ADDAX PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENT (NIGERIA) LIMITEDIZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT Document Number : IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT Document Title: FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT Do ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Rev:01 Nov 06, 2013 Status: IFR Page 2 of 26 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 4 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................... 4 2.1 Scope and Objectives of the Study ................................................................................. 5 2.2 BOUNDARIES ................................................................................................................ 6 3 DEFINITIONS ....................................................................................................... 9 4 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................... 9 5 METHODOLOGY................................................................................................ 10 5.1 Event Tree Analysis ...................................................................................................... 10 5.2 Fire Consequence and Gas Dispersion Modeling ......................................................... 10 5.3 Hazardous Area Classification ...................................................................................... 12 5.4 Fire and Gas Location Map ........................................................................................... 13 5.5 Impact Assessment ...................................................................................................... 13 6 DATA AND ASSUMPTIONS ............................................................................... 13 6.1 Process Data ................................................................................................................ 13 6.2 Environmental Data ...................................................................................................... 14 7 RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................................................. 17 APPENDIX I: EVENT TREE ANALYSIS ....................................................................... 18 APPENDIX II: FIRE CONSEQUENCE AND GAS DISPERSION MODELING ............. 20 APPENDIX III: PLOTS OF THERMAL RADIATION CONTOURS ON WHP ................. 22 APPENDIX IV: SHELL FRED/MODELLING REPORTS ................................................ 23 APPENDIX V: PLOTS OF MINIMUM SAFE DISTANCES ............................................ 24 APPENDIX VI: HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION DRAWINGS .......................... 25 APPENDIX VII: FIRE AND GAS LOCATION MAPS ..................................................... 26 .. 8 ............................................. 15 Table 3 : Equipment Process Data ................................................................................................................. 16 Table 4: Event Tree .........................................................IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT Document Title: FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT Document Number: ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Rev:01 Nov 06................................. 2013 Status: IFR Page 3 of 26 LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Summary of Environmental conditions ................Vapour Release ........................................ 14 Table 2: Tolerability Criteria ..................... 19 LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1-1: The Izombe Process area Plot Plan .......................... 18 Table 5: Event Tree Analysis – Liquid Release ........................ 7 Figure 1-2: Izombe Process Area Plot Plan showing safe distances.................................................................................................................................................................... production manifolds. . Evaluate Equipment Spacing 7. The recommendations from the study are as outlined below. (See Figure 1. crude oil transfer pumps.000 acres in Izombe Village which is about 30km from Owerri. Identify Credible Fire scenarios 3. Install Open Path Gas Detectors and Point Detectors at the indicated positions on the Main Process Facilities to provide full coverage for Gas Detection on the Process Area 2. flow lines from Ossu and Njaba production fields are tied into the Izombe manifold in an arrangement that enables it to be routed to Izombe flow station process facilities 2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY There is currently no Fire and Gas Detection or protection system on the main process facilities at the Izombe Flowstation. Identify credible Gas release events 2. Identify high risk exposures 8. 