HPCL QRA

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DET NORSKE VERITASReport on QRA for POL IRDs/ depots BHARATPUR For Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation Limited Mumbai – 400 001 Maharashtra, India Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th Julyy, 2013 DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK DET NORKSE VERITAS AS EMGGEN CHAMBERS, 10 C.S.T ROAD, VIDHYANAGARI, SANTACRUZ ( E),KALINA MUMBAI 400098 TEL: +91 22 26676400 FAX: +91 22 26653380 http://www.dnv.com QRA for POL IRDs/ depots – Bharatpur For: Hindusthan Petroleum Corporation Limited Gresham Assurance Building, Sir P.M. Road, Post Box No. 198, Fort, Mumbai – 400 001 Maharashtra, India Account Ref.: K Somashekhar Rao, Sr. Manager – HSE-O&D [email protected] Date of First Issue: Report No.: Revision No.: Summary: 2013-05-29 12QR1P2-27 02 Project No. Organisation Unit: Subject Group: PP046380 Maritime & Oil and Gas, India SHE DNV conducted Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) for HPCL POL IRDs/ depots. This QRA Study aims to identify Individual and Societal Risk associated with the Bharatpur location. This report presents the DNV’s findings and conclusion from the study. Prepared by: Vishalakshi Daine Consultant Signature Verified by Anil Bhat Avvari Consultant Signature Approved by: Salian Varadaraja Project Sponsor Signature No distribution without permission from the client or responsible organisational unit (however, free distribution for internal use within DNV after 3 years) Indexing Terms No distribution without permission from the client or responsible organisational unit Key Words QRA Strictly confidential Service Area SHE Risk Management Unrestricted distribution Market Segment Oil & Gas Rev. No. / Date: 02/30-07-2013 Reason for Issue: Prepared by: Verified by Approved by: Draft report issued to HPCL VDAI AVAB VASAL for comments All rights reserved. This publication or parts thereof may not be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying or recording, without the prior written consent of Det Norske Veritas AS. Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page ii DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Executive Summary Det Norske Veritas (DNV) conducted a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study covering the entire HPCL POL IRDs/ depots. The presentation of results is in line with UK HSE guidelines. This report presents the DNV’s study findings and conclusion from the study for the Bharatpur. The overall objective of the QRA study is to quantify the level of individual fatality risks associated with the Bharatpur; and to demonstrate that the level of risks is in compliance with the UK HSE guidelines Based on the QRA study for the Bharatpur, the following conclusions and recommendations can be drawn: Area under Study Tank Farm Pump House Area Gantry Operations Major Hazard Recommended Control /Mitigation Ensure availability of water spray system in the tank farm area for Pool fire and Tank fire are protecting the tank from major events in the Tank the external fire farm area, leading to the escalation of the fire from Ensure regular one tank to the another maintenance procedure to reduce likelihood of failure of the valves, flanges and pipes Release of pressurized inventories from the pump Consider providing HC house may cause severe detectors in Pump house damage in the Depot area premises Fire due to Leak during TT loading operations. Major events of pool fire due to leak or spillage, flash fire are observed. Hazardous radiation levels of 12.5 kw/m2 and 37.5 kW/m2 are observed close to gantry. As the gantry area is a high risk and high consequence zone, ensure minimum activity of trucks and personnel in this area. Ensure emergency escape route is provided and informed to all Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page iii Consider provision of HC detectors for early detection of hazardous leaks. cost effective risk mitigation measures should be implemented to mitigate the risks to a level that is As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). the loading operations Even though the Individual and societal risk levels of the Bharatpur has been found to be in ALARP region in assessing with HSE UK risk criteria. Ensure PPE usage by all personnel. emergency procedures established and implemented for all personnel at gantry. SOP. 2013 Page iv . 30th July. Ensure training. In order to maintain the level of risk at this level. Ensure that the loaded trucks spend minimum time near the gantry after the loading operations Office Building Ensure that the loaded Fire radiation due to leak trucks spend minimum from the loaded tanker time near the gantry after trucks.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Area under Study Major Hazard Recommended Control /Mitigation gantry and TT crew. Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. : 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. 2013 Page v . 30th July. a measure of heat flux or radiant heat LFL : Lower Flammable Limit LOC : Loss of containment LSIR : Location Specific Individual Fatality Risk per year P&ID : Piping and Instrumentation Diagram PLL : Potential Loss of Life QRA : Quantitative Risk Assessment UFL : Upper Flammable Limit UK HSE: UK Health and safety Executive VCE : Vapour Cloud Explosion Report No.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK GLOSSARY ALARP: As Low As Reasonable Practical HSE : Health Safety Environment IR JF : Individual Risk : Jet Fire kW/m2 : Kilo Watt per Square Metre. ......... III 1 INTRODUCTION............ 6 2.................................................. 8 3 RISK RESULTS ................................................. 30th July..........1 FN Curve....: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02........1 Material Inventory ......................................................................6.......................................2....6 Input Data .............................. 2 1........................3 Material Composition ........... 1 1........................................................... 11 3............................................................... 5 1................4 Report Structure ..........6 Population .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 1................................6....................... 1 1...............................3 Scope of Study ..6....................................................................5 Ignition Sources................................................................................... 3 1.................................................................................................................................................DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary ....................................................2 Process Conditions .................... 9 3........2 Societal Risk ..................................1 UK HSE criteria........ 13 5 REFERENCES .6....... 5 1........................................................................ 1 1....... 2013 Page vi .....................................5 Facility Description............................................................................................................... 1 1..... 5 2 RISK ASSESSMENT CRITERIA ............................................................................. 7 2...................2 Individual Risk Criteria ....1 Individual Risk ...........................................................................................................................................................6............. 6 2....................................................................................................1 Background .......2 Objectives .......................................................3 Societal Risk Criteria .................................................... 11 4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ...... 5 1..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 1.....................................................6..................4 Weather .................................................................................................................. 15 Report No................................................. 9 3................................. 5 1.................. ........................................................................... 4 Figure 2-1: ALARP Principle .................................................................................................................................. 2013 Page vii ............................................... 8 Table 3-1: LSIR .......................................... 6 Figure 2-2: FN Curve and Criterion Line ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 7 Figure 3-1: Individual Risk Contours for Bharatpur ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 12 Report No.............. 3 Figure 1-2: Bharatpur Layout ........................................................................................................................: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.... 30th July.......................... 9 List of Figures Figure 1-1: Bharatpur Layout ........... 10 Figure 3-2: FN Curve Onsite ......................................................DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK List of Tables Table 2-1: Societal Risk Criteria – Onsite ..................................................................................... 11 Figure 3-3: FN Curve Offsite ....................................................... 1 Background Det Norske Veritas (DNV) conducted a Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study covering the entire HPCL POL IRDs/ depots. 30th July.2 Objectives The overall objective of the QRA study is to .Tabulation of the consequences in terms of: Distances to radiation levels. Report No. The presentation of results is in line with UK HSE guidelines. 1.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.Quantify the level of individual fatality risks associated with the Bharatpur.Demonstrate that the level of risks is in compliance with the UK HSE guidelines 1.3 Scope of Study DNV has performed the work in accordance to the UK HSE guidelines. and . Following are the important aspects of this study: . This report presents the DNV’s study findings and conclusion from the study for the Bharatpur.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 1 INTRODUCTION 1. Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) and explosion overpressure for different weather classes according to specific criteria classes.Verify the individual and societal risk levels in accordance with UK HSE criteria . 2013 Page 1 . Annexe 1 QRA Methodology This appendix explains the QRA methodology applied in this QRA. and the structure of this report. 30th July.4 Report Structure This report presents: Section 1 Introduction This section provides a general introduction of the project. the main objectives of the QRA study.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. the scope of study. Annexe 2 Assumptions Register The assumptions presented are applied in the modelling and preparation of the reports/technical notes. Section 3 Risk Results This section provides the risk results due to process hazard Section 4 Conclusions and Recommendation This section outlines the overall conclusions of the study and provides the recommendation to be implemented in order to ensure ALARP performance in the operation. Section 5 Reference This section details the reference used in this QRA. 2013 Page 2 . as well as the corresponding frequencies. fire and explosion. Annexe 4 Consequence Analysis This appendix presents outcome of an event in terms of toxic. Report No.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 1. Section 2 Risk Assessment Criteria This action outlines the risk criteria applied in this QRA study. Annexe 3 Failure case and frequency analysis This appendix defines the failure cases selected for analysis. 2013 Page 3 .DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 1.5 Facility Description The Bharatpur layout is shown in the figure below. 30th July. Figure 1-1: Bharatpur Layout Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. 2013 Page 4 .: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Figure 1-2: Bharatpur Layout Report No. 30th July. 1.Failure case and frequency analysis.5 Ignition Sources In order to calculate the risk from flammable materials. Second. The details are placed in a table at Annexe 3 . information on the ignition sources (which are present in the area over which a flammable cloud may drift) is required. 1. various parts of the consequence modelling require specification of wind speed and atmospheric stability. Report No.6. the impact (risk) calculations require wind-rose frequencies for each combination of wind speed and stability class used. First.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK s 1.3 Material Composition Material required for the QRA study is taken from the Mass and Energy balance sheet provided by the client for most of the cases.6.6.6 Population All the population details are provided to the study and the presence factor is explained with respect to the unit is given in details in Assumption Register (Annexe 2). 1.6.6 Input Data 1.6.Failure case and frequency analysis. 1.2 Process Conditions The process conditions like temperature and pressure required for the QRA study is taken from the Mass and Energy balance sheet and Process flow diagram provided by the client. 2013 Page 5 . The static and dynamic inventory is calculated based on the flow rate and equipment dimension provided by the client. The inventory details with respect to vessel and pipelines is given at Annexe 3 . 30th July. If the data is not available suitable representative material is considered as per DNV – Technical note 13 and international standard. 1.1 Material Inventory Material required for the QRA study is taken from the Mass and Energy balance sheet provided by the client.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.4 Weather Meteorological data are required at two stages of the QRA.6. This is explained in Assumption Register (Annexe 2) in detail. An individual risk above 1 x 10-4 fatalities per year for public is considered as unacceptable and an individual risk above 1 x 10-3 fatalities per year for workers is considered unacceptable.1 UK HSE criteria Following points details the UK HSE guidelines: .Societal risk can be represented by FN curves. 30th July.