People v. Willie Peralta Wilfredo Peralta alias “Willie” guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer an imprisonment term of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Chief PNP Inspector Arthur Rivera the sum of One Hundred Eighty Four Thousand Seven Hundred Fifteen Pesos (P184,715.00) as actual damages, Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) in moral damages, and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) in indemnity damages. ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the herein accused WILFREDO PERALTA (a.k.a.) WILLIE, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as Principal in the crime of Murder charged in this case, and said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of RECLUSION PERPETUA Issues THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION’S WITNESSES NOTWITHSTANDING SERIOUS FLAWS, CONTRADICTIONS AND INCOHERENCE (IN) THE TESTIMONIES AS TO THE IDENTITY AND PARTICIPATION OF ACCUSED IN THE KILLING OF MAJOR ARTHUR RIVERA. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVINCING (sic) THE ACCUSED DESPITE CLEAR ABSENCE OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. Held Devoid of Merit Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses lies within the province and competence of trial courts. Said doctrine is based on the time-honored rule that the matter of “assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in the light of the declarant’s demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial and is thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate between truth and falsehood. Thus, appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses, unless it be clearly shown that the lower court had over looked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances of significance in the case A review of the records of this case shows that the trial court did not err in giving credence to the testimonies of the witnesses. Conrado Capitulo, who saw the gunman up close, was very categorical and frank in his testimony. He identified accused Wilfredo Peralta as the man who shot Major Rivera. The defense also failed to impute any ill-motive on said witness which would discredit his positive identification of the accused. Absent any reason or motive for a prosecution witness to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such proper motive exists and his testimony is thus worthy of full faith and credit This Court has held that discrepancies between the affidavit and the testimony of the witness in open court do not necessarily impair the credibility of the testimony, since affidavits are usually taken ex parte and are often incomplete for lack of searching inquiries by the investigating officer Between alibi and positive identification, this Court has given weight in favor of identification especially when it is categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness to impute so grave a wrong on the accused.[86] Alibi is inherently weak and generally not given much credence by the courts due to the facility with which it can be concocted Emmanuel Pontejos v. Office of the Ombudsman & Restituto Aquino Before us is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following are respectfully recommended, thus: ‘1.That an Information for Estafa (one count) be filed against respondent EMMANUEL T. PONTEJOS before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; ‘2. That an Information for Direct Bribery be filed against respondent Atty. EMMANUEL T. PONTEJOS before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; ‘3. That an Information for Unauthorized Practice of Profession in violation of R.A. 6713 be filed against Atty. EMMANUEL T. PONTEJOS before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City; and ‘4. That the complaint against Director WILFREDO I. IMPERIAL and RODERICK NGO be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence; and ‘5. That respondent CARMENCITA ATOS Y. RUIZ be extended immunity from criminal prosecution in accordance with Section 17 of R.A. 6770 and be utilized as a state witness.’"5 The Review and Recommendation disapproved Assistant City Prosecutor De Guzman’s recommendation to amend the Information for estafa by including Atos as a co-accused; while the Order denied reconsideration. Aquino accused Pontejos and Atos of conspiring to exact money in exchange for a favorable decision of a case against Roderick Ngo then pending in the HLURB. The respondents filed separate CounterAffidavits to refute the charges.10 They claimed that the meetings mentioned by Aquino did not take place. Neither did they receive any money from him. The Overall Deputy Ombudsman found probable cause against Pontejos for the crimes of estafa, direct bribery and illegal practice of profession in violation of RA 6713 The criminal cases for estafa and direct bribery against Pontejos were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.28 On May 13, 1999, Pontejos filed a Motion for Reinvestigation The March 14, 2003 Order denied reconsideration. Thereafter, Pontejos filed this Petition. Petitioner raises the following issues Ombudsman erred in not declaring that petitioner was denied due process Ombudsman was tainted with ill motives amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction the Ombudsman erred in singling out petitioner Ombudsman erred in giving weight to the Affidavit dated 18 February 1999 of Ms. Atos despite an earlier affidavit which totally contradicts her averments therein. The Petition is unmeritorious. Probable cause, Instances when this Court may intervene in the prosecution of cases. Brocka v. Enrile38 cited some of these exceptions, as follows: (1) when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied. The OMB’s authority to grant immunity is subject to the "pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court." He claims that the procedural rules allow the discharge of an accused as state witness only upon conformity of the trial court.57 An information against the accused must first be filed in court prior to the discharge. Moreover, the prosecution could only recommend and propose, but not grant immunity.58 The pertinent provision of the Rules of Court reads: "Sec. 