4.1) In addition to local Izombe producing wells. The Fire and Gas Assessment Study is carried out to achieve the following objectives: 1.0 while calculating for different leak scenario to determine the possible radiant heat exposure to personnel and other process equipment. Identify Detection Types 5.IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT Document Title: FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT Document Number: ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Rev:01 Nov 06. Open path detector coverage HP. 1. The production flow station has producing facilities that include well-heads. Install Flame Detectors as indicated on the Fire Protection System Layout. LP and Gas lift Separators are considered critical. storage tanks etc. Recommend Options for implementing Fire Protection and achieve Asset Integrity Objectives for Izombe Flowstation Main Process Facilities The results of this study shall be utilized as an input into the design of the fire and gas protection system for Izombe Flowstation by APDNL The overall objective remains to operate the Izombe Production facilities with risks reduced to as Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). 2013 1 Status: IFR Page 4 of 26 INTRODUCTION Izombe Flow station covers an approximate area of 74. Identify potential Fire and Gas Detection locations on Process Areas for optimal sensitivity 6. The Fire Consequence and Gas Dispersion modelling is performed utilizing SHELL FRED 4. production separators. Evaluate Fire and Gas propagation models with respect to Safety Systems. Personnel and Asset Protection. 8. Consider providing Security Camera monitor for the Process Area on Izombe Flowstation Control room.IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT Document Title: FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT Document Number: ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Rev:01 Nov 06. The following appendices are attached to the report 2. Appendix VII: Fire and Gas Location Maps Scope and Objectives of the Study The scope and objectives of this analysis are summarized as follows: To assess the consequence of the accidental or intentional release of flammable hydrocarbon products on process equipment in terms of dispersion. 4. Activation of the Fire protection system shall be based on Confirmed Fire or Confirmed Gas on a 2oo3 Voting System. This would prolong the resistance time to fire radiation and retain structural integrity. Appendix VI: Hazardous Area Classification Drawings 7. Appendix IV: SHELL FRED Modelling Report 5. Consider fire-proofing the structural legs of the pipe racks in the vicinity of Gas Scrubbers and Gas Pig Receiver.1 1. Appendix III: Plots of Thermal Radiation 4. Design of the Izombe Process Facilities Fire Protection piping system should perform hydraulic analysis to ensure water and foam are sprayed at the appropriate pressure wherever required. Consider modifying the piping to increase this distance. . 6. Appendix V: Plots of Minimum Safe Distance 6. Appendix II: Fire Consequence and Gas Dispersion Modelling Results 3. fire and explosion To serve as input to the fire and gas detector location mapping study in determining the most effective location for the F& G system Evaluate the effects on escape devices and Safety equipment. Review Izombe Flowstation equipment and piping layout against the developed Hazardous Area Classification Drawing: Consider increasing the spacing between the HP and LP Separators to satisfy minimum separation distance requirements. 2013 Status: IFR Page 5 of 26 3. 5. 7. The SDV/ESD at the inlets to HP and LP Separators are TOO CLOSE to the vessels to serve as credible barriers to isolate flow into the separators or process area. Appendix I: Event Tree Analysis 2. IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT Document Title: FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT Document Number: ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Rev:01 Nov 06. o Fire and explosion consequence resulting from failure of ESD and Shutdown valve failing to respond on demand. etc. Catastrophic failures such as o Full piping and/or vessel ruptures. 2013 2. atmospheric pollution. .2 Status: IFR Page 6 of 26 BOUNDARIES The areas not included in the study scope and thus considered outside the evaluation boundaries are outlined below: Environmental impacts of released hydrocarbons such as liquid spill. 2013 Figure 2-1: The Izombe Process area Plot Plan Status: IFR Page 7 of 26 .Document Number : Document Number: IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Document Title: Rev:01 FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT Nov 06. Document Number : IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT Document Title: FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT Document Number: ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Rev:01 Nov 06. 2013 Figure 2-2: Izombe Process Area Plot Plan showing safe distances Status: IFR Page 8 of 26 . Document Number : Do IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Document Title: Rev:01 FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT Nov 06. Description API RP 500 Recommended Practice For Classification Of Locations For Electrical Installations Classified As Class 1 Zone 0 And Zone 2 API 521 Guide For Pressure Relieving And Depressurization . Evacuation and Rescue ESD Emergency Shutdown FWS Full Well Stream FWKO 4 Status: IFR Free Water Knock out HP High Pressure LEL Lower Explosive Limit LP Low Pressure OGP International Association of Oil and Gas Producers PSLL Pressure Switch Low Low UEL Upper Explosive Limit USD Utility Shutdown VCE Vapour Cloud Explosion REFERENCES Document No. 2013 3 Page 9 of 26 DEFINITIONS Term Definition ALARP As Low As Reasonably Possible APDNL Addax Petroleum Development Nigeria Limited ATM Atmospheres EER Escape. thereby minimizing the loss of inventory.5mm. . 