1FIRST DIVISION simple reason that cement is the product of a manufacturing process and is no G.R. No. L-29059 December 15, 1987 longer the mineral product contemplated in the Tax Code (i.e.; minerals subjected COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. to simple treatments) for the purpose of imposing the ad valorem tax. CEBU PORTLAND CEMENT COMPANY and COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents. What has apparently encouraged the herein respondents to maintain their present posture is the case of Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, CRUZ, J.: L-20563, Oct. 29, 1968 (28 SCRA 789) penned by Justice Eugenio Angeles. For By virtue of a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals rendered on June 21, 1961, as some portions of that decision give the impression that Republic Act No. 1299, modified on appeal by the Supreme Court on February 27, 1965, the Commissioner of which amended Section 246, reclassified cement as a mineral product that was Internal Revenue was ordered to refund to the Cebu Portland Cement Company the not subject to sales tax. ... amount of P 359,408.98, representing overpayments of ad valorem taxes on cement xxx xxx xxx produced and sold by it after October 1957. 1 After a careful study of the foregoing, we conclude that reliance on the decision penned by Justice Angeles is misplaced. The said decision is no authority for the On March 28, 1968, following denial of motions for reconsideration filed by both the proposition that after the enactment of Republic Act No. 1299 in 1955 (defining petitioner and the private respondent, the latter moved for a writ of execution to mineral product as things with at least 80% mineral content), cement became a enforce the said judgment. The motion was opposed by the petitioner on the ground 'mineral product," as distinguished from a "manufactured product," and therefore that the private respondent had an outstanding sales tax liability to which the ceased to be subject to sales tax. It was not necessary for the Court to so rule. judgment debt had already been credited. In fact, it was stressed, there was still a balance owing on the sales taxes in the amount of P 4,789,279.85 plus 28% It was enough for the Court to say in effect that even assuming Republic Act No. surcharge. 3 1299 had reclassified cement was a mineral product, the reclassification could not On April 22, 1968, the Court of Tax Appeals * granted the motion, holding that the be given retrospective application (so as to justify the refund of sales taxes paid alleged sales tax liability of the private respondent was still being questioned and before Republic Act 1299 was adopted) because laws operate prospectively only, therefore could not be set-off against the refund. 4 unless the legislative intent to the contrary is manifest, which was not so in the case of Republic Act 1266. [The situation would have been different if the Court In his petition to review the said resolution, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue instead had ruled in favor of refund, in which case it would have been absolutely claims that the refund should be charged against the tax deficiency of the private necessary (1) to make an unconditional ruling that Republic Act 1299 re-classified respondent on the sales of cement under Section 186 of the Tax Code. His position is cement as a mineral product (not subject to sales tax), and (2) to declare the law that cement is a manufactured and not a mineral product and therefore not exempt retroactive, as a basis for granting refund of sales tax paid before Republic Act from sales taxes. He adds that enforcement of the said tax deficiency was properly 1299.] effected through his power of distraint of personal property under Sections 316 and 318 5 of the said Code and, moreover, the collection of any national internal revenue In any event, we overrule the CEPOC decision of October 29, 1968 (G.R. No. L- tax may not be enjoined under Section 305, 6 subject only to the exception prescribed 20563) insofar as its pronouncements or any implication therefrom conflict with in Rep. Act No. 1125. 7 This is not applicable to the instant case. The petitioner also the instant decision. denies that the sales tax assessments have already prescribed because the prescriptive period should be counted from the filing of the sales tax returns, which The above views were reiterated in the resolution 12 denying reconsideration of the had not yet been done by the private respondent. said decision, thus: The nature of cement as a "manufactured product" (rather than a "mineral For its part, the private respondent disclaims liability for the sales taxes, on the ground product") is well-settled. The issue has repeatedly presented itself as a threshold that cement is not a manufactured product but a mineral product. 