batul presented as his first witness, Board of Election Inspectors chairperson Brenda Landicho, who testified that some ballots do not bear her signature as BEI chairperson. Batul filed a motion to allow him to present 49 more BEI chairpersons to testify on the genuineness of the signatures of the BEI chairpersons on the revised ballots, but such was denied. Batul’s filed a motion to allow fifty (50) BEI chairpersons to testify on the signatures appearing at the back of the ballots from the precincts where "reversals" were found during revision,k but the same was also denied. Thereafter, Batul filed his formal Offer of Evidence with Tender of Excluded Evidence, pointing out that the 50 BEI chairpersons would have testified on the genuineness of the signatures appearing at the back of the revised ballots where "there were discrepancies between the election returns and the tally sheets on one hand, and the physical count of the ballots during revision on the other." Bayron filed his Comment/Objections to Batul’s Offer of Evidence. Finally, The Comelec ordered to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the 21 May 2001 proclamation of FERNANDO U. BATUL as Vice-Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, and asked Vice-Mayor Fernando U. Batul to vacate the Office of the Vice-Mayor, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, and to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office. Also, for the Deputy Executive Director of the Commission to implement this Resolution and to furnish a copy thereof to the Office of the President of the Philippines, the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, the Office of the Governor, Palawan, and to the Office of the Secretary of the local Sangguniang Panglungsod, Palawan. Bayron took his oath and assumed the position of vice-mayor of Puerto Princesa City on 22 July 2003. The Issues (1) In G.R. No. 157687, Batul contends that the COMELEC First Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in (1) issuing orders denying Batul’s right to present evidence on his behalf; and (2) considering the case submitted for resolution without giving Batul the opportunity to present testimonial (and other evidence) on his behalf, in violation of his right to due process. (2) In G.R. No. 158959, Batul contends that the COMELEC executed its Decision despite his pending motion for reconsideration in violation of COMELEC Rules of Procedure and contrary to applicable jurisprudence. The Ruling The petitions are bereft of merit. (1) NO. Section 2, Rule 17 shows that it is merely directory and confers upon the COMELEC the discretion to change the order of hearing for special reasons. This is in keeping with the nature of election contests, which unlike ordinary civil actions, are clothed with public interest. Election contests involve the adjudication not only of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also of paramount public interest considering the need to dispel uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate The COMELEC First Division correctly exercised its discretion in refusing to hear all 50. BEI chairpersons, as this would not have been feasible and practical given the remaining time until the next election. Moreover, a formal trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all situations essential to due process. It is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present evidence on which a fair decision can be based. Batul was in fact given an opportunity to substantiate his charge of multiple substitution of ballots at the hearing where BEI chairperson Landicho testified. Batul also submitted an exhaustive memorandum to support his charge. Verily, "to be heard" does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court. One may also be heard through pleadings and where opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process. (2) As to election cases involving regional, provincial, and city officials, which fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC, Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution vests the COMELEC with the authority to promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including preproclamation controversies. Additionally, Section 52(c), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code empowers the COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of the Code or other laws which it is required to enforce and administer. There is no reason why the public policy underlying the suppletory application of Section 2 – to obviate a hollow victory for the duly elected candidate as determined by either the courts or the COMELEC – should not apply with equal force to election contests involving city and provincial officials. The primary reason advanced by Batul – that Section 2 does not apply to election contests involving city, provincial and regional officials, simply because these cases are originally cognizable by the COMELEC – cannot negate this public policy. Such a reason cannot frustrate or further delay the assumption of public office by the lawful choice of the people as determined by the COMELEC. Batul did not contest the good reasons cited by the COMELEC First Division in granting immediate execution. Hence, we see no reason to discuss the COMELEC’S findings on this matter. In sum, the Court holds that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. 20. MAKALINTAL V COMELEC G.R. No. 157013 July 10, 2003 AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Facts: A petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Legal standing to sue is established in the petitioner’s capacity as taxpayer and has the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. The Court has held that they may assail the validity of a law appropriating public funds because expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The need to consider the constitutional issues raised before the Court is further buttressed by the fact that it is now more than fifteen years since the ratification of the 1987 Constitution requiring Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. Thus, strong reasons of public policy demand that the Court resolves the instant petition and determine whether Congress has acted within the limits of the Constitution or if it had gravely abused the discretion entrusted to it. Issues: (1) Whether or not RA 9189 is unconstitutional Ruling: The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;” (b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;” (c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: “The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval;” The phrase, “subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee” in the first sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May, 2004 elections; and the phrase, “only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee” found in the second paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as they require review and approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004 elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove the countries wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189. Otherwise, Congress would overstep the bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into the independence of the COMELEC. And (d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: “It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission” of the same law; for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the independence of constitutional commission, such as COMELEC. COMELEC agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 are unconstitutional. Like the petitioner, respondent COMELEC anchors its claim of unconstitutionality of said Sections upon Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution providing for the independence of the constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC. It asserts that its power to formulate rules and regulations has been upheld in Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr. where the Court held that the power of the COMELEC to formulate rules and regulations is implicit in its power to implement regulations under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution. COMELEC joins the petitioner in asserting that as an independent constitutional body, it may not be subject to interference by any government instrumentality and that only this Court may review COMELEC rules and only in cases of grave abuse of discretion. However, by vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional. The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with respect only to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged with Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution, where the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for president and vicepresident is vested in the Congress. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of president and vicepresident. In addition, the Court notes that Section 18.4 of the law, to wit: 18.4. . . . Immediately upon the completion of the canvass, the chairman of the Special Board of Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile, electronic mail, or any other means of transmission equally safe and reliable the Certificates of Canvass and the Statements of Votes to the Commission, . . . [Emphasis supplied] clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that the returns of every election for President and Vice-President shall be certified by the board of canvassers to Congress. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach “on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vicepresident and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.” The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD. Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. A simple, cursory reading of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 may indeed give the impression that it contravenes Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. Filipino immigrants and permanent residents overseas are perceived as having left and abandoned the Philippines to live permanently in their host countries and therefore, a provision in the law enfranchising those who do not possess the residency requirement of the Constitution by the mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intent to return to the Philippines within a given period, risks a declaration of unconstitutionality. However, the risk is more apparent than real. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. However, the members of the Constitutional Commission that they intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time. Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the “qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” is not physically present in the country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he has not actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law. Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law continues to be in full force and effect. 21. MARCOS YRA vs. MAXIMO ABANO G.R. No. L-30187, November 15, 1928 Malcolm, J. FACTS: Maximo Abano, respondent, is a native of the municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the proper age, he transferred to Manila to complete his education. While temporarily residing in Manila, Abano registered as a voter there. Shortly after qualifying as a member of the bar and after the death of his father, Abano returned to Meycauayan to live. From May 10, 1927, until the present, Abano has considered himself a resident of Meycauayan. When the 1928 elections were approaching, he made an application for cancellation of registration in Manila which was dated April 3, 1928, but this application was rejected by the city officials for the reason that it was not deposited in the mails on or before April 4, 1928. Nevertheless, Abano presented himself as a candidate for municipal president of Meycauayan in the 1928 elections and was elected by popular vote to that office. Petitioner, Marcos Yra, the vice-president elect of Meycauayan, Bulacan, challenged the right of respondent through a quo warranto proceeding on the ground that the respondent is ineligible. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is ineligible to hold a municipal office for the reason that he was not a qualified voter in his municipality. HELD: No. One of the qualifications required by law of a person who announces his candidacy is that he must be a duly qualified elector. The Executive Bureau has held that the term "qualified" when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter. To become a qualified candidate a person does not need to register as an elector. It is sufficient that he possesses all the qualifications prescribed in section 431 and none of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector in the municipality does not deprive him of the right to become a candidate to be voted for. 22. AKBAYAN Youth v. COMELEC G.R. No. 147066 March 26, 2001 Buena, J. Facts: Herein petitioners seek to direct the COMELEC to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001 General Elections, of new voters ages 18-21 due to the failure of around four (4) million youth to register on or before December 27, 2000, the deadline set by COMELEC under RA No. 8189 or Voter’s Registration Act of 1996. Senator Raul Roco as Chairman of the Committee on Electoral Reforms, Suffrage, and People’s Participation, through a Letter invited the COMELEC to a public hearing discussing the extension of said registration. Commissioners Luzmininda Tancangco and Ralph Lantion submitted a memorandum giving restrictive parameters based on t he Report on the request for an extended registration. COMELEC in its resolution dated February 8, 2001, it resolves to deny the request to conduct said extension. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Supreme Court to declare Sec. 8 of RA No. 8189 unconstitutional and to direct COMELEC to conduct a special registration for new voters. Michelle Betito also filed a petition for mandamus. The Court resolved to consolidate the two petitions. On March 16, 2001, the Solicitor General recommended an additional continuing registration of voters be conducted at the soonest possible time. ISSUES 1. Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing COMELEC resolution dated February 8, 2001? 2. Can the Supreme Court compel the COMELEC to conduct a special registration of new voters after December 27, 2000, COMELEC’s imposed deadline and before the May 14, 2001 General elections, through a writ of mandamus? HELD 1. No. The COMELEC, in denying the request of the petitioners, acted within the bounds and confines of the applicable law on the matter—Sec. 8 of RA No. 8189. Sec. 29 of RA No. 8436 as invoked by the petitioners and Sec. 8 of RA No. 8189 as answered by COMELEC are far from contradicting each other. The Supreme Court held that Sec 29 of RA No. 8189 applies in the present case, upholding the assailed COMELEC resolution and denying the petitions. Sec. 29 of RA No. 8436 would come into play in cases where the pre-election acts are susceptible of performance within the available period prior the election day. COMELEC exercised a prerogative that falls squarely within the proper sphere of its constitutionally mandated powers. The right of suffrage ought to be exercised within the bounds of the Constitution and must properly yield to pertinent laws enacted by the Legislature. It is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements in the Constitution, statute and repositories of law. The right to vote is conditioned upon the process of registration under RA No. 8189. The State may enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voter’s registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful election. 2. No. The remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act. The Court’s function is to check whether or not the government branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction as explained in Bayan v. Exec. Secretary Zamora. 23. BAUTISTA V COMELEC, G.R. No. 133840 November 13, 1998 Melo, j: For quick recall: “nuisance candidate” “Efren and Edwin” Doctrine: Sec. 69, Omnibus Election Code: COMELEC may motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of if (1) filed for mockery or disrepute; (2) will confusion; (3) or there is no bona fide intention to run. Trivia: Edwin was a tricycle driver, and worse, a drug addict, has no personal funds to support his campaign, and was really known as “Boboy Tarugo”. Petitioner Cipriano "Efren" Bautista and private respondent Miguelita del Rosario were duly registered candidates for Mayor of Navotas in the May 11, 1998 elections. Edwin "Efren" Bautista, hereinafter referred to as Edwin Bautista, also filed a certificate of candidacy at the very last minute of the last day, (midnight) Mar. 27, 1997. Apr. 1, 1998 – Efren filed a petition to declare Edwin a nuisance candidate. Apr. 30 – COMELEC declared Edwin a nuisance candidate & ordered cancellation of his COC. The name of Edwin Bautista was not included in the list of candidates for mayor. May 8 – Edwin filed a motion for reconsideration. May 10 – Election Officer of Navotas issued a directive to the board of election inspectors (BEI) to include Edwin in the certified list of candidates. On the afternoon of the same day, this Election Officer recalled his derective bec. Edwin’s MR is pending resolution. Bec. of the conflicting directives, NCR Regional Election Director instructed BEI to tally separately the votes for "EFREN BAUTISTA", "EFREN", "E. BAUTISTA" and "BAUTISTA". COMELEC chairman affirmed said instructions. In a memo, the chairman directed the BEI to "proceed with the counting of the votes for local officials excluding the votes cast for 'Bautista', 'Efren' and 'Efren Bautista' as stray but to segregate such stray votes into a separate improvised tally sheet in order to count the total stray votes." May 13 – COMELEC denied Edwin’s MR and upheld that he was a nuisance candidate. When they started canvassing the election returns, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Navotas refused to canvass as part of the valid votes of Efren the separate tallies of ballots voting for "EFREN BAUTISTA", "EFREN", "E. BAUTISTA", and "BAUTISTA". May 20 – Efren filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Declare Illegal the Proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers. COMELEC ruled that the Board of Canvassers, in not including the “Bautista stray votes”, was correct and NOT an illegal proceeding. The duty of the Board of Canvassers is only to canvass what is on the face of the election returns and not to go beyond it. Obviously, the stray votes in the separate tally sheet cannot be said to be entries in the election returns. Section 211 (4) of the Omnibus Election Code provides that “(w)hen two or more words are written on the same line on the ballot all of which are the surnames of two or more candidates, the same shall not be counted for any of them, unless one is a surname of an incumbent who has served for at least one year in which case it shall be counted in favor of the latter.” W/N COMELEC should include the “Bautista stray votes” as part of the valid votes of petitioner YES. Extreme caution should be observed before any ballot is invalidated. In the appreciation of ballots, doubts are resolved in favor of their validity (Silverio vs. Castro, 19 SCRA 521 [1967]). The votes separately tallied are not really stray votes. Factual circumstances and logic dictate that the "Bautista stray votes" refer to only one candidate, Efren. Such votes could not have been intended for Edwin, who was declared a nuisance candidate1, was allegedly known as a mere tricycle driver and worse, a drug addict, and shown as a candidate with no political line-up, no personal funds that could have supported this own campaign, and no accomplishments which may be noted and considered by the public, as against2 a known former public officer who had served the people of Navotas as barangay official, councilor, and as vice-mayor. To rule other wise will definitely result in the disenfranchisement of the will of the electorate. COMELEC is therefore directed to order the inclusion, as part of the valid votes of petitioner, the “Bautista stray votes”. 1 Edwin was found to be a nuisance candidate in acc. with sec. 69 of the Omnibus Election Code. (1) He was running under the name of Edwin "Efren" Bautista, when it had been established that he was really known as "Boboy" or "Boboy Tarugo". (2) The fact that he has no political lineup and had no funds to support his campaign expenses, and the fact that he "has not demonstrated any accomplishment/achievement in his twenty-six (26) years of existence as a person that would surely attract the electorate to choose him as their representative in government" demonstrate that he had no bona fide intention of running for the office. 2 Petitioner previously held under his name Cipriano and appellation "Efren”, various elective positions in 1962, 1970, and 1980. He is also a duly registered Naval Architect and Marine Engineer, and a member of various civic organizations such as the Rotary Club of Navotas.