Bersamin Case Digests Volume 1

INTERADENT ZAHNTECHNIK, PHIL., INC., REPRESENTED BY LUIS MARCO I.AVANCEÑA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. REBECCA S. FRANCISCO-SIMBILLO, RESPONDENT. / A.C. No. 9464, August 24, 2016 / FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: LEGAL ETHICS/DISBARMENT COMPLAINT F: In 2012, complainant Intradent Zahnetchnik Philippines, Inc. informed the Office o the Bar Confidant about the following criminal cases against respondent: 1. for Estafa and Qualified Theft; and 2. Art. 291 (RPC). Revealing Secrets With Abuse of Office. The respondent, who freshly passed the 2011 Bar Exam, opted OBC's given option for her to to sign the Roll of Attorneys, subject to the condition that the complaint-letter would be automatically converted to a disbarment complaint. In her comment, respondent stated that she instituted a labor case against the complainant; that the criminal charges filed against her were intended to malign, inconvenience, and harass her, and to force her to desist from pursuing the labor case; and that at the time of the filing of her comment, the criminal complaints brought against her were still pending determination of probable cause by the respective Offices of the City Prosecutor. Eventually, the charge for estafa and qualified theft were dismissed by the City Prosecutor. Complainant, appealed to the DOJ. DOJ then denied the appeal. The criminal case for Art. 291 (RPC) was also dismissed by the MTC upon withdrawal of the Information with leave of court by the Prosecutor. In 2015, respondent filed a motion seeking resolution of the disbarment case. I: May the disbarment complaint against the respondent prosper? H: No. We rule in favor of the respondent. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be disbarred on any of the following grounds, namely: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case without authority so to do. In fine, in order to hold the lawyer amenable to disbarment by reason of his or her having committed a crime involving moral turpitude, it is not enough to show that there is a pending case involving moral turpitude against him or her, because Section 27 of Rule 138 expressly requires that he or she must have been found by final judgment guilty of the crime involving moral turpitude. The complainant did not allege, much less prove, that the respondent had been convicted by final judgment of any criminal offense involving moral turpitude. On the contrary, the criminal cases that were the sole bases for the complaint for disbarment had already been dismissed after due proceedings. Although the complainant might have availed itself of the available remedies to review or reverse the dismissals, it behooves the Court to terminate this case against her now considering that, as indicated, the mere existence or pendency of the criminal charges for crimes involving moral turpitude is not a ground for disbarment or suspension of an attorney. MANUEL A. ROXAS, PROTESTANT, VS. JEJOMAR C. BINAY, PROTESTEE. / P.E.T. No. 004, August 16, 2016 / R E S O L U T I O N MAIN TOPIC: POLITICAL LAW/ELECTION LAW/PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL F: In 2010, Congress, in joint session assembled and sitting as the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC), proclaimed Jejomar C. Binay as the Vice President duly elected in the May 10, 2010 Elections. On July 9, 2010, the protestant initiated this protest praying, among others, to PRESERVE and SAFEGUARD the integrity of the ballot boxes, their contents and keys, list of voters with voting records, books of voters and other documents and paraphernalia used in the May 2010 elections for the position of Vice-President of the Republic of the Philippines, as well as the data storage devices containing the electronic data evidencing the results of elections in the contested 76,340 clustered precincts. Further the protest prayed to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the proclamation of Jejomar C. Binay as the Vice-President and PROCLAIM Manuel A. Roxas as the duly elected Vice-President. Upon being served by summons and the protest, Binay, in his Answer with Counter-Protest, posited that Tribunal have no jurisdiction over the protest and counter-protested that fraud, anomalies and irregularities had occurred in clustered precincts in the provinces of Regions VI, VII and CARAGA, and the same that had unduly favored the Roxas. On August 31, 2010 issued a precautionary protection order (PPO) of the ballot boxes, etc.. Prior the termination of Preliminary Conference, COMELEC, requested that the subject ballot boxes be retrieved as the same shall be used in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections to commence on February 19, 2013 until March 15, 2013. Noting that the parties had filed their certificates of candidacy for the Presidency in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections, the Tribunal directed them to move in the premises by expressing their interest in pursuing the case. Neither of the parties has complied with the directive as of date. In view of the holding of the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections the Tribunal lifted the PPO on February 23, 2016. I: W/N PET to still pursue in resolving the protest and counter-protest. H: No. After the holding of the National and Local Elections on May 9, 2016, the Philippines elected a new set of national and local officials. On May 30, 2016, the NBOC officially proclaimed Rodrigo R. Duterte as the newly elected President of the Philippines, and Ma. Leonor G. Robredo as the newly elected Vice President of the Philippines. Both of them took their respective oaths of office and assumed office at noon of June 30, 2016. The term of the office of Vice President being contested by the parties had expired at noon of June 30, 2016. Vice President Robredo has assumed the office thereby contested. Clearly, the protest and the counter-protest that are the subject matter of this case have become moot and academic. As such, the Tribunal is constrained to dismiss the protest and the counter-protest. It is settled rule that the Tribunal should not anymore proceed in this case because any decision that may be rendered hereon will have no practical or useful purpose, and cannot be enforced. Proceeding in this case until its resolution will then be an exercise in futility considering that there is no longer any practical reason why the Tribunal should still determine who had won as Vice President in the 2010 National and Local Elections if the term of such office had already expired. WHEREFORE, the Tribunal DISMISSES the protest filed by protestant Manuel A. Roxas, and the counter- protest filed by protestee Jejomar C. Binay on the ground of mootness. No pronouncement on costs of suit. AURORA A. SALES, PETITIONER, VS. BENJAMIN D. ADAPON, OFELIA C. ADAPON AND TEOFILO D. ADAPON, RESPONDENTS. / G.R. No. 171420, October 05, 2016 / FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW/CRIMINAL PROCEDURE/PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION/COMPLAINANT prosecuting before the DOJ thru an AGENT / Clarificatory Hearing and Deposition F: Aurora A. Sales, a US immigrant, thru Jerico B. Sales, her son-in-law, instituted a criminal complaint against the respondents (siblings of Aurora) for the crime of use of falsified documents under Article 172, par. 3 of the RPC. Her siblings allegedly used a falsified Deed of Extra-judicial Settlement which caused the issuance of various certificates of title, which subdivided the parcel of land left by their parents, to which she wasn't fully aware of and consented to. Aurora posits that the signature appearing on the deed was not hers. Invesitgating Prosecutor issued a Resolution dismissing the instant complaint on the ground that it is impossible for him to proceed with the preliminary investigation without the appearance of private respondent who will be subjected to some clarificatory questions on certain matters. MR to the Resolution was denied. DOJ, on petition for review, reversed the resolution. CA, on certiorari, held that DOJ acted with grave abuse of discretion as the investigating prosecutor was bound to personally examine the Aurora as the complainant and her continuous absence from the clarificatory hearing effectively prevented the determination of the existence of probable cause. I: W/N the investigating prosecutor was correct in dismissing the criminal complaint for the continuous absence of the complainant from the clarificatory hearing? H: NO. The investigating prosecutor gravely erred in dismissing the petitioner's criminal complaint for falsification simply because of her non-appearance at the clarificatory hearing. To start with, her personal presence was excusable because of her advanced age and the distance of her place of residence at the time (New York, United States of America) from the Province of Batangas, the venue of the proceedings. Secondly, the records already contained sufficient evidence upon which the investigating prosecutor could make a finding of probable cause. Thirdly, she was represented in the proceedings by her son-in-law Jerico B. Sales, whom she had constituted as her agent for purposes of pursuing the criminal case against the respondents. Being her agent expressly authorized for that special purpose, Jerico could competently respond to the investigating prosecutor's clarificatory questions in a manner legally binding on her. Thirdly, had the investigating prosecutor sincerely considered her personal presence as absolutely necessary in the determination of probable cause, he should have granted her request to have her deposition taken instead. Such power was within his discretion as the investigating prosecutor. And, lastly, the investigating prosecutor's requiring her personal presence at the clarificatory hearing was probably unnecessary and superfluous in view of his failure to specify the matters still needing to be clarified. As earlier mentioned, the documents submitted by both parties in the proceedings were already sufficient for the determination of whether or not probable cause existed against the respondents. If the clarificatory hearing was geared towards the determination of the existence of probable cause, the non­specification of the matters to be inquired into during the clarificatory hearing indicated that no more matters needed to be clarified from the petitioner herself. SC PP: It is error to dismiss a criminal complaint for falsification if the records already contained sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to charge the respondents therewith on the basis alone that the complainant, already residing abroad, did not herself submit to the clarificatory hearing, and the investigating prosecutor did not state the matters that still required clarification. NILO B. DIONGZON vs ATTY. WILLIAM MIRANO / A.C. No. 2404, August 17, 2016 / FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: LEGAL ETHICS/Conflict of Interest F: In 2013, IBP Governors found, via Resolution (for a disbarment complaint), Atty. William Mirano guilty of representing conflicting interest between the complainant and Spouses Almanzur and Milagros Gonzales. Diongzon was the first to avail of Atty. Mirano’s legal services in 1979, then on 1981. In January 1982, Diongzon and Atty. Mirano signed a retainer contract for the latter's legal services. In February 1982, the Gonzaleses sued Diongzon (for replevin and damages). Eventually, Atty. Mirano entered his appearance as counsel for the Gonzaleses in the civl case against Diongzon. In May 1982, complainant filed a disbarment case. In his answer, Atty. Mirano admits that Diongzon had been his client before in a civil case but counters, among others, that he is not a retained counsel because the retainer agreement did not take effect and he returned the amount paid to him by Diongzon. He further alleged that Diongzon wanted him to falsify documents to an estafa case, however he refused to follow that's why a complaint was filed against him by Diongzon. I: Whether or not Atty. Mirano is guilty of representing conflicting interest. H: YES. The lawyer-client relationship begins from the moment a client seeks the lawyer's advice upon a legal concern. The seeking may be for consultation on transactions or other legal concerns, or for representation of the client in an actual case in the courts or other fora. From that moment on, the lawyer is bound to respect the relationship and to maintain the trust and confidence of his client. No written agreement is necessary to generate a lawyer-client relationship, but in formalizing it, the lawyer may present a retainer agreement to be considered and agreed to by the client. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients. Specifically, Canon 15.03 demands that: "A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts." A conflict of interest exists when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two opposing parties, like when the lawyer performs an act that will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represented him, or when the lawyer uses any knowledge he previously acquired from his first client against the latter. The prohibition against conflict of interest is founded on principles of public policy and good taste, inasmuch as the lawyer-client relationship is based on trust and confidence. A lawyer has a duty to preserve his client's confidence in him, even if their relationship ends. The purpose is to assure freedom of communication between the lawyer and the client in order to enable the former to properly represent and serve the latter's interests. To use against the latter any information the former gains during the relationship is deplorable and unethical. When he appeared in court for the benefit of the Gonzaleses to try the case against the complainant, the respondent unquestionably incurred a conflict of interest. Having become privy to the terms of the sale subject of the civil case, the conflict of interest became unmitigated because the complainant had not expressly consented in writing to his appearing in behalf of the Gonzaleses. It would have been more prudent for him to have excused himself from representing either party in the civil case. SC PP: A lawyer who agrees to represent a client's interests in the latter's business dealings is duty-bound to keep the confidence of such client, even after their lawyer-client relationship had ended. If he represents any other party in a case against his former client over a business deal he oversaw during the time of their professional relationship, he is guilty of representing conflicting interests, and should be properly sanctioned for ethical misconduct. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES VS PAQUITO OCHOA, ET. AL. / G.R. 204605, JULY 19, 2016 / EN BANC MAIN TOPIC: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW/EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT vs. TREATY vs. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT SUB TOPIC: MERCANTILE LAW / IP CODE F: The Madrid Protocol, which was concluded in 1989, covering 97 member-states, was adopted in order to remove the challenges deterring some countries from acceding to the Madrid Agreement. The protocol has two objectives, namely: (1) to facilitate securing protection for marks; and (2) to make the management of the registered marks easier in different countries. In September 2011, the Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines (IPOPHL) recommended to the DFA that Philippines should accede to the Madrid Protocol as the same would benefit the country and help raise the level of competitiveness for Filipino brands. DFA, upon its own review, endorsed to the President the country's accession to the Madrid Protocol and under EO No. 459, determined that the Madrid Protocol is an executive agreement - IPOPHL, DOST, and DTI concurred with DFA's recommendation. In 2012, President Aquino III ratified that Madrid Protocol through an instrument of accession. The instrument of accession was deposited with the Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) on April 25, 2012. The Madrid Protocol entered into force in the Philippines on July 25, 2012. Petitioner IPAP, an association of more than 100 law firms and individual practitioners in Intellectual Property Law commenced this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition: 1. to challenge the validity of the President's accession to the Madrid Protocol without the concurrence of the Senate; 2. To argue that Madrid Protocol is a treaty and not an executive agreement; and 3. To persuade that the implementation of the Madrid Protocol in the Philippines, specifically the processing of foreign trademark applications, conflicts with the Section 125 1 of the IP Code. I:1. W/N IPAP has locus standi to challenge President'e ratification of the Madrid Protocol; 2. W/N President's ratification of the Madrid Protocol is valid and constitutional; 3. W/N the Madrid Protocol is in conflict with the IP Code. 1 Sec. 125. Representation; Address for Service. - If the applicant is not domiciled or has no real and effective commercial establishment in the Philippines, he shall designate by a written document filed in the office, the name and address of a Philippine resident who may be served notices or process in proceedings affecting the mark. Such notices or services may be served upon the person so designated by leaving a copy thereof at the address specified in the last designation filed. If the person so designated cannot be found at the address given in the last designation, such notice or process may be served upon the Director. (Sec. 3, R.A. No. 166 a) H1: Yes. IPAP emphasized that the paramount interest involved has TRANSCENDENTAL IMPORTANCE because its petition asserts that the Executive Department has overstepped the bound of its authority thereby cutting into another branch's functions and responsibilities. SC recognized IPAP's locus standi to bring the present challenge and adopted a LIBERAL ATTITUDE towards locus standi whenever the issue presented for consideration has TRANSCEDENTAL SIGNIFICANCE to the people, or whenever the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public. H2: Yes. Accession to the Madrid Protocol was constitutional. Treaties and International Agreements require Senate's concurrence, while Executive Agreements may be validly entered into without the Senate's concurrence (See Section 2 of E.O. No. 459, Series of 1997, which defines IA, Treaties, and EA). The DFA Secretary's determination and treatment of the Madrid Protocol as an executive agreement (well within his power under EO 459) are upheld. We observe at this point that there are no hard and fast rules on the propriety of entering into a treaty or an executive agreement on a given subject as an instrument of international relations. The primary consideration in the choice of the form of agreement is the parties' intent and desire to craft their international agreement in the form they so wish to further their respective interests. The matter of form takes a back seat when it comes to effectiveness and binding effect of the enforcement of a treaty or an executive agreement, inasmuch as all the parties, regardless of the form, become obliged to comply conformably with the time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda. The principle binds the parties to perform in good faith their parts in the agreements. H3: No. The Madrid Protocol accords with the intent and spirit of the IP Code, particularly on the subject of the registration of trademarks. The Madrid Protocol does not amend or modify the IP Code on the acquisition of trademark rights considering that the applications under the Madrid Protocol are still examined according to the relevant national law. In that regard, the IPOPHL will only grant protection to a mark that meets the local registration requirements. IPAP misapprehends the procedure for examination under the Madrid Protocol. The difficulty, which the IPAP illustrates, is minimal, if not altogether inexistent. The IPOPHL actually requires the designation of the resident agent when it refuses the registration of a mark. Local representation is further required in the submission of the Declaration of Actual Use, as well as in the submission of the license contract. ATTY. RODOLFO D. MATEO, Petitioner vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, et. al., Respondents/ G.R. 177875 / August 8, 2016 / First Division MAIN TOPIC: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW/ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS F: NWRB employees (also respondents herein) lodged a complant with the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) charging the petitioner with dishonesty, usurpation of authority and conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service. It was alleged that he had not disclosed the existence of a prior criminal conviction for homicide in his PDS on file with the NWRB; that he had approved and issued numerous water permits without or in excess of his authority, or in conflict with prior action by the Board; and that he had approved and issued certificates of public convenience without the certificates being first passed upon by the Board as a collegial body; that he had been indiscriminately reassigning personnel in complete disregard of their rank, status and safety to purposely dislocate them; and that he had acted without due process in certain disciplinary actions taken against subordinates. Complainant filed his counter-affidavit. After formal hearing and submission of memorandum / position papers (only respondents fiiled their memorandum/position paper), PAGC filed a resolution finding the petitioner administratively liable and holding that he should be dismissed from service. The matter was elevated to the OP, and issued a resolution concurring with the findings and recommendation of the PAGC. Complainant appealed to the CA insisting that the OP and the PAGC had committed serious errors of fact and law; had exceeded their jurisdiction; and had gravely abused their discretion in not affording him his constitutional right to confront his accusers, thereby violating his right to administrative due process. He assailed the public respondents for recommending and ordering his dismissal without factual, legal, and evidentiary basis. CA denied the petition for review and affirmed OP's ruling. I: 1. W/N the conduct of PAGC in arriving at a Recommendation and/or Order of Dismissal of the Petitioner from Public Service is bereft of affording him his constitutional right to confront his accusers which is a deprivation of administrative due process; and 2. W/N the penalty of dismissal for a first time offender of dishonesty and grave misconduct is very harsh. H1: No. Administrative due process simply means the opportunity to be heard or to explain one's side, or to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. For him to insist on a formal trial-type hearing, in which he could confront his accusers, was bereft of legal basis considering that he had been duly notified of the complaint against him and of the formal hearings conducted by the PAGC. He had also filed his answer to the complaint and participated in the formal hearings. For sure, the trial- type hearing was not indispensable in administrative cases. The requirements of administrative due process were satisfied once the parties were afforded the fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides. The administrative agency could resolve the issues based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties. H2. No. Under the previous and current rules on administrative cases, dishonesty and grave misconduct have been classified as grave offenses punishable by dismissal. These offenses reveal defects in the respondent official's character, affecting his right to continue in office, and are punishable by dismissal even if committed for the first time. The above ruling holds against the petitioner even if the petitioner argued that dismissal was a penalty too harsh where a lesser one would suffice and prayed that the Court should consider his 13 years of public service, and the fact that no graft charges had been filed against him. SC PP: The failure of a public servant to disclose in his personal data sheet (PDS) the fact of his conviction by final judgment of a crime punished with reclusion temporal is guilty of dishonesty, and may be dismissed from the service even if the charge is committed for the first time. SPOUSES EMILIO AND ALICIA JACINTO, COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTY. EMELIE P. BANGOT, JR., RESPONDENT./ A.C. No. 8494, October 05, 2016 / EN BANC MAIN TOPIC: LEGAL ETHICS / LAWYER’S OATH & ATTORNEY’S FEES (CONTINGENT FEES) F: Sps. Jacinto owns a parcel of land covered by OCT No. P-3387. Some owners of a land, which is adjacent to the land of the spouses, insituted a petition (to reconstitute a lost title) before the RTC of Cagayan de Oro. A court order was issued by the RTC which caused a private survey team to be deployed and to survey the owners' land. While doing the survey, the said team attempted to enter and survey Sps Jacinto's land. Thus, the Sps. Jacinto sought legal assistance from Atty. Bangot. Atty. Bangot told them that he would be initiating a case for certiorari in their behalf to nullify the order for the reconstitution of the lost title filed before the RTC; that he had then insinuated that one of their lots would be his attorney's fees. At first, the spouses refused but eventually consented to giving Atty. Bangot only a portion of Lot No. 37926-H with an area of 250 square meters. Atty. Bangot unilaterally prepared a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), which he also made Sps Jacinto to sign it. Upon arriving at their residence, they discovered that the technical detail specified in the MOA is a portion covered by Lot No. 37925-G and not Lot No. 37926-H. Plus, the agreed area was increased to 300 meters. Aggrieved, they decided to see Atty. Bangot to revoke the MOA and pay him, instead, in cash, but the latter refused. They were even challenged to file an appropriate case against him. More to the spouses' surprise, Atty. Bangot only filed a Manifestation which is not a preparatory pleading for certiorari. An administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Bangot by the spouses. In his defense, he averred, among others, that the complaint was just a harassment tactic to intimidate him from seeking judicial remedies to settle their dispute on the validity of the MOA. And that the lot, in the form of attorney’s fees will be paid on a contingent bases. IBP issued a resolution on the complaint and recommended that Atty. Bangot be suspended from the practice of law for 2 years. I: 1. W/N Atty. Bangot violated the Lawyer’s Oath; and 2. W/N the attorney’s fees he imposed is reasonable and that the said lot at the time of their negotiations is his attorney's fees which would be delivered to him only on a contingent basis. H1: Atty. Bangot grossly violated the Lawyer's Oath and his ethical duties as an attorney because he did not observe candor and fairness in his dealings with his clients. He vowed, among others, to do no falsehood, and not to consent to the doing of any falsehood, as well as not to delay any man's cause for money or malice but to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion "with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients. He also breached the following canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility 2. He certainly transgressed the Lawyer's Oath by receiving property of a substantial value from the complainants after having made them believe that he could ensure their land from intrusion by third parties. We sadly note in this connection that his changing the property ostensibly agreed upon with the bigger lot as payment for his legal services reflected his deceit at the start of the relationship. Surely, the totality of the respondent's actuations inevitably eroded public trust in the Legal Profession. On the basis of his acts and actuations, the attorney's fees in the form of the lot he charged from them were unconscionable and unreasonable, and should be struck down for failing to pass muster under the aforestated guidelines. His betrayal of his clients' trust besmirched the honorable name of the Law Profession. H2: No. Rule 20.1 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility serves as a guide to determine reasonableness of attoney's fees. The worth of such minimal effort (to file a Manifestation) was exaggerated and disproportionate when taken in the context of the attorney's fees being Lot No. 37925-G with 300 square meters in area. The two-paged Manifestation for Information was not even the procedural precursor of the promised petition for certiorari. Moreover, he did not actually file the petition for certiorari as he had promised. And, lastly, he did nothing more after filing the Manifestation for Information. He certainly transgressed the Lawyer's Oath by receiving property of a substantial value from the complainants after having made them believe that he could ensure their land from intrusion by third parties. Their agreement was not a contingent fee arrangement. Indeed, a contingent fee arrangement is a contract in writing in which the fee, usually a fixed percentage of what may be recovered in the action, is made to depend upon the success in the effort to enforce or defend a supposed right. The amount of the contingent fee agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fee in consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing should the suit fail. Such arrangement is generally recognized as valid and binding in this jurisdiction but its terms must be reasonable. Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states that "a contract for a contingent fee, when sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness." A contract of this nature is permitted because it redounds to the benefit of the poor client and the lawyer especially in cases where the client has a meritorious cause of action but has no means with which to pay for the legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation. Considering that a contingent fee arrangement is susceptible to abuse, the courts should closely scrutinize it to protect the client from 2 Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest immoral or deceitful conduct. Canon 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients. Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Canon 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Canon 20- A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. Rule 20.4 A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. 3 (a) the time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required; (b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; (c) the importance of the subject matter; (d) the skill demanded; (e) the probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case; (f) the customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he belongs; (g) the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service; (h) the contingency or certainty of compensation; (i) the character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and j) the professional standing of the lawyer. unjust charges. The court looks in large measure at the reasonableness of the stipulated fee under the circumstances of each case as explicitly provided in Section 24 4, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. SC PP: We have said time and again, and this we cannot overemphasize, that the Law is neither a trade nor a craft but a profession whose basic ideal is to render public service and to secure justice for those who seek its aid. If the Law has to remain an honorable profession and has to attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, by their lives, accord continuing fidelity to such tenets and principles. Every attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of his client; and that for as long as the attorney is in good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the interests of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such services. Yet, equally without question is that the attorney should not accept the engagement that is way above his ability and competence to handle, for there will then be no basis for him to accept any amount as attorney's fees; or that he should at least begin to perform the contemplated task undertaken for the client to entitle him to be compensated on the basis of quantum meruit. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS DELIA CAMANNONG / G.R.NO. 199497 / AUGUST 24, 2016 / FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: CRIMINAL LAW / Illegal Recruitment SUB TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW / CRIMINAL LAW / AWARD OF ACTUAL DAMAGES F: Accused Delia Camannong was pronounced by the RTC guilty of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in a Large Scale, penalized under Art. 38 in relation to Art. 30 par. (a) of the Labor Code and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay .a fine of Php 100,000.00, with payment of actual damages of Php 6,500.00 to the complainants. On appeal by the accused before the CA, the decision of conviction was affirmed with modification increasing the fine to Php 500,000.00 I: 1. W/N the accused is guilty of Illegal Recruitment in a Large Scale? 2. W/N even without receipts as evidence of the monies given to the accused, are the complainants still entitled to the award of actual damages? H1: Yes. The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in large scale are: (1) that the accused engaged in acts of recruitment and placement of workers as defined under Article 13(b )9 of the Labor Code, or in any CA prohibited activities listed under Article 3410 of the Labor Code; (2) that she had not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment with respect to the requirement to secure a license or authority to recruit and deploy workers; 11 and (3) that she committed the unlawful acts against three or more persons. RTC and CA unanimously found that the accused-appellant had misrepresented to the complainants her capacity to send workers abroad for employment. Believing her misrepresentation, they parted with their money for her to process their deployment papers. It was established that she did not have the necessary license or authority to engage in recruitment in the Province of Pangasinan, including the Cities of Dagupan, San Carlos and Urdaneta, a fact duly attested to by a competent employee of the Department of Labor and Employment. In this connection, the Prosecution did not even need to establish that she had not been issued any license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. Under the law, even a licensee or holder of the authority to engage in recruitment who failed to reimburse the amounts received as placement or related fees upon her failure to deploy the victim could be criminally liable for the crime. H2: We uphold the payment of actual damages in that amount and legal interest. It is true that actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must also be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, for the courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. Generally, the courts require competent proof of thr actual amount of loss, and for this reason, the Courts have denied claims for actual damages not supported by receipts. in this case, despite the complainants uniformly testifying 4 Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. -- An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable. that they had parted with their money without asking for receipts, there seemed to be no dispute about each of them having actually paid to the accused-appellant that amount for their processing and passport fees and other expenses including the amount necessary to open their bank accounts. To still deny them their right to recover actual damages only because they had no receipts to show for their payments would be a travesty of justice. For, if we are now affirming her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale for collecting the sums of money from them, it would really be beyond understanding to reverse the assessment of actual damages by the trial judge just to serve the general policy of limiting proof of actual damages to receipts. One of the constant lessons from our experience as judges is that the non-issuance of receipts by the illegal recruiters was also essential to the scheme to defraud the victims. By all means, then, should the lack of receipts not hinder the courts from vindicating the victims of the fraud. EMILIO A. AQUINO, PETITIONER VS. CARMELITA TANGKEKO, MORRIS TANGKEKO, AND RANILLO TANGKEKO, RESPONDENTS / G.R. NO. 197356 / AUGUST 24, 2016 / FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW/Post Judgment Remedies/Petition For Relief From Judgment (R.38) vs. Petition for Annulment of Judgment (R.47) F: Emilio Aquino, estranged husband of deceased Lovely Tangkeko-Aquino, filed a Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC in Malolos City to claim rightful custody of his son. In his petition he alleged that due marital issues involving in-laws (respondents herein), he was forced to leave their conjugal dwelling as well as their son named Azilimson Gabriel T. Aquino. Emilio, at first, he could still visit and have access to his son but when Lovely died, his access to his son had become scarce and respondents refused to inform him of his son's whereabouts. Respondents, countering, denied that they had not deprived the petitioner of the lawful custody of his son, and countered that Emilio consented to let his son stay with the respondents upon Lovely’s death; and that they had then assumed the responsibility of raising and taking care of Azilimson. RTC ruled in favor of the respondents, observing that letting the custody remain with the respondents is for the best interest of the child. RTC's ruling had attained finality prior to Emilio's Motion for Reconsideration, which, therefore, MR was denied. Emilio filed a Petition For Relief From Judgment to seek nullification of RTC's ruling, contending that his MR was filed on time, attaching a certification from PhilPost to support his claim. RTC denied the petition for relief from judgment, opining that the petition was in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration and was, therefore, prohibited by the Rules of Court. Undeterred, Emilio assailed the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus before the CA thru a Petition for Annulment of Judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud and denial of due process. CA dismissed the Petition for Annulment of Judgment pointing out that it did not comply with the conditions set for the remedy by Section 1 and 2 of Rule 47 of ROC; that it suffered infirmities, among others, failure to include material dates. MR over CA's dismissal was filed but the same was denied, holding that the petition had been "judiciously evaluated and passed upon" and there's no compelling reason to deviate from the ruling. I: W/N one who brought a Petition for Relief from Judgment under Rule 38 ROC can still avail himself of an action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court based on the same grounds available to him for the prior remedy? H: No. A Petition For Annulment of Judgment initiated under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances provided the petitioner has failed to avail himself of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies provided by law without fault on his part. It has often been stressed that such action is never resorted to as a substitute for the petitioner's own neglect in not promptly availing himself of the ordinary or other appropriate remedies. Owing to the exceptional character of the remedy of annulment of judgment, the limitations and guidelines set forth by Rule 4 7 should be strictly complied with. A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. In this case, petitioner could no longer avail himself of the remedy simply because he had already brought the petition for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 38. He had thereby foreclosed his recourse to the remedy of annulment of the judgment under Rule 47. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK VS HEIRS OF BENEDICTO AND AZUCENA ALONDAY, G.R. NO. 171865, OCTOBER 12, 2016 /FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: COMMERCIAL LAW/DRAGNET CLAUSE SUB TOPIC: CIVIL LAW/OBLIGATIONS & CONTRACTS/CONTRACT OF ADHESION F: On September 26, 1974, Sps. Spouses Alonday obtained an agricultural loan from PNB Davao Del Sur Branch secured by a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) on the land of the spouses located in Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur covered by OCT No. P-3599. In 1980, Spouses now obtained a commercial loan, secured by a REM over their other property located in Ulas, Davao City under TCT No. T-66139. Both the mortgage contracts on both REM executed by the plaintiff contained a pertinent provision, which reads: "xxx In case the Mortgagor executes subsequent promissory note or notes either as renewal of the former note, as an extension thereof, or as a new loan, or is given any other kind of accommodation, xxx, this mortgage shall also stand as security for the payment of the said promissory note or notes and/or accommodations without the necessity of executing a new contract and this mortgage shall have the same force and effect as if the said promissory note or notes and/or accommodations were existing on the date thereof, notwithstanding full payments of any or all obligations of the Mortgagors.xxx" In time, the spouses were able to settle their obligation over the commerical loan on July 5, 1984. However, their agricultural loan still remained unpaid. Children of the Spouses demanded the release of the mortgage over the property under TCT T-66139. PNB however informed them that the mortgage could not be release because the agricultural loan still remains unsettled. Because of the Spouses' failure to pay, PNB foreclosed the mortgage over the property under OCT P-3599 in August 17, 1984. Unable to redeem the property by the Spouses, PNB consolidated its ownership and later on sold the same property to Felix Malmin on Nov. 10, 1989. Spouses filed a civil complaint for damages before the RTC of Davao City on the grounds that the foreclosure and sale of the property covered by TCT T-66139 was illegal. RTC ruled in favor of the Spouses and ordered PNB to pay an amount of money representing the value of the land covered by TCT T-66139 and attorney's fees and costs. CA, on appeal by PNB, affirmed RTC's decision. I:1. Whether the dragnet clause on the second REM covers the property covered by the REM on the agricultural loan; and 2. Whether the Mortgage contract of the REM is a contract of adhesion. H1: No. The REM on the property covered by TCT No. T-66139 was specifically constituted to secure the payment of the commercial loan of the Spouses ALONDA Y. In the same manner, the real estate mortgage on the property covered by OCT No. P- 3599 was constituted to secure the payment of their agricultural loan with the PNB. With the execution of separate mortgage contracts for the two (2) loans, it is clear that the intention of the parties was to limit the mortgage to the loan for which it was constituted. SC did not agree to PNB's argument that the Mojica vs. Court of Appeals case is applicable in this case. The case highlighed that if future loans must be sufficiently described in the mortgage contract, all the more reason that the same requirement must be applicable for a past loan. The mere fact that the Mortgage contract made no mention of the pre-existing loan strongly indicates that each of the loans of the Spouses had been treated separately by the parties themselves, and this sufficiently explained why the loans had been secured by different mortgages. H2: YES. SC concurred with the CA and the RTC in their holding that the mortgage contracts executed by the Spouses Alonday were contracts of adhesion exclusively prepared by the petitioner. Under Article 1306 of the Civil Code, the contracting parties "may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." This is an express recognition by the law of the right of the people to enter into all manner of lawful conventions as part of their safeguarded liberties. The objection against a contract of adhesion lies most often in its negation of the autonomy of the will of the parties in contracts. A contract of adhesion, albeit valid, becomes objectionable only when it takes undue advantage of one of the parties - the weaker party - by having such party just adhere to the terms of the contract. In such situation, the courts go to the succor of the weaker party by construing any obscurity in the contract against the party who prepared the contract, the latter being presumed as the stronger party to the agreement, and as the party who caused the obscurity. *** ROGELIO BARONDA, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, AND HIDECO SUGAR MILLING CO., INC., Respondents. G.R. No. 161006, October 14, 2015 FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW/ Voluntary Arbitrator's order of reinstatement of the petitioner was immediately executory F: Hideco Sugar Milling Co., Inc. (HIDECO) employed the petitioner as a mud press truck driver.Petitioner hit HIDECO's transmission lines while operating a dump truck, causing a total factory blackout. Restoration cost HIDECO damages. Petitioner was terminated from employment. Petitioner filed in the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a complaint for illegal dismissal against HIDECO. NCMB found the dismissal illegal and reinstatement is therefore ordered. The separation was deemed suspension without pay for his negligent acts, and is further ordered to pay respondent employer the sum of P26,484.41 for actual damages. Petitioner filed his manifestation with motion for the issuance of the writ of execution in the Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator, praying for the execution of the decision, and insisting on being entitled to backwages and other benefits. HIDECO opposed the petitioner's motion for execution and simultaneously presented its own motion for execution to enforce the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator. A second motion for execution was filed by the petitioner. The Voluntary Arbitrator granted the petitioner's second motion for execution. HIDECO instituted a special civil action for certiorari in the CA. HIDECO’s petition was granted. I1: Whether or not the CA erred in granting HIDECO's petition for certiorari despite its procedural flaws. H1: Yes. HIDECO's proper recourse was to appeal by petition for review; hence, the CA erred in granting HIDECO's petition for certiorari. The order issued on July 25, 2001 by the Voluntary Arbitrator was a final order, as contrasted from a merely interlocutory order, because its issuance left nothing more to be done or taken by the Voluntary Arbitrator in the case. It thus completely disposed of what the reinstatement of the petitioner as ordered by the Voluntary Arbitrator in the award or decision of January 13, 1999 signified. The proper remedy from such order was to appeal to the CA by petition for review under Rule 43, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The period of appeal was 10 days from receipt of the copy of the order of July 25, 2001 by the parties. It is true that Section 4 of Rule 43 stipulates that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. However, Article 262-A of the Labor Code, the relevant portion of which follows, expressly states that the award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator shall be final and executory after 10 calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties. On account of Article 262-A of the Labor Code, the period to appeal was necessarily 10 days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators; otherwise, the order of July 25, 2001 would become final and immutable, because only a timely appeal or motion for reconsideration could prevent the award or decision from attaining finality and immutability. Yet, HIDECO filed the petition for certiorari, not a petition for review under Rule 43, and the CA liberally treated the petition for certiorari as a petition for review under Rule 43. We hold that such treatment by the CA was procedurally unwarranted. To begin with, even if the error sought to be reviewed concerned grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Voluntary Arbitrator, the remedy was an appeal in due course by filing the petition for review within 10 days from notice of the award or decision. This was because certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy, was available only when there was no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In other words, the justification for HIDECO's resort to the extraordinary equitable remedy of certiorari did not exist due to the availability of appeal, or other ordinary remedies in law to which HIDECO as the aggrieved party could resort. Although it is true that certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal, and that either remedy was not an alternative of the other, we have at times permitted the resort to certiorari despite the availability of appeal, or of any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in exceptional situations, such as: (1) when the remedy of certiorari is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to a party; (2) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (3) where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (4) where appeal would be slow, inadequate and insufficient; (5) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (6) where public interest is involved; and (7) in case of urgency.31 Verily, as pointed out in Jaca v. Davao Lumber Company,the availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of certiorari where the appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial, speedy and sufficient; for it is inadequacy, not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari. It is nonetheless necessary in such exceptional situations for the petitioner to make a strong showing in such situations that the respondent judicial or quasi-judicial official or tribunal lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction, or gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. HIDECO did not establish that its case came within any of the aforestated exceptional situations. I2: Whether or not the reinstatement aspect of the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision was executory pending appeal. H2: Yes. Voluntary Arbitrator's order of reinstatement ofthe petitioner was immediately executory.Although the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration or of an appeal forestalls the finality of the decision or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator, the reinstatement aspect of the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision or award remains executory regardless of the filing of such motion for reconsideration or appeal. The immediate reinstatement of the employee pending the appeal has been introduced by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, which amended Article 223 of the Labor Code, to wit: SEC. 12. Article 223 of the same code is amended to read as follows: Art. 223. Appeal. x x x x In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, in so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein, xxx We also see no reason to obstruct the reinstatement decreed by the Voluntary Arbitrator, or to treat it any less than the reinstatement that is ordered by the Labor Arbiter. Voluntary arbitration really takes precedence over other dispute settlement devices. Such primacy of voluntary arbitration is mandated by no less than the Philippine Constitution, and is ingrained as a policy objective of our labor relations law. The reinstatement order by the Voluntary Arbitrator should have the same authority, force and effect as that of the reinstatement order by the Labor Arbiter not only to encourage parties to settle their disputes through this mode, but also, and more importantly, to enforce the constitutional mandate to protect labor, to provide security of tenure, and to enhance social justice. The 2001 Procedural Guidelines in the Execution of Voluntary Arbitration Awards/Decisions (Guidelines), albeit not explicitly discussing the executory