8 As such, it was question for determining the basis for computing the ad valorem mining tax to be exempted from sales taxes under Section 188 of the Tax Code after the effectivity of paid by cement Companies. No pronouncement was made in these cases that as a Rep. Act No. 1299 on June 16, 1955, in accordance with Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. "manufactured product" cement is subject to sales tax because this was not at Collector of Internal Revenue, 9 decided in 1968. Here Justice Eugenio Angeles declared issue. that "before the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 1299, amending Section 246 of the National Internal Revenue Code, cement was taxable as a manufactured product under Section The decision sought to be reconsidered here referred to the legislative history of 186, in connection with Section 194(4) of the said Code," thereby implying that it was Republic Act No. 1299 which introduced a definition of the terms "mineral" and not considered a manufactured product afterwards. Also, the alleged sales tax "mineral products" in Sec. 246 of the Tax Code. Given the legislative intent, the deficiency could not as yet be enforced against it because the tax assessment was not holding in the CEPOC case (G.R. No. L-20563) that cement was subject to sales tax yet final, the same being still under protest and still to be definitely resolved on the prior to the effectivity f Republic Act No. 1299 cannot be construed to mean that, merits. Besides, the assessment had already prescribed, not having been made within after the law took effect, cement ceased to be so subject to the tax. To erase any the reglementary five-year period from the filing of the tax returns. 10 and all misconceptions that may have been spawned by reliance on the case of Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, L-20563, October Our ruling is that the sales tax was properly imposed upon the private respondent for 29, 1968 (28 SCRA 789) penned by Justice Eugenio Angeles, the Court has the reason that cement has always been considered a manufactured product and not a expressly overruled it insofar as it may conflict with the decision of August 10, mineral product. This matter was extensively discussed and categorically resolved 1983, now subject of these motions for reconsideration. in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Republic Cement Corporation, 11 decided on August 10, 1983, where Justice Efren L. Plana, after an exhaustive review of the On the question of prescription, the private respondent claims that the five-year pertinent cases, declared for a unanimous Court: reglementary period for the assessment of its tax liability started from the time it filed From all the foregoing cases, it is clear that cement qua cement was never its gross sales returns on June 30, 1962. Hence, the assessment for sales taxes made considered as a mineral product within the meaning of Section 246 of the Tax on January 16, 1968 and March 4, 1968, were already out of time. We disagree. This Code, notwithstanding that at least 80% of its components are minerals, for the contention must fail for what CEPOC filed was not the sales returns required in Section save for the exception already noted. that is. supra. without any pronouncement as to costs. (Citing Bisaya Land Transportation Co. Cortes emphasized in the aforestated resolution: In order to avail itself of the benefits of the five-year prescription period under Section 331 of the Tax Code. Nos. CTA. that the filing of an income tax return cannot be considered as substantial compliance with the requirement of filing sales tax returns. fee or charge imposed by this Code. the challenge to the assessment is still-and only-on the administrative level. v. There is all the more reason to apply the rule here because it appears that even after crediting of the refund against the tax deficiency. v. v. the applicable period is ten (10) days from the discovery of the fraud. falsity or omission. It goes without saying that this injunction is available not only when the assessment is already being questioned in a court of justice but more so if. a balance of more than P 4 million is still due from the private respondent. the petition is GRANTED. CEPOC argues that said returns contain the information necessary for the assessment of the sales tax. To require the petitioner to actually refund to the private respondent the amount of the judgment debt. so as to start the running of said period? 13 The argument that the assessment cannot as yet be enforced because it is still being contested loses sight of the urgency of the need to collect taxes as "the lifeblood of the government. Collector of Internal Revenue. L-12100 and L-11812. G. . No. the taxpayer should have filed the required return for the tax involved. April 29. CTA. et al. Both parties admit that returns were made for the ad valorem mining tax.. which he will later have the right to distrain for payment of its sales tax liability is in our view an Idle ritual. 291. The assessment made by the Commissioner in 1968 on CEPOC's cement sales during the period from July 1. — No court shall have authority to grant an injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal revenue tax. Absent a return or when the return is false or fraudulent. Thus CEPOC should have filed sales tax returns of its gross sales for the subject periods. 786 is SET ASIDE. We agree with the Commissioner. 1959 to December 31. as in the instant case. The Commissioner does not consider such returns as compliance with the requirement for the filing of tax returns so as to start the running of the five-year prescriptive period." If the payment of taxes could be postponed by simply questioning their validity.. SO ORDERED. Injunction not available to restrain collection of tax. 331 did not begin to run against the government. G. the machinery of the state would grind to a halt and all government functions would be paralyzed. 1959). Inc. 16 SCRA 277). a sales tax return. L-21516. 2 183(n) but the ad valorem tax returns required under Section 245 of the Tax Code. the statute of stations in Sec.R. in CTA Case No. 1966.R. As Justice Irene R. 331. Inc. WHEREFORE. We hold that the respondent Court of Tax Appeals erred in ordering such a charade. 