2013 Page 10 of 26 METHODOLOGY The following section describes the approach utilized in the Fire and Gas System Assessment Study. resulting from minor leaks.IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT Document Title: FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT 5 Document Number: ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Rev:01 Status: IFR Nov 06. A worst case scenario for a 10mm vessel leak was developed with a wind speed of 10m/s. 5. which may lead to significant hydrocarbon releases that may have the potential to form flammable vapour clouds. This also recognizes the failure of instrument impulse tubing.1 Hazard Identification Event Tree Analysis Gas Dispersion Modeling Fire Consequence and Gas Dispersion Modeling Develop Hazardous Area Classification Drawing Impact Assessment Develop Fire and Gas Detectors Location Map Recommendations and Conclusions Event Tree Analysis The event tree analysis was performed to further analyze the propagation of the initiating event (Loss of containment) to arrive at the final event outcomes by factoring in the following: Probability of immediate ignition Probability of delayed ignition Probability of Failure on demand for shut-down valves Probability of creating overpressures. However the study also took cognizance of the potential for significant undetected gas release from Izombe Flow station process facilities.2 Fire Consequence and Gas Dispersion Modeling The major basis of the Fire Consequence and Gas Dispersion Modelling Study is on hydrocarbon releases/loss of containment scenarios from 2. The process consists of the following: 5. EER System etc.) One major result from the Event Tree Analysis is the selection of the final scenarios that are modeled using the Fire Consequence Modeling software. 5mm and 10mm leaks. This recognizes that minor leaks have higher likelihood to lead to continuous release as the PSLL may be unable to detect the pressure loss and initiate a shutdown. Probability of release occurring in the direction of receptor (Safety Equipment. The Event Tree Analysis is shown in Appendix I. The study also recognized that larger leak sizes will lead to shutdown. two (2) different types of fluid release were utilized for this study. 25%. This is also taken as the initial release condition. The consequence modeling is usually based on the propagation of the initiating loss of containment event. The following assumptions are made for the fluid release scenario. it is understood that the vapour (gas) component may still be contained in the liquid phase. 25%LEL.IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT Document Title: FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT Document Number: ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Rev:01 Status: IFR Nov 06. It is also modeled to release from the gas lines. The dispersion was modeled for 10%. Liquid/Mixed (Phase) Release – It is assumed that fluid release from the lower/bottom part of the pipings is in the liquid phase. However. The modeling shall consider the following. Vapour/Gas (Phase) Release – It is assumed that release from the upper/top part of pipings is in the vapour phase. The 10%LEL. The distances for the two (2) distinct zones 16kw/m2 and 32kw/m2 of thermal radiation contour shall be recorded in tabular form. 50% and 100% LEL limits The fire consequence scenarios are modeled using Computer based Modeling software (SHELL FRED 4. The contours were plotted for the 16 kw/m2 and 32 kw/m2 to ascertain the impact of the fire on surrounding equipment. Based on the composition of the hydrocarbon fluid from the process simulation. Worst case conditions of wind towards the receptor (Safety Equipment) shall be used. Even when this is not the case. horizontal planes Pressure of vessel or piping at time of leak/release Other properties of released fluid Environmental conditions. Computations shall model distances from the release point/source to thermal radiation contours of 16 kw/m2 and 32 kw/m2. sustained release from the liquid side will ultimately lead to a mixed-phase release.0). 50%LEL 100%LEL and UFL contours table are depicted in Appendix II . The contour distance table for modeled scenarios is in Appendix II. Continuous release may have liquids come out through the release point for the crude oil lines. Radiation Contours immediately following ignition Available inventory that feeds the leak Releases in the vertical. 2013 Page 11 of 26 Proposed recommendations to mitigate risks associated with significant vapour releases from minor leaks are also discussed In addition the UEL and LEL limits for unignited gas releases were also calculated to aid the identification of optimal positions for installation of fire and gas detectors to enable the timely detection of flammable concentrations from gas releases. 