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. An indication of this is shown in the below figure Figure 2-1: ALARP Principle .An individual risk below 1 x 10-6 fatalities per year is considered as acceptable for both plant workers and public. Between these limits the risk is considered as ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Practicable). 2013 Page 6 . The plot is cumulative in the sense that. Report No. the risk results are assessed against a set of risk criteria as per UK HSE criteria. 2. for each frequency.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK s 2 RISK ASSESSMENT CRITERIA In order to determine acceptability. N is the number of casualties that could be equaled or exceeded. which are plots of the cumulative frequency (F) of various accident scenarios against the number (N) of casualties associated with the modeled incidents. Individual risk levels above 1 x 10-3 per year will be considered unacceptable and will be reduced.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK s Often ‘casualties’ are defined in a risk assessment as fatal injuries.Risk levels between 1 x 10-3 and 1 x 10-6 per year will be reduced to levels as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). 2013 Page 7 . 30th July.Individual risk levels below 1 x 10-6 per year will be broadly acceptable .: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. in which case N is the number of people that could be killed by the incidents. Individual risk above 10-3 per annum for any person shall be considered intolerable and fundamental risk reduction improvements are required. irrespective of cost . Risk criteria for Individual Risk for on-site are as follows: . That is the risk within this region is tolerable only of further risk reduction is considered impracticable because the cost required to reduce the risk is grossly disproportionate to the improved gained Report No.2 Individual Risk Criteria The UK HSE Individual Risk Criteria was considered to assess the risk for HPCL POL IRDs/ depots. Figure 2-2: FN Curve and Criterion Line 2. the number of the individuals at risk is also important. which includes workers and the public. The word “societal” is merely used to indicate a group of people and societal risk refers to the frequency of multiple fatality incidents. Societal risk should not be confused as being the risk to society or the risk as being perceived by society. the risk to an individual is not always an adequate measure of total risks. The concept of societal risk is much more than that for individual risk. regulators and authorities.The hazard. Table 2-1: Societal Risk Criteria – Onsite Maximum Tolerable Intercept With N=1 Negligible Intercept With N=1 10-2 10-4 Report No. public attitudes and perception and aversion to major accident Societal risk is the relationship between frequency of an event and the number of people affected. These factors include.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK s 2. Societal risk is usually represented by an FN (Frequency – Number of Fatality) curve. .: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. government. and the corresponding relationship involving F. Catastrophic incidents with the potential multiple fatalities have a little influence on the level of risk but have a disproportionate effect on the response of society and impact of company reputation. A number of factors are involved which make it difficult to determine single value criteria for application to a number of different situations. the consequential risks and the consequential benefits .Factors of importance to the company.3 Societal Risk Criteria When considering the risk associated with a major hazard facility. 30th July. Societal risk from a major hazard facility can thus be expressed as the relationship between the number of potential fatalities N following a major accident and frequency F at which N fatalities are predicated to occur. DNV has used following societal risk criteria. The relationship between F and N.The nature of assessment . are usually presented graphically on log-log axis. the cumulative frequency of events causing N or more fatalities. 2013 Page 8 . 91E-07 2.40 20.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. 30th July. the geographical variation of LSIR may be represented by iso-risk contour plots and used for land-use planning. Table 2.60E-06 3. In offshore studies.25E-07 3.No Location LSIR Remarks 1 2 3 4 D.1 presents the LSIR Table 3-1: LSIR S.34E-06 Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Acceptable Table 3-2: Major Risk Contributors to office building S. In onshore studies.No Location Risk/yr % 1 2 3 4 5 Large Leak from MS Tanker Large Leak from SKO Tanker Large Leak from HSD Tanker Medium leak from MS Tanker Medium leak from SKO Tanker 8.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK s 3 RISK RESULTS 3.08 17. It is a standard output from a QRA.1 Individual Risk Location specific individual risk (LSIR) is used to indicate the risk at a particular location.97E-07 23. 2013 Page 9 . an LSIR value is normally computed for each separate module on the installation.39 10. this is not a realistic risk measure. Since in reality people do not remain continually at one location.42E-07 7.G Control room Gantry Office Building Workers change room 5.62E-07 7.22E-07 6.38E-07 3. 365 days per year.88 8.27 Report No. It is the risk for a hypothetical individual who is positioned there for 24 hours per day. 2013 Page 10 . 30th July.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Figure 3-1: Individual Risk Contours for Bharatpur Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 3. Figure 3-2: FN Curve Onsite The following observation can be drawn: Report No. It represents the relationship between the frequency and the number of people suffering a given level of harm from the realisation of specified hazards. expressed as a risk per year. The “blue line” represents the upper limit of risk and the “green line” represents the lower level of risk. It is usually taken to refer to the risk of death and usually.2.1 FN Curve FN curve defines the societal risk.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. 30th July.2 Societal Risk 3. The region between this two represents the risk in the ALARP (AS LOW AS REASONABLY PRACTICABLE) region. 2013 Page 11 . The following figure presents the onsite societal risk FN Curve for Bharatpur. The “red line” represents the level of societal risk that has been realised around Bharatpur. The region beyond the blue line indicates the unacceptable region and the region below blue line represents the broadly acceptable region. FN Curve Offsite No Risk curve found for offsite population Report No. 2013 Page 12 .Compared to the UK HSE risk criteria.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. the FN Curve shows that societal risk is within the Acceptable region and does not exceed the unacceptable criteria.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK . 30th July. 2013 Page 13 . Major personnel in this area. events of pool fire due to leak or spillage.5 kW/m2 are route is provided and informed observed close to gantry. 30th July. leading to the escalation of the fire from Ensure regular one tank to the another maintenance procedure to reduce likelihood of failure of the valves. ensure minimum Fire due to Leak during TT activity of trucks and loading operations.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. Consider provision of HC detectors for early detection of hazardous leaks.5 Ensure emergency escape kw/m2 and 37. Report No.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Area under Study Tank Farm Pump House Area Gantry Operations Major Hazard Recommended Control /Mitigation Consider providing water spray system in the tank farm area for protecting Pool fire and Tank fire are the tank from the external major events in the Tank fire farm area. flanges and pipes Release of pressurized inventories from the pump house may cause severe damage in the Depot premises Consider providing HC detectors in Pump house area Dyke should be provided to the pumps to limit pool formation of the release inventory As the gantry area is a high risk and high consequence zone. to all gantry and TT crew. Hazardous radiation levels of 12. flash fire are observed. DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Area under Study Major Hazard Recommended Control /Mitigation Ensure training.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. 30th July. emergency procedures established and implemented for all personnel at gantry. 2013 Page 14 . Ensure PPE usage by all personnel. the loading operations Report No. Ensure that the loaded trucks spend minimum time near the gantry after the loading operations Office Building Ensure that the loaded Fire radiation due to leak trucks spend minimum from the loaded tanker time near the gantry after trucks. SOP. Guidelines for Consequence Analysis of Chemical Releases. “Consequence Handbook”.TNO. October 2009 for Process Pipes. Pumps. Report no. 04. P.A Flack / B Bain / T Lindberg / J R Spouge “Process Equipment Failure Frequencies” Rev. 2005 .. F. 30th July.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. 2009 Report No.:70037714. Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment.“Methods for the calculation of physical effects – due to releases of hazardous materials (liquids and gases)” TNO Yellow Book. “The Purple Book”. .CCPS. Butterworth-Heinemann.Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD). CPR – 14E. American Institute of Chemical Engineers. David Worthington. 2013 Page 15 . First Edition. Andreas Flack.Robin Pitblado. Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 1999. 1996 .Lees.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL IRD/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 5 REFERENCES . . August 2007. Atmospheric Storage Tank . August 2008 . Phil Crosthwaite. com . Since establishment as an independent foundation in 1864. quality and environmental management. DNV assists its customers in managing risk by providing three categories of service: classification. so businesses can run smoothly in a world full of surprises. certification and consultancy. This means continuously developing new approaches to health. independent provider of services for managing risk with a global presence and a network of 300 offices in 100 different countries.dnv. safety.Det Norske Veritas: Det Norske Veritas (DNV) is a leading. property and the environment. DNV has become an internationally recognised provider of technical and managerial consultancy services and one of the world’s leading classification societies. Global impact for a safe and sustainable future: Learn more on www. DNV’s objective is to safeguard life. : 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. 2013 Page i . 30th July.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Annexe 1 QRA Methodology Report No. ........... 10 2...........4........................... 1 1...2 Consequence Modelling/Phast Software .............2 What is QRA?..............1 Built-In Event Trees .......................................................1 Hazard Identification .................................................................................................................................... 6 2............ 10 3 QRA SOFTWARE TOOL ....................................3 Frequency Analysis............................................................................................................................................................ 7 2... 12 Report No.. 5 2.......................4..............................3 Risk Presentation: ..... 30th July.......DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Table of Contents 1 QRA METHODOLOGY ......................................................4 Risk Calculation/PHASTRISK Software............................................................................................ 7 2.......................................1 Introduction to Risk Assessment .....................................3 Key Components in QRA .......................................... 7 2..................... 2 1................................ 5 2.................. 2 2 QRA APPROACH ...................................1................................................................................................................ 2013 Page ii .......2 Atmospheric Condition..............: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02............................................. 1 1...................................................4................. ....................................................... 17 List of Figures Figure 1-1: QRA methodology .............. 8 Figure 2-2: Event Tree 2 – Continuous Release with Rainout .......: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02............. 6 Table 2-2: Effects of Thermal Radiation ............... 9 Figure 2-4: Event Tree 4 – Instantaneous Release with Rainout ........ 4 Figure 2-1 : Event Tree 1 – Continuous Vapour Release .........................................................DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK List of Tables Table 2-1: Explosion Overpressure Effects ............................. 3 Figure 1-2: ALARP Principle .............................................................................................................................................. 7 Table 3-1 PHAST RISK Default Vulnerability Parameters .................................................................................. 8 Figure 2-3: Event Tree 3 – Instantaneous Vapour Release ....................................................................... 30th July.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Report No.... 2013 Page iii ...................................................................... an event or chain of events. They are sudden unintended departures from normal conditions in which some degree of harm is caused. Mexico City. The impact or effect is the degree of harm caused by the event. the more neutral term “event” is used in place of the more colloquial term “incident”. Thus a scraper trap is a hazard because it has the potential to cause a fire.e.e. the lower is its safety.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. The popular understanding of safety sometimes appears to be “zero risk”. the term does not imply that such events are likely.