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. –When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that: ‘(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; ‘(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; ‘(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; ‘(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and ‘(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. ‘Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.’"59 The Court has already held that this provision is applicable only to cases already filed in court.60 The trial court is given the power to discharge an accused as a state witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused The alleged denial of due process is controverted by the facts. It appears from the records that Pontejos eventually received a copy of the aforementioned Affidavit.67 More importantly, he had challenged the Affidavit in his Motion for Reinvestigation68 and request for reconsideration of the Review and Recommendation of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman.69 Pontejos’ contention must necessarily fail because -- as shown -- he had the opportunity to be heard and in fact, availed of it. As a final note, Pontejos has made it appear that the criminal cases filed against him were based on ill motives. His arguments challenge the evidence gathered. It is readily apparent that these arguments should be raised as defenses during the trial, not in the present Petition. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED Teofisto Guingona v. CA This case is an offshoot of the investigation conducted by the government in the last quarter of 1995, which delved into the alleged participation of national and local officials in jueteng and other forms of illegal gambling For review on certiorari to partially set aside the June 28, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals Premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for want of merit, and the injunction issued against respondent judges from hearing the criminal actions against petitioner is hereby LIFTED Court of Appeals upheld the justice secretary’s denial on January 11, 1996 of private respondent’s Petition for Reconsideration of Admittance of Potenciano A. Roque to the Witness Protection Program. From the explicit terms of the statute, it is at once apparent that the presence of such corroborative evidence is sine qua non to a witness’ admission into the Program. Being in the nature of a condition precedent [to] his admission into the Program, the existence of such corroborative evidence must be shown at the time his application for admission is being evaluated. In its Decision, Respondent Court addressed mainly the issue of whether the secretary of justice acted in excess of his jurisdiction (a) in admitting Petitioner Roque into the Program and (b) in excluding him from the Informations filed against private respondent. Private respondent contended that Roque’s admission was illegal on two grounds: first, his testimony could not be substantially corroborated in its material points; and second, he appeared to be the most guilty or at least more guilty than private respondent, insofar as the crimes charged in the Informations were concerned. Respondent Court also ruled that RA 6981 contemplates two kinds of witnesses: (a) a witness who has perceived or has knowledge of, or information on, the commission of a crime under Section 3; and (b) a particeps criminis or a participant in the crime under Section 10. On the first issue, Respondent Court initially ruled that, by express provision of Sections 3 and 10, the requirement of corroboration is a condition precedent to admission into the Program. Respondent Court upheld herein petitioners’ alternative position that substantial corroboration was nevertheless actually provided by Angelito Sanchez’ and retired Gen. Lorenzo M. Mateo’s testimonies. Hence, it disposed in favor of the government. Subsequently, this petition was filed Whether or not a witness’ testimony requires prior or simultaneous corroboration at the time he is admitted into the witness protection, security and benefit program. As noted earlier, this petition is unusual and unique. Despite ruling in their favor, Respondent Court is assailed by petitioners for opining that admission to the Program requires prior or simultaneous corroboration of the material points in the witness’ testimony “Sec. 10. State Witness. Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and desires to be a witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be admitted into the Program whenever the following are present his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points The petition must fail, because the facts and the issue raised by petitioners do not warrant the exercise of judicial power The Constitution provides that judicial power “includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable Courts have no authority to pass upon issues through advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems [10] or friendly suits collusively arranged between parties without real adverse interests. [11] Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. As a condition precedent to the exercise of judicial power, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts the government is in effect asking this Court to render an advisory opinion on what the government prosecutors should do – when, how and whom to grant or to deny admission into the Program It is urged that they [the provisions of RA 6918] constitute ‘xxx an intrusion into judicial prerogative for it is only the court which has the power under the Rules on Criminal Procedure to discharge an accused as a state witness.’ The argument is based on Section 9, Rule 119 which gives the court the prerogative to approve the discharge of an accused to be a state witness. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference the decision on whether to prosecute and whom to indict is executive in character. Only when an information, charging two or more persons with a certain offense, has already been filed in court will Rule 119, Section 9 of the Rules of Court Finally, an accurate reading of the assailed Decision will further enlighten petitioners as to its true message. Respondent Court did sustain Roque’s admission into the Program -- even as it held that the first contention of petitioners was untenable -- based on the latter’s alternative argument that Roque’s testimony was sufficiently corroborated by that of General Mateo The petition is hereby DENIED FREDESMINDA DAYAWON, complainant, vs. JUDGE ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN In a verified letter-complaint dated June 25, 1999, complainant Fredesminda Dayawon charged Judge Zeida Aurora B. Garfin of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Iriga City, Branch II, with ignorance of the law and serious misconduct relative to Criminal Case Nos. 20420, 20424, 20426 and 20428, all entitled “People of the Philippines v. Fredesminda Dayawon.” Judge Garfin allegedly convicted complainant, who was the accused in said cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, without conducting a trial on the merits. As a result, complainant was deprived of her day in court and was found guilty of the crime charged without due process of law. Apparently, Judge Garfin simultaneously resolved complainant’s motion to dismiss and the criminal cases on the merits without setting the cases for trial. Petitioner appealed the judgment to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) her grounds the fact that no trial was conducted Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, Judge Garfin filed her comment,[7] wherein she explained that during pre-trial of the criminal cases, complainant admitted having issued the bouncing checks and signified her desire to enter into a compromise agreement. However, upon the instance of her new counsel, she instead filed a motion to dismiss and, claimed that the full obligation had already been paid. Hence, Judge Garfin set the motion to dismiss for hearing, after which the prosecution and defense filed their respective memoranda. Judge Garfin further emphasized that with the admission made by complainant that she issued the bad checks, the burden of proving that she did not violate Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shifted to her. Since there is no specific provision in the Rules of Court governing such a remedial situation, she applied Section 6, Rule 135, to wit: The OCA’s (office of the court administrator) recommendation is well-taken. Any judge should know that before an accused can be convicted of a crime charged, it is essential that he be given the chance to refute the allegations against him in a proper trial on the merits and not simply in a hearing on an incident of the case such as a motion to quash. The Rules of Court prescribe the procedure to be followed in criminal cases and respondent judge was not at liberty to disregard the rules on the flimsy excuse that the peculiarity of the criminal cases required the application of any suitable proceeding in accordance with Section 6 of Rule 135. Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. – When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules.” It is clear from the foregoing that the accused was indeed denied of her right to due process. All throughout the aforesaid proceedings, the accused was made to believe that what was being litigated was her motion to dismiss SEC. 3. Order of Trial. – xxx xxx xxx (e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly. Conformably, a modified order of trial is authorized whenever an accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense. This does not mean, however, that in such a case, trial could be dispensed with altogether. A judge must nonetheless ascertain whether the defense put up by the accused could withstand judicial scrutiny. In other words, while the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to an extenuating circumstance, the trial court is still duty-bound to establish that the accused, in fact, did not incur any liability relative to his admission. Needless to say, a regular trial on the merits is necessary for this purpose. Furthermore, it was not for respondent judge to unilaterally determine that the entire case was submitted for decision without giving complainant the opportunity to submit, or at the very least, manifest if she had additional evidence to prove her innocence. Granting that complainant was accorded the chance to offer proof as to the alleged payment in support of her motion to dismiss, it remained incumbent upon respondent judge to notify complainant that the case will be decided on the merits. An accused in a criminal case must not be precluded from availing of every option allowed by the rules to adduce evidence in his defense. In this case, respondent judge deprived complainant of this opportunity when she adopted procedural shortcuts and decided the criminal cases without conducting a trial on the merits. A judge should observe the usual and traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he should hear both sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum.[14] In this regard, he must neither sacrifice for expediency’s sake the fundamental requirements of due process nor forget that he must conscientiously endeavor each time to seek the truth, to know and aptly apply the law, and to dispose of the controversy objectively and impartially. [15] The fundamental right of an accused to due process must not be readily sacrificed in favor of the speedy resolution of cases. The latter would indeed be meaningless if it were the result of arbitrary conduct or procedure. Contrary to respondent judge’s claim, there is no showing that complainant consented to submit the cases for decision without a trial When the ignorance of a judge is so gross, he is administratively liable even if he acted in good faith. [16] In the case at bar, while there seems to be no proof that respondent judge acted maliciously in precipitately deciding the criminal cases against complainant, her lapses cannot simply be ignored considering that the same pertained to an application of basic procedural rules which she is bound to know and observe. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Judge Zeida Aurora B. Garfin is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and is ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of P10,000.00. She is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO VERCELES, FELIX CORPUZ, MAMERTO SORIANO (At large), PABLO RAMOS (At large), and JERRY SORIANO (State Witness), accused, MARIO VERCELES and FELIX CORPUZ, accused-appellants. Accused Mario Verceles alias “Baldog”, Felix Corpuz, Mamerto Soriano alias “Merto”, Pablo Ramos and Jerry Soriano were charged with the crime of Robbery with Rape The trial court subsequently discharged accused Jerry Soriano and received his testimony as state witness. According to Soriano, on October 18, 1996, the five accused boarded a tricycle owned by Mario Verceles to visit his cousin in barangay Goliso, located at the boundary of Urbiztondo The prosecution witness Maribeth Bolito testified that on October 19, 1996 at around 2:00 in the morning, she was awakened by a man fondling her breast and other private parts Accused Felix Corpuz and Mario Verceles interposed the instant appeal. They alleged that the trial court erred in discharging Jerry Soriano as a state witness, in appreciating conspiracy among the accused, in not considering as mitigating circumstance the voluntary surrender of Mario Verceles, and in awarding damages to the private complainants. The appeal lacks merit. Accused-appellants contend that the discharge of Jerry Soriano did not comply with the requirements of the Rules of Court. They contend that Soriano’s testimony does not constitute direct evidence; at most, it was circumstantial in nature and of minuscule importance.[10] Moreover, Jerry Soriano was the most guilty for he admitted his guilt with regard to the commission of the crime together with Mamerto Soriano.[11] The requirements for the discharge and utilization of an accused as a state witness are enumerated in Rule 119, Section 17[12] of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz: a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the accused; c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. The trial court did not err in discharging Jerry Soriano to be utilized as a state witness. First, the testimony of Jerry Soriano was absolutely necessary as the prosecution has no direct evidence to prove the identity of the malefactors Mamerto Soriano, Felix Corpuz, Mario Verceles and Pablo Ramos. Second, Jerry Soriano’s testimony was corroborated in its material points by other prosecution witnesses and physical evidence Jerry Soriano does not appear to be the most guilty for he was not a co-conspirator in the robbery with rape. He merely accompanied the accused and received three hundred pesos as his share in the proceeds of the sale of the stolen properties. Granting ex gratia argumenti that not all the requisites of a valid discharge are present, the improper discharge of an accused will not render inadmissible his testimony nor detract from his competency as a witness. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision finding accused-appellants Mario Verceles and Felix Corpuz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape punished under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is reduced from P200,000.00 to P50,000.00; the award of exemplary damages is DELETED for lack of basis and the sum of P50,000.00 is awarded for civil indemnity. RIMBERTO T. SALVANERA, Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and LUCITA PARANE, Respondents. On appeal are the Decision dated April 30, 1999 and the two Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, dated September 22, 1999 and May 11, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 46945. The Court of Appeals discharged accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from the Information in Criminal Case No. TM-1730 for Murder, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Trece Martires City, to become state witnesses. The appellate court likewise cancelled the bail bond of petitioner Rimberto Salvanera. petitioner Rimberto Salvanera, together with Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay and Domingo Tampelix, is charged with the murder of Ruben Parane, committed as follows: RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN RENDERING THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD ASSAILED ORDERS DEFYING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE THEREON WHEN IT RULED THAT THE "SUBSTANTIAL CORROBORATION" REQUIREMENT UNDER SECTION 9, RULE 119 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT WAS SATISFIED BY THE PROSECUTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT A. THE "SUBSTANTIAL CORROBORATION" REQUIREMENT MUST BE SATISFIED THROUGH THE TESTIMONY OF THE OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES WHO ARE NOT AN (sic) ACCUSED SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED AS STATE WITNESS, NOT BY ANOTHER ACCUSED LIKEWISE SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED. B. THE SWORN STATEMENT OF AN ACCUSED SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED CANNOT BE USED AS EVIDENCE FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN HIS OWN DISCHARGE PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE BY A COMPETENT COURT OF THE ORDER OF HIS DISCHARGE. C. THE TESTIMONIES OF ABUTIN AND TAMPELIX CANNOT BE SUBSTANTIALLY CORROBORATED IN ITS MATERIAL POINTS BY THE OTHER PROSECUTION WITNESSES. D. THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY AN ACCUSED SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED AS STATE WITNESS CANNOT BE USED TO CORROBORATE THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY ANOTHER ACCUSED LIKEWISE SOUGHT TO BE DISCHARGED AS STATE WITNESS. II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN RENDERING THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD ASSAILED ORDERS, DEFYING LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER, WHEN IT CANCELLED PETITIONER'S BAIL BOND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT JUDGE ALREADY RULED THAT THE EVIDENCE OF HIS GUILT IS NOT STRONG.3 We uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals. In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following conditions must be present, namely: (1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense; (2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case; (3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge; (4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and (5) The trial court is satisfied that: a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and, e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.4 According to petitioner, the testimony of an accused sought to be discharged to become a state witness must be substantially corroborated, not by a co-accused likewise sought to be discharged, but by other prosecution witnesses who are not the accused in the same criminal case. Petitioner justifies this theory on the general principles of justice and sound logic. He contends that it is a notorious fact in human nature that a culprit, confessing a crime, is likely to put the blame on others, if by doing so, he will be freed from any criminal responsibility Thus, in the instant case, petitioner supposes that both Abutin and Tampelix will naturally seize the opportunity to be absolved of any liability by putting the blame on one of their co-accused. Petitioner argues that prosecution witnesses Parane and Salazar, who are not accused, do not have personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the alleged conspiracy. Thus, they could not testify to corroborate the statement of Abutin and Tampelix that petitioner is the mastermind or the principal by induction. We agree with the Court of Appeals in dismissing this reasoning as specious. To require the two witnesses Parane and Salazar to corroborate the testimony of Abutin and Tampelix on the exact same points is to render nugatory the other requisite that "there must be no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of the state witness." In Chua v. Court of Appeals,9 we ruled that the trial court has to rely on the information offered by the public prosecutor as to who would best qualify as a state witness. The prosecutor knows the evidence in his possession and the witnesses he needs to establish his case. In Mapa v. Sandiganbayan,10 we held: The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power should be exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute. For fairness demands that courts keep the scales of justice at equipoise between and among all litigants. Due process demands that courts should strive to maintain the legal playing field perfectly even and perpetually level. . The grant of petitioner’s application for bail is premature. It has to await the testimony of state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix. Their testimonies must be given their proper weight in determining whether the petitioner is entitled to bail. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46945, dated April 30, 1999, September 22, 1999 and May 11, 2000, respectively, are AFFIRMED in toto. CRISTETA CHUA-BURCE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Subject of the present appeal by certiorari is the decision dated November 27, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 12037, (a) affirming in toto the trial court’s decision finding petitioner guilty of estafa, and (b) denying her Motion for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated March 25, 1993. The Regional Trial Court, On August 16, 1985, Ramon Rocamora, the Manager (of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Calapan Branch, Oriental Mindoro) requested Fructuoso Peñaflor, Assistant Cashier, to conduct a physical bundle count of the cash inside the vault, which should total P4,000,000.00, more or less. During this initial cash count, they discovered a shortage of fifteen bundles of One Hundred Pesos denominated bills totalling P150,000.00. The One Hundred Peso bills actually counted was P3,850,000.00 as against the balance of P4,000,000.00 in the Cash in Vault (CIV) Summary Sheet, or a total shortage of P150,000.00. The next day, to determine if there was actually a shortage, a reverification of the records and documents of the transactions in the bank was conducted. There was still a shortage of P150,000.00. "COMES NOW, the accused, assisted by counsel, and unto this Honorable Court most respectfully submits this Pre-Trial agreement: 1. That the evidence already adduced by the plaintiff in Civil Case No. R-3733 will be adopted by the prosecution as its evidence in Criminal Case No. C-2313; 2. That the evidence to be adduced by the defendant in Civil Case No. R-3733 will also be adopted as evidence for the defense in Criminal Case No. C-2313. WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is prayed that the foregoing pre-trial agreement be admitted in compliance with the Order of this Court dated April 19, 1988. Pursuant to the pre-trial agreement, the public prosecutor filed a Motion to Adopt Evidence.[9] Both the pre-trial agreement and said Motion were granted by the trial court.[ WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff Metrobank, ordering defendants Cristeta Chua-Burce and Antonio Burce, spouses, to pay Metrobank the amount of P150,000.00 representing the amount misappropriated with the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from August 15, 1985 until fully paid and to pay the costs of suit. Petitioner seasonably appealed Petitioner raises the following issues:[14] 1. IS THE RESULT OF POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE? 2. CAN THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ADMIT IN EVIDENCE THE EVIDENCE WHICH WAS ALREADY DENIED ADMISSION IN THE ORDER OF THE FORMER JUDGE OF THE SAME COURT? 3. DOES PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF MISAPPROPRIATION OR CONVERSION EXISTS (sic) AGAINST THE PETITIONER WHEN THERE WERE OTHER PERSONS WHO HAD DIRECT AND GREATER ACCESS IN THE CASH-IN-VAULT? 