nature of the reinstatement order, seems to align with the Court's stance by punishing the noncompliance by a party of the decision or order for reinstatement. (Section 2, Rule III of the Guidelines) The 2005 NCMB Revised Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedingsalso supports this Court's position (Section 6 of its Rule VIII). NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, Petitioner, v. ERNESTO ROXAS, Respondent. G.R. No. 171953, October 21, 2015 FIRST DIVISION MAINT TOPIC: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT F: Roxas applied for commercial lots in the project, particularly Lot 9 and Lot 10 in Block 11, Area 3, Phase III A/B, with an area of 176 square meters, for the use of his business of buying and selling gravel, sand and cement products. The NHA approved his application, and issued the order of payment respecting the lots. The NHA issued the notice of award for the lots in favor of Roxas, at P1,500.00/square meter. The NHA conducted a final subdivision project survey, causing the increase in the area of the subject lots from 176 to 320 square meters. The NHA informed Roxas about the increase in the area of the subject lots, and approved the award of the additional area of 144 square meters to him at P3,500.00/square meter. Although manifesting his interest in acquiring the additional area, he appealed for the reduction of the price to Pl,500.00/square meter. After the NHA rejected his appeal, he commenced in the RTC this action for specific performance and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. He amended the complaint to compel the NHA to comply with the terms and conditions of the order of payment and the notice of award. The RTC rendered judgment against the NHA. CA affirmed the RTC decision. In order to prevent the execution, the NHA brought another petition for certiorari in the CA. The CA dismissed the NFIA's petition for certiorari. The CA observed that the NHA was a government-owned and -controlled corporation whose funds were not exempt from garnishment or execution; and ruled that Roxas did not need to first file his claim in the COA. I: Whether or not the NHA was immune from suit. H: No. First of all, the mantle of the State's immunity from suit did not extend to the NHA despite its being a government-owned and -controlled corporation. Under Section 6(i) of Presidential Decree No. 757, which was its charter, the NHA could sue and be sued. As such, the NHA was not immune from the suit of Roxas. As the text of the legal provision plainly shows, the audit jurisdiction of the COA extends to all government-owned or -controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, and other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the Government, as well as to all non-governmental entities subsidized by the Government, or funded by donations through the Government, or required to pay levies or government share, or for which the Government has put up a counterpart fund, or those partly funded by the Government. There is no distinction as to the class of claims. Ubi lex non distinguish nee nos distinguere debemos.26 Indeed, a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated. Corollary to this rule is the principle that where the law does not make any exception, the courts may not exempt something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary. There is no question that the NHA could sue or be sued, and thus could be held liable under the judgment rendered against it. But the universal rule remains to be that the State, although it gives its consent to be sued either by general or special law, may limit the claimant's action only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution. In other words, the power of the court ends when the judgment is rendered because government funds and property may not be seized pursuant to writs of execution or writs of garnishment to satisfy such judgments. The functions and public services of the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public fund from their legitimate and specific objects, and as appropriated by law. The rule is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Indeed, the disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law. MICROSOFT CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ROLANDO D. MANANSALA AND/OR MEL MANANSALA, DOING BUSINESS AS DATAMAN TRADING COMPANY AND/OR COMIC ALLEY, Respondent. / G.R. No. 166391, October 21, 2015 / FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: MERCANTILE LAW/COPYRIGHT AND TRADEMARK F: Petitioner (Microsoft Corporation) is the copyright and trademark owner of all rights relating to all versions and editions of Microsoft software (computer programs) such as, but not limited to, MS-DOS (disk operating system), Microsoft Encarta, Microsoft Windows, Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel, Microsoft Access, Microsoft Works, Microsoft Powerpoint, Microsoft Office, Microsoft Flight Simulator and Microsoft FoxPro, among others, and their user's guide/manuals. Private Respondent-Rolando Manansala is doing business under the name of DATAMAN TRADING COMPANY and/or COMIC ALLEY. Private Respondent Manansala, without authority from petitioner, was engaged in distributing and selling Microsoft computer software programs. Mr. John Benedict A. Sacriz, a private investigator accompanied by an agent from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was able to purchase six (6) CD-ROMs containing various computer programs belonging to petitioner.As a result of the test- purchase, the agent from the NBI applied for a search warrant to search the premises of the private respondent. The search warrant was served on the private respondent's premises and yielded several illegal copies of Microsoft programs. I: Whether or not printing or copying was not essential in the commission of the crime of copyright infringement under Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 49. H: Yes. The commission of any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 49 without the copyright owner's consent constituted actionable copyright infringement. The Court has emphatically declared that Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on a private domain owned and occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this connection, consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of anything the sole right to do which is conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright. 5 The "gravamen of copyright infringement," 6 is not merely the unauthorized manufacturing of intellectual works but rather the unauthorized performance of any of the acts covered by Section 5. Hence, any person who performs any of the acts under Section 5 without obtaining the copyright owners prior consent renders himself civilly and criminally liable for copyright infringement. The mere sale of the illicit copies of the software programs was enough by itself to show the existence of probable cause for copyright infringement. There was no need for the petitioner to still prove who copied, replicated or reproduced the software programs. Indeed, the public prosecutor and the DOJ gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the petitioner's charge for copyright infringement against the respondents for lack of evidence. ARSENIO A. AGUSTIN, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND SALVADOR S. PILLOS, Respondent. /G.R. No. 207105, November 10, 2015 / EN BANC MAIN TOPIC: POLITICAL LAW/ELECTION / DISQUALIFICATION re: CITIZENSHIP F: In 1997, the petitioner was naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America (USA). On October 5, 2012, he filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte to be contested in the May 13, 2013 local elections.As the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party, he declared in his CoC that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to; that he was a natural born Filipino citizen; and that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for 25 years. On October 10, 2012, respondent Salvador S. Pillos, a rival mayoralty candidate, filed in the COMELEC a Petition To Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin, docketed as SPA No. 13-023 (DC), alleging that the petitioner had made a material misrepresentation in his CoC by stating that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos for 25 years despite having registered as a voter therein only on May 31, 2012. Having admitted his dual citizenship, Agustin had the burden of proving through his evidence that he complied with the statutory requirements imposed upon dual citizens provided under Republic Act 9225, particularly Section 3 and 5(2) thereof. I1: Whether or not Agustin was eligible as a candidate for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. I2: Whether or not there is propriety in Pillos' claim as the rightful occupant of the contested elective position. H1: No. The Court finds and declares that the petitioner made no material misrepresentation in his CoC; hence, there is no legal or factual basis for the cancellation of the CoC. Even so, he was disqualified to run as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for being a dual citizen. With his disqualification having been determined and pronounced by final judgment before the elections, the votes cast in his favor should not be counted. Accordingly, his rival, respondent Pillos, should be proclaimed duly elected Mayor for obtaining the highest number of votes in the elections. A valid CoC arises upon the timely filing of a person's declaration of his intention to run for public office and his affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume. The valid CoC renders the person making the declaration a valid or official candidate. The petitioner's continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of the USA through using 5 Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 6 NBI-Microsoft Corporation v. Hwang his USA passport after the renunciation of his USA citizenship reverted him to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion disqualified him from being elected to public office in the Philippines pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code. H2: Yes. In Cayat v. Commission on Elections, the Court has expounded on the effect of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 covers two situations. The first is when the disqualification becomes final before the elections, which is the situation covered in the first sentence of Section 6. The second is when the disqualification becomes final after the elections, which is the situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6. The present case falls under the first situation. Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is categorical: a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. Even if his disqualification did not subvert the validity of his CoC, the petitioner would be reduced to a non-candidate under the terms of Section 6, supra, should it be shown that the disqualification attained finality prior to the 2013 elections. The effect was to render the votes cast in his favor stray, resulting in Pillos being proclaimed the winning candidate. It is crucial, therefore, to determine with certainty the time when the judgment declaring the petitioner disqualified from running for the local elective position attained finality. Under the circumstances, the finality of the petitioner's disqualification pursuant to the April 23, 2013 resolution prior to the May 13, 2013 elections rendered him a non- candidate, and the votes cast for him should not have been counted.Pillos, being the qualified candidate obtaining the highest number of votes, should be proclaimed duly elected as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte in the 2013 elections. ??? RURAL BANK OF MALASIQUI, INC., Petitioner, v. ROMEO M. CERALDE AND EDUARDO M. CERALDE, JR., Respondent./ G.R. No. 162032, November 25, 2015 / FIRST DIVISION CIVIL LAW>In pari delicto - ? F: Romeo M. Ceralde and Eduardo M. Ceralde, Jr., are the owners of the parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 111647 and 111648 respectively, of the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan. Under varied dates in the years 1978, 1980, 1981 and 1982, they mortgaged these properties in favor of appellee [R]ural [B]ank of Malasiqui, Inc., as security for agricultural loans they obtained from the bank. At the time, however, the land had already been placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer and the corresponding Certificates of Land Transfer were already issued to the tenants thereon. Nevertheless, appellee rural bank, through its president, adviced (sic) mortgagors-appellants to submit an Affidavit of Non-Tenancy, which appellants complied with. The mortgages were then approved by appellee rural bank. After the respondents did not pay the loans at maturity, the petitioner caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages. In the ensuing foreclosure sale, the petitioner acquired the mortgaged properties for being the highest bidder. This appeal resolves the question of which between the parties - on one hand, the petitioner, the rural bank that foreclosed the mortgage constituted on the agricultural lands earlier expropriated under the land reform program of the State, and acquired the lands under mortgage as the highest bidder in the ensuing foreclosure sale; and, on the other, the respondents, the registered owners and mortgagors of the lands in favor of the petitioner - was entitled to the payment of the just compensation for the lands. In this suit initiated by the respondents to assert their right to the net value of the just compensations, the petitioner prevailed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57, in San Carlos City, Pangasinan by virtue of the judgment rendered on July 15, 1995 (dismissing the respondents' complaint for lack of cause of action),1 but the Court of Appeals (CA), reversing the judgment of the RTC on appeal through the assailed decision promulgated on April 15, 2003,2 ordered the petitioner instead to pay to the respondents the sum of P119,912.00, plus legal interest reckoned from July 12, 1993, the date when the complaint was filed, representing the net value of the just compensation . The petitioner is now before the Court to seek the review and reversal of the adverse decision of the CA. I: Whether or not respondents were entitled to the net value of their landholdings. H: We hold that the respondents were entitled to the net value of the lands not only by law but also by equity. As to equity, we need only to point out that when the parties are both at fault, the mistake of one is negated by the other's, and they are then returned to their previous status where the law will look at the facts as if neither is at fault. In such event, we can only apply the law, particularly Section 80 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, and such application favors the respondents, as we have already explained. MEGAWORLD PROPERTIES AND HOLDINGS, INC., EMPIRE EAST LAND HOLDINGS, INC., AND ANDREW L. TAN, Petitioners, v. MAJESTIC FINANCE AND INVESTMENT CO., INC., RHODORA LOPEZ-LIM, AND PAULINA CRUZ, Respondents. / G.R. No. 169694, December 09, 2015 / FIRST DIVISION CIVIL LAW /OBLIGATIONS / RECIPROCAL OBLIGATIONS F: Megaworld Properties and Holdings, Inc. (developer) entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Majestic Finance and Investment Co., Inc. (owner) for the development of the residential subdivision located in Brgy. Alingaro, General Trias, Cavite. The developer and owner agreed, through the addendum to the JVA,to increase the initial deposit for the settlement of claims and the relocation of the tenants from P10,000,000.00 to P60,000,000.00. The developer, by deed of assignment, transferred, conveyed and assigned to Empire East Land Holdings, Inc. (developer/assignee) all its rights and obligations under the JVA including the addendum. The owner filed in the RTC a complaint for specific performance with damages against the developer, the developer/assignee, and respondent Andrew Tan, who are now the petitioners herein. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 67813, was mainly based on the failure of the petitioners to comply with their obligations under the JVA, including the obligation to maintain a strong security force to safeguard the entire joint venture property of 215 hectares from illegal entrants and occupants. Under review is the decision of the CA whereby the CA upheld the order by the RTC directing the defendants (petitioners herein) to perform their obligation to provide round-the-clock security for the property under development. Also appealed is the resolution denying the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. I: Whether or not either party of a joint venture agreement to develop property into a residential subdivision has already performed its obligation as to entitle it to demand the performance of the other's reciprocal obligation. H: The obligations of the parties under the JVA were unquestionably reciprocal. Reciprocal obligations are those that arise from the same cause, and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other at the same time, such that the obligations of one are dependent upon the obligations of the other. They are to be performed simultaneously, so that the performance by one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment by the other. As the Court has expounded in Consolidated Industrial Gases, Inc. v. Alabang Medical Center: Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, and in which each party is a debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the obligation of the other. They are to be performed simultaneously, so that the performance of one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other. In reciprocal obligations, neither party incurs in delay if the other does not comply or is not ready to comply in a proper manner with what is incumbent upon him. From the moment one of the parties fulfills his obligation, delay by the other begins. xxx In reciprocal obligations, before a party can demand the performance of the obligation of the other, the former must also perform its own obligation. For its failure to turn over a complete project in accordance with the terms and conditions of the installation contracts, CIGI cannot demand for the payment of the contract price balance from AMC, which, in turn, cannot legally be ordered to pay. In each activity, the obligation of each party was dependent upon the obligation of the other. Although their obligations were to be performed simultaneously, the performance of an activity obligation was still conditioned upon the fulfillment of the continuous obligation, and vice versa. Should either party cease to perform a continuous obligation, the other's subsequent activity obligation would not accrue. Conversely, if an activity obligation was not performed by either party, the continuous obligation of the other would cease to take effect. The performance of the continuous obligation was subject to the resolutory condition that the precedent obligation of the other party, whether continuous or activity, was fulfilled as it became due. Otherwise, the continuous obligation would be extinguished. According to Article 1184 of the Civil Code, the condition that some event happen at a determinate time shall extinguish the obligation as soon as the time expires, or if it has become indubitable that the event will not take place. Here, the common cause of the parties in entering into the joint venture was the development of the joint venture property into the residential subdivision as to eventually profit therefrom. Consequently, all of the obligations under the JVA were subject to the happening of the complete development of the joint venture property, or if it would become indubitable that the completion would not take place, like when an obligation, whether continuous or activity, was not performed. Should any of the obligations, whether continuous or activity, be not performed, all the other remaining obligations would not ripen into demandable obligations while those already performed would cease to take effect. This is because every single obligation of each party under the JVA rested on the common cause of profiting from the developed subdivision. Being reciprocal in nature, their respective obligations as the owner and the developer were dependent upon the performance by the other of its obligations; hence, any claim of delay or non-performance against the other could prosper only if the complaining party had faithfully complied with its own correlative obligation.ch CAPITAL INSURANCE AND SURETY CO., INC., Petitioner, v. DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS, INC., Respondent./ G.R. No. 159979, December 09, 2015 / FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPICL: MERCANTILE LAW/INSURANCE/DEPOSITED SECURITIES vis-à- vis Sec. 203 of IC F: Respondent sued Vilfran Liner, Inc., Hilaria F. Villegas and Maura F. Villegas in the RTC to recover the unpaid billings related to the fabrication and construction of 35 passenger bus bodies. It applied for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. RTC issued the writ of preliminary attachment, which the sheriff served on the defendants, resulting in the levy of 10 buses and three parcels of land belonging to the defendants. The sheriff also sent notices of garnishment of the defendants' funds in the of BPI Family Bank, China Bank, Asia Trust Bank, City Trust Bank, and Bank of the Philippine Island.The levy and garnishment prompted defendant Maura F. Villegas to file an Extremely Urgent Motion to Discharge Upon Filing of a Counterbond, attaching thereto CISCO Bond No. 0001 1-00005/JCL(3) dated June 10, 1997 and its supporting documents purportedly issued by the petitioner. RTC approved the counterbond and discharged the writ of preliminary attachment. RTC rendered its decision in favor of the respondent. The foregoing judgment shall be enforceable against the counterbond posted by defendant Vilfran Liner, Inc.The petitioner, a duly registered insurance company, hereby appeals to seek the reversal of the unfavorable affirmative ruling on this issue of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on September 15, 2003. The CA therein held that the securities were not covered by absolute immunity from liability, but could be made to answer for valid and legitimate claims against the insurance company under its contract. I: Whether or not the securities deposited by the insurance company pursuant to Section 203 of the Insurance Code subject of levy by a creditor. H: Yes. The security deposit was immune from levy or execution. Except as otherwise provided in the Insurance Code, no judgment creditor or other claimant shall have the right to levy upon any securities of the insurer held on deposit under this section or held on deposit pursuant to the requirement of the Commissioner. The forthright text of provision indicates that the security deposit is exempt from levy by a judgment creditor or any other claimant. This exemption has been recognized in several rulings, particularly in Republic v. Del Monte Motors, Inc., the prequel case for this ruling, where the Court has ruled: x x x As worded, the law expressly and clearly states that the security deposit shall be (1) answerable for all the obligations of the depositing insurer under its insurance contracts; (2) at all times free from any liens or encumbrance; and (3) exempt from levy by any claimant. Basic is the statutory construction rule that provisions of a statute should be construed in accordance with the purpose for which it was enacted. That is, the securities are held as a contingency fund to answer for the claims against the insurance company by all its policy holders and their beneficiaries. This step is taken in the event that the company becomes insolvent or otherwise unable to satisfy the claims against it. Thus, a single claimant may not lay stake on the securities to the exclusion of all others. The other parties may have their own claims against the insurance company under other insurance contracts it has entered into. What right, if any, did the respondent have in the petitioner's security deposit? The right to claim against the security deposit is dependent on the solvency of the insurance company, and is subject to all other obligations of the insurance company arising from its insurance contracts. Accordingly, the respondent's interest in the security deposit could only be inchoate or a mere expectancy, and thus had no attribute as property. 7 ASB REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ORTIGAS & COMPANY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Respondent. / G.R. No. 202947, December 09, 2015 / FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: CIVIL LAW/CONTRACTS/RECISSION F: Respondent Ortigas & Company Limited Partnership (Ortigas) entered into a Deed of Sale with Amethyst Pearl Corporation (Amethyst) involving the parcel of land with an area of 1,012 square meters situated in Barrio Oranbo, Pasig City and registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 65118 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal for the consideration of P2,024,000.00. 