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 1 QRA METHODOLOGY 1. Safety is the inverse of risk. Report No. A “major hazard” is associated with Loss of Containment and has the potential to cause significant damage or multiple fatalities. The word “hazard” does not express a view on the magnitude of the consequences or how likely it is that the harm will actually occur. people or environment. Texas City. Pasadena. 2013 Page 1 . Bhopal. More scientifically. For flammable incidents. Sometimes. which has caused or could have caused personal injury. in turn. ignition has to take place for a hazard to be realized.e. processes such gas compression is a hazardous activity because it has the potential to cause fires and explosions. 30th July. etc. An oil & gas facility has the potential to cause harm such as: - Sickness. may result in damage to property. i. damage to property or environment. injury or death of workers and people in the surrounding community Damage to property and investments Degradation of the physical and biological environment Interruption to production and disruption of business A state or condition having the potential to cause a deviation from uniform or intended behaviour which. Again. is known as hazard. the chance of the event occurring in specified circumstances). The consequence is defined as an event or chain of events that result from the release of a hazard. The higher the risk for an occupation or installation. the rate of events per unit time) or a probability (i. Risk is the combination of the likelihood and the consequences of such incidents. They range from minor incidents such as a small gas leak to major accidents such as Flixborough. it is defined as the likelihood of a hazard occurrence resulting in an undesirable event.1 Introduction to Risk Assessment This section is presented to assist the reader who is not familiar with the terms used in this document and for those who are familiar to confirm DNV understanding of the terms and their application in the context of this document. Incidents are the actual realization of a hazard. but this is impossible in an intrinsically hazardous activity such as oil and gas production. The likelihood may be expressed either as a frequency (i. 1. Despite this. The term ‘Quantified Risk Assessment’ is synonymous with QRA as used here. but strictly this refers to the purely numerical analysis of risks without any evaluation of their significance.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 1. in order to provide input to a decision-making process. QRA is a rather immature and highly judgmental technique. The hazard identification consists of a qualitative review of possible accidents that may occur. QRA is sometimes called ‘probabilistic risk assessment’ term originally used in the nuclear industry. QRA should not be the only input to decision-making about safety. 2013 Page 2 . many branches of engineering have found that QRA can give useful guidance. and illustrated in Figure 1-1. There are several formal techniques for this. 30th July. while it uses scientific methods and verifiable data.2 What is QRA? Quantitative risk assessment (QRA) is a means of making a systematic analysis of the risks from hazardous activities. The scope of work for a QRA should be to define the boundaries for the study.3 Key Components in QRA The study is based on the premises of a traditional Quantitative Risk Assessment. identifying which activities are to be included and which are excluded. and its results have a large degree of uncertainty. However. The key components of QRA are explained below. and which phases of the facility’s life are to be assessed. The first stage in a QRA is defined as system definition where the potential hazards associated with a facility or activities are to be analyzed. Report No. based on previous accident experience or judgment where necessary. Nevertheless. and forming a rational evaluation of their significance. This qualitative evaluation is described in this guide as “hazard assessment”.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. as other techniques based on experience and judgment may be appropriate as well. which are useful in their own right to give a qualitative appreciation of the range and magnitude of hazards and indicate appropriate mitigation measures. QRA is probably the most sophisticated technique available to engineers to predict the risks of accidents and give guidance on appropriate means of minimizing them. The term ‘quantitative risk analysis’ is widely used. 2013 Page 3 . and identifying and selecting a list of failure cases that will fully capture the hazard potential of the facilities to be studied. Report No. hazard identification uses similar techniques.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK In a QRA. In pipeline case. The component failure frequencies to be used are usually derived from an analysis of historical accident experience. this can be performed by breaking the line into sections depending on availability of isolation valves along the line. impact criteria to be used. release conditions to be modelled. 30th July. the frequency analysis estimates how likely it is for the accidents to occur. or by some form of theoretical modelling.systems.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. Failure cases are usually derived by breaking the process system down into a larger number of sub. Figure 1-1: QRA methodology Once the potential hazards have been identified. based on the type and number of equipment components included in the defined failure cases. where failure of any component in the sub-system would cause similar consequences. but has a more precise purpose – defining the boundaries of a study in terms of materials to be modelled. explosion or toxic cloud affect human beings. depending on the defined scope of the QRA study. Consequence analysis requires the modelling of a number of distinctive phases.Individual risk . the environment or business. i. Figure 1-2: ALARP Principle Unacceptable Region High Risk Broadly acceptable only if risk reduction is impracticable or if its cost is grossly disproportionate to the improvement gained ALARP Region Broadly Acceptable Region Given immediate attention and a response developed commensurate with the scale of the threat Low Risk Report No. Risk assessment is the process of comparing the level of risk against a set of criteria as well as the identification of major risk contributors. Various forms of risk presentation may be used. fires and explosions (for flammable materials). or to make some other judgment about their significance. and their impact on people. as well as to reduce the overall level of risk to As Low as Reasonably Practical (Figure 1-2).e. The purpose of risk assessment is to develop mitigation measures for unacceptable generators of risk.e. dispersion. commonly grouped as follows: . When the frequencies and consequences / impact of each modelled event have been estimated. 30th July.the risk experienced by a group of people exposed to the hazard The next stage is to introduce criteria. Estimation of the consequences of each possible event often requires some form of computer modelling.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. consequence modelling evaluates the resulting effects if the accidents occur. discharge. how does the fire. which are yardsticks to indicate whether the risks are acceptable. Closely liaised with the consequence assessment is the impact assessment. i. equipment and structures. 2013 Page 4 Necessary to maintain assurance that risk remains at this level .Group/Societal risk . they can be combined to produce risk results.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK In parallel with the frequency analysis.the risk experienced by an individual person . The number of specific cases and the distribution of the cases in terms of the size which are analyzed quantitatively take into account the potential consequences and the format of the frequency data that are being used. 2013 Page 5 . In a plant.Site specific parameters .. if released. It is both time-consuming and unnecessary to consider every part of the range. there is a wide range of substances that. could cause injury or fatality. The range of possible releases for a given stream covers a wide spectrum. Report No. and were not analyzed further. potentially hazardous releases..Knowledge transfer from other risk assessments for boosting station plants carried out by DNV within the applicable confidentiality constraints .1 Hazard Identification Hazard identification is the structured study of a plant in order to produce a list of foreseeable. Of these. water streams) or only likely to give a local hazard (e. A list of the main process streams is defined from the Process Flow Schemes (PFS). small pool fires).g. The hazards applicable for the plant have been identified through: .g.The selection of appropriate hazards considered a range of issues. instead. some were considered to be non-hazardous (e. from a pinhole leak up to a catastrophic rupture (of a vessel) or full bore rupture (of a pipe). 30th July.1. a finite number of failure cases are generated to characterize each unit.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. The streams identified to be hazardous were further analyzed in the QRA. including: Nature of potential hazards Position of plant in relation to the surrounding community Complexity of the process DNV has concentrated on the flammable hazards.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 2 QRA APPROACH 2. Atmospheric conditions. causing overpressure impact Various factors affecting the extent of consequence are also considered within the PHAST model which includes: .: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. including: - Jet Fire.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 2. including solar radiation flux. ambient temperature. 2013 Page 6 . causing thermal radiation impact within the flammable cloud envelope Explosion.Release orientation Detailed findings of the consequence analysis for selected failure cases are presented in Section 6. The qualitative levels of explosion and heat radiation effects are described in Table 2-1 and Report No. causing thermal radiation impact Flash Fire. PHAST calculates wide range of possible consequences from the LOC events. 30th July. causing thermal radiation impact Pool Fire.Release location . humidity and wind speed/direction as well as weather stability . PHAST is a consequence and impact assessment module integrated within DNV risk calculation software PHASTRisk.2 Consequence Modelling/Phast Software The consequence analysis is performed using DNV proprietary software PHAST. 2 Structural damage to buildings 0.02 10% window glass broken 0.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Table 2-2 respectively are used to assess the likelihood of harm to people or the likelihood of further loss of containment and / escalation as per DNV’ Technical note. Table 2-1: Explosion Overpressure Effects Overpressure (bar) Effects Within Zone 0.35 Heavy damage to buildings and process equipment Report No.1 Repairable damage to buildings and house facades 0. 30th July.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.05 Window glass damage causing injury 0. 2013 Page 7 . continuous release with rain-out1.5 Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood. however blistering of the skin (second degree burns) is likely. These event trees are presented in to . 30th July. following a pressurized release of liquid or gas. i.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. continuous vapour release.5 25 Minimum energy required to ignite wood at indefinitely long exposures (non piloted) 12.4.5 Pain threshold reached after 8 sec.6 2. release with rain-out. 2 Rain-out occurs if liquid drops suspended in a vapour cloud. Rain-out will occur when the droplets loose their initial (release) momentum and gravity prevails Report No. 0% lethality 1. 2.1 Built-In Event Trees PHASTRisk has 4 built-in consequence outcome event trees.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Table 2-2: Effects of Thermal Radiation Radiation Intensity (kW/m2) 37. instantaneous vapour release. It is noted that ‘No Ignition’ event leads to ‘No Effect’ for ‘flammable-only’ material release. second degree burns after 20 sec 4 Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach cover within 20 s. PHASTRisk combines consequence results from the PHAST module with a range of risk-related information in order to produce risk results. 2.3 Observed Effect Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment Will cause no discomfort for long exposure Frequency Analysis The failure frequencies for the scenarios developed are obtained from DNV’s Technical Notes (TN 14). DNV proprietary software PHASTRisk is used for the main risk calculation in the study. melting plastic tubing 9.4 Risk Calculation/PHASTRISK Software As mentioned earlier. 2013 Page 8 . drop to the ground.e. 2013 Page 9 . 30th July.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Figure 2-1 : Event Tree 1 – Continuous Vapour Release Figure 2-2: Event Tree 2 – Continuous Release with Rainout Report No. 30th July.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Report No. 2013 Page 10 .: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. Release duration of 20 seconds is used as the cut-off time to consider continuous release giving instantaneous effects. 30th July.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Figure 2-3: Event Tree 3 – Instantaneous Vapour Release Figure 2-4: Event Tree 4 – Instantaneous Release with Rainout PHAST RISK also accounts for a short-duration continuous release. Report No. an event where a continuous release lasts for relatively short duration and hence gives effects similar to an instantaneous release. 2013 Page 11 . PHASTRisk models the event as a pure fireball. It is the risk for a hypothetical individual who is positioned there for 24 hours per day.4.2 Atmospheric Condition Variation in wind direction defines the apparent orientation of consequences.g. Individual Risk per Annum (IRPA) is the annual frequency that any individual in a specific worker group becomes a fatality. and the extent and duration of dispersing flammable vapour clouds being exposed to those sources. 2. are also addressed. 365 days per year. in the event of an instantaneous vapour release. and hence in principle may be applied to different situations. unique to each release case and release direction. discounting the overpressure wave which may accompany the event. 