5. direction and ambient wind conditions. The model provides the option to select the release phase of the fluid and it is also able to automatically calculate the release phase based on the fluid composition and the corresponding process condition of the fluid for a given equipment. . 2. This is necessary to determine the effective location of gas detectors. The input parameters include. The vapour/gas phase release is modeled to occur from the upper part of the vessel. the scenario type. flashing liquid (two phase) and pure liquid inventories. process conditions. release geometry.IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT Document Title: FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT Document Number: ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Rev:01 Status: IFR Nov 06. The Jet Fire scenario is modeled using the process equipment source model which considers the release of material from its storage or process conditions in an equipment.3 Hazardous Area Classification A Hazardous Area Classification study was also carried out to identify areas within the Izombe facility where there is a high likelihood of explosive mixtures or atmosphere. release conditions. The definitions of the Zones also recognize that the chance of a fire or explosion depends on the likelihood of an explosive atmosphere occurring at the same time as an ignition source becomes active. The properties of jet fires depend on the fuel composition. Jet fires can arise from releases of gaseous. etc. 25% and 50% LEL limits. location. (include mass flow / containment pressure. The hazardous area classification was carried out as an integral part of the risk assessment to identify areas where controls over ignition sources are needed (hazardous area) and also those areas where they are not (non hazardous areas).(in this case a leak) as a minor leak. These are not considered as catastrophic rupture or line rupture cases. release rate. Other input parameters include the release source (pipe/vessel). Hazardous areas are further classified in Zones which distinguish between locations that have a high chance of an explosive atmosphere occurring and those locations where an explosive atmosphere may only occur occasionally or in abnormal circumstances. through all the stages.2. the two-phase release is modeled to occur from the liquid section in a vessel. The jet fire scenario also calculates the UEL and LEL distances for unignited releases. volume of the vessel or piping). 5mm and 10mm leaks. geometry.5mm. temperature. 2013 Page 12 of 26 The representative plots of fire scenarios superimposed on the Izombe production facilities are made and presented in Appendix III 5. the fluid composition. simulations were carried out for 10%.1 Jet Fire Scenario A jet fire is a turbulent diffusion flame resulting from the combustion of a fuel continuously released with some significant momentum in a particular direction or directions. This is to aid in the implementation of special precautions over likely sources of ignition to prevent fire and explosions. The representative plots are shown in Appendix V. The Hazardous Area Classification drawings are attached in Appendix VI 5. Consequently an area can be classified as non-hazardous. based on the fire consequence models and analysis carried out for the Izombe facility. The alarms enable the operators to take appropriate intervention and emergency actions. Flame detection targets are set in line with typical fire events within the industry and also align with flame detector manufacturers’ specifications. The F&G detection signals also operate protective functions. 50% and 100% LFL) is set to detect those flammable gas releases that are generally large enough to potentially cause fire and explosion hazard. The Fire and Gas Location Maps are attached in Appendix VII 5. 2013 Page 13 of 26 A hazardous area can be further defined as a location where an explosive atmosphere may occur in quantities that require special precautions to protect the health and safety of workers. 6 6.4 Fire and Gas Location Map A Fire and Gas Location Map was developed to describe the basis for the installation of a Fire and Gas protection system for the Izombe facility. A location where an explosive atmosphere is not expected to occur in quantities that require such special precautions is deemed to be non-hazardous. if a release is extremely unlikely to occur and/or if the quantities released are small. The fire and gas location map shows the installation positions for the fire and gas detectors.5 Impact Assessment The impact of a potential loss of containment event leading to a fire was evaluated and minimum safe distances between equipment were recommended.IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT Document Title: FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT Document Number: ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Rev:01 Status: IFR Nov 06. Sound engineering judgment and generic target scenarios were used to determine the location of the fire and gas detectors. particularly in relation to the use of equipment. For these purposes “special precautions” means precautions to control potential ignition sources within a hazardous area. The function of the fire and gas detection systems is to primarily give warning of flammable releases or the outbreak of fire and to provide local indication and a control station alarm. when undetected. The process conditions were collated from the Process & Instrumentation Diagram (P &ID) and on .1 DATA AND ASSUMPTIONS Process Data The composition of the fluid was collated from the Process Design Basis. The flammable gas detection target (25%. The term “not expected to occur in such quantities” implies that consideration is also given to the likelihood of a loss of containment event (leaks) as well as the potential quantity of such releases when considering the area classification. 