4. IS RULE 111 SECTION 2 (a) OF THE REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE APPLICABLE IN (sic)THE CASE AT BAR? 5. WAS THERE A VALID PROCEEDING WHEN THE FISCAL WAS NOT ACTUALLY PRESENT AND DID NOT CONTROL AND SUPERVISE THE PROSECUTION OF THE CASE? Exsm The crucial issues, in our mind, are (1) whether there was a valid trial of the criminal case, and (2) whether the elements of the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code were duly proven beyond reasonable doubt. Kycalr The records clearly show that the pre-trial agreement was prepared by petitioner with the conforme of the public prosecutor. Thereafter, petitioner filed a consolidated memorandum for both civil and criminal cases. Section 5 of Rule 110[15] requires that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The rationale behind the rule is "to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private persons. This is allowed under Section 2 (e) of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court[17] which provides that during pre-trial conference, the parties shall consider "such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial." The parties, in compliance with Section 4 of Rule 118,[18] reduced to writing such agreement. Petitioner, her counsel, and the public prosecutor signed the agreement. Petitioner is bound by the pre-trial agreement, and she cannot now belatedly disavow its contents.[ The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code are:[23] (1) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (2) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it or a denial on his part that he received it; (3) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another and (4) that there be demand for the return of the property Petitioner herein being a mere cash custodian had no juridical possession over the missing funds. Hence, the element of juridical possession being absent, petitioner cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa under Article 315, No. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code.[29] WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is ordered RELEASED from custody unless she is being held for some other lawful cause. No costs. SIXTO M. BAYAS and ERNESTO T. MATUDAY, petitioners, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, respondents. May pretrial stipulations duly signed by the accused and their counsel be unilaterally withdrawn before the commencement of the trial? To this main issue, the answer is “No.” Stipulations freely and voluntarily made are valid and binding and will not be set aside unless for good cause. The Rules of Court mandate parties in a criminal case to stipulate facts. Once they have validly and voluntarily signed the stipulations, the accused and their counsel may not set these aside on the mere pretext that they may be placed at a disadvantage during the trial. Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying for the setting aside of the April 28, 2000 On May 6, 1999, three Informations[6] were filed before the SBN, charging Petitioners Ernesto T. Matuday and Sixto M. Bayas with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, as amended; and two counts of malversation through falsification penalized under Article 217 During their arraignment on September 21, 1999, petitioners pled “not guilty.” The pretrial conference scheduled on October 15, 1999 was cancelled and reset to November 5, 1999, because the counsel for the accused, Atty. Jose M. Molintas, was not prepared.[7] On November 5, 1999, the pretrial was again cancelled because of the absence of Atty. Molintas, who was allegedly “suffering from the flu.” Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan urged the accused to discuss with their counsel the stipulation of facts drafted by Ombudsman Prosecutor II Evelyn T. Lucero. They were asked to do so, so that at the resumption of the pretrial on December 10, 1999, they could expeditiously pass upon all other matters that still remained to be resolved.[8] JOINT STIPULATION OF FACTS AND DOCUMENTS “COME NOW the accused, counsel for the accused and the Prosecution, by and through the undersigned Special Prosecution Officer, Office of the Special Prosecutor, unto the Honorable Court, most respectfully aver: THAT “1. After a conference the Defense and the Prosecution admitted the following facts as follows: “a. Accused Ernesto Matuday was then the Municipal Mayor and accused Sixto Bayas was and [is] still the Municipal Treasurer and designated Municipal Accountant both of Kabayan, Benguet during the period relevant to this case; “b. Both of the accused admit the disbursement of the amount of P510,000.00 and P55,000.00. “2. The Prosecution and Defense jointly admit the following documents as their respective documentary exhibits x x x ([with] reservation to mark additional exhibits during the trial of the case) The Sandiganbayan justified its denial of petitioners’ Motion to Withdraw Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents in this wise: “x x x. [For] the fact that there [was] express statement from Atty. Rogelio A. Cortes this morning that neither fraud nor any other mistake of a serious character vitiated the consent of the parties when they affixed their conformity to the stipulations of facts, the reason put forth by the accused or movant’s counsel at this time, is that if these stipulations were to remain, then the accused might as well not present any evidence on the entire accusation against him as this will already be supported by the evidence on record. While the court, indeed, sees this as a possibility, that, by itself, is not a ground for withdrawing any stipulation freely and knowingly made and given.”[10] In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for the Court’s consideration: “I Whether or not respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioners’ Motion to Withdraw the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents, considering the relevant facts and applicable laws and rules. “II Whether or not the denial by respondent Sandiganbayan of the withdrawal of the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents would result in manifest injustice and impairment of the constitutional rights of the petitioners. “III Whether or not there is a law or rule which would bar petitioners from withdrawing their Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents from the respondent Sandiganbayan.”