2. location and presence factor of all ignition sources specified. power lines) or area sources (e. It is a standard output from a QRA. They are largely independent of the number of workers exposed. ground flares).09 and operating probability 1 as per DNV Technical Note. which include temperature and humidity. Individual risk criteria are intended to ensure that individual workers are not exposed to excessive risk levels on an installation. in which the thermal radiation impact defines the level of human fatality. This is directly specified in PHASTRisk. Delayed ignition: This is a calculated value within PHASTRisk. an LSIR value is normally computed for each Report No.3 Risk Presentation: Risk would be presented in terms of Individual and Societal (group). Entire Complex has been considered as Ignition source with ignition probability 0. Flash fire/explosion probability in the event of delayed ignition. line sources (roads. the geographical variation of LSIR may be represented by iso-risk contour plots and used for land-use planning. Various probability factors which will determine the route of event within the event trees are also determined in the PHASTRisk model.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Further. Delayed ignition sources can be modelled as point sources (e. 2013 Page 12 . These include: Immediate Ignition: This is directly specified and will be different depending on the size of the release. Fireball / flash fire / explosion probability in the event of immediate ignition of instantaneous release. to cater for “background” sources posed by a variety of human activity).g. The calculation is based on the strength. Location specific individual risk (LSIR) is used to indicate the risk at a particular location. In onshore studies. In offshore studies.4.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. This is also directly specified in PHASTRisk. 30th July. PHASTRisk accounts for the different wind directions from the wind distribution probability input and combine the values into the risk calculation. Atmospheric conditions. 30th July.e. Since in reality people do not remain continually at one location. the industry or a community. IRPA = ∑ LSIR x presence factor Risk is defined as the product of the consequences (here measured as harm to people) and the likelihood of occurrence (i. an expected rate of occurrence per year). There is no acceptance criterion for PLL. or for comparing alternatives during the design stages of any project.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. There are several ways of presenting societal risk. Report No. N Where: ∑= sum for all outcomes f = frequency of an outcome (per year) N = number of fatalities caused by the outcome Potential Loss of Life (PLL) is the measure of the average number of statistical fatalities that may be expected within a given time period. Potential loss of life (PLL) is a societal or group risk measure and is typically used in cost benefit analysis for assessing remedial measures. is the Potential Loss of Life (PLL). this is not a realistic risk measure. but the measure. "PLL per year" is another term for annual fatality rate.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK separate module on the installation. Societal (or group) risk measures the risk of an operation to the company. which is found to be most useful for offshore installations. 2013 Page 13 . PLL is defined as the long term average number of fatalities per year due to a specific cause and can be expressed mathematically as: PLL = ∑ f . This PHAST RISK modelling software requires the following inputs to be able to produce risk results: . which is managed by DNV’s London-based software development division. The PHAST RISK software has been in existence since the 1970s.Import an electronic map of the study area.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. specified weather class. which may cause delayed ignition of a flammable release. based on the latest available data. An electronic database of approximately 1400 materials is available to the PHAST RISK software. software calculated delayed ignition probability data.7. wind directional probability data. to produce individual and societal risk results. The PHATS RISK software will calculate dispersion and consequence modelling results for all specified weather classes and wind speeds with the failure case specified release frequency data. built-in event tree alternate consequence outcome branch probability data. and specifying the day / night number of people for each location.Superimpose all potential ignition sources within the study area. based on the specified consequence impact criteria levels. jet fire. with the material properties regularly reviewed and if required re-adjusted. flash fire. 30th July.The electronic map may be programmed in PHAST RISK to: . explosion).g. based on the latest available accident and test data. as required. The PHAST RISK consequence modelling results (for each material) are regularly reviewed and where required re-calibrated. Report No.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 3 QRA SOFTWARE TOOL The basis for this QRA study is DNV’s proprietary risk modelling software. and has been under continual development and improvement ever since. . 2013 Page 14 .Superimpose all on-site and off-site populations within the study area by location. wind speed. on which individual fatality risk contour results may be produced. . and specified population data by location. specified immediate ignition probability data. fatal impact probability data for each alternate consequence outcome (e. PHAST RISK software version 6. Prepare and import weather class. Leak elevation. Based on release duration and release phase (gas. and overhead power lines). weather class. Leak size. welding work shops) or line sources (e. in terms of hazard range and event duration (where applicable). then 100%). unless above auto ignition. Report No. Each ignition source carries additional specification in terms of presence factor and ignition source strength (probability of ignition per unit time. Each failure case calculation in PHAST RISK starts with discharge modelling.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Delayed ignition sources may be specified as point sources (e. 2-phase). which may be reprogrammed by the risk analyst.g. The immediate ignition probability associated with each flammable failure case is a risk analyst programmed value.g. for each weather class / wind speed combination. built-in consequence outcome event trees (continuous vapour release. based on historical ignition data. vertical). Enter all identified failure cases. roads. based on the dispersion modelling results and event duration. Pressure.g. wind directional probability files are entered into PHAST RISK. PHAST RISK will then calculate all alternate consequence outcomes (e.g. railway lines. Leak direction (e.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. wind speed. and transformers). horizontal. 30th July. Normally separate day / night. Quantity released (or release duration). where each event tree branch probability carries default values. liquid. Temperature. instantaneous release with rain-out). which are defined in terms of: Location. wind speed and wind direction probability data for the study area. the higher the ignition probability. explosion) of the event tree selected. Material released. fired heaters. typically varying from 1% to 30%. continuous release with rain-out. which varies with leak size and release phase (Gas / Liquid / 2-Phase) (the larger the leak vapour flow rate. Leak frequency and Immediate ignition probability. flares. area sources (e. The actual delayed ignition probability of any release is calculated by PHAST RISK. jet fire. most often broken down into 16 wind directions. when in contact with a flammable vapour cloud between LFL and UFL). instantaneous vapour release. 2013 Page 15 . diesel-generators. PHAST RISK directs the dispersion and consequence calculations to one of 4 alternate.g. 2013 Page 16 . for each specified failure case. Report No. PHAST RISK selected event tree and branch probabilities.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK So far the calculations performed in PHAST RISK only relate to the alternate consequence outcomes and the consequence hazard ranges. combined with vapour cloud persistence (duration). based on the consequence hazard range results. 30th July. wind speed and wind directional probability. For each release case. The delayed ignition probability calculation is based on the strength and location of all specified ignition sources and the failure case dispersion hazard range. using the failure case specified leak frequency as starting point. indoors and outdoors. PHAST RISK performs its individual and societal risk calculations based on a 200 x 200 grids (40. Specified immediate ignition probability and PHAST RISK calculated delayed ignition probability.000 points). while also separately multiplying this result by the PHAST RISK calculated delayed ignition probability. PHAST RISK takes the failure case release frequency as initial input. for the first of 16 wind directions. Weather class. multiplies this by the first weather class / wind speed probability. PHAST RISK will perform impact frequency calculations. for each of the 16 wind directions. with the grid point spacing automatically varied. PHAST RISK takes this result and multiplies it by the immediate ignition probability. Location and number of people (or equipment) within hazard area for societal risk results. This is based on the PHAST RISK calculated magnitude of each consequence and the PHAST RISK default impact probability criteria or risk analyst specified impact criteria for that type of consequence. To produce risk results. for each alternate consequence out come. Fatal Impact probability for each alternate consequence outcome. with separate calculations for day and night. Frequency aspects of the risk calculations relate to the: Risk analyst defined failure case leak frequency. For each grid point within range PHAST RISK then calculates the magnitude of the consequence at each grid point (e. for that weather class / wind speed and wind direction. PHAST RISK can also produce societal risk results by comparing the calculated level of individual risk at all 40.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. and combining this with the number of people indoors and outdoors. This is repeated until all failure cases have been calculated. based on the pre-specified levels of individual fatality risk (or equipment damage) to be plotted. explosion overpressure at a particular grid point may be 3psi). and using linear interpolation between relevant grid points. cumulatively adding these risk results at each grid point. at each grid point. The calculated consequence magnitude at each grid point is then compared to the PHAST RISK programmed impact criteria level. based on the impact probability criteria specified in PHAST RISK. 30th July. PHAST RISK takes the calculated consequence hazard range and verifies which grid points are within the consequence hazard area. for the type of consequence and the magnitude of the consequence. and the result added to the previous risk level. 2013 Page 17 . cumulatively adding to the risk level at each grid point. entered in the PHAST RISK software. The risk contour results are super imposed on the electronic site map. The above calculations are repeated for all day / night weather classes. the next failure case will be calculated. relating to immediate or delayed ignition branch path. Once completed. entered by the risk analyst by location. Once all risk calculations at these grid points have been completed for the first failure case.g. This calculation is repeated for each event tree alternate consequence outcome at each grid point. while PHAST RISK also tracks the risk contribution made by each failure case at each grid point. and the likelihood of fatality or damage calculated. Report No. PHAST RISK produces individual risk contour results by linking points of equal risk.000 grid points. The above calculations are then repeated for each of the 16 wind directions.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK These 2 results are multiplied by the first of the event tree consequence branch probabilities. again adding all results cumulatively at each grid point. wind speeds and wind directions. VCEs and no hazard). 1. fire balls. or to one or more specified criteria levels.068 barg) and 5 psi (0. jet fires. For flash fires the LFL envelope is used and for VCE overpressure two impact criteria levels are used. ignition data and population data entered into the PHAST RISK software are critical to the risk results. Each event-tree assigns a ‘split’ between alternate consequence outcomes (spill fires.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK The above discussion demonstrates that the meteorological data.5 psi (0.5(0. flash fires. This is in line with the intention of performing a QRA as per the “Guidelines for QRA Study (Revision April 2008)” for a purpose of land-use planning. For flammable releases the alternate consequences would be spill fires. People vulnerability criteria. For flash fires the LFL envelope is used and for VCE overpressure two impact criteria levels are used. The normal default people fatal fraction impact criteria used in PHAST RISK are shown in the below table. jet fires.34 barg). fire balls. Instantaneous No Rain Out.1 barg) and 5 psi (0. which pre-determines the fraction of fatalities resulting indoor & outdoor from being exposed to specific consequence outcomes for a specified duration. Note that with default settings the risk modelling within PHAST RISK aims to produce conservative offsite fatality risk results. delayed ignition and no ignition probabilities. 4 built-in event trees (Continuous No Rain Out. 30th July. 1. based on the immediate ignition. pool fires and fire balls the varying percentage fatalities (with distance) is calculated based on the Eisenberg Probit equation. Continuous With Rain Out.034) psi. 2013 Page 18 . each with predefined values for the impact levels that will affect people. Instantaneous With Rain Out) that are automatically selected based on the type of material and the release conditions. Report No. This is achieved by the build-in but programmable parameter settings.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. flash fires and vapour cloud explosions (VCEs). for each alternate consequence outcome. 