1968. (Butuan Sawmill. The resolution dated April 22. in the same way that an income tax return cannot be considered as a return for compensating tax for the purpose of computing the period of prescription under Sec. May 29. 1960 is not barred by the five-year prescriptive period. There being no sales tax returns filed by CEPOC. The question in this case is: When was CEPOC's omission to file tha return deemed discovered by the government. the Tax Code provides: Sec. That is the reason why. It has been held in Butuan Sawmill Inc. the amount was earned through the joint efforts of the persons among whom it was distributed It has been established that the Philippine We deal first with the procedural question. petitioner.. It thus had the effect of suspending on January 18. factories and oil manufacturing process. and was presented to the private respondent. the private respondent. 1965. it was from this commission that the P75. 1988 of the reglementary period had been consumed. viz. and there is not enough substantiation of such payments. considered by the tax authorities. Algue flied a letter inducing other persons to invest in it. who deferred their income tax returns and paid the corresponding taxes thereon. It is argued that no indication was Internal Revenue with the Court of Tax Appeals. ALGUE. Sugar Estate Development Company had earlier appointed Algue as its agent. It is therefore necessary to reconcile the apparently conflicting interests of the the Payees for their work in the creation of the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation of authorities and the taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation. According to Rep. when the appeal was filed on April 23. J. a domestic authorizing it to sell its land.00. income taxes for the years 1958 and 1959. and letter from the petitioner assessing it in the total amount of P83. Atty. only 20 days G. Guevara There is no dispute that the payees duly reported their respective shares of the fees in produced his file copy and gave a photostat to BIR agent Ramon Reyes. dodge. such protest could not be located in the office of the petitioner. 1965. when it was filed.000. 1 On January 18." being "tantamount to an outright denial thereof and makes the said President. which is the the Philippines and its subsequent purchase of the properties of the Philippine Sugar promotion of the common good. 1965. 19 It should be remembered that this was a family corporation where strict business procedures were not applied and immediate issuance The proven fact is that four days after the private respondent received the petitioner's of receipts was not required. through its counsel. 15 For this sale. an attempt to evade a legitimate assessment by involving an imaginary Act No.R. it may be observed that the petitioner had Originally claimed these correctly disallowed the P75. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without The Court of Tax Appeals had seen it differently. 1965. after examining the evidence. 1965. the reglementary period which started on the date the assessment was received. it held that the unnecessary hindrance On the other hand. 3 account before the warrant of distraint and levy was issued. 1125. when the books were to notice of assessment. 1965. These were collected by itself. after its incorporation largely of protest or request for reconsideration.00 deduction claimed by private respondent Algue as promotional fees to be personal holding company income 12 but later conformed to the legitimate business expenses in its income tax returns.. Guevara gave the BIR a copy of the protest that it was. received a authority. 2 On March 12. 16 A search of the protest in the dockets of the case proved fruitless. Edith. Guevara was finally informed that the Appeals also found. each payee made an accounting of all of the fees received by him or her. The corollary issue is whether decision of the respondent court rejecting this assertion. This was apparently not taken into be closed.00 was properly CRUZ. O'Farell. During the intervening period. whether by check or in cash. INC. 6 made as to how such payments were made. Now for the substantive question. Atty. it filed its letter of protest. Algue filed a petition for review of the decision of the Commissioner of are members of the same family in control of Algue. The period started running again only on April 7. may be achieved. Jr. In fact. 7 It is true that as a rule the warrant of distraint and levy is "proof of the finality of the assessment" 8 and renders hopeless a request for We find that these suspicions were adequately met by the private respondent when its reconsideration. In short." 11 the protest filed by private respondent was not pro forma and was based on strong legal considerations. and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS. The record shows that on January 14. the appeal may be made within thirty days after receipt of the decision deduction. indeed. at the end of the year. The petitioner contends that the claimed deduction of P75. when the private respondent was definitely informed of the implied rejection of the said protest and the warrant was FIRST DIVISION finally served on it. construction and other allied activities. 14 Ultimately. or ruling challenged. As the Court of Tax Appeals correctly noted. Alberto Guevara. who refused to receive it on the ground of the pending protest. to . 