7 Republic v. Del Monte Motors, Inc., Amethyst assigned the subject property to its sole stockholder, petitioner ASB Realty Corporation (the petitioner), under a so-called Deed of Assignment in Liquidation in consideration of 10,000 shares of the petitioner's outstanding capital stock. Thus, the property was transferred to the petitioner free from any liens or encumbrances except those duly annotated on TCT No. PT-94175. The Register of Deeds of Rizal cancelled TCT No. PT-94175 and issued TCT No. PT-105797 in the name of the petitioner with the same encumbrances annotated on TCT No.PT-94175. Ortigas filed its complaint for specific performance against the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City. Ortigas amended the complaint, and alleged, among others, that Defendant has violated the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale. After trial on the merits, the RTC dismissed the complaint. This appeal seeks the review and reversal of the amended decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which ruled in favor of Ortigas and Company Limited Partnership. I: Whether or not Ortigas validly rescinded the Deed of Sale due to the failure of Amethyst and its assignee, the petitioner, to fulfill the covenants under the Deed of Sale. H: The Civil Code uses rescission in two different contexts, namely: (1) rescission on account of breach of contract under Article 1191; and (2) rescission by reason of lesion or economic prejudice under Article 1381. Ortigas did not have a cause of action against the petitioner for the rescission of the Deed of Sale. Under Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. The essential elements of a cause of action are: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of the defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages or other relief. It is only upon the occurrence of the last element that the cause of action arises, giving the plaintiff the right to file an action in court for the recovery of damages or other relief. The second and third elements were absent herein. The petitioner was not privy to the Deed of Sale because it was not the party obliged thereon. Not having come under the duty not to violate any covenant in the Deed of Sale when it purchased the subject property despite the annotation on the title, its failure to comply with the covenants in the Deed of Sale did not constitute a breach of contract that gave rise to Ortigas' right of rescission. It was rather Amethyst that defaulted on the covenants under the Deed of Sale; hence, the action to enforce the provisions of the contract or to rescind the contract should be against Amethyst. In other words, rescission could not anymore take place against the petitioner once the subject property legally came into the juridical possession of the petitioner, who was a third party to the Deed of Sale. PEDRO LADINES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND EDWIN DE RAMON, Respondents. / G.R. No. 167333, January 11, 2016 / FIRST DIVISION MAINT TOPIC: CRIMINAL LAW/ INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW / IMPOSITION OF PENALTY F: Petitioner and one Herman Licup were charged with homicide. Armed with bladed weapons, attacked, assaulted and stabbed one Erwin de Ramon, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which resulted to his instantaneous death. The RTC pronounced the petitioner guilty as charged. Pedro Ladines was sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity without subsidiary imprisonment [in] case of insolvency and [to] pay the costs.Herman Licup is acquitted of the offense charged. The CA affirmed the conviction. I: Whether or not the trial court was correct in imposing the highest penalty within a period of the imposable penalty without specifying the justification for doing so. H: No. To impose the highest within a period of the imposable penalty without specifying the justification for doing so is an error on the part of the trial court that should be corrected on appeal. In default of such justification, the penalty to be imposed is the lowest of the period. We declare that the lower courts could not impose 17 years and four months of the medium period of reclusion temporal, which was the ceiling of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as the maximum of the indeterminate penalty without specifying the justification for so imposing. They thereby ignored that although Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, which has set the rules "for the application of penalties which contain three periods," requires under its first rule that the courts should impose the penalty prescribed by law in the medium period should there be neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, its seventh rule expressly demands that "[w]ithin the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and. the greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime." By not specifying the justification for imposing the ceiling of the period of the imposable penalty, the fixing of the indeterminate sentence became arbitrary, or whimsical, or capricious. In the absence of the specification, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence for the petitioner should be the lowest of the medium period of reclusion temporal, which is 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal. WINSTON F. GARCIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner, vs. MARIO I.MOLINA, Respondent. / G .R. No. 165223, January 11, 2016 / FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW / ADMINISTRATIVE LAW F: In his affidavit, Elino F. Caretero pointed to the respondent as the person who had handed to him a letter entitled Is It True allegedly written by respondent. A Memorandum was transmitted to the respondent requiring him to explain the circulation and publication of the letter, and to show cause why no administrative sanction should be imposed on him for doing so. In response, he denied the imputed act. Petitioner issued a Memorandum to formally charge the respondent with grave misconduct, and to preventively suspend him for 60 days. The respondent also instituted in the CA a special civil action for certiorari to challenge the legality of the Memorandum. CA nullified the charges against the respondent. I: Whether or not the CA committed a reversible error in annulling the petitioner's Memorandum charging respondent of grave misconduct and preventively suspending respondent for 60 days. H: The Court concurs with the CA. The record contains nothing to show that the respondent's act constituted misconduct. The passing of the letter to Caretero did not equate to any "transgression" or "unlawful behavior," for it was an innocuous act that did not breach any standard, norm or rule pertinent to his office. Neither could it be regarded as "circulation" of the letter inasmuch as the letter was handed only to a single individual who just happened to be curious about the paper the respondent was then holding in his hands. The handing of the letter occurred in ostensibly innocent circumstances on board the elevator in which other employees or passengers were on board. If the motive of the respondent was to pass the letter in order to publicize its contents, he should have made more copies of the letter. But that was not so, considering that Caretero categorically affirmed in his affidavit about asking the respondent what he had wanted to do with the letter, to wit: Do you want me to photocopy the document Sir?, but the respondent had simply replied: HINDI NA SA IYO NA LANG YAN. It is plain, then, that intent to cause the widespread dissemination of the letter in order to libel the petitioner could not be justifiably inferred. To be sure, the respondent's act could not be classified as pertaining to or having a direct connection to the performance of his official duties as a litigation lawyer of the GSIS. The connection was essential to a finding of misconduct, for without the connection the conduct would not be sanctioned as an administrative offense. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, for instance, the Court reversed the conclusion of the CA that the petitioner's offense related to his official functions by virtue of the offense having been made possible precisely by his official functions; that his position had enabled the petitioner to have free rein inside the building even after office hours; and that he had used his office to commit the misconduct for which he was being charged, with the Court pointing out that the alleged offense was in no way connected with the performance of his functions and duties as a public officer. SPOUSES ROBERTO and ADELAIDA PEN, Petitioners, vs.SPOUSES SANTOS and LINDA JULIAN, Respondents. /G.R. No. 160408, January 11, 2016 / FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: CIVIL LAW/ PACTUM COMMISSORIUM F: On April 9, 1986, the Julians obtained various loans from appellant Adelaida Pen. As security, the appellees executed a Real Estate Mortgage over their property.Foreclosure proceedings ensued.The Julians executed a two (2) page Deed of Sale. After the execution of the Deed of Sale, Pen paid the capital gains tax and the required real property tax. The Julians failed to repurchase the property. The petitioners who were the buyers of the mortgaged property of the respondents seek the reversal of the decision whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the adverse judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In their respective rulings, the CA and the RTC both declared the deed of sale respecting the respondents' property as void and inexistent, albeit premised upon different reasons. The CA pronounced the deed of sale as void but not because of the supposed lack of consideration as the RTC had indicated, but because of the deed of sale having been executed at the same time as the real estate mortgage, which rendered the sale as a prohibited pactum commissorium in light of the fact that the deed of sale was blank as to the consideration and the date, which details would be filled out upon the default by the respondents; that the promissory notes contained no stipulation on the payment of interest on the obligation, for which reason no monetary interest could be imposed for the use of money; and that compensatory interest should instead be imposed as a form of damages arising from Linda's failure to pay the outstanding obligation. I1: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling against the validity of the deed of sale. I2: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that no monetary interest was due for Linda's use of Adelaida's money. H1: Article 2088 of the Civil Code prohibits the creditor from appropriating the things given by way of pledge or mortgage, or from disposing of them; any stipulation to the contrary is null and void. The elements for pactum commissorium to exist are as follows, to wit: (a) that there should be a pledge or mortgage wherein property is pledged or mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal obligation; and (b) that there should be a stipulation for an automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing pledged or mortgaged in the event of non-payment of the principal obligation within the stipulated period. The first element was present considering that the property of the respondents was mortgaged by Linda in favor of Adelaida as security for the farmer's indebtedness. As to the second, the authorization for Adelaida to appropriate the property subject of the mortgage upon Linda's default was implied from Linda's having signed the blank deed of sale simultaneously with her signing of the real estate mortgage. The haste with which the transfer of property was made upon the default by Linda on her obligation, and the eventual transfer of the property in a manner not in the form of a valid dacion en pago ultimately confirmed the nature of the transaction as a pactum commissorium. It is notable that in reaching its conclusion that Linda's deed of sale had been executed simultaneously with the real estate mortgage, the CA first compared the unfilled deed of sale presented by Linda with the notarized deed of sale adduced by Adelaida. The CA justly deduced that the completion and execution of the deed of sale had been conditioned on the non-payment of the debt by Linda, and reasonably pronounced that such circumstances rendered the transaction pactum commissorium. The Court should not disturb or undo the CA's conclusion in the absence of the clear showing of abuse, arbitrariness or capriciousness on the part of the CA. In a sale, the contract is perfected at the moment when the seller obligates herself to deliver and to transfer ownership of a thing or right to the buyer for a price certain, as to which the latter agrees. The absence of the consideration from Linda's copy of the deed of sale was credible proof of the lack of an essential requisite for the sale. In other words, the meeting of the minds of the parties so vital in the perfection of the contract of sale did not transpire. And, even assuming that Linda's leaving the consideration blank implied the authority of Adelaida to fill in that essential detail in the deed of sale upon Linda's default on the loan, the conclusion of the CA that the deed of sale was a pactum commisorium still holds, for, as earlier mentioned, all the elements of pactum commisorium were present. H2: The CA correctly deleted the monetary interest from the judgment. Pursuant to Article 1956 of the Civil Code, no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing. In order for monetary interest to be imposed, therefore, two requirements must be present, specifically: (a) that there has been an express stipulation for the payment of interest; and (b) that the agreement for the payment of interest has been reduced in writing.Considering that the promissory notes contained no stipulation on the payment of monetary interest, monetary interest cannot be validly imposed. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. / G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015 / (En Banc) MAIN TOPIC: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW / RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED / BAIL F: Senator Juan Ponce Enrile has been charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the purported misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Enrile filed a Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital and his Motion to Fix Bail on the ground that he was not a flight risk and his age and physical condition must further be seriously considered, among others. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion since it is premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an anterior showing that the evidence of guilt is not strong. I: Whether Enrile’s poor health justifies his admission to bail. H: YES. In now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to: xxx uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine  authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in bothhis public and his private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail. The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize. It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial. On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice – that the courts can already consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. MA. CECILIA CLARISSA C. ADVINCULA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. LEONARDO C. ADVINCULA, Respondent./ A.C. No. 9226 June 14, 2016 /(En Banc) MAIN TOPIC: LEGAL & JUDICIAL ETHICS / DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER F: This administrative case stemmed from the complaint for disbarment against respondent by no less than his wife. She averred that respondent committed unlawful and immoral acts: he sired a child with a woman other than his lawful wife was a conduct way below the standards of morality required of every lawyer, among others. I: Whether the respondent’s act of siring a child outside a lawful marriage constitute an immoral conduct which is prohibited in the Code that would warrant a disbarment. H: NO. The good moral conduct or character must be possessed by lawyers at the time of their application for admission to the Bar, and must be maintained until retirement from the practice of law. In this regard, the Code of Professional Responsibility states: Rule 1.0 I - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. xxxx  CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. xxxx Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the Court, must not only be in fact of good moral character, but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the Court is required not only to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but also to conduct himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Immoral conduct has been described as conduct that is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. On different occasions, we have disbarred or suspended lawyers for immorality based on the surrounding circumstances of each case. In Bustamante-Alejandro v. Alejandro, the extreme penalty of disbarment was imposed on the respondent who had abandoned his wife and maintained an illicit affair with another woman. Likewise, disbarment was the penalty for a lawyer who carried on an extra-marital affair with a married woman prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage was null and void, while he himself was also married. In another case we have suspended for two years, a married attorney who had sired a child with a former client. In Samaniegov. Ferrer, suspension of six months from the practice of law was meted on the philandering lawyer. Yet, we cannot sanction Atty. Advincula with the same gravity. Although his siring the child with a woman other than his legitimate wife constituted immorality, he committed the immoral conduct when he was not yet a lawyer. The degree of his immoral conduct was not as grave than if he had committed the immorality when already a member of the Philippine Bar. Even so, he cannot escape administrative liability. Taking all the circumstances of this case into proper context, the Court considers suspension from the practice of law for three months to be condign and appropriate. SUGARSTEEL INDUSTRIAL, INC. and MR. BEN YAPJOCO, Petitioners,vs. VICTOR ALBINA, VINCENT UY and ALEX VELASQUEZ, Respondents. / G.R. No. 168749, June 6, 2016 /(First Division) MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW/CIVIL PROCEDURE / POST-JUDGMENT REMEDIES /APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS OR FINAL ORDERS OF THE NLRC F: Respondents Albina, Uy, and Velasquez charged the petitioners in the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) with having illegally dismissed them as kettleman, assistant kettleman and inspector, respectively. The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that the dismissal of the respondents was justified. NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA. Aggrieved, the respondents assailed the result through their petition for certiorari in the CA. CA granted the petition for certiorari. It ruled that the NLRC's affirmance of the LA'sdecision did not accord with the evidence on record and the applicable lawand jurisprudence. I: Whether CA gravely abused its discretion by disregarding the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter that the NLRC affirmed? H: NO. As a rule, the certiorari proceeding, being confined to the correction of acts rendered without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion that amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction, is limitedin scope and narrow in character. As such, the judicial inquiry in a specialcivil action for certiorari in labor litigation ascertains only whether or notthe NLRC acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction, or withgrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. We find that the CA did not exceed its jurisdiction by reviewing theevidence and deciding the case on the merits despite the judgment of theNLRC already being final. We have frequently expounded on thecompetence of the CA in a special civil action for certiorari to review thefactual findings of the NLRC. In Univac Development, Inc. v. Soriano, forinstance, we have pronounced that the CA is "given the power to pass uponthe evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues," withoutcontravening the doctrine of the immutability of judgments. The power ofthe CA to pass upon the evidence flows from its original jurisdiction over thespecial civil action for certiorari, by which it can grant the writ of certiorarito correct errors of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC should the latter'sfactual findings be not supported by the evidence on record; or when thegranting of the writ of certiorari is necessary to do substantial justice or toprevent a substantial wrong; or when the findings of the NLRC contradictthose of the LA; or when the granting of the writ of certiorari is necessary toarrive at a just decision in the case. The premise is that any decision by the NLRC that is not supported by substantial evidence is a decision definitelytainted with grave abuse of discretion. Should the CA annul the decision ofthe NLRC upon its finding of jurisdictional error on the part of the latter,then it has the power to fully lay down whatever the latter ought to havedecreed instead as the records warranted. The judicial function of the CA inthe exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction over the NLRC extends to thecareful review of the NLRC's evaluation of the evidence because the factual findings of the NLRC are accorded great respect and finality only when theyrest on substantial evidence. Accordingly, the CA is not to be restrained fromrevising or correcting such factual findings whenever warranted by thecircumstances simply because the NLRC is not infallible. Indeed, to deny tothe CA this power is to diminish its corrective jurisdiction through the writof certiorari. The policy of practicing comity towards the factual findings of thelabor tribunals does not preclude the CA from reviewing the findings, andfrom disregarding the findings upon a clear showing of the NLRC'scapricious, whimsical or arbitrary disregard of the evidence or ofcircumstances of considerable importance crucial or decisive of thecontroversy. In such eventuality, the writ of certiorari should issue, and theCA, being also a court of equity, then enjoys the leeway to make its ownindependent evaluation of the evidence of the parties as well as to ascertainwhether or not substantial evidence supported the NLRC's ruling. INTERPORT RESOURCES CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. SECURITIES SPECIALIST, INC., and R.C. LEE SECURITIES INC., Respondents./ G.R. No. 154069 / June 6, 2016 /First Division MAIN TOPIC: CIVIL LAW/ OBLIGATIONS /NOVATION F: Oceanic Oil and Mineral Resources, Inc. entered into a subscription agreement with R.C. Lee, covering 5,000,000 of its shares. Thereupon, R.C. Lee paid 25% of the subscription, leaving 75% unpaid. Consequently, Oceanic issued the subscription agreements to R.C. Lee. Oceanic merged with Interport, with the latter as the surviving corporation. In 1979, respondent SSI, a dealer in securities, received in the ordinary course of business the Oceanic subscription agreements.Then R.C. Lee paid its unpaid subscriptions and was accordingly issued stock certificates corresponding thereto despite failure of INterport to show the list of subscription agreements under his name. SSI tendered payment prior to the deadline when Interport issued a call for the full payment of the subscription receivables but Interport rejected it.SSI then wrote R.C. Lee demanding delivery of the 5,000,000 Interport shares on the basis of the purported assignment of the subscription agreements covering the shares made in 1979 but the latter failed to return the subject shares inasmuch it had already sold the same to other parties. SSI also made demands upon Interport and R.C. Lee for the cancellation of the shares issued to R.C. Lee and for the delivery of the shares to SSI. After its demands were not met, SSI commenced an action before the SEC to compel respondents to deliver the 5,000,000 shares and to pay damages. It alleged fraud and collusion between Interport and R.C. Lee in rejecting the tendered payment and the transfer of the shares covered by the subscription agreements.SEC ruled in favor of SSI but the same was revered by the SEC En Banc. I: Whether the assignment of the subscription agreements to SSI effectively extinguished the obligation of R.C. Lee to Oceanic. H: YES. The SEC correctly categorized the assignment of the subscription agreements as a form of novation by substitution of a new debtor and which required the consent of or notice of the creditor. We agree. Under the Civil Code, obligations may be modified by: (1) changing their object or principal conditions; or (2) substituting the person of the debtor; or (3) subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. Novation, which consists in substituting a new debtor In the place of the original one, may be made even without the knowledge or against the will of the latter, but not without the consent of the creditor. In this case, the change of debtor took place when R.C. Lee assigned the Oceanic shares under the Subscription Agreement Nos. 1805, and 1808 to 1811 to SSI so that the latter became obliged to settle the 75% unpaid balance on the subscription. The SEC likewise did not err in appreciating the fact that Interport was duly notified of the assignment when SSI tendered its payment for the 75% unpaid balance, and that it could not anymore refuse to recognize the transfer of the subscription that SSI sufficiently established by documentary evidence. Yet, Interport claims that SSI waived its rights over the 5,000,000 shares due to its failure to register the assignment in the books of Interport; and that SSI was stopped from claiming the assigned shares, inasmuch as the assignor, R.C. Lee, had already transferred the same to third parties. Interport’s claim cannot be upheld. It should be stress that novation extinguished an obligation between two parties. Clearly the effect of the assignment of the subscription agreements to SSI was to extinguish the obligation of R.C. Lee to Oceanic, now Interport, to settle the unpaid balance on the subscription. As a result of the assignment, Interport was no longer obliged to accept any payment from R.C. Lee because the latter had ceased to be privy to Subscription Agreements Nos. 1805, 1808 to 1811 for having been extinguished insofar as it was concerned. On the other hand, Interport was legally bound to accept SSI’s tender of payment for the 75% balance on the subscription price because SSI had become the new debtor under Subscription Agreements Nos. 1805, 1808 to 1811. As such, the issuance of the stock certificates in the name of R.C. Lee had no legal basis in the absence of a contractual agreement. NENITA D. SANCHEZ, Petitioner,vs. ATTY. ROMEO G. AGUILOS, Respondent. A.C. No. 10543, March 16, 2016 /(First Division) MAIN TOPIC: LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS / Duties and responsibilities of a lawyer / attorney’s fees F: Complainant has charged respondent with