0.34 barg).0 psi (0. For jet fires. which include: Indoor & outdoor people fatality impact criteria levels. For jet fires. pool fires and fire balls the varying percentage fatalities (with distance) is calculated based on the Eisenberg Probit equation. DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Table 3-1 PHAST RISK Default Vulnerability Parameters Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. 30th July. 2013 Page 19 . 30th July.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Annexe 2 Assumption Register Report No. 2013 Page i .: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. ................................... 5 6 IMPACT CRITERIA......... 2 2.......................................................................................... 6 6........................................... pool fire and fireball ........................................................................................................................................1 Identification of Ignition Sources .................................................... 1 2 METEOROLOGICAL DATA .....1......................................................................................: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02................................................ 6 6............................................................... 5 4 POPULATION ............2 Night Weather Class ............................... 2013 Page ii ..................... 6 7 RELEASE SIZES.......................................................................................1 Jet fire.......... 2 3 IGNITION ....DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Table of Contents 1 RISK CALCULATION TOOL ........................................................3 Explosion............................................................................................................................................................................................ 6 6....................... 5 5 MATERIAL COMPOSITION ..................................................................................2 Flash fire...................................................................................................... 7 Report No................ 2 2.........................................................1 Day Weather Class............ 4 3...... 30th July... It provides an experienced risk analyst with a tool that allows them to focus their attention and experience on the real problem areas rather than the administration of large quantities of data.Phast Risk analyses complex consequences from accident scenarios. PhastRisk combines recognized and validated models for the various physical phenomena. automatically selecting the appropriate model depending on the circumstances of the release. so that time and effort can then be directed to mitigating these highest risk activities. accurate and appropriate advice on safety related issues. to thermal radiation from fires. to quantify the risk associated with the release of hazardous materials. taking account of local population. explosion overpressures and toxic lethality. which is an industry standard method for carrying out QRA of onshore process and pipelines (chemical and petrochemical) facilities. . land usage and weather conditions. 2013 Page 1 .DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 1 RISK CALCULATION TOOL The risk analysis within this study is conducted using DNV Software’s Phast Risk program Version 6. .: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.Phast Risk allows efficient identification of major risk contributors. through atmospheric dispersion. rain-out and re-evaporation of liquid. Phast Risk is intended as a set of models for risk analysts to enable them to provide timely. It models all stages of a release from outflow through a hole or from a pipe end. Report No.Phast Risk incorporates the industry standard consequence modeling of Phast. . 30th July.7. . This distribution is combined with the wind rose information to generate likelihood for the wind to be from a particular direction and of a specified speed and stability.110465753 0.1 Day Weather Class . Table 2-1: Wind Speed Distribution (Day) Wind Direction N NE E SE S SW W NW Calm Weather Categories 3B 5D 0.001972603 0.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.D11 : D stability (neutral) and 11 m/s wind speed.018410959 0. .085917808 0.F3 : F stability (very stable) and 3 m/s wind speed.024547945 0.D11 : D stability (neutral) and 11 m/s wind speed. 2. 2013 Page 2 .002630137 0. 30th July.011178082 0.00460274 0.B2 : B stability (Unstable) and 2 m/s wind speed.011835616 0.2 Night Weather Class .042958904 0.177972603 0.00460274 0.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 2 METEOROLOGICAL DATA Data on the wind speed and stability category have been obtained from the client and this will be used for this particular QRA study. There are two different weather classes for Day and Night which are listed below: 2.009205479 0.104328767 0.006136986 0.000657534 0.042958904 0.019068493 Report No. Atmospheric temperature : 15-25°C .005041096 0.060931507 0.005041096 0.060931507 0. 30th July.060931507 0.001890411 0.022849315 0. the following meteorological parameters will be applied: An average ambient condition as follow is used in the study: .5kw/m2 for day and 0kw/m2 for night Report No.190410959 0.003150685 0.013863014 0.005041096 0.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Table 2-2: Wind Speed Distribution (Night) Wind Direction N NE E SE S SW W NW Calm Weather Categories 3B 5D 0.038082192 0.Humidity : 70% .Solar radiation flux : 0.003150685 0. 2013 Page 3 .167561644 0.121863014 0.015753425 0.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.Surface temperature : 15-25°C .010082192 Referring to the same study.038082192 0. DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 3 IGNITION In order to calculate the risk from flammable materials. If these factors are known for each source of ignition considered. information on the ignition sources (which are present in the area over which a flammable cloud may drift) is required. for each source (as that used for population data). industrial sites where location of specific ignition sources is unknown. namely PHAST RISK. the following factors need to be specified: Presence Factor This is the probability that an ignition source is active at a particular location. railways. etc. workshops.Location - The location of each ignition source must be specified on the site layout. Line sources Roads. then the probability of a flammable cloud being ignited as it moves downwind over the sources can be calculated. The PHAST RISK software then calculates equivalent combined ignition factors and presence factors for all sources based on its location on the map. The results of the dispersion calculations for each flammable release are then used to determine the size and mass of the cloud when it reaches the source of ignition. Area sources Population. The data is entered into the risk quantification software. Ignition Factor This defines the “strength” of an ignition source. For each ignition source considered. This allows the position of the source relative to the location of each release to be calculated. It is derived from the probability that a source will ignite a cloud if the cloud is present over the source for a particular length of time. 30th July. 2013 Page 4 .: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. Ignition sources in a QRA study may be of 3 types: Point sources Known specific sources such as flares. . Report No. electrical transmission lines. hot work. however.9 and operating probability 0.1 as per DNV Technical Note. 30th July. Further analysis of the population will be conducted in order to define various factors associated with the population presence. compressor and vehicles movement etc. The basis of the population assigned to the facility will be based on the data given by HPCL Bharatpur.g. e. No specific field survey is performed for the neighbouring industrial plants in this risk study. 4 POPULATION A representative estimate of the exposed populations is sufficient to determine the acceptability of societal risks by determining the order of magnitude of potential fatalities within a population group. 2013 Page 5 . Report No. the ignition sources considered in this QRA study are listed below: .DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 3. as is the standard prevailing in the HPCL Bharatpur . flare. turbine. generally a process petro-chemical plant has various types of ignition sources on-site.g. fraction of time spent indoor etc. day/night variation. In summary.It is assumed that stringent ignition control is maintained. hot surface. 5 MATERIAL COMPOSITION The material composition used for the study is provided by HPCL Bharatpur.Entire Complex has been considered as Ignition source with ignition probability 0.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.1 Identification of Ignition Sources The ignition sources identified for the proposed expansion project are near-by Industrial plants and onsite ignition sources like hot machinery surfaces. e.1. electrical sources. 3 Explosion The study applies the TNT Correlation Model which utilizes two fixed coefficients to establish ranges to specified damage levels (these coefficients are 0.56 ln(I1.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. Fatality modification factors are also applied and are combined with the above impact criteria to produce the final fatality rate resulted from each type of consequence.3 and 0.The minimum explosive mass considered: 100 Kg. respectively. 2013 Page 6 . Areas exposed to radiation levels of 37.03 for heavy damage to buildings and 0.1 Jet fire. This is assumed as the time that someone will remain within the radiation envelope before attempting to escape.06 for repairable damage to buildings). Pr = -36.333 . The damage levels are used as single criteria to establish the human fatality rate. Report No.38 + 2. pool fire and fireball Two sets of criteria are used to determine impact from combination of these events. The fatality levels in areas exposed to lower radiation levels are determined using the following Probit function. Separate factors are used for people being outdoors at the time of the event and for people inside a building.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 6 IMPACT CRITERIA The following impact criteria are used. 6. 6.1 bar for heavy and repairable damage.2 Flash fire The area within the LFL envelope of flammable vapor cloud is used as single value criteria and it is assumed that this area gives 100% fatality level. These damage levels are not explicitly associated with overpressure levels but are generally considered to be equivalent to 0.5 kW/m2 are assumed to give 100% fatality level. 30th July. t) Where: Pr : Probit I : thermal radiation level in W/m2 t : exposure duration in second The maximum exposure duration for these events is set to 20 seconds. 6.Explosion location criterion: Cloud Centroid . The parameters considered for Explosion are following: . representative of releases larger than 150mm. 30th July. 2013 Page 7 .Large release through 100 mm hole. .DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 7 RELEASE SIZES The following representative leak sizes have been applied: Release Sizes: .: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. Report No. . representative of 3 to 10 mm hole sizes. representative of 10 to 50 mm hole sizes. representative of 50 to 100 mm hole sizes. .Catastrophic Rupture at vessel diameter/ Full bore release at pipeline diameter.Small release through 5 mm equivalent hole.Medium release through 25 mm hole. DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Annexe 3 Frequency Analysis Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. 2013 Page i . 30th July. ....... 5 1...................................... 8 List of Tables Table 1-1 : Failure case scenarios ............................................................................................................................................... 3 1....................................................................6 Release duration ..............DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Table of Contents 1 2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION ...5 Failure Cases ........................ 3 1......................................................................................................................................................... 5 1................................................3 Instantaneous Releases............................................................................................................................................ 9 Report No..................................... 6 Table 2-1 : Failure frequencies of the identified scenarios .................................................................................2 Continuous Releases ................................. 2013 Page ii .................... 30th July..................................... 3 Table 1-2 : List of Failure Cases . 6 1........................................... 8 FREQUENCY DISCUSSION ...............................................................: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02..............................1 Failure case scenarios .......4 Events which could lead to a Release .................................................... 5 1................................. DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 1.5bar 2.5bar 25 pl from tank to pump house_MS MS ambient 2.1 Failure case scenarios Following scenarios have been identified for the Bharatpur Table 1-1 : Failure case scenarios Sr.5bar 2. No 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Failure Case TK-1 TK-2 TK-3 TK-4 TK-5 TK-6 TK-7/UG TK-8/UG TK-9/UG TK-10 TK-11 TK-12 TK-13 TK-14 TK-15 TK-16 TK-17 TK-18 HSD Pump_2400 LPM SKD Pump_1200 LPM MS Pump 2400 LPM Receipt Pipeline to Tank MS Receipt Pipeline to Tank HSD Receipt Pipeline to Tank SKO Material Handled HSD HSD SKO SKO MS MS MS MS HSD WATER WATER HSD HSD MS MS MS HSD HSD HSD SKO MS MS HSD SKO Temp ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient ambient Pressure atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric atmospheric 2.5bar 26 PL from tank to pump house_HSD HSD ambient 2. 2013 Page 3 .5bar 27 PL from tank to pump house_SKO SKO ambient 2.5bar 2.5bar Report No.5bar 2. 30th July.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.5bar 2. 