17 The Court of Tax service of the warrant. this new corporation purchased the PSEDC day in the office of the petitioner. Alberto Guevara. that no distribution of dividends was BIR was not taking any action on the protest and it was only then that he accepted the involved. worked for the formation of the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation. testified that the request deemed rejected. The main issue in this case is whether or not the Collector of Internal Revenue Parenthetically. Estate Development Company. each payee's need arose.. No. Alberto Guevara. Even so.00 promotional fees were paid to the Jr. and the accountant. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. Agreeing with Algue. 1965. Atty. The payment was in the form of promotional fees. which letter was stamp received on the same through the promotion of the said persons. Cecilia V.000. Algue received as agent a commission of P126. Pursuant to such corporation engaged in engineering.85 as delinquency Pablo Sanchez. L-28896 February 17.183. January 14." 10 But there is a special circumstance in the case at bar that payments were not made in one lump sum but periodically and in different amounts as prevents application of this accepted doctrine. the petitioner suggests a tax The above chronology shows that the petition was filed seasonably. 18 warrant of distraint and levy earlier sought to be served. It was only after Atty. 1965. respondents. 13 or not the appeal of the private respondent from the decision of the Collector of Internal Revenue was made on time and in accordance with law.000.000.: disallowed because it was not an ordinary reasonable or necessary business expense.. vs. 3 aforenamed individuals. on April The petitioner claims that these payments are fictitious because most of the payees 23. de Jesus. 5 Sixteen days later. as the said court found. if at all. Eduardo Guevara. Hence. 4 On April 7. such collection should be made in said amount had been legitimately paid by the private respondent for actual services accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government rendered. a warrant of distraint and levy properties. Isabel Guevara. the warrant was premature and could therefore not be served. 1965. reading as follows: SEC. complain and the courts will then come to his succor. as it was. allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered. This symbiotic relationship is the the persons in the family corporation. This is likely to occur in the case of a corporation having few stockholders. Hence. If it is not. Act No. . . it is a to the private respondent was P125. It is said that taxes are what we pay for civilization society. the government would be paralyzed for lack of the motive power to activate and operate it. he may still be stopped in his tracks if the taxpayer can demonstrate. despite the natural reluctance to surrender part of one's hard earned income to the taxing authorities. in view of the close relationship among and enhance their moral and material values. however. 11. 2. without costs. the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business. Compensation for personal services. We hold that the appeal of the private respondent from the decision of the petitioner This finding of the respondent court is in accord with the following provision of the Tax was filed on time with the respondent court in accordance with Rep. And Code: we also find that the claimed deduction by the private respondent was permitted SEC. then the taxpayer has a right to P75. 1125.000.00.00. 20 Admittedly. . Estate properties. The government for its part.000. 4 make up the total of P75.00 as clear profit from the transaction.. 30 O. The total commission paid by the Philippine Sugar Estate Development Co. is expected to respond in the . as of the Vegetable Oil Investment Corporation to the actual purchase by it of the Sugar it has here. 22 and Revenue Regulations No. (a) Expenses: ACCORDINGLY. is not deductible. however. in fact. but the excessive payments are a distribution of earnings upon the stock.--In computing net income there shall be under the Internal Revenue Code and should therefore not have been disallowed by allowed as deductions — the petitioner. every person who is able to must contribute his share in the running of the government. rationale of taxation and should dispel the erroneous notion that it is an arbitrary method of exaction by those in the seat of power. but not in fact as the purchase price of services. 325. from the formation tax collector. This was no mean feat and should be. sufficiently recompensed. Section 70 (1). We agree with the respondent court that the amount of the promotional fees was not excessive. In the present case. . This form of tangible and intangible benefits intended to improve the lives of the people arrangement was understandable. the appealed decision of the Court of Tax Appeals is AFFIRMED in (1) In general. it would seem likely that the salaries are not paid wholly for services rendered.000. everything seemed to be informal. This was a reasonable proportion.G. 23 The Solicitor General is correct when he says that the burden is on the taxpayer to prove the validity of the claimed deduction.--Among the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in carrying on any trade or business may be included a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services actually rendered. in fact. 18. we find that the onus has been discharged satisfactorily. Without taxes. The amount of accordance with the prescribed procedure. 70. payments purely for service.