misconduct for the latter’s refusal to return the amount of P70,000 she had paid for his professional services despite not having performed the contemplated professional services. IBP recommended that respondent to return to the complainant the amount of P30,000 which he received because it is excessive. I: Whether respondent should return the entire amount received from the client despite failure to accomplish tasks which he is naturally expected to perform during his professional engagement? H: YES. We can easily agree that every attorney is entitled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance andrequest of his client. As long as the attorney is in good faith and honestlytrying to represent and serve the interests of the client, he should have areasonable compensation for such services. The attorney’s fees shall be those stipulated in the retainer’sagreement between the client and the attorney, which constitutes the lawbetween the parties for as long as it is not contrary to law, good morals, goodcustoms, public policy or public order. The underlying theory is that theretainer’s agreement between them gives to the client the reasonable noticeof the arrangement on the fees. Once the attorney has performed the taskassigned to him in a valid agreement, his compensation is determined on thebasis of what he and the client agreed. In the absence of the writtenagreement, the lawyer’s compensation shall be based on quantum meruit, which means “as much as he deserved.” The determination of attorney’sfees on the basis of quantum meruit is also authorized “when the counsel, forjustifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its conclusion.” Moreover, quantum meruit becomes the basis of recovery of compensationby the attorney where the circumstances of the engagement indicate that it will be contrary to the parties’ expectation to deprive the attorney of all compensation. Nevertheless, the court shall determine in every case what isreasonable compensation based on the obtaining circumstances, provided that the attorney does not receive more than what is reasonable, in keeping with Section 24 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The court’s supervision of the lawyer’s compensation for legal services rendered is not only for the purpose of ensuring the reasonableness of the amount of attorney’s fees charged, but also for the purpose of preserving thedignity and integrity of the legal profession. The respondent should not have accepted the engagement because as it was later revealed, it was way above his ability and competence to handle the case for annulment of marriage. As a consequence, he had no basis toaccept any amount as attorney’s fees from the complainant. He did not evenbegin to perform the contemplated task he undertook for the complainant because it was improbable that the agreement with her was to bring the action for legal separation. His having supposedly prepared the petition forlegal separation instead of the petition for annulment of marriage was either his way of covering up for his incompetence, or his means of charging her more. Either way did not entitle him to retain the amount he had already received. THE CHRISTIAN SPIRITISTS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,PICO LOCAL CENTER (CSP-PLC),Complainant, vs. / ATTY. DANIEL D. MANGALLAY, Respondent./ A.C. No. 10483 March 16, 2016 / (First Division) MAIN TOPIC: LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS / Duties and responsibilities of a lawyer F: Respondent Attorney, as the plaintiff, successfully defeated the local congregation of the CSP-PLC, whose church building and other structures were the objects of the action. After the defendants filed a notice of appeal, parties agreed to settle among themselves, wherein the defendants will withdraw the notice of appeal and voluntarily vacate and remove the structures in consideration of respondent’s financial assistance. But despite receiving the financial assistance, the defendants reneged on their end of the agreement. At the respondent’s instance, the trial court issued the writ of execution and the writ of demolition. The demolition impelled CSP-PLC to bring disbarment complaint against respondent on his alleged gross misconduct and deceit in causing the demolition of the structures without the demolition order from the court. They alleged that respondent took advantage of his legal knowledge to cause the premature demolition of the structures sans the demolition order, among others. I: Whether respondent erred when it appropriated the dismantled materials as compensation for the expenses incurred in the demolition. H: NO. Specifically, the demolition was authorized by the order issued by the MTC on December 19, 2013.18 in the execution of the final and executory decision in Civil Case No. R-1256, the sheriffs dutifully discharged their functions. The presence of the respondent during the execution proceedings was by no means irregular or improper, for he was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. R-1256. The complainant was then represented by Pante and some other members of the congregation, who did not manifest any resistance or objection to any irregularity in the conduct of the execution. After all, elements of the Philippine National Police were also present to ensure the peaceful implementation of the writ of execution. Neither do we find anything wrong, least of all criminal, in the act of the respondent of taking away the materials of the demolished structures. The parties put an end to their dispute by the defendants, including the complainant and Pante, opting to withdraw their notice of appeal and undertaking to voluntarily vacate and to peacefully turn over the premises to the respondent by August 31, 2013 in exchange for the latter’s financial assistance of the P300,000.00. The respondent paid the amount in the MTC on March 20, 2013, and the amount was later on received by Maria Omiles, Feliciano Omiles, Jr., and Noralyn T. Abad as the representatives of the CSP-PLC on the same day. But the latter reneged on their part of theagreement without returning the P300,000.00 to the respondent, who wasleft to exhaust his legal remedies to enforce the judgment against them. It isnotable that the judgment expressly directed him "to exercise his optionpursuant to the provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil Code of thePhilippines within thirty (30) days from the finality of this judgment insofaras the improvements introduced by the defendants on the subject property." Article 448 of the Civil Code granted to him as the owner of the premises, among others, "the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing orplanting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and548." His act of taking the materials of the demolished structures wasundoubtedly the exercise of the right of appropriating them in light of thefact that the P300,000.00 earlier delivered as financial assistance was mostlikely meant to indemnify the supposed builders in good faith. TUNG HUI CHUNG and TONG HONG CHUNG, Petitioners, vs. SHIH CHIU HUAN a.k.a. JAMES SHIH, Respondent./ G.R. No. 170679 March 9, 2016 / First Division MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW /Post-judgment remedies /Annulment of judgments or final orders F: Petitioners, both Australian citizens, filed in the RTC a complaint to recover from the respondent a sum of money and damages which involved a contract to sell. In said contract, respondent, as the vendor, undertook to deliver to the petitioners, as the vendees, shares of stock worth P10M in a publicly listed corporation. After respondent failed to deliver the shares, they entered into a compromise agreement which was approved by the RTC. In said agreement, respondent acknowledged his obligation to the petitioners in the amount of $250,000 which he promised to pay in US currency by installment. However, after the payment of the initial amount of $20,000, respondent failed to pay the second installment despite demand. Petitioners then sought the execution of the judgement upon the compromise agreement through their motion for execution. RTC then granted said motion and issued the writ of execution. Respondent then filed a motion to quash writ of execution but was denied by the RTC. Respondent then went to the CA on certiorari alleging that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of execution, the order denying the motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the compromise agreement was patently unjust, one-sided, unfair, fraudulent and unconscionable; hence the RTC should not have issued the writ of execution. CA annulled the judicially-approved compromise agreement. Hence, this petition. I: Whether the CA was correct in nullifying and setting aside the judgment based on the compromise agreement. H: NO. To start with, a compromise agreement is a contract whereby theparties make reciprocal concessions to avoid litigation or to put an end to one already commenced. It is an accepted, nay, even highly encouragedpractice in the courts of law of this jurisdiction.It attains the authority andeffect of res judicata upon the parties upon its execution, and becomes immediately final and executory, unless rescinded by grounds which vitiate consent.Once stamped with judicial imprimatur, it ceases to be a merecontract between the parties, and becomes a judgment of the court, to beenforced through writ of execution. The CA did not recognize that what it was asked to annul and setaside in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 88804 was no longer the compromise agreementof the parties but already the judgment based on the compromise agreement.The failure to recognize led the CA into granting the unprecedented relief of annulling the compromise agreement on the ground of fraud and lack of consent. In so doing, the CA acted without jurisdiction. First of all, theaction before the CA was a special civil action for certiorari that had beenbrought on March 7, 2005, which was way beyond the period of 60 daysfrom the rendition of the judgment based on the compromise agreement onOctober 20, 2003. The long delay grossly violated Section 4, Rule 65 of theRules of Court, which allowed the petition for certiorari to be filed not laterthan 60 days from notice of the judgment being assailed. Moreover, thegrounds relied upon by the respondent in his petition for certiorari in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 88804 – that the RTC had committed grave abuse of discretiontantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction for issuing the writ of executionthat was patently unjust, one-side, unfair, fraudulent and unconscionablecompromise agreement; and for issuing the writ of execution of thecompromise agreement that lacked consideration – were not proper groundsfor assailing the judgment based on the compromise agreement. Evenassuming that such grounds for the petition for certiorari were true, whichthey were not, the judgment based on the compromise agreement could notbe assailed on that basis. As the foregoing excerpt of the assailed decisionbears out, the annulment of the judgment based on the compromiseagreement was premised on fraud and lack of consent on the part of therespondent as a contracting party, which were far from the jurisdictionalerror on which the petition for certiorari should have rested. ALUMAMAY JAMIAS, et al., Petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., Respondent./ G.R. No. 159350, March 9, 2016 /First Division MAIN TOPIC: LABOR LAW /Termination of employment>Employer-employee relationship F: Respondent Innodata Philippines, Inc, a domestic corporation engaged in the business of data processing and conversion for foreign clients hired petitioners on various dates and under a one-year term. After their respective contracts expired, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal claiming that Innodata had made it appear that they had been hired as project employees in order to prevent them from becoming regular employees. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the compliant on the ground that petitioners had knowingly signed their respective contracts in which the durations of their engagements were clearly stated and that their fixed term contracts, being exemptions to Article 280 of the Labor Code, precluded their claiming regularization. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. CA upheld the NLRC. I: Whether a fixed period in a contract of employment in itself signify intention to circumvent Article 280 of the Labor Code. H: NO. Article 280 of the Labor Code contemplates three kinds of employees, namely: (a)regular employees; (b) project employees; and (c) casuals who are neitherregular nor project employees. The nature of employment of a worker isdetermined by the factors provided in Article 280 of the Labor Code,regardless of any stipulation in the contract to the contrary. Thus, in BrentSchool, Inc. v. Zamora, we explained that the clause referring to written contracts should be construed to refer to agreements entered into for the purpose of circumventing the security of tenure. Obviously, Article 280 doesnot preclude an agreement providing for a fixed term of employmentknowingly and voluntarily executed by the parties. A fixed term agreement, to be valid, must strictly conform with therequirements and conditions provided in Article 280 of the Labor Code. The test to determine whether a particular employee is engaged as a project orregular employee is whether or not the employee is assigned to carry out aspecific project or undertaking, the duration or scope of which was specifiedat the time of his engagement. There must be a determination of, or a clearagreement on, the completion or termination of the project at the time theemployee is engaged. Otherwise put, the fixed period of employment mustbe knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, without any force,duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee andabsent any other circumstances vitiating his consent, or it must satisfactorilyappear that the employer and employee dealt with each other on more or lessequal terms with no moral dominance whatsoever being exercised by theformer on the latterengagement as well as their respective project assignments (i.e., Jamias being assigned to the CD-ROM project; Cruz and Matuguinas to the TSET project). There is no indication that the petitioners were made to sign thecontracts against their will. Neither did they refute Innodata’s assertion thatit did not employ force, intimidate or fraudulently manipulate the petitionersinto signing their contracts, and that the terms thereof had been explainedand made known to them. Hence, the petitioners knowingly agreed to theterms of and voluntarily signed their respective contracts. That Innodata drafted the contracts with its business interest as theoverriding consideration did not necessarily warrant the holding that thecontracts were prejudicial against the petitioners.47 The fixing by Innodata ofthe period specified in the contracts of employment did not also indicate itsill-motive to circumvent the petitioners’ security of tenure. Indeed, thepetitioners could not presume that the fixing of the one-year term wasintended to evade or avoid the protection to tenure under Article 280 of theLabor Code in the absence of other evidence establishing such intention.This presumption must ordinarily be based on some aspect of the agreementother than the mere specification of the fixed term of the employmentagreement, or on evidence aliundeof the intent to evade. SIMPLECIO A. MARSADA, Complainant, vs. ROMEO M. MONTEROSO, Sheriff, IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, Cabadbaran, Agusandel Norte, Respondent. A.M. No. P-10-2793 March 8, 2016 / (En Banc) MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW /Execution of Judgments F: A complaint for misconduct and dishonesty was filed by petitioner against respondent in relation to the latter’s conduct in the service of the writ of execution in an action for the collection of a monetary obligation. A decision was held in favor of Marsada, the judge issued a writ of execution only “as far as the amount of P35,000 is concerned.” When the writ was implemented, Monteroso delivered only P25,000 to Marsada, but he requested the latter to sign a prepared typewritten receipt indicating that he received the said amount as full and entire satisfaction of the defendant’s obligation. Marsada later asked for the balance but Monteroso informed him that the defendant no longer had any property or money with which to fully satisfy the judgment. Thus, Marsada went to see the judge to seek another writ of execution showing the receipt he had signed at Monteroso’s request. At this, the judge blamed Marsada for signing the receipt. Hence, Marsada brought his administrative complaint against respondent. I: Whether the sheriff erred when it unilaterally discontinued the effort to recover the balance of the subject of the writ of execution. H: YES. The writ of execution should mirror the judgment that it enforces. The form and contents of the writ of execution are specified in Section 8, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Under this provision of the Rules of Court, Monteroso could enforce the writ of execution only “according to its terms, in the manner herein after provided.” However, he was remiss in his duty to enforce the writ by collecting only P25,000.00. Even assuming that he had only been successful in collecting P25,000.00 from the defendant, he still exceeded his authority in requesting Marsada to sign the typewritten acknowledgment receipt reflecting the P25,000.00 as the full and complete satisfaction of the writ of execution. He had neither basis nor reason to have Marsada sign the receipt in that tenor because the text and tenor of the writ of execution expressly required the recovery of P35,000.00 from the losing party. Also, Marsada claimed that Monteroso had represented to him that the defendant could no longer pay the balance. The representation, even if true, did not justify Monteroso’s unilateral decision to discontinue the effort to recover the balance. It clearly devolved upon him as the sheriff to levy upon the execution debtor’s properties, if any, as well as to garnish the debts due to the latter and the credits belonging to the latter. The duty to exhaust all efforts to recover the balance was laid down in Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Misconduct 8 is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his position or office to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others. Section 2, Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel states: "Court personnel shall not solicit or accept any gift, favor or benefit based on any or explicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall influence their official actions." Marsada did not establish that the act complained of was tainted with corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or disregard of established rules. Consequently, Monteroso’s lability only amounted to simple misconduct 9. SPOUSES CESAR AND THELMA SUSTENTO, Complainants, vs. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN, Respondent./A.M. No. RTJ-11-2275, March 8, 2016 / (En Banc) MAIN TOPIC: LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS / Adjudicative Responsibilities F: On January 26, 2009, complainants filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the RTC. Almost 6 months had elapsed and only after complainants filed for Early Resolution before the Respondent dismissed the Petition. On December 1, 2009, complainants then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On December 8, 2009, complainants filed a Reply on the Comments/Answer submitted by their opposing 8 Dela Cruz v. Malunao 9Section 46, D, of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative cases in the Civil Service. party. On December 10, 2009, respondent judge issued an Order deeming the MR submitted for resolution. Complainant then charged the respondent with undue delay in the resolution of the petition for certiorari and undue delay in the resolution of their MR beyond the 90-day period in violation of AC No. 38-98 and Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution. However, up to the date of the instant administrative matter was filed; respondent judge has still yet to resolve the MR. I: Whether the respondent is guilty of the less serious offense of undue delay in rendering an order by not resolving the complainants’ motion for reconsideration within the prescribed period. H: YES. What is obvious is that the respondent judge took too much time indisposing of the petition for certiorari and the ensuing motion forreconsideration. The delays were plainly violative of the injunction to him toact expeditiously on the matters 90 days from their submission. The respondent judge sought to justify his delay by citing thevoluminous caseload he had as the presiding judge. The justification doesnot persuade. Although we are not insensitive to the heavy caseloads of thetrial judges, we have allowed reasonable extensions of the periods for thetrial judges to resolve their cases. If the heavy caseload of any judge shouldpreclude his disposition of cases within the reglementary period, he shouldnotify the Court, through the Court Administrator, of the reasons or causesfor the delay, and request in writing a reasonable extension of the time todispose of the affected cases. No judge should arrogate unto himself theprerogative to extend the period for deciding cases beyond the mandatory90-day period. The respondent judge insists that that he did not need to act on theresulting motion for reconsideration because the petition for certiorari,being a prohibited pleading, was a contravention of the rules of procedure.Such insistence did not justify his inability to act promptly. The fact that thepetition for certiorari was a prohibited pleading furnished him a betterreason to act promptly on the petition for certiorari and the motion forreconsideration. We are also not swayed by his other excuses of not having then a legalresearcher assigned to him; and of his branch clerk of court being recentlyappointed. The court's business did not stop because of such events; hence,he could not use such excuses to delay his actions on the pending mattersbefore his court. Verily, the responsibility for the prompt and expeditiousaction on the case, which belonged first and foremost to him as the presidingjudge, could not be shifted to others like the legal researcher or the recently appointed branch clerk of court. The respondent cannot be spared from the consequences of his undue delays in the case of the complainants. He did not show that he ever requested the Court for the additional time within which to dispose of the matters therein. It then becomes inescapable for him to face the consequences of his inexplicable inaction. He was guilty of gross inefficiency and neglect of duty. Failure to render a decision within the 90-day period from the submission of a case for decision is detrimental to the honor and integrity of the judicial office, and constitutes a derogation of the speedy administration of justice ANGELITO RAMISCAL and MERCEDES ORZAME, Complainants, vs. ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO, Respondent./ A.C. No. 10945 (Formerly CBD 09-2507), February 23, 2016 /(En Banc) MAIN TOPIC: LEGAL ETHICS / Duties and responsibilities of a lawyer F: Complainants Spouses Angelito and Mercedes Ramiscal engaged the legal services of respondent Atty. Edgar Orro to handle a case in which they were the defendants filed in the Regional Trial Court.RTC decided in their favor. As expected, the plaintiff filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. Later on, respondent did not inform them that the CA reversed the decision of the RTC which they only learned from their neighbors. After much effort, they finally reached the respondent. He asked for P7,000 as his fee in filing the motion for reconsideration in their behalf and then they paid to him the said amount. To their dismay, they later discovered that he did not file the motion for reconsideration; hence, the decision attained finality, eventually resulting in the loss of their property.Consequently, the Ramiscals brought this administrative complaint against the respondent. The IBPsuspended respondent from the practice of law for two years. I: Whether respondent did not competently and diligently discharge his duties as a lawyer. H: YES. Every lawyer, upon becoming a member of the Philippine Bar, solemnly takes the Lawyer’s Oath, by which he vows, among others, that: "I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients." If he should violate the vow, he contravenes the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly its Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18, viz.: CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.x xxx Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information. It is beyond debate, therefore, that the relationship of the lawyer and the client becomes imbued with trust and confidence from the moment that the lawyer-client relationship commences, with the lawyer being bound to serve his clients with full competence, and to attend to their cause with utmost diligence, care and devotion. To accord with this highly fiduciary relationship, the client expects the lawyer to be always mindful of the former’s cause and to be diligent in handling the former’s legal affairs. As an essential part of their highly fiduciary relationship, the client is entitled to the periodic and full updates from the lawyer on the developments of the case. The lawyer who neglects to perform his obligations violates Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a member of the Law Profession in the Philippines, the respondent had the foregoing professional and ethical burdens. But he obviously failed to discharge his burdens to the best of his knowledge and discretion and with all good fidelity to his clients. By voluntarily taking up their cause, he gave his unqualified commitment to advance and defend their interest therein. Even if he could not thereby guarantee to them the favorable outcome of the litigation, he reneged on his commitment nonetheless because he did not file the motion for reconsideration in their behalf despite receiving from them the P7,000.00 he had requested for that purpose. He further neglected to regularly update them on the status of the case, particularly on the adverse result, thereby leaving them in the dark on the proceedings that were gradually turning against their interest. Updating the clients could have prevented their substantial prejudice by enabling them to engage another competent lawyer to handle their case. As it happened, his neglect in that respect lost for them whatever legal remedies were then available. His various omissions manifested his utter lack of professionalism towards them. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PABLITO ANDAYA y REANO, Accused-Appellant./ G.R. No. 183700, October 13, 2014/ First Division MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW / EVIDENCE / SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE F: An asset who was conducting surveillance of Pablito Andaya reported to the police station that he had arranged to buy shabu from Andaya. The police conducted a buy bust operation, where two pieces of marked P100.00 bills were recorded in the police blotter. The police gave the marked bills to the asset. Upon reaching the designated place, the team members alighted from their vehicles and occupied different positions where they could see and observe the asset. The asset knocked on the door of Andaya’s house. Andaya came out and talked to the asset briefly. The asset gave Andaya the marked money, while the asset received something from Andaya. The pre- arranged signal signifying consummation of the transaction was given. The team members approached Andaya and the asset, introduced themselves as police officers and arrested Andaya, who was then brought to the police station. The merchandise handed by accused to the asset was sent to the crime laboratory, which was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). Andaya was charged for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. During trial, the confidential informant was not presented as witness. I: Whether the non-presentation of a confidential informant was adverse to the Prosecution, indicating that guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt H: Yes. The non-presentation of the confidential informant as a witness does not ordinarily weaken the State's case against the accused. However, if the arresting lawmen arrested the accused based on the pre-arranged signal from the confidential informant who acted as the poseur buyer, his non-presentation must be credibly explained and the transaction established by other ways in order to satisfy the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt because the arresting lawmen did not themselves participate in the buy-bust transaction with the accused. To secure the conviction of the accused who is charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs as defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002), the State must establish the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur buyer; and (b) that the dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. Here, the confidential informant was not a police officer. He was designated to be the poseur buyer himself. It is notable that the members of the buy-bust team arrested Andaya on the basis of the pre-arranged signal from the poseur buyer. The pre- arranged signal signified to the members of the buy-bust team that the transaction had been consummated between the poseur buyer and Andaya. However, the State did not present the confidential informant/poseur buyer during the trial to describe how exactly the transaction between him and Andaya had taken place. There would have been no issue against that, except that none of the members of the buy-bust team had directly witnessed the transaction, if any, between Andaya and the poseur buyer due to their being positioned at a distance from the poseur buyer and Andaya at the moment of the supposed transaction. NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent./G.R. No. 166441, October 8, 2014/ First Division MAIN TOPIC: CRIMINAL LAW / ELEMENTS OF ATTEMPTED RAPE, ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS F: Bartolome was charged with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness involving different victims. AAA was awakened when she felt that somebody was on top of her. Norberto was mashing her breast and touching her private part. AAA realized that she was divested of her clothing and that she was totally naked. Norberto ordered her not to scream or she’ll be killed. AAA tried to push Norberto away and pleaded to have pity on her but her pleas fell on deaf ears. She fought back and kicked Norberto twice. Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. Norberto offered her money and told her not to tell the incident to her mother otherwise, she will be killed. AAA went out of the tent to seek help from Jess (the house boy) but she failed to wake him up. Thirty minutes later, when AAA returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of BBB. AAA saw her companion awake but her hands were shaking. When she finally entered the tent, Norberto left and went outside. I: 1. Whether the acts of the accused constituted attempted rape 2. Whether the acts of the accused constituted acts of lasciviousness H1: No. The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of acts of lasciviousness does not. Only the direct overt acts of the offender establish the intent to lie with the female. However, merely climbing on top of a naked female does not constitute attempted rape without proof of his erectile penis being in a position to penetrate the female's vagina. In attempted rape, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of execution of having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt acts without the offender performing all the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with the female. H2: Yes. It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the offender’s intent to lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of lasciviousness. Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female. Without such showing, only the felony of acts of lasciviousness is committed. Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony of acts of lasciviousness is consummated when the following essential elements concur, namely: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person of either sex; and (b) the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii) when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under 12 years of age. In that regard, lewd is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form of immorality that has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner. The information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her panty and underwear and la[id] on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast." With such allegation of the information being competently and satisfactorily proven beyond a reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His embracing her and touching her vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her. FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent./ G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014/ First Division MAIN TOPIC: CRIMINAL LAW / SPECIAL LAWS / R.A. 7610 F: Rosaldes, a public school teacher, was charged with violation of R.A. 7610. It was alleged that her student Michael Ryan Gonzales was hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Roused from sleep, Rosaldes asked Michael to apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat, Rosaldes went to Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan’s body hit a desk. As a result, he lost consciousness. Rosaldes proceeded to pick Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. Rosaldes contended that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries suffered by Michael Ryan to maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase, demean or degrade his dignity. She characterizes her maltreatment as an act of discipline that she as a school teacher could reasonably do towards the development of the child. She insisted that her act further came under the doctrine of in loco parentis. I: Whether the accused committed a violation of R.A. 7610 H: Yes. Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands. She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority. FE U. QUIJANO, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. DARYLL A. AMANTE, Respondent./ G.R. No. 164277, October 8, 2014 / FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW / SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS / FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER SUB TOPIC: CIVIL LAW /CO-OWNERSHIP F: Siblings Fe, Eliseo, Jose and Gloria, inherited from their father a parcel of land. Eliseo, sickly and in need of money, sold his share in the property to the Atty. Amante, with their deed of absolute sale stating that the sale was with the approval of Eliseo’s siblings. Fe, Eliseo, Jose and Gloria executed a deed of extrajudicial partition to divide their father’s estate (consisting of the aforementioned parcel of land) among themselves. The partition resulted in the portions earlier sold by Eliseo to the respondent being adjudicated to the Fe instead of to Eliseo. Due to the Fe needing her portion that was then occupied by Atty. Amante, she demanded that the latter vacate it. Despite several demands, Atty. Amante refused to vacate, prompting her to file against him a complaint for ejectment and damages. Fe alleged that she was the registered owner of the parcel of land a portion of which was being occupied by Atty. Amante, who had constructed a residential building thereon by the mere tolerance of Eliseo when the property she and her siblings had inherited from their father had not yet been subdivided, and was thus still co-owned by them; and that Atty. Amante’s occupation had become illegal following his refusal to vacate despite repeated demands. I: Whether an action for unlawful detainer by a co-owner will ensue against a buyer of an undivided portion of a property sold by another co-owner H: No. Where the plaintiff does not prove her alleged tolerance of the defendant's occupation, the possession is deemed illegal from the beginning. Hence, the action for unlawful detainer is an improper remedy. But the action cannot be considered as one for forcible entry without any allegation in the complaint that the entry of the defendant was by means of force, intimidation, threats, strategy or stealth. [Also], even if an heir’s right in the estate of the decedent has not yet been fully settled and partitioned and is thus merely inchoate, Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the heir the right to exercise acts of ownership. Accordingly, when Eliseo sold the disputed property to the respondent, he was only a co-owner along with his siblings, and could sell only that portion that would be allotted to him upon the termination of the co- ownership. The sale did not vest ownership of the disputed property in the respondent but transferred only the seller’s pro indiviso share to him, consequently making him, as the buyer, a co-owner of the disputed property until it is partitioned. As Eliseo’s successor-in-interest or assignee, the respondent was vested with the right under Article 497 of the Civil Code to take part in the partition of the estate and to challenge the partition undertaken without his consent. BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. MA. ANTONIA R. ARMOVIT, Respondent./ G.R. No. 163654, October 8, 2014/FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW /EVIDENCE /PAROL EVIDENCE F: Armovit treated her friends and used her BPI Express Credit Card for payment. The waiter returned to inform her that her credit card had been cancelled upon verification with BPI Express Credit and would not be honored. Relying on her credit card because she did not then carry enough cash that day, her guests were made to share the bill to her extreme embarrassment. Armovit called BPI Express Credit to verify the status of her credit card. She learned that her credit card had been summarily cancelled for failure to pay her outstanding obligations. She vehemently denied having defaulted on her payments. Thus, she demanded compensation for the shame, embarrassment and humiliation she had suffered in the amount of P2,000,000.00. In its reply letter, BPI Express Credit claimed that it had sent Armovit a telegraphic message requesting her to pay her arrears for three consecutive months, and that she did not comply with the request, causing it to temporarily suspend her credit card. It further claimed that she had been notified of the suspension and cautioned to refrain from using the credit card to avoid inconvenience or embarrassment; and that while the obligation was settled, she failed to submit the required application form in order to reactivate her credit card privileges. Later, Armovit received a telegraphic message from BPI Express Credit apologizing for its error of inadvertently including her credit card in the Caution List sent to its affiliated merchants. As a result, Armovit sued BPI Express Credit for damages, insisting that she had been a credit card holder in good standing, and that she did not have any unpaid bills at the time of the incident. I: Whether BPI Express Card Corporation may be allowed to impose as additional requirement, apart from those contained in the Terms and Conditions Governing the Issuance and Use of the BPI Express Credit Card, the submission of an application form to enable its cardholder to reactivate his/her credit card H: No. The Terms and Conditions Governing the Issuance and Use of the BPI Express Credit Card printed on the credit card application form spelled out the terms and conditions of the contract between BPI Express Credit and its card holders, including Armovit. Such terms and conditions determined the rights and obligations of the parties. Yet, a review of such terms and conditions did not reveal that Armovit needed to submit her new application as the antecedent condition for her credit card to be taken out of the list of suspended cards. Considering that the terms and conditions nowhere stated that the card holder must submit the new application form in order to reactivate her credit card, to allow BPI Express Credit to impose the duty to submit the new application form in order to enable Armovit to reactivate the credit card would contravene the Parol Evidence Rule. ALLEGED LOSS OF VARIOUS BOXES OF COPY PAPER DURING THEIR TRANSFER FROM THE PROPERTY DIVISION, OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES (OAS), TO THE VARIOUS ROOMS OF THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADEMY. A.M. No. 2014-025-Ret. RELEASE OF COMPULSORY RETIREMENT BENEFITS UNDER R.A. No. 8291 OF MR. ISIDRO P. AUSTRIA, FORMER SUPPLY OFFICER II, PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADEMY, SUPREME COURT / A.M. No. 2008-23-SC, September 30, 2014/ En Banc MAIN TOPIC: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW / ADMINISTRATIVE LAW / GRAVE MISCONDUCT, CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE, RETIREMENT OR RESIGNATION TO ADMNIISTRATIVE LIABILITY F: Forty reams of long copy paper and 40 reams of short copy paper, valued at P27,000.00 were lost and it was reported that: (a) Austria, Supply Officer II, had admitted having used the SC’s Lite Ace van to unload 50 reams of short bond paper contained in five boxes in Intramuros to pay his outstanding personal debt of P5,000.00; but had denied any involvement in the loss of the other boxes of copy paper; (b) Ordoñez, Store Keeper IV, had claimed that he supervised and made the transfer of 300 reams in 30 boxes of long bond paper to the OCA stock room, but the verification had shown only 270 reams in 27 boxes; he had admitted riding the PHILJA van to deliver the reams of copy paper to the Repro Room without the proper trip ticket, leaving the boxes of copy paper there without padlocking the stockrooms; (c) driver Glor of the Administrative Division had admitted driving the Lite Ace van to Intramuros with Austria on board, and had acknowledged facilitating the unlawful transfer of 50 reams of copy paper in 50 boxes; but had denied knowledge of the remaining missing boxes of copy paper; and (d) Carmona, Judicial Staff Employee II had driven the PHILJA van upon the request of Ordoñez without the corresponding trip ticket, and had assisted Ordoñez only in the transfer of the boxes from the OCA stockroom to the Repro Room. I: 1. Whether respondents should be held administratively liable for grave misconduct, and/or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service 2. Whether retirement or resignation releases a government employee from administrative liability H1: Yes. There is grave misconduct when the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule are present. Dishonesty is defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straight forwardness. Both gross misconduct and dishonesty are grave offenses that are punishable by dismissal even for the first offense. X X X The Civil Service laws and rules contain no description of what specific acts constitute the grave offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. However, jurisprudence has been instructive, with the Court having considered the following acts or omissions as constitutive of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, namely: (a) misappropriation of public funds; (b) abandonment of office; (c) failure to report back to work without prior notice; (d) failure to keep public records and property safe; (e) making false entries in public documents; and (f) falsification of court orders. H2. No. The fact that Austria meanwhile reached the compulsory retirement age did not render A.M. No. 2008-23-SC moot, let alone release him from whatever liability he had incurred while in the active service. The jurisdiction acquired by the Court continues despite his compulsory retirement. Indeed, the Court retains its jurisdiction to declare a respondent either innocent or guilty of the charge even in the extreme case of the respondent’s supervening death. If innocent, the respondent receives the vindication of his name and integrity by declaring his service in the Government to be well and faithful; if guilty in anyway, he deserves the sanction just and appropriate for his administrative sin. Ordoñez’s resignation would not extricate him from the consequences of his gross neglect of duty, because the Court has not allowed resignation to be an escape or an easy way out to evade administrative liability or administrative sanction. Ordoñez remains administratively liable, but his resignation prevents his dismissal from the service. A fine can be imposed, instead, and its amount is subject to the sound discretion of the Court. The recommended sanction for Cardona is warning. Such sanction is sufficient considering that Ordoñez merely solicited the help of Cardona in transferring the reams of copy paper from the OCA stockroom to the Repro Room in the SC New Building. Although Carmona admittedly used a trip ticket not authorized for the transfer, we cannot appreciate that fact against him because the rule on securing trip tickets was not yet strictly implemented at that time. At any rate, it nowhere appeared that Carmona directly participated in the theft. Re: ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT ON THE ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT AND FOR ENGAGING IN THE BUSINESS OF LENDING MONEY AT USURIOUS RATES OF INTEREST OF MS. DOLORES T. LOPEZ, SC CHIEF JUDICIAL STAFF OFFICER, AND MR. FERNANDO M. MONTALVO, SC SUPERVISING JUDICIAL STAFF OFFICER, CHECKS DISBURSEMENT DIVISION, FISCAL MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET OFFICE / A.M. No. 2010-21-SC, September 30, 2014 /En Banc MAIN TOPIC: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW /ADMINISTRATIVE LAW /ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT, MOONLIGHTING F: An anonymous letter-complaint assailed the profitable money-lending with usurious interest scheme engaged in by respondents Dolores T. Lopez, an SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, and Fernando M. Montalvo, an SC Supervising Judicial Staff Officer, both of the Checks Disbursement Division of the Court’s Fiscal Management and Budget Office (FMBO). It stated that the respondents had been involved in the money-lending activities targeting the low-salaried employees of the Court like the drivers and employees of the janitorial services; that such money-lending had been going on with the help of the personnel of the Checks Disbursement Division of FMBO by enticing employees of the Court to pledge forthcoming benefits at a discounted rate; and that around 300 Automated Teller Machine cards were surrendered by the borrowers to the respondents as collateral for the individual borrowings. I: 1. Whether anonymous complaints are given probative value in administrative proceedings 2. Whether Lopez’s money-lending activities make her administratively liable H1. Yes. An anonymous complaint is always received with great caution, originating as it does from a source unwilling to identify himself or herself. It is suspect for that reason. But the mere anonymity of the source should not call for the outright dismissal of the complaint on the ground of its being baseless or unfounded provided its allegations can be reliably verified and properly substantiated by competent evidence, like public records of indubitable integrity, "thus needing no corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant, whose identity and integrity could hardly be material where the matter involved is of public interest," or the declarations by the respondents themselves in reaction to the allegations, where such declarations are, properly speaking, admissions worthy of consideration for not being self-serving. H2. Yes. Administrative Circular No. 5 (Re: Prohibition for All Officials and Employees of the Judiciary to Work as Insurance Agents), dated October 4, 1988, has prohibited all officials and employees of the Judiciary from engaging directly in any private business, vocation or profession, even outside their office hours. The prohibition has been at ensuring that full-time officers and employees of the courts render full-time service, for only thereby could any undue delays in the administration of justice and in the disposition of court cases be avoided. The nature of the work of court employees and officials demanded their highest degree of efficiency and responsibility, but they would not ably meet the demand except by devoting their undivided time to the government service. This explains why court employees have been enjoined to strictly observe official time and to devote every second or moment of such time to serving the public. Although many "moonlighting" activities were themselves legal acts that would be permitted or tolerated had the actors not been employed in the public sector, moonlighting, albeit not usually treated as a serious misconduct, can amount to a malfeasance in office by the very nature of the position held. In the case of Lopez, her being the Chief of the Checks Disbursement Division of the FMBO, a major office of the Court itself, surely put the integrity of the Checks Disbursement Division and the entire FMBO under so much undeserved suspicion. She ought to have refrained from engaging in money lending, particularly to the employees of the Court. We do not need to stress that she was expected to be circumspect about her acts and actuations, knowing that the impression of her having taken advantage of her position and her having abused the confidence reposed in her office and functions as such would thereby become unavoidable. There is no doubt about her onerous lending activities greatly diminishing the reputation of her office and of the Court itself in the esteem of the public. EMERITU C. BARUT, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent./ G.R. No. 167454, September 24, 2014 / First Division MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW /EVIDENCE /FORMAL OFFER F: Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) guards Conrado Ancheta and Barut stopped Rico Villas because his vehicle had no headlights. Ancheta asked for his driving license. Villas surrendered his driving license, and Ancheta issued to him a traffic violation report (TVR) ticket. The passenger jeepney carrying Vincent Ucag stopped where Villas’ jeep had parked. Ucag and Danilo Fabiano, a co-passenger, alighted and approached Ancheta and Barut to inquire what the matter was. Apprised of the reason for the stoppage of Villas’ jeep, Ucag requested the return of Villas’ driving license, but Ancheta refused because he had already issued the TVR ticket. After an argument, Ucag told Villas to return for his driving license the next day. This irked Ancheta, who dared Ucag to finish the issue right there and then. Ancheta pulled out his .38 caliber revolver and fired it several times, hitting Ucag on both thighs. Ucag fired back and hit Ancheta. Fabiano and Villas witnessed the exchange of gunshots between Ucag and Ancheta. Upon seeing the exchange of gunshots, Vincent Ucag rushed towards his father to go to his succor. Before Vincent could reach his father, Barut fired at Vincent in the chest. Vincent was rushed to the Parañaque Medical Center, where he expired while undergoing emergency surgery. His father was brought to the Camp Panopio Hospital in Quezon City for treatment and medical attendance. Barut was charged with homicide. During trial, Barut adverted to the extrajudicial sworn statement that Villas gave barely a day following the fatal shooting of Vincent – in which he declared not having seen Barut fire a gun. I: Whether the court may consider as evidence the extrajudicial sworn statement of Villas H: No. The negative treatment of the declaration contained in Villas’ extrajudicial sworn statement was in accord with prevailing rules and jurisprudence. Pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the RTC as the trial court could consider only the evidence that had been formally offered; towards that end, the offering party must specify the purpose for