5bar 30 PLfrom pump house to gantry_HSD HSD ambient 2.5bar 29 PL from pump house to gantry_SKO SKO ambient 2.5bar Report No.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Sr. No Failure Case Material Handled Temp Pressure 28 PL from pump house to gantry_MS MS ambient 2. 30th July.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. 2013 Page 4 . Release occasioned from other operations or maintenance. strong winds). tide. In such situation. 30th July.4 Events which could lead to a Release Releases can be caused by: . If ignition occurs after some delay similar to continuous release. a fireball may be formed depending on the nature of the material.Vandalism/sabotage Report No.2 Continuous Releases If ignited immediately. 1. a flash fire or VCE may be the consequence.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 1. pipe-work or fittings. . If ignition is immediate.g. the trailers etc. depending upon the degree of congestion within area and energy strength of the ignition source. If ignition is delayed.Failure or leak from other equipment. a continuous release will form a jet fire. .Impact event. . waves.Internal explosion in ship.Incorrect operation. a flammable cloud would be formed and drifted with the wind.3 Instantaneous Releases An instantaneous release would result from catastrophic rupture of a storage vessel (such as the storage cylinders.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. a flash fire or Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) may result. . tsunamis. 2013 Page 5 . if the cloud is ignited (after some delays). . .) or reactors.Natural event (e. 1. DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 1. 2013 Page 6 . No Failure Case Hole Size (mm) Small Medium Large Cata/ FBR Tank Fire Tank Fire 1 TK-1 5mm NA 100 mm catastrophic Rupture 2 TK-2 5mm NA 100 mm catastrophic Rupture Tank Fire 3 TK-3 5mm NA 100 mm catastrophic Rupture Tank Fire Tank Fire 4 TK-4 5mm NA 100 mm catastrophic Rupture 5 TK-5 5mm NA 100 mm catastrophic Rupture Tank Fire 6 TK-6 5mm NA 100 mm catastrophic Rupture Tank Fire 7 TK-7/UG 5mm NA NA catastrophic Rupture NA 8 TK-8/UG 5mm NA NA catastrophic Rupture NA NA 9 TK-9/UG 5mm NA NA catastrophic Rupture 10 TK-10 5mm NA 100 mm catastrophic Rupture Tank Fire 11 TK-11 5mm NA 100 mm catastrophic Rupture Tank Fire 12 TK-12 5mm NA 100 mm catastrophic Rupture Tank Fire 13 TK-13 5mm NA 100 mm catastrophic Rupture Tank Fire 14 TK-14 5mm NA 100 mm catastrophic Rupture Tank Fire 15 TK-15 5mm NA 100 mm catastrophic Rupture Tank Fire Report No.5 Failure Cases The failure cases with the hole sizes considered for each of the release is as follows Table 1-2 : List of Failure Cases Sr. 30th July.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. 30th July. No Failure Case Hole Size (mm) Small Medium Large Cata/ FBR Tank Fire 16 TK-16 5mm NA 100 mm catastrophic Rupture Tank Fire 17 TK-17 5mm NA 100 mm catastrophic Rupture Tank Fire 18 19 20 21 5mm NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 100 mm NA NA NA catastrophic Rupture FBR FBR FBR Tank Fire NA NA NA 5mm 25mm 100 mm FBR NA 5mm 25mm 100 mm FBR NA 24 TK-18 HSD Pump_2400 LPM SKD Pump_1200 LPM MS Pump 2400 LPM Receipt Pipeline to Tank MS Receipt Pipeline to Tank HSD Receipt Pipeline to Tank SKO 5mm 25mm 100 mm FBR NA 25 pl from tank to pump house_MS 5mm 25mm 100 mm FBR NA 26 PL from tank to pump house_HSD 5mm 25mm 100 mm FBR NA 27 PL from tank to pump house_SKO 5mm 25mm 100 mm FBR NA 28 PL from pump house to gantry_MS 5mm 25mm 100 mm FBR NA 29 PL from pump house to gantry_SKO 5mm 25mm 100 mm FBR NA 30 PLfrom pump house to gantry_HSD 5mm 25mm 100 mm FBR NA 22 23 NA stands for “Not Applicable” Report No.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Sr.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. 2013 Page 7 . 2 FREQUENCY DISCUSSION Estimation of the likelihood of occurrence of each of the failure cases modelled has been done based on historical failure frequencies of process equipment. DNV has ensured that the most reputable. comprehensive and appropriate data are selected for each of the equipment failure frequencies quoted.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 1. The below Table shows the failure frequencies that are considered for the failure case scenarios Report No. 2013 Page 8 . 30th July.6 Release duration Release duration of 600 seconds is chosen for this study. This includes the time to detect. isolate and the subsequent blow down (if possible) of the node from which leak occurs.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. The historical failure data are based on an extensive research by DNV on several failure frequency databases worldwide. After the leak is detected and the section is isolated it is understood that no more inventory is entering the section. 00E-05 HSD.00E-05 1.00E-05 9.SKD.00E-04 5. MS Road Tanker Failure 9.80E-02 7.80E-03 1.00E-03 3.00E-07 1.50E-07 5. Ethanol.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. SKD.40E-03 HSD.80E-04 4.50E-03 1.00E-06 2.60E-08 9. MS pump failure Report No.00E-07 Atmospheric Storage tank Failure Underground Tank Failure Pipeline from Tank to Pump House Receipt Lines to Tanks HSD.10E-06 2. SKD.10E-03 1.50E-07 5.60E-08 0 0 0 3.10E-06 2.00E-05 5.40E-06 1.00E-05 9. 30th July.30E-05 8. 2013 Page 9 .00E-07 1. MS loading arm Failure 7.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Table 2-1 : Failure frequencies of the identified scenarios Case Description Small Medium Large FBR 2. 2013 Page i .: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Annexe 4 Consequence Analysis Report No. 30th July. ....................................................................................................................................... 4 1..................................................: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.......3 Flash Fire ......................................................................................................................................DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Table of Contents 1 CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT ................................. 6 1.....2 Jet Fire ........................... 2013 Page ii ...........1 Pool Fire ..................4 Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE)................................ 8 Report No................................... 7 1......... 5 1... 30th July........ ...................: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02............. 30th July..............................DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK List of Tables Table 1-1 : Consequence Results............................................ 2013 Page iii ...................... 9 Report No. 7. The hazard distances for each event depend on the leak size. weather conditions. Consequence distances for the following weather conditions have been evaluated in the tables below. based on built-in programmable event trees.Flash fires. 30th July. 2013 Page 4 . . the results of which are discussed in terms of hazard distances. the effect zones for the various possible outcomes of such a release are determined for both early and delayed ignition presents the consequence hazard distances for the failure case scenarios identified in the POL Terminal Bharatpur. . .B3 : B Stability (Unstable) and 3 m/s wind speed Report No. The flammable consequences that may potentially arise from failure of equipment’s or lines are: . The dispersion of gas releases from different hole sizes are modelled using state-of-art methods. For flammable and explosive consequence.Explosions.D11 : D stability (neutral) and 11 m/s wind speed. The corresponding consequences in terms of flammable and explosive effects are modelled and analysed by using PHAST RISK software version 6. .Fireball. where the corresponding consequences and risk impact are calculated. the release conditions and the dispersion characteristics as calculated by the PHAST RISK software.F3 : F stability (very stable) and 3 m/s wind speed.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 1 CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT For each defined failure case for the POL Terminal Bharatpur. operating conditions. the release location. the consequence modelling is carried out to determine the potential effects of releases. and/or .: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.Jet fires. Each failure case is entered into PHAST RISK software. . In Case of tanks small. medium leaks are considered from the fittings around the tanks like flanges. pool fires. PHAST is a consequence and impact assessment module integrated within DNV risk calculation software PHAST Risk. flash fires. Report No.12. Three levels of radiation are presented in this report. Table 1-1 below summarises representative failure cases with the associated pool fire consequence results.5 kW/m2.37. however blistering of the skin (second degree burn) is likely. valves etc. outside pool fires rarely cause fatalities as the time between when the fire starts until the time when the fire is fully developed is usually sufficient for people to escape. vapor cloud explosions.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK The consequence analysis is performed using DNV proprietary software PHAST. solid surface in the open air or within an enclosure. and tank fire and bund fire scenarios are considered as the worst case scenarios.e. these tend to be people caught within the pool itself or later fire fighting personnel in the event of a boil-over (due to burning oil not thermal radiation). The extent of the consequence of a Pool fire is represented by the thermal radiation envelope. In general terms. i.1 Pool Fire A pool fire in the open air and in an enclosed area may take place when there is an ignition of a liquid spill which is released on a horizontal.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.4 kW/m2. 2013 Page 5 . this level will cause extreme pain within 20 seconds and movement to a safer place is instinctive.: . This level indicates around 6% fatality for 20 seconds exposure. The following descriptions are based on the different hazard types modeled. .5 kW/m2. this level of radiation is assumed to give 100% fatality. . 30th July. this level is sufficient to cause personnel if unable to reach cover within 20s. A liquid pool fire can be either fuel controlled or ventilation controlled. 1. which are jet fires. 0: lethality. If there are fatalities. DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 1.2 Jet Fire A jet fire may result from ignition of a high-pressure leakage of gas from process plants or storage tanks. Jet fires are characterized by a high momentum jet flame that is highly turbulent. The flame is lifted above the exit opening from which the gas is discharged generally at high pressure. This distance appears because the combustion process can only take place when the flow velocity is reduced sufficiently to allow stable combustion. Another feature of such fires is the high entrainment of air into the flame plume due to the highly turbulent flame. The extent of the consequence of a Jet fire is represented by the thermal radiation envelope. Three levels of radiation are presented in this report, i.e.: - 4 kW/m2; this level is sufficient to cause personnel if unable to reach cover within 20s; however blistering of the skin (second degree burn) is likely; 0: lethality, - 12.5 kW/m2; this level will cause extreme pain within 20 seconds and movement to a safer place is instinctive. This level indicates around 6% fatality for 20 seconds exposure. - 37.5 kW/m2; this level of radiation is assumed to give 100% fatality. Jet fires are a direct hazard to people and structures caught within the flame envelope or exposed to high thermal radiation levels. This scenario is considered for the whole boosting station in which material is handled at the significant pressures. Table 1-1 below summarises representative failure cases with the associated jet fire consequence results. Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 6 DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 1.3 Flash Fire A flash fire is the non-explosive combustion of a flammable vapour cloud resulting from a release of volatile material into the open air, which, after mixing with air, ignites. The flame initially propagates slowly, often 10m/s or less, and in the Shell Maplin Sands experiments often was unable to overcome the wind speed to flash back to the source. However, where congestion or confinement exist, flame speeds can accelerate to hundreds of m/s and overpressure effects will result. The cloud burns as a flash fire and the major hazard to people and to equipment (especially control cabling) is for those within the burning envelope (including those who might be above on elevated structures). Flame duration and intensity for most flammable clouds are insufficient to cause a significant thermal radiation hazard outside the flame envelope. The literature provides little information on the effects of thermal radiation from flash fires, probably because thermal radiation hazards from burning vapour clouds are considered less significant than possible blast effects. Furthermore, flash combustion of a vapour cloud normally lasts no more than a few tens of seconds. Propane experiments (Maplin) gave average flame speeds of up to about 12 m/s. higher transient flame speeds, up to 28 m/s were observed in one instance. Pool Fire Formation of pools is also likely, particularly for materials that have high boiling points. Flash calculations were conducted to consider the vaporization of light components in the streams, especially for high pressure or high temperature process conditions. Flashed vapor and light component releases will behave as jets, with jet fire and vapor cloud impacts modelled in the same way as for gas releases, as set out in the previous sections. The extent of the consequence of a flash fire is represented by the flash fire envelope, i.e. the maximum dispersion distance of the flammable cloud at LFL concentration. Table 1-1 below summarises representative failure cases together with their flash fire consequence results. Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 7 DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK 1.4 Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE) Due to the large volume of flammable materials and highly flammable material with higher proportion of the more volatile components, there is significant potential for Vapour Cloud Explosion Events (VCE) in case any ignition source is not available immediately. Maximum flammable fuel volume for prediction of explosion overpressure effects estimated to be considerable based on flow rate, isolation time (10 mins), time for vaporization and probability of VCE scenario. Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 8 4 16.4 7.8 11.5kW/m2 12.3 30.4 11.8 13.7 11 23.7 73 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.9 3.9 7.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.4 11 23.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.7 54.2 35 76.2 3.2 11 15.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.9 .2 36 82 97 37.4 38.9 8.6 6. 30th July.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Table 1-1 : Consequence Results Description TK-1 &2 TK-3&4 Accident Scenario Small Event Flash Fire Pool Fire Large Flash Fire Pool Fire Catastrophic Rupture Flash Fire Pool fire tank Fire Pool fire Small Flash Fire Pool Fire Large Impact criteria LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.6 23.2 15.6 13.7 7.1 26.3 30.9 7 11.4 93 157 NR 21 46 6.3 15.4 38.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.7 92 NR 18 42 2.5kW/m2 Flash Fire Pool Fire Report No.5kW/m2 12.9 37.2 35 76.4 2.1 15.1 26.7 92 NR 18 42 9.5kW/m2 12. 2013 Page 9 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s F 3m/s 3.1 26.2 2.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.3 32 6.4 17 7. DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description TK-5&6 Accident Scenario Event Catastrophic Rupture Flash Fire Pool fire tank Fire Pool fire Small Flash Fire Pool Fire Large Flash Fire Pool Fire Catastrophic Rupture Flash Fire Pool fire tank Fire Pool fire Impact criteria 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 10 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 73.3 85.4 21.1 30.7 37.4 37.4 38.9 41 97 115 6 6 19 23 31 33 F 3m/s 73.3 24 37.4 38.9 97 6 19 31 2.8 3 2.9 6.4 11.4 16 24.9 23 29.7 74.5 47.6 37.5 38.7 99.7 6 19 32 8.8 13.8 17.4 17.4 23 31.7 88.6 67.7 37.5 41 120 6 24 34 6.1 11 15.8 27.7 23 29.8 74.6 50.6 37.5 38.7 99.7 6 19 32 DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description Accident Scenario Event Impact criteria TK-7&8 /UG Small Flash Fire Pool Fire Catastrophic Rupture Flash Fire Pool fire Small Flash Fire Pool Fire LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 TK-9/UG TK-12 Catastrophic Rupture Flash Fire Pool fire Small Flash Fire Pool Fire Large Flash Fire Pool Fire Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 11 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s NR NR 3 4 7 7.9 11 11 21.4 26.5 33.3 33.3 35 38 91 111 F 3m/s NR 3 7 11 18.5 33.3 35 91 NR NR NR 3 4 3 6 9.5 21.4 33.3 35 91 6.7 9.3 26.5 33.3 38 111 6.3 9.5 18.5 33.3 35 91 2.9 3 2.6 6.5 10.5 14.5 5.9 23.8 31.5 8.9 12.4 15.5 5.9 23.8 32.6 6.3 10.2 14 5.9 23.8 31.5 DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description TK-13 Accident Scenario Event Catastrophic Rupture Flash Fire Pool fire tank Fire Pool fire Small Flash Fire Pool Fire Large Flash Fire Pool Fire Catastrophic Rupture Flash Fire Pool fire tank Fire Pool fire Impact criteria 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02, 30th July, 2013 Page 12 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 70.5 79.2 22.7 33.8 37.4 37.4 38.7 41 92 104 6 6 17.5 20.5 28 29 F 3m/s 70.5 26.5 37.4 38.7 92 6 17.5 28 3.2 3.4 2.9 7.8 11.3 15.7 7.1 26.2 35 76.7 48.6 37.4 38.7 92 NR 18 38.7 9.6 13.4 16.9 7.1 26.2 36 86 84 37.4 85 149 NR 22 42 6.8 11 15.4 7.1 26.2 35 76.7 63.9 37.4 38 92 NR 18 38.7 5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.8 31.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.6 17 23 31.1 2.9 6.8 74.8 17.8 3.9 31 88.9 23 29.4 26 36.6 6.9 23 29.5kW/m2 12.7 23 29.4 17.3 3.3 19.1 11 15.4 16 24.5 3 7.6 6 19 32.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.4 98 6.4 11.5kW/m2 12.4 22.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description Accident Scenario Event Impact criteria TK-14 Small Flash Fire Pool Fire LFL 37.4 26. 30th July.5kW/m2 12.8 27.2 26.8 13.2 35 83 9.6 27.5kW/m2 12.7 74.7 88.5 35.7 23 29.4 23.7 17.3 35 83 . 2013 Page 13 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s F 3m/s 2.5kW/m2 12.8 74.6 6 24 34.7 74.1 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.4 8.5 24.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.4 17.8 12.8 15.5 6 19 32.5kW/m2 12.4 3.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 TK-15 Large Flash Fire Pool Fire Catastrophic Rupture Flash Fire Pool fire tank Fire Pool fire Small Flash Fire Pool Fire Large Flash Fire Pool Fire Report No.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37. DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description TK-16 TK-17&18 Accident Scenario Event Impact criteria Catastrophic Rupture Flash Fire Pool fire tank Fire Pool fire Small Flash Fire Pool Fire LFL 37.2 3.9 18.4 99.3 41 3 3.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.7 75 37.8 45.7 .5kW/m2 12. 2013 Page 14 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 104 170 37.3 29.7 99.9 20.7 NR 18 41 9.8 21.4 17.7 NR 23.5kW/m2 12.5 25.6 12 17 33 25.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL Large Flash Fire Pool Fire Catastrophic Rupture Flash Fire Pool fire tank Fire Pool fire Small Flash Fire Report No.6 25.4 33.9 47.4 37.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.4 33 81 97 37.4 38.4 38.7 NR 18.3 53.2 3.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.7 NR 17.7 99.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.7 166 NR NR 17.4 35 95 118 37.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.7 6.8 80.4 38.3 2.9 12.4 41 120.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.4 14.7 99.5kW/m2 12.4 38.9 47.5kW/m2 12. 30th July.9 F 3m/s 141 37.7 86.9 6.3 3. 7 24.9 6.7 32.4 6.5 20.9 6 17.2 10.3 74 18.5kW/m2 12.4 10.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37. 2013 Page 15 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 6.9 81.5 6.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.8 .9 43.5 28 19.1 4.3 24.2 19.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.7 9.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.3 19.7 32.7 32.7 24.2 3.9 72.1 4.3 24.7 32.6 40.5kW/m2 12.8 12.9 6.5 19.5kW/m2 12.7 82.5 F 3m/s 6.3 24.5 15 6.9 34 72.4 6.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description HSD Pump Accident Scenario Event Impact criteria Pool Fire 37.5kW/m2 12.9 15 16 6.5kW/m2 Large Flash Fire Pool Fire Catastrophic Rupture Flash Fire Pool fire tank Fire Pool fire Rupture Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire SKo Pump Rupture Flash Fire Jet Fire Report No. 30th July.9 34 72.3 24.5 40.2 74.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.9 6 6 17.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.9 72.6 4.4 3.3 6.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.3 6.5 40.4 20.9 81.2 19.3 42 38.8 3.5 28 29 19 19. 1 19.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description Accident Scenario Event Impact criteria 12.3 40.3 77.5 93.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.4 78.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.4 6.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.2 3.5kW/m2 12.5 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR F 3m/s 50.5kW/m2 12.6 4.4 19.1 40.4 43.7 104 19.7 18.5 54.3 37.5kW/m2 12.3 19.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 Pool fire MS Pump Rupture Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Ethanol Pump Rupture Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Receipt Pipeline to Tank MS Small Flash Fire Jet Fire Report No.8 3.9 80.1 4.4 49 69.8 44.8 67.2 26.7 89.8 81.1 78.2 27 27.1 41.9 46.4 6.5 6.6 79.1 19.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.4 3.1 74. 2013 Page 16 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 52.5kW/m2 12.5 19.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5 65 58. 30th July.7 67 19.8 NR NR NR NR .5 51.3 41 43.1 4.3 50.5kW/m2 12.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.8 51.5 63.9 108 102 19.8 38 43.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37. : 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.5kW/m2 12.6 13 18 18.6 18 NR NR NR NR 8.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description Accident Scenario Medium Event Impact criteria Pool fire 37.4 5.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.2 21.7 .5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 12.7 23.3 23.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.3 42 NR NR NR NR 19.7 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.7 23.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.2 F 3m/s 4.7 60. 30th July.5kW/m2 12.3 19.2 21.2 19.8 72.5 11.9 18.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.9 8.4 11.3 21.3 21.9 NR NR NR NR 19.2 42 46.9 18.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Large Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Line Rupture Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Report No.4 60.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37. 2013 Page 17 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 4.5kW/m2 12. 5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.6 13 18 18.3 42 NR NR NR NR 19.7 60.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Medium Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Large Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Catastrophic Rupture Flash Fire Report No.5 11.9 NR NR F 3m/s 60.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.4 60.2 21.4 5.9 18.8 72.2 42 46.5kW/m2 12.2 21.5kW/m2 12.3 23.5kW/m2 12.7 23.9 73 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 4.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.9 18.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 12.9 8.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.7 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.8 NR NR NR NR 4. 2013 Page 18 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 60.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.6 18 NR NR NR NR 8. 30th July.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description Receipt Pipeline to Tank HSD Accident Scenario Small Event Impact criteria 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.4 11.9 NR .2 19.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37. 5kW/m2 12.6 18 NR NR NR NR 8.3 42 NR NR NR .5kW/m2 Pool fire Receipt Pipeline to Tank FO Small Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Medium Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Large Flash Fire Jet Fire Report No.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.7 NR NR NR NR NR NR F 3m/s NR NR NR 19.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.9 NR NR NR NR 4.5kW/m2 12.2 19.9 8.3 23.8 72.4 60. 30th July.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 12.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 4.4 5.5kW/m2 12.4 11. 2013 Page 19 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.6 13 18 18.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5 11.2 42 46.2 21.9 18.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description Accident Scenario Event Impact criteria Jet Fire 37.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.7 60.9 18.7 23.2 21. 2 21.4 60.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5 10 10.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.2 21.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 12.2 19.6 F 3m/s NR 19.6 7.7 23.7 23.4 15.2 21.4 NR NR NR NR 7.4 60. 2013 Page 20 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s NR NR 19.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 Pool fire Line Rupture Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Receipt Pipeline to Tank SKO Small Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Medium Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Report No.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 4.2 19.7 60.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 7.9 NR NR NR NR 4.9 NR NR NR NR 19.8 72.9 15.2 21.4 5.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description Accident Scenario Event Impact criteria 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.6 .4 10 15.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 12.7 60.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.8 72. 30th July.5kW/m2 12. 5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.4 11.4 5.8 31.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5 31.6 18.5kW/m2 12.6 18 .6 7.8 31.5 31. 30th July.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.8 NR NR NR NR 7.8 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 7.6 18.8 33.6 7.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Line Rupture Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire pl from tank to pump house_MS Small Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Report No.8 33.8 31.5kW/m2 12.6 13 18 18.8 NR NR NR NR 7.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.8 23.6 18.8 23.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.8 NR NR NR NR 4.5kW/m2 12.6 18.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description Accident Scenario Large Event Impact criteria 12. 2013 Page 21 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 18.8 33.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.3 F 3m/s 18.5 31.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.8 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 7.5kW/m2 12.8 23.8 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 4.5 11. 2 19.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.5kW/m2 12.2 42 46.9 18.2 21.5kW/m2 12.3 19.2 21.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.9 8.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description Accident Scenario Event Impact criteria Medium Flash Fire Jet Fire LFL 37.7 60.7 23.8 72.2 60.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.9 18.3 21.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.4 60.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 12.3 21.9 73 NR NR NR NR F 3m/s NR NR NR NR 8. 30th July.7 23.7 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.3 42 NR NR NR NR 19.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.3 23.8 NR NR .: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. 2013 Page 22 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.5kW/m2 12.7 60.5kW/m2 Pool fire Large Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Line Rupture Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire PL from tank to pump house_HSD Small Flash Fire Jet Fire Report No.9 NR NR NR NR 19. 