SID# 24698027
Nick French
Philosophy 104
February 25, 2016
Nietzsche and the Genetic Fallacy
A popular indict of Nietzsche's criticism of Christian-influenced morality is that On the Genealogy of Morality commits the genetic fallacy; Nietzsche's argument seems to criticize the source of "slave morality" rather than its validity or content. What makes this particularly compelling is that On the Genealogy of Morality1 provides a historical account of a plotted transition from the Greek understanding of a self-affirming noble morality to the Christian and Jewish life-denying slave morality. Thus, the argument goes, Nietzsche's dismissal of Christianity and its reincarnation as secular western philosophy is unwarranted since it's grounded in their origins. In this paper, I argue that applying the genetic fallacy to Nietzsche's argument ignores his underlying indict of life-denying theories of morality which functions independent of circumstance. In addition, I intend to show that Nietzsche purposes the genealogy not as a direct criticism, but as a persuasive supplement to his ahistorical argument and an explanation for how slave morality and our concept of evil came to be.
To this end, I will provide a basis for my interpretation of Nietzsche's argument against Christian-influenced morality and then outline the case that it bites into the genetic fallacy. I then argue that the gist of Nietzsche's criticism of Christian ideals is ahistorical which means that the genetic fallacy doesn't apply. I then consider two responses to the possible counter-argument which questions why Nietzsche would provide an extensive genealogy if his argument was ahistorical.
Nietzsche's argument against Christian-influenced morality is grounded in his understanding of how the West transitioned from a Greek understanding of ethics, particularly on the scale of good versus bad to a Christian kind that contrasts good to evil. Nietzsche recounts how for the Greeks, the concept of good was synonymous with nobility; those who were "powerful, high ranking and high-minded who felt and ranked themselves and their doings as good" (10)1 were good. The opposite was bad. This changed when the Romans, a society that embodied this ideology, conquered the Jews. Rather than accept the power of their conquerors', Nietzsche contends, the priestly class of Judea inverted the life-affirming values of the Romans. By creating the concept of freewill and motivated by hatred and resentment, the Jews declared the warrior class evil because of their strength. Now, "the miserable alone are the good… whereas you, you noble and powerful ones, you are in all eternity the evil…" (16).1 Thus originated slave morality, which Nietzsche argues spread vis-à-vis Christianity and modern secular thought. This slave morality achieves justice through an imagined revenge, denying people their true reactions. Nietzsche argues that this denial creates a deep a lasting resentment like a can of worms digging in; he contrasts this with the noble morality of the Greeks who didn't need to lie themselves into an artificial state of happiness—they could take it for themselves.
Some argue that Nietzsche's genealogical argument doesn't provide a reason to reject Christianity or its secular forms because it commits the genetic fallacy. The fallacy occurs when a criticism of a theory is based on its source rather than its content. This argument appears to have weight because Nietzsche spends a lot of time demonstrating that the Jews had ill will when challenging the warrior morality of the Romans. Assuming its validity, Nietzsche's account of the creation of slave morality seems to have a strong explanatory power. However, some argue this does little to deny Christianity's validity, let alone secular theories such as Kant's, which could be true despite their origins.
This application of the genetic fallacy is flawed because it relies on the assumption that Nietzsche rejects slave morality on historical grounds; this is not the case. I will argue that the crux of his argument is ahistorical because it's based on slave morality's life denying nature. If Nietzsche's argument is indeed based on the nature of slave morality rather than its creation, it would by definition not raise the genetic fallacy. It appears that Nietzsche foresees this exact criticism when he plays devil's advocate with himself in Aphorism Nine of Book I: "But why are you still talking about nobler ideals!... the people were victorious… if this happened through the Jews, so be it!.. The church, not its poison, repels us… Leaving the church aside, we, too, love the poison" (18).1 The question raised by the passage mirrors the genetic fallacy's; despite its unsavory source (the church), the poison (slave morality) could be desirable, so why reject it on face? To that, Nietzsche presents his ahistorical argument.