--All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during toto. But even as we concede the inevitability and indispensability of taxation. This test and its practical application may be further stated and illustrated as follows: Any amount paid in the form of compensation.000. For all the awesome power of the considering that it was the payees who did practically everything. No. The test of deductibility in the case of compensation payments is whether they are reasonable and are.00 was 60% of the total commission. 30. Algue still requirement in all democratic regimes that it be exercised reasonably and in had a balance of P50. and the excessive payment correspond or bear a close relationship to the stockholdings of the officers of employees.) It is worth noting at this point that most of the payees were not in the regular employ of Algue nor were they its controlling stockholders. 1931. payments purely for service. If in such a case the salaries are in excess of those ordinarily paid for similar services.. This test and deductibility in the case of compensation payments is whether they are reasonable and are. (a) An ostensible salary paid by a corporation may be a distribution of a dividend on stock. including a reasonable SO ORDERED. (Promulgated Feb. Practically all of whom draw salaries. The private respondent has proved that the payment of the fees was necessary and reasonable in the light of the efforts exerted by the payees in inducing investors and prominent businessmen to venture in an experimental enterprise and involve themselves in a new business requiring millions of pesos. Deductions from gross income. 21After deducting the said fees. that the law has not been observed. motor vehicles in the City of Iloilo. HODGES. Hodges. known as the Local Autonomy Act. 36. It is expressly required therein that the payment of the municipal with it who may come within its jurisdiction. being repugnant to Section 2(h) of Republic Act 2264. Taxation. It would also appear that municipalities and municipal districts are prohibited from imposing any DECISION percentage tax on sales or other taxes in any form on articles subject to specific tax. motor vehicle which comes within the prohibition of the section above adverted to. 1960. who was engaged in the business of buying and selling second-hand chartered cities as the City of Iloilo. thru its municipal board. It provides that the payment of the tax shall be a requirement for registration petition for declaratory judgment with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo praying that and transfer of ownership and that unless the tax is paid the registration and transfer of said ordinance be declared void ab initio. Ct. establish any condition on the registration of motor vehicles. firm. But the requirement of The case having been submitted under a stipulation of facts. Well-settled is the principle that taxes are imposed for the support of the valid. all chartered cities. Both parties have appealed. The court a quo undoubtedly had in mind the provision of Section 2(h) of Republic Act No. to collect fees and charges for services rendered by the city."cralaw virtua1aw library same was approved by virtue of the power and authority granted to it by Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1960 a requirement. N. under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. January 31. profession or occupation being conducted within the city. N. licenses or fees: Provided. the tax to be paid 1/2 of 1% of the selling price of a second-hand motor vehicle comes within the category of a in the office of the city treasurer. of the Rules of Court. The Court a quo refund to him the amounts he was required to pay thereunder without prejudice to considered this portion invalid reasoning as follows: "Chartered cities are not authorized to determining its validity in an appropriate action.: gasoline. series of 1960. besides imposing a percentage tax. Respondents-Appellants. is empowered (a) to impose [G. and that the tax receipt shall be made part of the just tax within the provision of Section 2 of Republic Act 2264. known as the Local From a cursory analysis of the provisions above-stated we can readily draw the conclusion Autonomy Act. and believing that the same is invalid for having been passed in excess of But the ordinance. except gasoline. pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. L-18129. municipality or municipal district and otherwise to levy for public purposes. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding. 26 S. 1963. the Municipal Board of the City of Iloilo enacted Ordinance No. Com. 2264. in no case.. 2264. known as the Local Autonomy Act. association or corporation owning or dealing tax has been paid. is The City of Iloilo. or C. On June 13. just and uniform taxes. Indeed. driving thereof. Petitioner-Appellant. in its answer. it cannot be disputed that a sales tax of tax shall be a requirement for registration and transfer of ownership. also imposes an additional the authority conferred by law upon the municipal board. municipality or municipal district. v. but the prohibition only refers to municipalities and municipal districts and does not comprehend C. in the city. firm. to regulate and impose reasonable fees for services rendered in connection with any business. except BAUTISTA ANGELO. 5 Section 2 of Republic Act No. 33. he filed on June 27. THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF THE CITY exercising any privilege. No. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government. profession or occupation conducted within the city. which is one of the exceptions constituting a restriction on the taxation power granted by said Act to a city. is one of those affected by the enactment of the ordinance.] municipal licenses. 2. municipalities and municipal districts shall have authority to impose municipal license taxes or fees upon persons engaged in any occupation or business. municipality or municipal district. ET AL. That municipalities and municipal districts shall. To require the payment of sales tax before the registration of the sale can be made in the Motor Vehicles Office. or exercising privileges in chartered cities. requiring any person. rendered in connection with any business. under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code: EN BANC It would appear that the City of Iloilo. registration of motor vehicles and the issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the Rule 66. 199 I [2nd] 160). but the portion thereof which requires the payment of the tax as a condition government in return for the general advantage and protection which the government precedent for the registration of the sale in the Motor Vehicles Office is invalid for affords to taxpayers and their property (Union Refrigerator Transit Co. (b) to regulate and impose reasonable fees for services OF ILOILO. municipalities or municipal districts by requiring them to secure licenses at rates fixed by the municipal board or city council of the city. 1960 holding that part of the ordinance which requires the is merely a coercive measure to make the enforcement of the contemplated sales tax more owner of a used motor vehicle to pay a sales tax of 1/2 of 1% of the selling price is effective. the municipal council of the municipality or the municipal district council of the municipal district. impose any percentage tax on sales or other taxes in any form based thereon nor impose taxes on articles subject to specific tax.R. and that the City of Iloilo be ordered to ownership cannot be effected in the Motor Vehicles Office of the City. J. association or corporation to pay a sales tax that the City of Iloilo has the authority and power to approve the ordinance in question for it of 1/2 of 1% of the selling price of any motor vehicle and prohibiting the registration of merely imposes a percentage tax on the sale of a second-hand motor vehicle that may be the sale of the motor vehicle in the Motor Vehicles Office of the City of Iloilo unless the carried out within the city by any person. A copy of the petition for We disagree. the court a quo rendered the ordinance cannot be considered a tax in the light viewed by the court a quo for the same decision on December 8. provides in part: "SEC. and (c) to levy for public purposes just and uniform taxes. v. pursuant to which the ordinance in question was approved by the Municipal Board of the City of Iloilo. licenses or fees. 2264 which prohibits a chartered city from imposing a tax on the declaratory judgment was furnished the Solicitor General in accordance with Section 4. taxes or fees upon any person engaged in any occupation or business. justified the approval of the ordinance alleging that the tantamount to imposing a tax for the registration of motor vehicles. 2264.. It is imperative that the power . It is true that the tax in question is in the form of a percentage tax on the proceeds of the sale of a second-hand documents to be presented to the Motor Vehicles Office. the decision appealed from is modified by declaring Ordinance No. Ledbetter." (Sinco. third. citing Cook Co. Stewart. those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation not simply convenient..) We are.. Vol. 5 S. 216 N. 97. Hence in giving corporations authority to carry out the powers expressly granted to them. 491.C. Ottawa v.. Rep. it is understood that they are also given the power to adopt such means as may be necessary for accomplishing their ends. 108 U. 33 of the City of Iloilo valid even with regard to the portion which requires the payment of the tax as a condition precedent for the registration of the sale in the Motor Vehicles Office of said City. I. 766. Municipal Corporations.S. 110. Without this implied power the end of government may falter or fail. 2d 651. 5th Ed. p. New Bern.J. W. 10th Ed. No costs. 268 Ky.. those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted. Philippine Political Law. McCrea.) "If the power of municipalities are to be confined to those expressly granted by the law. 688. citing Spahn v. 2d 542. 449. Carey. 103 S.. therefore. Section 117." (62 C. S. v. E. 559. 93 Ill. 6 to impose them be clothed with the implied authority to devise ways and means to accomplish their collection in the most effective manner. p. of the opinion that the ordinance in question is valid it being a valid exercise of the power of taxation granted to Iloilo City by Section 2 of Republic Act No. but indispensable. second. and in so doing they gave the choice of the means adapted to the ends and are not confined to any one mode of operation. in many cases they will be denied even the power of self-preservation as well as of the means necessary to accomplish the essential object of their creation. those granted in express words. WHEREFORE. citing Smith v. 16 Am. Riddle v. 236." (Dillon. "It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers. .) "Municipal corporations may exercise all powers in the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted. and no others: First. 2264.