5kW/m2 12.7 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.6 13 18 18.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.7 60.4 60.4 5.8 72.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 Pool fire Medium Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire large Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Line Rupture Flash Fire Jet Fire Report No.5kW/m2 12.9 NR NR NR NR .2 21.2 19.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. 2013 Page 23 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s NR NR NR NR 4.9 18. 30th July.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description Accident Scenario Event Impact criteria 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.3 23.5kW/m2 12.2 21.4 11.5 11.3 42 NR NR NR NR 19.6 18 NR NR NR NR 8.5kW/m2 12.9 8.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.9 18.2 42 46.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.7 23.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR F 3m/s NR NR 4. 7 23.4 11.2 19.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description PL from tank to pump house_FO Accident Scenario Small Event Impact criteria Pool fire 37.5kW/m2 12.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 4.9 18.2 21.3 42 NR NR NR NR 19. 2013 Page 24 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 19.7 23.2 21.5kW/m2 12.5 11.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.2 21.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.3 23.2 21.8 72. 30th July.7 60.2 42 46.9 8.7 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.9 NR NR NR NR 4.4 60.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 12.4 F 3m/s 19.2 19.5kW/m2 12.6 18 NR NR NR NR 8.5kW/m2 Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Medium Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire large Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Report No.6 13 18 18.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.7 .5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.4 5.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.9 18. 7 NR NR F 3m/s 60.2 42 46.6 18 NR NR NR NR 8. 2013 Page 25 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 60.4 11.5kW/m2 12.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.6 13 18 18.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.4 5.2 21.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.4 60.3 23.9 18.3 42 NR .7 60. 30th July.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire PL from tank to pump house_SKO Small Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Medium Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire large Flash Fire Report No.2 21.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description Accident Scenario Line Rupture Event Impact criteria 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.7 23.9 8.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.9 NR NR NR NR 4.5kW/m2 12.9 18.8 72.2 19.5 11.8 72.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.9 NR NR NR NR 19.5kW/m2 12.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 4. 9 73 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 4.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.4 11.7 23.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.7 60.9 NR NR NR NR 19.2 60.2 21.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR F 3m/s NR NR NR 19.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.3 21.8 NR NR NR NR 4.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 12. 30th July.2 21.5 11.4 5.5kW/m2 Pool fire Line Rupture Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire PL from pump house to gantry_MS Small Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Medium Flash Fire Jet Fire Report No.7 60.6 13 18 18.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description Accident Scenario Event Impact criteria Jet Fire 37.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.6 18 NR NR NR .3 21.2 19.5kW/m2 12.4 60.3 19.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.8 72.5kW/m2 12.7 23. 2013 Page 26 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37. 30th July.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.3 42 NR NR NR NR 19.7 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.5 F 3m/s NR 8.3 19.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description Accident Scenario Event Impact criteria 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.4 5.9 18.5kW/m2 12.9 NR NR NR NR 19.8 NR NR NR NR 4.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.9 73 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 4.7 23.7 23.5kW/m2 12.2 19. 2013 Page 27 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s NR NR 8.4 60.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.7 60.2 21.2 21.3 21.2 60.5kW/m2 12.9 18.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.3 21.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.9 8.2 42 46.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 12.4 .8 72.5kW/m2 12.7 60.3 23.5kW/m2 Pool fire large Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Line Rupture Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire PL from pump house to gantry_SKO Small Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Report No. 3 42 NR NR NR NR 19.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.2 42 46.9 NR NR NR NR 19.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire large Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Line Rupture Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Report No.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37. 30th July.4 60.2 21.3 19.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description Accident Scenario Medium Event Impact criteria 12.7 60.5kW/m2 12.3 21.9 18.5kW/m2 12.2 21.7 60.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 12.8 .3 23.8 72. 2013 Page 28 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 11.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.7 23.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.7 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.9 8.6 18 NR NR NR NR 8.9 73 F 3m/s 11.2 60.2 19.7 23.9 18.6 13 18 18.3 21. : 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.9 NR NR NR NR F 3m/s NR NR NR NR 4.2 19.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 Pool fire Medium Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire large Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Line Rupture Flash Fire Jet Fire Report No.7 23.6 13 18 18.5kW/m2 12.9 18.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description Accident Scenario Event Impact criteria PLfrom pump house to gantry_HSD Small Flash Fire Jet Fire LFL 37.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.7 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19. 2013 Page 29 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 4. 30th July.8 72.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.2 21.5 11.2 42 46.5kW/m2 12.6 18 NR NR NR NR 8.3 23.2 21.9 NR NR .4 11.9 18.4 5.4 60.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.9 8.7 60.3 42 NR NR NR NR 19.3 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37. 3 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 8.5kW/m2 12.9 8.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.5kW/m2 12.6 18 NR NR NR NR 8.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.2 42 46.6 13 18 18.7 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR F 3m/s NR NR 19.9 18. 30th July.5kW/m2 12.2 19.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 4.7 23.4 60.4 5.5 11.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description Accident Scenario Event Impact criteria 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 Pool fire PLfrom pump house to gantry_FO Small Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Medium Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire large Flash Fire Jet Fire Report No.7 60.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 12.9 NR NR NR NR 4. 2013 Page 30 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s NR NR NR NR 19.2 21.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.8 72.3 42 NR NR NR NR .2 21.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.4 11.3 23.9 18. 1 3. 30th July.9 3.4 12.7 3.4 F 3m/s 19.3 3.6 20.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.7 23.6 11.5kW/m2 12.7 12.2 21.5 14.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5 14.7 60.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description Accident Scenario Line Rupture Event Impact criteria Pool fire 37.9 NR NR NR NR 19.5 20.2 6.6 15.5 8.7 60.3 19.1 13.7 5.6 6 6.9 NR NR NR NR NR NR NR NR 19.6 NR 3.2 21.8 6 12.7 5.2 21.7 15.7 NR 2.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.7 23.3 9.5kW/m2 12.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.2 19.9 3.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.7 12.5kW/m2 12.8 72.4 5.5kW/m2 Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Loading Arm Small Flash Fire Jet fire Pool fire Medium Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Report No.3 8.1 12.7 12.2 21.4 60.5kW/m2 12.2 .7 10.2 4.8 72.9 9 9.4 60.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37. 2013 Page 31 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 19.3 12.2 19. 8 2.8 31.9 8.3 88.8 25.3 15.3 35.6 8.8 NR NR 1.62 86.2 11.5kW/m2 12.5 36.6 2.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.7 31.8 44.5kW/m2 12. 30th July.2 31.6 36.3 22.5kW/m2 12.1 6.9 .3 1.5kW/m2 12.4 61 12.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.7 NR 1.8 41.3 36.2 86.5 37.3 15.5 46.1 18.7 15.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5 97.9 39.8 41.7 8.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.8 12.9 31.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.6 3.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5 41.7 31.6 11.5kW/m2 12.9 17.9 88.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire HSD Tanker Small Flash Fire Pool fire Medium Flash Fire Pool fire Large Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Report No.2 29.9 43.3 3.8 22.9 31.9 60.5 6.3 24.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description Accident Scenario Line Rupture Event Impact criteria 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.7 22.4 2.9 39.8 19 3.5 13.9 F 3m/s 15.7 45 58.9 15. 2013 Page 32 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 15.7 11.1 40 6.9 99. 9 31.5kW/m2 12.3 F 3m/s 13.9 35 82.5 27.5kW/m2 12.8 97 42 28 30 30.4 5.3 31.4 84.5kW/m2 12.9 97.4 36 31.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.4 51.7 27.5 14.8 31.9 31.4 35.7 10.8 34.3 3.5kW/m2 12.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description MS Tanker Accident Scenario Event Impact criteria Tank Rupture Flash Fire Pool fire Small Flash Fire Jet Fire LFL 37.11 3.94 82.3 10.9 35.9 15.4 22.5 49.3 31.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 12. 30th July.7 15.5 12.6 11.7 17.9 40.8 27.5 30.3 23 12.8 38.3 .2 31.5 83.3 19.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.55 3.1 3.9 28 13.7 37.7 3.2 11.7 NR 2.5kW/m2 Pool fire Medium Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Large Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Report No.9 22.6 NR 3.8 5.6 39 51.2 4.6 38.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.8 35.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.7 38. 2013 Page 33 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 14.9 20.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.45 41.9 20. 7 12.11 12.7 10.98 26 31.7 22.7 38.5 12.1 11.6 20 24.5 42.9 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.6 34.3 42. 30th July.3 37.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description SKO Tanker Accident Scenario Event Tank Rupture Flash Fire Pool fire Small Flash Fire Jet Fire Impact criteria 12.9 12.7 16 8 7.4 19.8 NR NR 1.2 22.4 87.6 NR 1.7 1.6 14 7.6 34.7 9.5kW/m2 12.57 .5 23.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.5 3 2.3 30.9 9.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.6 39.7 88.6 31.7 3.5kW/m2 12.6 88.8 10.5kW/m2 12.7 95 113 25.2 94.3 3.9 38.3 37.3 30.7 43 31.3 88.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.5kW/m2 12.6 3. 2013 Page 34 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 41.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.53 F 3m/s 41.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 Pool fire Medium Flash Fire Jet Fire Pool fire Large Flash Fire Jet Fire Report No.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.9 30.5kW/m2 12.85 24.7 7.7 109.2 30.3 19.7 38.8 3.1 9.1 102 12. 5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 Pool fire Tank Rupture Flash Fire Pool fire Report No.6 43 93.5 31.7 86 34.4 109 11.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Description Accident Scenario Event Impact criteria 4 kW/m2 37.5kW/m2 12.5kW/m2 4 kW/m2 LFL 37.3 . 30th July.2 32.98 31.9 105 F 3m/s 32.4 10.5 41.7 34.3 31.5kW/m2 12. 2013 Page 35 Consequence Distance(m) B3m/s D 11m/s 31.5 14.7 31.9 39 86.45 31.9 31.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.6 93.5 41. 30th July.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Figure 1: Flash fire damage distance due to catastrophic rupture of TK-1 at 3F weather condition Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. 2013 Page 36 . 30th July. 2013 Page 37 .: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Figure 2: Pool fire damage distance due to catastrophic rupture of TK-1 at 3F weather condition Report No. 2013 Page 38 .: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Figure 3: Flash fire damage distance due to catastrophic rupture of TK-13 at 3F weather condition Report No. 30th July. 30th July.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. 2013 Page 39 .DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Figure 4: Pool fire damage distance due to catastrophic rupture of TK-13 at 3F weather condition Report No. 2013 Page 40 .DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Figure 5: Flash fire damage distance due to catastrophic rupture of TK-15 at 3F weather condition Report No.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02. 30th July. 30th July.: 12QR1P2-27 Rev 02.DET NORSKE VERITAS QRA for POL terminal/depot Bharatpur MANAGING RISK Figure 6: Pool fire damage distance due to catastrophic rupture of TK-15 at 3F weather condition Report No. 2013 Page 41 .


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