[13] The Petition has no merit Petitioners contend that pretrial stipulations may be unilaterally withdrawn by the accused because allegedly, they are not binding until after the trial court has issued a pretrial order approving them. We are not persuaded. Petitioners fail to appreciate the indispensable role of stipulations in the speedy disposition of cases. The new Rules on Criminal Procedure mandate parties to agree on matters of facts, issues and evidence. Such stipulations are greatly favored because they simplify, shorten or settle litigations in a faster and more convenient manner. They save costs, time and resources of the parties and, at the same time, help unclog court dockets. Once validly entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for good cause While petitioners wish to be relieved from the stipulations, they, however, do not allege that these were false or misleading or were obtained through force or fraud. On the contrary, they do not dispute the finding of the anti-graft court that no fraud or serious mistake vitiated their and their counsel’s consent to the signing of these stipulations. They even admitted, in answer to its query, that they had freely given their consent. Nonetheless, in a desperate bid to strengthen their position, petitioners lay the blame on the alleged incompetence of their former counsel. In their effort to withdraw from the Joint Stipulation, petitioners argue that the two questioned items impair their constitutional right to be presumed innocent, violate their right against self-incrimination, and deny them due process in the sense that the trial would be a “useless formality, an idle ceremony. Sec. 2. Pre-trial agreement. -- All agreements or admissions made or entered [into] during the pretrial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court.”[28] Based on the foregoing provision, for a pretrial agreement to be binding on the accused, it must satisfy the following conditions: (1) the agreement or admission must be in writing, and (2) it must be signed by both the accused and their counsel. The court’s approval, mentioned in the last sentence of the above-quoted Section, is not needed to make the stipulations binding on the parties. Such approval is necessary merely to emphasize the supervision by the court over the case and to enable it to control the flow of the proceedings Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated Pretrial is meant to simplify, if not fully dispose of, the case at its early stage. It is therefore important that the parties take active roles in the proceedings. The Rules on Criminal Procedure provide that if the counsel for the accused and/or the prosecutor do not appear at the pretrial and do not offer an acceptable excuse for their lack of cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or penalties As already discussed, the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly made lies at the sound discretion of the court. Unless exercised with grave abuse, this discretion will not be disturbed on appeal.[39] There is “grave abuse of discretion” where “a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and so gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law. Petitioners in this case failed to prove that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing them to withdraw the stipulations that they had freely and voluntarily entered into WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Orders AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. MARILYN C. PASCUA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents What constitutes a valid promulgation in absentia? In case of such promulgation, when does the accused's right to appeal accrue? Before us is a petition that calls for a ruling on the aforestated issues, particularly seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 17, 1999 and its order dated September 28, 1999 denying reconsideration. the Court finds the accused, MARILYN C. PASCUA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of twenty six (26) counts of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 The judgment was initially scheduled for promulgation on March 31, 1998. However, considering that the presiding judge was on leave, the promulgation was reset to May 5, 1998 No motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal was filed by petitioner within 15 days from May 5, 1998. On June 8, 1998, a notice of change of address was filed by petitioner with the trial court, sent through a private messengerial firm Section 6. Promulgation of judgment. –The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court. If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city the judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court which rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal; provided, that if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed and resolved by the appellate court. The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. If the accused was tried in absentia because he jumped bail or escaped from prison, the notice to him shall be served at his last known address. In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel. If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice. (Italics supplied) Promulgation of judgment is an official proclamation or announcement of the decision of the cour the presence in person of the accused at the promulgation of judgment is mandatory in all cases except where the conviction is for a light offense, in which case the accused may appear through counsel or representative. Significantly, both versions of said section set forth the rules that become operative if the accused fails to appear at the promulgation despite due notice: (a) promulgation shall consist in the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused at his last known address or through his counsel; and (b) if the judgment is for conviction, and the accused's failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall further order the arrest of the accused. It thus appears that the judgment in a criminal case must be promulgated in the presence of the accused, except where it is for a light offense, in which case it may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative (Dimson v. Elepaño, 99 Phil. 733 [1956]), and except where the judgment is for acquittal, in which case the presence of the accused is not necessary Jurisprudence further dictates that the absence of counsel during the promulgation will not result in a violation of any substantial right of the accused, and will not affect the validity of the promulgation of the judgment Petitioner's first argument is devoid of merit. In the first place, her non- receipt of the notice