6.6 API 521. However. Precipitator and inlet manifold. Gas Scrubber.2. Gas Lift Vessel. Scenarios from flanges and instrument tubing were also simulated due to their susceptibility to leaks. HP Separators. such as Safety Equipment location etc. evaluations were also made with respect to specific receptors. 2013 Page 14 of 26 FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT the Process Flow Diagram (PFD) and served as input data into the computer modeling equations.2.3 6. . Main Hazards Areas The main hazard zones were identified based on the equipment layout on the process area. FWKO. LP Separators. See API 521.2 Environmental Data The prevailing environmental conditions slightly affects the radiation effect distances thus the environmental conditions below have been selected with appropriate justification.04KW/m2 See Table 8. it is conservative to use a low wind-speed to minimize the likelihood of a cooling effect and ensure accurate heat intensity is predicted.(Ref 13) Wind direction NorthNorth East Extracted from Izombe Flow Station Summary Basis However.1 Value Justifications 23.80C 290C Typical mean monthly temperature as presented by Nigeria Meteorological Agency Owerri Station weather report Average daily relative humidity 80% The lower the humidity.IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT Document Number: ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Document Title: Rev:01 Status: IFR Nov 06. Incident Solar Radiation 1.(Ref 13) Wind Speed 5 m/s The effect of wind speed on the radiation contour specified for the scope of this study is minimal. the main process equipment consist of Test separators. Table 1: Summary of Environmental conditions Environmental Parameter Ambient temperature 6. The equipment process data is shown in table 7.2 Assessment Criteria The following assessment criteria have been used to assess fire & explosion effects resulting from oil & gas release on personnel and equipment. the lower the moisture content and the more heat is transmitted through the atmosphere. 5 kW/m2 For unprotected equipment 37.IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT Document Title: FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT Document Number: ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Rev:01 Status: IFR Nov 06. 2013 Page 15 of 26 Table 2: Tolerability Criteria SN Exposure 1 . Radiation from Pool/Jet fire Human Fatality 12.5kW/m2 Corresponding to the maximum allowable radiation flux for a protected equipment . 554 BBL Partially stabilized Oil HP SEPARATOR V-200 230 120 100 15.Document Number : Document Number: IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Document Title: Rev:01 Status: IFR Nov 06.554 BBL Partially stabilized Oil GAS LIFT VESSEL V-210 1440 1440 111 NA Partially stabilized Oil FWKO V-300 50 27 110 31.108 Partially stabilized Oil PRECIPITATOR V-400 50 22 108 NA Partially stabilized Oil TEST SEPARATOR V-1500 230 120 84 NA Partially stabilized Oil GAS SCRUBBER V-3000 230 1500--isolated 83 NA Partially stabilized Oil CRUDE OIL TRANSFER PUMPS P-100/200 30 98 600 GPM Partially stabilized Oil . (DEG F) FLOW RATE FLUID LP SEPARATOR V-100 230 125 102 15. 2013 Page 16 of 26 FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT Table 3 : Equipment Process Data EQUIPMENT EQUIPMENT TAG MAWP (Psig) OPERATING PRESSURE (Psig) OPERATING TEMP. Document Number : IZOMBE FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT Document Title: FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT 7 Do ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Rev:01 Status: IFR Nov 06. Install Flame Detectors as indicated on the Fire Protection System Layout. 4. 3. 5. 6. Activation of the Fire protection system shall be based on Confirmed Fire or Confirmed Gas on a 2oo3 Voting System. . Consider fire-proofing the structural legs of the piperacks in the vicinity of Gas Scrubbers and Gas Pig Receiver. LP and Gaslift Separators are considered critical. Install Open Path Gas Detectors and Point Detectors at the indicated positions on the Main Process Facilities to provide full coverage for Gas Detection on the Process Area 2. 2013 Page 17 of 26 RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1. 