Nietzsche's primary criticism of slave morality is premised on the denial of human nature that is fundamental to Christianity and its secular forms, something that would be true in any context. In Aphorism Ten of Book I of On The Genealogy of Morality Nietzsche contrasts the "triumphant yes-saying to oneself" (19)1 of a noble morality to the life-denying nature of slave morality. He goes on to describe how slave morality is focused on what is opposite and external which it must reject; he declares that a noble morality is of jubilation where even badness is an afterthought. Since the slave cannot take his own happiness for himself, he must suffice with an imaginary revenge, which fuels ressentiment. Nietzsche argues that this also terminates in mediocrity and nihilism because there's no drive to become a higher man. These arguments are ahistorical because they are indicts of the nature of slave morality; Christian-influenced theories which legislate against what is immoral or evil would seem to cause the resentment that Nietzsche criticizes. This is evidenced by Nietzsche's change in language; when describing the genealogy he contrasts Jewish hate with the values of the Greeks and Romans. After transitioning to the crux of the criticism, he refers to the same conflict in ahistorical terms: slave and noble morality. In fact, there's no discussion of the Jews or the actual inversion of values during his criticism of slave morality that starts at aphorism nine. Thus, since Nietzsche's fundamental argument against Christian influenced morality is ahistorical and inherent to slave morality, the genetic argument cannot apply.
One might then question why Nietzsche would labor to provide such an extensive genealogy of western morality if his primary criticism is ahistorical. There are two responses I will identify. First, by depicting how slave morality was birthed from resentment and purposed to enslave the strong, Nietzsche is able to make a stronger case against Christianity—that it is inherently malicious (ahistorical criticism) and was created with this malevolent intent (genealogy). Second, Nietzsche makes liberal assumptions about metaphysics, assuming that evil as a metaphysical concept doesn't exist. It seems like one of Nietzsche's motives for the genealogy is to depict the inception of evil in order to open our eyes to how such an artificial concept propagated through our moral discourse.
Nietzsche goes to great lengths to describe the slave revolt that conceived Christian thought because it demonstrates the purposeful creation of an ideology to exact revenge on the powerful, which is exactly what Nietzsche's ahistorical argument criticizes. This provides motive and evidence against Christianity for the murder of noble morality. His depiction of the Roman conquering of the priestly Judea is rife with adjectives such as "hate" and "resentment" which he will later ascribe to the ahistorical perpetrators of slave morality. The inception of slave morality, according to Nietzsche, was the purposeful inversion of values against the Romans, so that they, the powerful, could be enslaved on account of being "good" in the Greek sense. This mirrors Nietzsche's ahistorical charge against Christianity, which is that it constrains man, specifically the noble man, from reaching his potential. Thus, Nietzsche's genealogy seems to add a degree of continuity to his criticism of Christian thought, which supplements his criticism of the inherent character of slave morality.
The second response to the question of Nietzsche's motive is premised on his belief that the artificial concept of evil has become so engrained into our moral discourse that only an illuminating history of its plotted inception can lift the shroud over our eyes. This is important to Nietzsche's criticism because without the genealogy, someone indoctrinated in slave morality could find his claims of noble morality's life affirming nature unintuitive. This interpretation is supported in On the Genealogy of Morality when he asks whether anyone would "like to go down and take a little look into the secret of how they fabricate ideals on earth?... your eyes must first get used to this falsely shimmering light" (26).1 Thus Nietzsche views his genealogy as a project to expose the fabrication of the concept of evil. The historical argument is necessary, he contends, because the slave revolt has "a two-thousand-year history behind it and… has only moved out of our sight today because it—has been victorious" (17).1 Here the purpose of the genealogy is made clear; Nietzsche believes it necessary to recount the historical foundation for slave morality to undermine the assumptions that could compel one to reject his ahistorical criticism of Christian thought.
Cited Works:
1. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, Maudemarie Clark, and Alan J. Swensen. On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub., 1998. Print.