of promulgation was due to her own failure to immediately file a notice of change of address with the trial court, which she clearly admitted. petitioner's second argument, petitioner has presented evidence sufficient to controvert the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty as regards the procedural requirement of the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket of the court. Attached to the petition is a piece of evidence that cannot be ignored by this Court We take judicial notice of said certification and hold that in view thereof, we cannot presume substantial compliance with the requirement of recording a judgment in the criminal docket. And in the absence of such compliance, there can be no valid promulgation. Without the same, the February 17, 1998 decision could not attain finality and become executory To register is to record or annotate. American and Spanish authorities are unanimous on the meaning of the term “to register” as "to enter in a register; to record formally and distinctly; to enroll; to enter in a list" Registration is a mere ministerial act by which a deed, contract, or instrument is sought to be inscribed in the records of the Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of title covering the land subject of the deed, contract, or instrument. Being a ministerial act, it must be performed in any case and, if it is not done, it may be ordered performed by a court of justice (Cruz, The Law of Public Officers, 1997 ed., p. 102). In fact, the public officer having this ministerial duty has no choice but to perform the specific action which is the particular duty imposed by law. Its purpose is to give notice thereof to all persons. the rules allow promulgation of judgment in absentia to obviate the situation where juridical process could be subverted by the accused jumping bail. But the Rules also provide measures to make promulgation in absentia a formal and solemn act so that the absent accused, wherever he may be, can be notified of the judgment rendered against him. We rule in the negative. Petitioner's later receipt of the copy of the decision does not in any way cure an invalid promulgation. And even if said decision be recorded in the criminal docket later, such piecemeal compliance with the Rules will still not validate the May 5, 1998 promulgation which was invalid at the time it was conducted. The express mention in the provision of both requirements for a valid promulgation in absentia clearly means that they indeed must concur. Finally, as regards the third argument, we agree with the Solicitor General that matters of sufficiency of evidence may not be passed upon in the herein proceedings. the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 17, 1999 decision and the September 28, 1999 order of the Court of Appeals are hereby set aside. The instant case is hereby remanded to the trial court for proper promulgation of its decision in accordance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. JUDITH YU, versus HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court We resolve the petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Judith Yu to enjoin respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 105, Quezon City, from taking further proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698 Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina Casaclang, an information for estafa against the petitioner was filed with the RTC. In a May 26, 2005 decision, the RTC convicted the petitioner as charged. It imposed on her a penalty of three (3) months of imprisonment (arresto mayor), a fine of P3,800,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment, and the payment of an indemnity to the Spouses Casaclang in the same amount as the fine.[2] The petitioner argues that the RTC lost jurisdiction to act on the prosecution’s motions when she filed her notice of appeal within the 15-day reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court, applying the “fresh period rule” enunciated in Neypes. The core issue boils down to whether the “fresh period rule” enunciated in Neypes applies to appeals in criminal cases. We find merit in the petition. it is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or as provided by statutes. cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided, however, That in habeas corpuscases, the period for appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from. SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads: SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. — An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run. In Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting of the 15-day period within which to appeal. The Court categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a motion for reconsideration within which to appeal The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.[16] The Court also reiterated its ruling that it is the denial of the motion for reconsideration that constituted the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. The raison d’être for the “fresh period rule” is to standardize the appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted. Thus, the 15day period to appeal is no longer interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final order or resolution. that “[t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are concerned – the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals bycertiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure SEC. 3. How appeal taken. — x x x x (b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review under Rule 42. Except as provided in the last paragraph of section 13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review oncertiorari under Rule 45 WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Judge Rosa Samson-Tatad is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from further exercising jurisdiction over the prosecution’s motions to dismiss appeal and for execution of the decision. The respondent Judge is also DIRECTED to give due course to the petitioner’s appeal in Criminal Case No. Q-01-105698, and to elevate the records of the case to the Court of Appeals for review of the appealed decision on the merits.