7. Open path detector coverage HP. The SDV/ESD at the inlets to HP and LP Separators are TOO CLOSE to the vessels to serve as credible barriers to isolate flow into the separators or process area. 8. Review Izombe Flowstation equipment and piping layout against the developed Hazardous Area Classification Drawing: Consider increasing the spacing between the HP and LP Separators to satisfy minimum separation distance requirements. Consider modifying the piping to increase this distance. Design of the Izombe Process Facilities Fire Protection piping system should perform hydraulic analysis to ensure water and foam are sprayed at the appropriate pressure wherever required. This would prolong the resistance time to fire radiation and retain structural integrity. Consider providing Security Camera monitor for the Process Area on Izombe Flowstation Control room. IMPACT CATEGORY MAJOR Yes Yes Loss of Containment (Initiating Event) Yes III: Vapour Cloud Explosion MINOR SERIOUS No No No IV: Unignited Gas Cloud V: No/Minor Accident INCIDENTAL INCIDENTAL . 2013 Page 18 of 26 FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT APPENDIX I: EVENT TREE ANALYSIS Table 4: Event Tree .Document Number : Document Number: IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Document Title: Rev:01 Status: IFR Nov 06.Vapour Release 1st Protection Layer INITIATING EVENT ID 2nd Protection Layer INITIATING EVENT FREQUENCY LEAK DETECTION & SHUT-DOWN FAILS IMMEDIATE IGNITION FIRE DETECTION & ESD FAILS EXPLOSION OUTCOME Po Pa Pb Pc Pd Outcome Frequency Yes I: Jet Fire No II: Flash Fire. IMPACT CTEGORY MAJOR Yes Yes Loss of Containment (Initiating Event) Yes III: Vapour Cloud Explosion MINOR SERIOUS No No No IV: Unignited Liquid Pool V: Minor Spill (Controlled) SERIOUS INCIDENTAL . 2013 Page 19 of 26 FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT Table 5: Event Tree Analysis – Liquid Release 1st Protection Layer INITIATING EVENT ID 2nd Protection Layer INITIARTING EVENT FREQUENCY LEAK DETECTION & SHUT-DOWN FAILS IMMEDIATE IGNITION FIRE DETECTION & ESD FAILS EXPLOSION OUTCOME Po Pa Pb Pc Pd Outcome Frequency Yes I: Jet Fire + Spill No II: Flash/Moderate Pool Fire.Document Number : Document Number: IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Document Title: Rev:01 Status: IFR Nov 06. 37 4.34 8.1 2.041 4.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 4.3201 2.2 0.7 0.6 0.3 5.94 7.5 1.74 7.43 15.41 15.23 3.38 4.5 2.0 2.2616 2.23 2.0 2.7 0.5 10.12 6.2 0.2 2.5 3.0 3.9 5.0 3.1 2.62 16.3 5.49 2.Document Number : Document Number: IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Document Title: FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT Rev:01 Status: IFR Nov 06.0 6.0 5.0 1.72 7.71 5.081 5.55 2.6 0.0 3.0 5.929 4.9 0.8 .6 10.5 1.49 12. 2013 Page 20 of 26 APPENDIX II: FIRE CONSEQUENCE AND GAS DISPERSION MODELING RESULTS EQUIPMENT/PIPING (AT 5MPS WIND SPEED) GAS SCRUBBER GAS LIFT VESSEL GAS PIG RECEIVER GAS PIPE RACK Modelled Release Size(mm) Flame Length (m) 16kw/m2 32kw/m2 10%LFL (m) 50% LFL (m) LFL (m) UFL (m) 2.9 0.938 4.0 1.0 1.6 0.5 3.5 1.04 7.5 2.23 8.4 4.2557 2.6746 2.2 5.0 7.49 4.5 1.5 3.0 3.22 8.6 0.0 1.5 2.845 7.0 5.5 2.5 10 6.0 1.41 4.862 7.4 10.7 0.5 1.47 4.48 2.0 3.918 3.03 3.0 4.0 5. 54 21. 2013 Page 21 of 26 10%LFL 50% LFL (m) (m) LFL (m) UFL (m) 2.0438 3.2 10.5 10.0 3.5 7.5 2.0 0.0 4.87 9.96 46.0 14.0 1.0 8.22 5.0 2.32 11.5 4.49 6.0 4.7224 6.46 5.0 8.1816 21.14 9.69 23.0 .6 5.1458 11.13 5.6526 11.6 10.92 3.0 5.19 5. 99 5.2258 10.0 2.88 9.5 2.0 0.8 5.94 10.5 5.7122 3.68 10.5 2.36 3.5 1.79 11.0 2.57 10.49 5.678 6.9682 6.59 3.7 3.61 5.5 6.33 5.6 9 12.78 2.95 22.5 3.8 10.5 2.2316 12.5 1.0 2.0 3.62 24.11 5.0 2.4 18.5 1.3 10.5 2.0 9.04 5.7 5.8533 3.0 3.96 8.0 3.0 6.75 3.56 27.297 2.9 0.81 8.11 5.5 4.21 9.0 8.5 1.37 2.Document Number : IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT Document Title: FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT EQUIPMENT/PIPING (AT 5MPS WIND SPEED) TEST SEPARATOR HP SEPARATOR LP SEPARATOR INLET MANIFOLD Modelled Release Size(mm) Flame Length (m) 16kw/m2 32kw/m2 Document Number: ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Rev:01 Status: IFR Nov 06. Document Number : IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT Document Title: FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT Do ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Rev:01 Status: IFR Nov 06. 2013 Page 22 of 26 APPENDIX III: PLOTS OF THERMAL RADIATION CONTOURS ON WHP . Document Number : IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT Document Title: FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT APPENDIX IV: SHELL FRED/MODELLING REPORTS Do ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Rev:01 Status: IFR Nov 06. 2013 Page 23 of 26 . 2013 Page 24 of 26 .Document Number : IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT Document Title: FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT APPENDIX V: PLOTS OF MINIMUM SAFE DISTANCES Do ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Rev:01 Status: IFR Nov 06. Document Number : IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT Document Title: FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT Do ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Rev:01 Status: IFR Nov 06. 2013 Page 25 of 26 APPENDIX VI: HAZARDOUS AREA CLASSIFICATION DRAWINGS . Document Number : IZOMBE FLOWSTATION FIRE AND GAS SYSTEM ASSESSMENT Document Title: FIRE AND GAS ASSESSMENT STUDY REPORT APPENDIX VII: FIRE AND GAS LOCATION MAPS Do ADDNL-HSSL-FCGM-0002 Rev:01 Status: IFR Nov 06. 2013 Page 26 of 26 .
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Report "IZOMBE Fire and Gas Assessment Study Report - Final"