which the evidence was being offered. The rule would ensure the right of the adverse party to due process of law, for, otherwise, the adverse party would not be put in the position to timely object to the evidence, as well as to properly counter the impact of evidence not formally offered. xxx The rule that only evidence formally offered before the trial court can be considered is relaxed where two requisites concur, namely: one, the evidence was duly identified by testimony duly recorded; and, two, the evidence was incorporated in the records of the case. Furthermore, the rule has no application where the court takes judicial notice of adjudicative facts pursuant to Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court; or where the court relies on judicial admissions or draws inferences from such judicial admissions within the context of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court; or where the trial court, in judging the demeanor of witnesses, determines their credibility even without the offer of the demeanor as evidence. AGRIEX CO., LTD., Petitioner, vs. HON. TITUS B. VILLANUEVA, Commissioner, Bureau of Customs (now replaced by HON. ANTONIO M. BERNARDO), and HON. BILLY C. BIBIT, Collector of Customs, Port of Subic (now replaced by HON. EMELITO VILLARUZ), Respondents./ G.R. No. 158150, September 10, 2014/ First Division MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW /JURISDICTION OF BUREAU OF CUSTOMS F: BOC Commissioner Villanueva issued his Indorsement on September 11, 2001 directing Collector of Customs Bibit to issue a Warrant of Seizure and Detention (WSD) against the 20,000 bags of Thai white rice of Agriex consigned to R&C Agro Trade. On October 4, 2001, Agriex filed with the Bureau of Customs in the Port of Subic an Urgent Motion to Quash Warrant of Seizure. Pending hearing of the seizure proceedings vis-à-vis the rice shipments, Collector Bibit issued a Notice of Sale on October 18, 2001, setting therein the auction sale of the 200,000 bags of Thai white rice on November 22, 2001 and November 23, 2001. Agriex filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on October 19, 2001, but Collector Bibit did not act on the motion. Agriex instituted the petition for certiorari and prohibition in the CA on November 12,2001 (with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of injunction), alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents for issuing the October 18, 2001 Notice of Sale notwithstanding that they had no jurisdiction over the 180,000 bags of Thai white rice intended for transshipment to other countries. Commissioner Villanueva issued his memorandum dated November 19, 2001 directing Collector Bibit not to proceed with the scheduled auction of the 180,000 bags of Thai white rice until further orders from his office. On November 22, 2001, the CA issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents to desist from holding the scheduled public auction. I: Whether the Bureau of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the BOC in a freeport zone H: Yes. It is well settled that the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings, and regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or put it at naught. The Collector of Customs sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods. Regional trial courts are devoid of any competence to pass upon the validity or regularity of seizure and forfeiture proceedings conducted by the BOC and to enjoin or otherwise interfere with these proceedings. Regional trial courts are precluded from assuming cognizance over such matters even through petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus. Verily, the rule is that from the moment imported goods are actually in the possession or control of the Customs authorities, even if no warrant for seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in connection with the seizure and forfeiture proceedings, the BOC acquires exclusive jurisdiction over such imported goods for the purpose of enforcing the customs laws, subject to appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals whose decisions are appealable to this Court. The proper recourse was an appeal in due course to the CTA, in accordance with Section 7(4) of RA No. 1125, as amended, in relation to Section 2402 of the Tariff and Customs Code, within 30 days after the receipt of the order. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC., Petitioner, vs. MA. CONCEPCION M. DEL ROSARIO, Respondent./ G.R. No. 157633, September 10, 2014/ First Division MAIN TOPIC: LABOR LAW / TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT F: Ma. Concepcion Del Rosario and Kathleen Gamboa, two flight attendants of Northwest Airlines, Inc., had a heated discussion and allegedly brawled during flight, after Del Rosario made remarks against Gamboa who borrowed a wine bottle opener from the former. Del Rosario was informed of her termination from the service because fighting was strictly prohibited by Northwest, and that fighting entailed dismissal from the service even if committed for the first time. Northwest considered her dismissal from the service justified and in accordance with the Rules of Conduct for Employees. I: Whether fighting in the workplace, even for the first time, justifies termination of employment H: No. Northwest argues that Del Rosario was dismissed on the grounds of serious misconduct and willful disobedience. Misconduct refers to the improper or wrong conduct that transgresses some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. But misconduct or improper behavior, to be a just cause for termination of employment, must: (a) be serious; (b) relate to the performance of the employee’s duties; and (c) show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. In several rulings where the meaning of fight was decisive, the Court has observed that the term fight was considered to be different from the term argument. In People v. Asto, for instance, the Court characterized fight as not just a merely verbal tussle but a physical combat between two opposing parties. x x x [T]he incident involving Del Rosario and Gamboa could not be justly considered as akin to the fight contemplated by Northwest. In the eyes of the NLRC, Del Rosario and Gamboa were arguing but not fighting. The understanding of fight as one that required physical combat was absent during the incident. Moreover, the claim of Morales that Del Rosario challenged Gamboa to a brawl (sabunutan) could not be given credence by virtue of its being self-serving in favor of Northwest, and of its being an apparent afterthought on the part of Morales during the investigation of the incident, without Del Rosario having the opportunity to contest Morales' statement. In that context, the investigation then served only as Northwest's means to establish that the grounds of a valid dismissal based on serious misconduct really existed. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the incident was the kind of fight prohibited by Northwest's Rules of Conduct, the same could not be considered as of such seriousness as to warrant Del Rosario's dismissal from the service. The gravity of the fight, which was not more than a verbal argument between them, was not enough to tarnish or diminish Northwest's public image.  ROSALIE L. GARGOLES, Petitioner, vs. REYLITA S. DEL ROSARIO, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE JAY ANNE'S ONE HOUR PHOTO SHOP, Respondent./ G.R. No. 158583, September 10, 2014 / First Division MAIN TOPIC: LABOR LAW / TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT F: Gargoles allegedly tampered with the daily printer's production reports/sales and appropriated for her own gain the cash value amounting to P11,305.00. Gargoles asserted that there was no substantial evidence showing the existence of just cause for her dismissal. I: Whether tampering the records of the company and for appropriating for one’s own the money of the company, despite assertions that there is no substantial evidence to prove such, is a valid cause for dismissal H: Yes. The just and valid causes for the dismissal of an employee, as enumerated in Article 282 of the Labor Code, include: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with her work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of her duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in her by her employer or duly authorized representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of her employer or any immediate member of her family or her duly authorized representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing. x x x The dishonesty imputed to the petitioner included the making of double entries in the production reports and thereby enriching herself by pocketing the extra cash generated from the double entries. Contrary to her assertion that there was no substantial evidence to justify her dismissal, the production reports containing the double entries were presented as evidence; and her double entries were confirmed in the affidavit executed by Redelito Caranay, Jr., her co-employee. As such, the finding of the just cause for her dismissal did not emanate from mere speculation, suspicion or assumption. It is true that every person is entitled to be presumed innocent of wrongdoing. The objective of the presumption has been to lay the burden of proof on the shoulders of the alleger of wrongdoing. The presumption extends to the petitioner and to every other employee charged with any wrongdoing that may cause them to be sanctioned, including being dismissed from employment. But the presumption, which is disputable, by no means excuses the employee charged with wrongdoing from answering and defending herself once the presumption has been overcome by a showing to the contrary. The failure of the employee to rebut or disprove the proof of wrongdoing then establishes the charge against her. This is especially true in a case for dismissal grounded on loss of confidence or breach of trust, in which the employer may proceed to dismiss the erring employee once the employer becomes morally convinced that she was guilty of a breach of trust and confidence. Based on the record, the petitioner did not sufficiently contradict or rebut the charge of dishonesty. PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51, SORSOGON CITY, Complainant, vs. ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, Respondent. / A.C. No. 7474, September 9, 2014 /En Banc MAIN TOPIC: LEGAL ETHICS F: Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough of the respondent, a law practitioner, who had engaged in the unethical practice of filing frivolous administrative cases against judges and personnel of the courts because the latter filed a motion to inhibit the complainant from hearing a pending case. Hence, the complainant has initiated a complaint for the disbarment of respondent on the ground of gross misconduct and gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility Atty. Juan S. Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795, entitled "People of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault" then pending in Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Sorsogon City, presided by complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid. Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty. Vicente Judar who had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the accused. But aside from entering his appearance as counsel for the accused, Atty. Dealca also moved that Criminal Case No. 2006-6795 be re-raffled to another Branch of the RTC "[c]onsidering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned," where" he does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersigned." Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca’s motion to re-raffle through an order. Judge Madrid also filed a letter complaint in the Office of the Bar Confidant citing Atty. Dealca’ sunethical practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse incidents between them. I: Whether Atty. Dealca filed frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against judges and court personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility H: [The] right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish by clear and convincing evidence the ground of bias and prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from participating in a particular trial in which Atty. Dealca was participating as a counsel.36 The latter’s bare allegations of Judge Madrid’s partiality or hostility did not suffice,37 because the presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and the evidence and without fear or favor should only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.38 As such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a lawyer as expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 [which state]: Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. x x x Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or haveno materiality to the case. In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation. ELSIE S. CAUSING, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HERNAN D. BIRON, SR., Respondents. / G.R. No. 199139, September 9, 2014 /En Banc MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW / SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS / CERTIORARI F: On January 1, 1993, Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo. On May 28, 2010, Mayor Biron issued Memorandum No. 12, Series of 2010, detailing Causing at the Office of the Municipal Mayor. On the same date, Mayor Biron also issued Office Order No. 13 detailing Catalina V. Belonio, another municipal employee, to the office of the Local Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo to assume the functions and duties as Local Civil Registrar-designate effective upon receipt of the order. Causing filed the complaint-affidavit dated June 8, 2010 in the Office of the Regional Election Director, Region VI, in Iloilo City, claiming that Office Order No. 12 dated May 28, 2010 issued by Mayor Biron ordering her detail to the Office of the Municipal Mayor, being made within the election period and without prior authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and violative of Section 1, Paragraph A, No. 1, in connection with Section 6 (B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737, Series of 2009, otherwise known as " In the Matter of Enforcing the Prohibition against appointment or hiring of new employees, creating or filing of new positions, giving any salary increase or transferring or detailing any officer or employee in the civil service and suspension of local elective officials in connection with the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.” On March 1, 2011, Atty. Elizabeth Doronilla, the Provincial Election Supervisor (PES), recommended the dismissal of the complaint-affidavit for lack of probable cause to charge Mayor Biron with the violation of Section (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, as implemented by Resolution No. 8737. On September 9, 2011, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and recommendation of PES Doronilla, observing that Mayor Biron did not transfer or detail Causing but only required her to physically report to the Mayor’s office and to perform her functions thereat; and that he did not strip her of her functions as the Municipal Civil Registrar, and did not deprive her of her supervisory functions over her staff. In his comment, Mayor Biron insists that the petition for certiorari should be dismissed because of the petitioner’s failure to file a motion for reconsideration in the COMELEC, and because of her failure to attach copies of equally important documents pertinent to the case. He emphasizes that Office Order No. 12 was issued by his office for the purpose of closely supervising her in performing her functions after complaints about her behavior in dealing with her co-workers and with the public transacting business in her office had been received by his office. I: 1. Whether the relocation of the petitioner by respondent Municipal Mayor during the election period from her office as the Local Civil Registrar to the Office of the Mayor constituted a prohibited act under the Omnibus Election Code and the relevant Resolution of the Commission on Elections 2. Whether filing of an MR is necessary before a petition for certiorari may be filed with the Supreme Court H1: No. The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 were transfer and detail. Transfer is defined in the Resolution as "any personnel movement from one government agency to another or from one department, division, geographical unit or subdivision of a government agency to another with or without the issuance of an appointment;" while detail as defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 is the movement of an employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment.33 Having acquired technical and legal meanings, transfer and detail must be construed as such. Obviously, the movement involving Causing did not equate to either a transfer or a detail within the contemplation of the law if Mayor Biron only thereby physically transferred her office area from its old location to the Office of the Mayor "some little steps" away.34 We cannot accept the petitioner’s argument, therefore, that the phrase "any transfer or detail whatsoever" encompassed "any and all kinds and manner of personnel movement,"35 including the mere change in office location. H2: Yes. The Rules of Court (1997) contains a separate rule (Rule 64) on the review of the decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit.27 Rule 64 is generally identical with certiorari under Rule 65, except as to the period of the filing of the petition for certiorari, that is, in the former, the period is 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed but, in the latter, not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution assailed. The well-established rule is that the motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The filing of the motion for reconsideration before the resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford to the public respondent the opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re- examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. The rule is not absolute, however, considering that jurisprudence has laid down exceptions to the requirement for the filing of a petition for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration, namely: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government, or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the petition is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where the petitioner was deprived of due process, and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent, and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BOBBY BELGAR, Accused-Appellant./ G.R. No. 182794, September 8, 2014 / First Division MAIN TOPIC: EVIDENCE /CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE F: Belgar was charged with rape of 15 year-old AAA. It was alleged that AAA and her two sisters were sleeping in their house when she was awakened because someone was touching her feet. She saw that it was Belgar, who was poking her neck with a knife. She resisted but he warned her not to shout or he would stab her and her sisters. He dragged her outside the house and brought her to a nearby tree, where he injected an unknown substance into her stomach. She fell unconscious afterwards. Upon regaining consciousness, she found herself naked, and her vagina was aching and soaked with white and red substance. She put on her clothes and returned to the house. She attended school the next morning. During her class, she broke a mirror and slashed her left wrist. Her teacher came to her aid and had her treated. While being treated she confided the rape to her teacher. She was then brought to the Municipal Health Office for examination. Belgar denied raping AAA and interposed alibi, and that it was his first time to see AAA when she identified him as the one who had raped her. During trial, Belgar arguesd that the perpetrator was already gone when AAA regained consciousness; that she did not experience or feel the actual sexual intercourse; that she only jumped to the conclusion that she had been raped, and that it was the accused who had raped her; that there was no evidence showing that he had been the perpetrator; that the non-examination of the white and red substance found in AAA’s vagina removed the proof of the possibility of the substance having come from a male organ; and that AAA did not properly identify the culprit. I: Whether circumstantial evidence may convict the accused for the crime of rape H: Yes. The commission of the rape was competently established although AAA had been unconscious during the commission of the act. Proof of the commission of the crime need not always be by direct evidence, for circumstantial evidence could also sufficiently and competently establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the Court affirmed convictions for rape based on circumstantial evidence. In this connection, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the conditions set forth in Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Courtare shown to exist, to wit: Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. – Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Both lower courts correctly concluded that the non-examination of the red and white substance found in AAA’s vagina did not negate the commission of the rape. A finding of the presence of spermatozoa on the victim did not define the commission of rape. Indeed, neither the medical examination of the rape victim nor the laboratory test of anything related to the crime was an element of the crime of rape. GEORGE T. CHUA, Complainant, vs. JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, Respondent./ A.M. No. RTJ-14-2394, September 1, 2014 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 12-3847-RT J)/ First Division MAIN TOPIC: LEGAL ETHICS F: Manila Bay Development Corporation (MBDC) leased for a period of 20 years about 10 hectares of reclaimed land along Roxas Boulevard in Parafiaque City to Jimmy Gow. A year later, Gow, who was the president of Uniwide Holdings, Inc. (Uniwide), assigned the lease to Uniwide. MBDC and Uniwide then entered into a supplemental agreement over the lease in 1996. On February 17, 2011, Uniwide filed an action for reformation of contract against MBDC in RTC Parañaque City. The complaint was raffled under Presiding Judge Madrona, essentially alleged that MBDC had reneged on its promise to develop the area into a commercial and business center; that the construction of what later came to be known as Macapagal Avenue had cut through the leased area, greatly affecting Uniwide’s construction plans; and that subsequent changes in circumstances had gone beyond the contemplation of the parties at the time they entered into the lease contract. Summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon MBDC on March 23, 2011. On the last day for the filing of its responsive pleading, MBDC moved for the dismissal of the complaint instead of filing its answer, claiming prescription and failure to state a cause of action. MBDC also stated in its motion that the action for reformation was merely a ploy by Uniwide to forestall the ejectment case against it. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss through its order dated August 1, 2011.5 MBDC received a copy of the order on September 26, 2011, and filed its motion for reconsideration 11 days thereafter. Judge Madrona then directed Uniwide and MBDC to file their comment and reply, respectively, after which the motion for reconsideration would be deemed submitted for resolution. Before MBDC could file its reply, Uniwide filed a motion to declare MBDC in default. On December 23, 2011, Judge Madrona issued another order resolving the two pending motions, declaring MBDC in default, and declaring its motion for reconsideration moot. Aggrieved, complainant George T. Chua, as the president of MBDC, filed a complaint-affidavit dated February 13, 2012 to charge Judge Madrona with manifest partiality, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law. I: Whether Judge Madrona should be held liable for manifest partiality, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law H: No. [Not] every error or mistake by a judge in the performance of his official duties as a judge renders him administratively liable. Indeed, no judge can be held administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance of the law, or incompetence in the adjudication of cases unless his acts constituted fraud, dishonesty or corruption; or were imbued with malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice. The complainant’s allegations against Judge Madrona arose from the following orders he had issued as the judge trying the civil case involving MBDC, namely: (1) denying MBDC’s motion to dismiss; (2) denying MBDC’s motion for reconsideration; and (3) granting Uniwide’s motion to declare defendant in default. Yet, it is clear that such orders were Judge Madrona’s resolutions of the motion to dismiss, motion for reconsideration, and motion to declare MBDC in default, and thus involved the exercise of his judicial functions. Assuming that Judge Madrona thereby erred, his errors were correctible only through available judicial remedies, not by administrative or disciplinary actions. JUANITO MAGSINO, Petitioner, vs. ELENA DE OCAMPO and RAMON GUICO, Respondents. G.R. No. 166944, August 18, 2014 First Division MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW/CIVIL PROCEDURE /APPEALS F: Magsino filed against De Ocampo and Guico a complaint for forcible entry with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or temporary restraining order in the Metropolitan Trial Court in Antipolo City (MeTC). Magsino then filed a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction in the Municipal Trial Court in Taytay, Rizal (MTC) but the MTC issued only a writ of preliminary injunction. The MTC rendered its judgment in favor of the respondents. Elevating the matter to the RTC, the RTC rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the MTC. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the RTC denied his motion. Dissatisfied, the petitioner appealed to the CA by petition for review. The CA promulgated its assailed resolution dismissing the petition for review, holding the petition for review is procedurally flawed in view of the following: The petition is not accompanied by copies of the pleadings and other material portions as would support the allegations of the petition, such as: (1) Copy of the complaint filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Taytay, Rizal, Answer, and Motion to Dismiss; and (2) Copies of the appeal memoranda filed by the parties. The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the first assailed resolution, arguing therein that the decisions of the MTC and the RTC submitted with the petition for review were sufficient for the CA to resolve the issues "without resort to[the] record" because the issues involved are questions of law – such as "[w]ill the possession in law of defendants (now respondents), have it (sic) over the prior physical, actual or de facto possession of the Plaintiff-appellant (now herein Petitioner);" that, at any rate, should the CA have really desired to inform itself more, all that it needed to do was simply to order the elevation of the records; and that "all rules of procedure should bow to the greater imperative of doing substantial justice." I: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for failure of petitioner to attach a (1) Copy of the complaint filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Taytay, Rizal, Answer, and Motion to Dismiss; and (2) Copies of the appeal memoranda filed by the parties. H: No. Section 2 (d), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court requires the petition for review to be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court, and the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition. The failure of the petitioner to comply with the requirement shall be a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition for review. [The] right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege to be exercised only in accordance with the law. Being the party who sought to appeal, he must comply with the requirements of the relevant rules; otherwise, he would lose the statutory right to appeal. It cannot be overemphasized, indeed, that the procedures regulating appeals as laid down in the Rules of Court must be followed because strict compliance with them was indispensable for the orderly and speedy disposition of justice. ISABELITA C. VINUY A, VICTORIA C. DELA PENA, HERMINIHILDA MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMA WANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L. QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M. PALACIO, MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A. SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA PENA, EUGENIA M. LALU, JULIANA G. MAGAT, CECILIA SANGUYO, ANA ALONZO, RUFINA P. MALLARI, ROSARIO M. ALARCON, RUFINA C. GULAPA, ZOILA B. MANALUS, CORAZON C. CALMA, MARTA A. GULAPA, TEODORA M. HERNANDEZ, FERMIN B. DELA PENA, MARIA DELA PAZ B. CULALA,ESPERANZA MANAPOL, JUANITA M. BRIONES, VERGINIA M. GUEVARRA, MAXIMA ANGULO, EMILIA SANGIL, TEOFILA R. PUNZALAN, JANUARIA G. GARCIA, PERLA B. BALINGIT, BELEN A. CULALA, PILAR Q. GALANG, ROSARIO C. BUCO, GAUDENCIA C. DELA PENA, RUFINA Q. CATACUTAN, FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA 0. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ, CORAZON M. SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA M. BUCO, PATRICIA A. BERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG, ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S. TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al. in their capacity and as members of the "Malaya Lolas Organizations," Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGOALBERT, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondents. G.R. No. 162230, August 13, 2014 En Banc MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW/SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS/CERTIORARI SUB TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW/PROVISIONAL REMEIES /PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION F: Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Supreme Court reverse its decision of April 28, 2010, and grant their petition for certiorari. Petitioners pray that the Court reconsider its April 28, 2010 decision, and declare: (1) that the rapes, sexual slavery, torture and other forms of sexual violence committed against the Filipina comfort women are crimes against humanity and war crimes under customary international law; (2) that the Philippines is not bound by the Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as the waiver of the claims of the Filipina comfort women against Japan is concerned; (3) that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women; and (4) that petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents. I: 1. Whether failure to state the material dates in a special civil action for certiorari will lead to dismissal of the case 2. Whether dismissal of certiorari case will render the preliminary injunction moot H: 1. Yes. Petitioners did not show that their bringing of the special civil action for certiorari was timely, i.e., within the 60-day period provided in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit: Section 4. When and where position filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion. As the rule indicates, the 60-day period starts to run from the date petitioner receives the assailed judgment, final order or resolution, or the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial timely filed, whether such motion is required or not. To establish the timeliness of the petition for certiorari, the date of receipt of the assailed judgment, final order or resolution or the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial must be stated in the petition; otherwise, the petition for certiorari must be dismissed. The importance of the dates cannot be understated, for such dates determine the timeliness of the filing of the petition for certiorari. As the Court has emphasized in Tambong v. R. Jorge Development Corporation: There are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received; second, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed; and third, when notice of the denial thereof was received. Failure of petitioner to comply with this requirement shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. Substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance with the Rules. 2. Preliminary injunction is merely a provisional remedy that is adjunct to the main case, and is subject to the latter’s outcome. It is not a cause of action itself. It is provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the pendency of the action; and it is ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main action. Following the dismissal of the petition for certiorari, there is no more legal basis to issue the writ of injunction sought. As an auxiliary remedy, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction cannot be issued independently of the principal action. In any event, a mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular act. Hence, it is an extreme remedy, to be granted only if the following requisites are attendant, namely: (a) The applicant has a clear and unmistakable right, that is, a right in esse; (b) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right; and (c) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury. In Marquez v. The Presiding Judge (Hon. Ismael B. Sanchez), RTC Br. 58, Lucena City, we expounded as follows: It is basic that the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, conditioned on the existence of a clear and positive right of the applicant which should be protected. It is an extraordinary, peremptory remedy available only on the grounds expressly provided by law, specifically Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, extreme caution must be observed in the exercise of such discretion. It should be granted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause of action and in the probability of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the prevention of multiplicity of suits. Where facts are not shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief of injunction should be refused. Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner.  NURSERY CARE CORPORATION; SHOEMART, INC.; STAR APPLIANCE CENTER, INC.; H&B, INC.; SUPPLIES STATION, INC.; and HARDWARE WORKSHOP, INC., Petitioners, vs. ANTHONY ACEVEDO, in his capacity as THE TREASURER OF MANILA; and THE CITY OF MANILA, Respondents. G.R. No. 180651, July 30, 2014 First Division MAIN TOPIC: TAXATION /DOUBLE TAXATION F: The City of Manila assessed and collected taxes from the individual petitioners pursuant to Section 15 (Tax on Wholesalers, Distributors, or Dealers) and Section 17 (Tax on Retailers) of the Revenue Code of Manila. At the same time, the City of Manila imposed additional taxes upon the petitioners pursuant to Section 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila, as amended, as a condition for the renewal of their respective business licenses. The petitioners point out that although Section 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila was not itself unconstitutional or invalid, its enforcement against the petitioners constituted double taxation because the local business taxes under Section 15 and Section 17 of the Revenue Code of Manila were already being paid by them. They contend that the proviso in Section 21 exempted all registered businesses in the City of Manila from paying the tax imposed under Section 21; and that the exemption was more in accord with Section 143 of the Local Government Code, the law that vested in the municipal and city governments the power to impose business taxes. The respondents counter, however, that double taxation did not occur from the imposition and collection of the tax pursuant to Section 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila and that the taxes imposed pursuant to Section 21 were in the concept of indirect taxes upon the consumers of the goods and services sold by a business establishment. I: Whether there was double taxation from the imposition and collection of the tax pursuant to Section 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila H: Yes. There is double taxation when the same taxpayer is taxed twice when he should be taxed only once for the same purpose by the same taxing authority within the same jurisdiction during the same taxing period, and the taxes are of the same kind or character. Double taxation is obnoxious. On the basis of the rulings in Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. and Swedish Match Philippines, Inc., the Court now holds that all the elements of double taxation concurred upon the City of Manila’s assessment on and collection from the petitioners of taxes for the first quarter of 1999 pursuant to Section 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila. Firstly, because Section 21 of the Revenue Code of Manila imposed the tax on a person who sold goods and services in the course of trade or business based on a certain percentage of his gross sales or receipts in the preceding calendar year, while Section 15 and Section 17 likewise imposed the tax on a person who sold goods and services in the course of trade or business but only identified such person with particularity, namely, the wholesaler, distributor or dealer (Section 15), and the retailer (Section 17), all the taxes – being imposed on the privilege of doing business in the City of Manila in order to make the taxpayers contribute to the city’s revenues – were imposed on the same subject matter and for the same purpose. Secondly, the taxes were imposed by the same taxing authority (the City of Manila) and within the same jurisdiction in the same taxing period (i.e., per calendar year). Thirdly, the taxes were all in the nature of local business taxes. SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA, Respondents. G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014 First Division MAIN TOPIC: CIVIL LAW / CONFLICT OF LAWS SUB TOPIC: CIVIL LAW / OWNERSHIP F: Atty. Juan Luna married Eugenia Zaballero on September 10, 1947. On January 12, 1976, Atty. Luna obtained from the Dominican Republic a divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia. On the same date, Atty. Luna married Soledad Lavadia. After the death of Atty. Luna, his share in a condominium unit, including the law books, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, Atty. Luna’s son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father. Soledad filed a complaint alleging that the subject properties were acquired during the existence of the marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad through their joint efforts, that since they had no children, Soledad became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of Atty. Luna to the extent of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in the said properties plus her ½ share in the net estate of Atty. Luna which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and testament. I: Whether the second wife of a Filipino who obtained divorce from his first wife is entitled to the properties of her deceased husband, alleging that said properties were acquired during the secon marriage H: No. Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage. The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage. Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code. x x x In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA, ACTING THROUGH ITS OWNER, GRAND PLAZA HOTEL CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT; MED-ARBITER TOMAS F. FALCONITIN; AND NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE HOTEL, RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES– HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA SUPERVISORS CHAPTER (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC), Respondents./ G.R. No. 172132, July 23, 2014 / First Division MAIN TOPIC: LABOR LAW / CERTIFICATION ELECTION F: On October 11, 1995, National Union of Workers in Hotel Restaurant and Allied Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC) filed a petition for certification election, seeking to represent all the supervisory employees of Heritage Hotel Manila. The petitioner filed its opposition, but the opposition was deemed denied on February 14, 1996 when Med-Arbiter Napoleon V. Fernando issued his order for the conduct of the certification election. The petitioner appealed the order of Med-Arbiter Fernando, but the appeal was also denied. On January 29, 2000, NUWHRAIN-HHMSC moved for the conduct of the pre-election conference. The petitioner filed its comment on the list of employees submitted by NUWHRAIN-HHMSC, and sought the exclusion of some from the list of employees for occupying either confidential or managerial positions. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on April 17, 2000, raising the prolonged lack of interest of NUWHRAIN- HHMSC to pursue its petition for certification election. On May 12, 2000, the petitioner filed a petition for the cancellation of NUWHRAIN- HHMSC’s registration as a labor union for failing to submit its annual financial reports and an updated list of members as required by Article 238 and Article 239 of the Labor Code. It filed another motion on June 1, 2000 to seek either the dismissal or the suspension of the proceedings on the basis of its pending petition for the cancellation of union registration. I: 1. Whether a petition for cancellation of union registration shall suspend the proceedings for certification election 2. Whether a mixed membership results in the illegitimacy of the registered labor union H1: No. Under the long established rule, too, the filing of the petition for the cancellation of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC’s registration should not bar the conduct of the certification election. In that respect, only a final order for the cancellation of the registration would have prevented NUWHRAIN-HHMSC from continuing to enjoy all the rights conferred on it as a legitimate labor union, including the right to the petition for the certification election. This rule is now enshrined in Article 238-A of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9481, which reads: Article 238-A. Effect of a Petition for Cancellation of Registration. – A petition for cancellation of union registration shall not suspend the proceedings for certification election nor shall it prevent the filing of a petition for certification election. H2: No. Presently, then, the mixed membership does not result in the illegitimacy of the registered labor union unless the same was done through misrepresentation, false statement or fraud according to Article 239 of the Labor Code. In Air Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Labor Relations, we categorically explained that— Clearly, then, for the purpose of de-certifying a union, it is not enough to establish that the rank-and-file union includes ineligible employees in its membership. Pursuant to Article 239 (a) and (c) of the Labor Code, it must be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, or in connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, the list of voters, or failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR.  MANOLITO GIL Z. ZAFRA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent /G.R. No. 176317, July 23, 2014 / First Division MAIN TOPIC: CRIMINAL LAW / INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW F: Zafra was charged of 18 counts of malversation of public funds through falsification of public documents. It was alleged that he had committed falsification through his submission of copies of falsified monthly report of collections and had tampered revenue receipts to the BIR and Commission on Audit. I: How the criminal penalty should be computed for the charge against Zafra H: In convicting an accused of the complex crime of malversation of public fund through falsification of a public document, the courts shall impose the penalty for the graver felony in the maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, plus fine in the amount of the funds malversed or the total value of the property embezzled. In addition, the courts shall order the accused to return to the Government the funds malversed, or the value of the property embezzled. Pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for each count is that prescribed on the more serious offense, to be imposed in its maximum period. Falsification of a public document by a public officer is penalized with prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000.00. Prision mayor has a duration of six years and one day to 12 years of imprisonment.26 In contrast, the penalty for malversation ranges from prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods to reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua depending on the amount misappropriated, and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or to the total value of the property embezzled, to wit: Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer: 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos. 2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos. 3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos. 4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is morethan twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporalin its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled. x x x x To determine the maximum periods of the penalties to be imposed on the petitioner, therefore, we must be guided by the following rules, namely: (1) the penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code constitute degrees; and (2) considering that the penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code are not composed of three periods, the time included in the penalty prescribed should be divided into three equal portions, which each portion forming one period, pursuant to Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code should be divided into three periods, with the maximum period being the penalty properly imposable on each count, except in any instance where the penalty for falsification would be greater than such penalties for malversation. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is imposed on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term. The maximum term is the penalty under the Revised Penal Code properly imposed after considering any attending circumstance; while the minimum term is within the range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense committed. xxx To illustrate, the count involving the largest amount misappropriated by the accused totaling P75,489.76 merited the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, and a fine of P75,489.76. Obviously, the penalty is that prescribed for malversation of public funds, the more serious offense. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 188165/189063 / December 11, 2013 /FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES/CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/DUE PROCESS OF LAW F: Cong. Villarama delivered a privilege speech in the House of Representatives denouncing acts of bribery allegedly committed by a high ranking government official whom he then called the 2 Million Dollar Man.In reaction, the Office of the President directed the Presidential Anti- Graft and Commission (PAGC) to conduct an inquiry on the exposé of Cong. Villarama.Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo requested PAGC to submit documents relevant to the exposé. Ombudsman’s found that the extortion was perpetrated on February 13, 2001 and that there was transfer of Mark Jimenez US $1,999,965.00 to Coutts Bank Account HO 133706 on February 23, 2001 in favor of the accused. However, information was filed only by the Ombudsman on April 18, 2008 which prompted the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the criminal case for violation of the accused right to speedy disposition of cases under the Constitution. I: Whether or not, delay on the part of the Office of the Ombudsman was vexatious, capricious, and oppressive? H: Yes. The Office of the Ombudsman had taken an unusually long period of time just to investigate the criminal complaint and to determine whether to criminally charge the respondents in the Sandiganbayan. Such long delay was inordinate and oppressive, and constituted under the peculiar circumstances of the case an outright violation of the respondents’ right under the Constitution to the speedy disposition of their cases. To allow the delay under those terms would definitely violate fair play and nullify due process of law – fair play, because the field of contest between the accuser and the accused should at all times be level; and due process of law, because no less that our Constitution guarantees the speedy disposition of the case. The guarantee of speedy disposition under Section 16 of Article III of the Constitution applies to all cases pending before all judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative bodies. Whether or not the fact-finding investigation was separate from the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman should not matter for purposes of determining if the respondents’ right to the speedy disposition of their cases had been violated.  RE: LETTERS OF LUCENA B. RALLOS, FOR ALLEGED ACTS/INCIDENTS/OCCURENCES RELATIVE TO THE RESOLUTION(S) ISSUED IN CA-G.R. SP No. 06676 BY COUIRT OF APPEALS EXECUTIVE JUSTICE PAMPIO ABARINTOS and ASSOCIATE JUSTICES RAMON PAUL HERNANDO and VICTORIA ISABEL PAREDES A.M. No. 12-9-08-CA RE: COMPLAINT FILED BY LUCENA B. RALLOS AGAINST JUSTICE GABRIEL T. INGLES, PAMELA ANN MAXIMO, and CARMELITA S. MANAHAN December 10, 2013; / IPI No. 12-203-CA-J [formerly A.M. No. 12-8- 06-CA] / EN BANC MAIN TOPIC: Legal Ethics/Administrative Remedies/Remedial Law F: The Heirs of Vicente Rallos sought just compensation from the city government of Cebu City for two parcels of land pertaining to the estate that Cebu City had been maintaining as public roads without their consent. RTC Branch 9 rendered its decision holding Cebu City liable to pay just compensation to the Heirs of Vicente Rallos and directing the creation of a board of commissioners that would determine the amount of just compensation. Cebu City brought in the CA, Visayas Station, and a petition for the annulment of the RTC’s decisions. Rallos asserted that respondent Justice Ingles, Justice Maxino and Justice Manahan had knowingly disobeyed the resolutions granting Cebu City’s application for the writ of preliminary injunction constituted serious misconduct and a violation of Article 206 of the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 6713 and Republic Act No. 3019. As relief, Rallos prayed that the respondent Justices be held guilty of serious misconduct, and meted the penalty of removal from office and perpetual disqualification from holding office or employment in the Government I: 1. Whether or not administrative complaints against erring judges is proper?; 2. Whether or not, series of inhibition by the justice concerned is a scheme to favor Cebu City? H1: No. Any errors should be corrected through appropriate judicial remedies, like appeal in due course or, in the proper cases, the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition if the errors were jurisdictional. The filing by Rallos of the letter-complaint instead of the motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the March 28, 2012 resolution was improper because she could not substitute the administrative to the proper judicial recourse. She should have waited for the action of the CA on her motion for reconsideration, and should the motion be eventually denied, her proper remedy was to appeal. H1: No. Good faith and regularity in the performance of official duties, which are strong presumptions under our laws, should prevail unless overcome by contrary proof. Rallos presented no proof to validate her suggestion. In fact, she herself conceded that she was thereby only voicing out her suspicion of an irregularity. VALENTINO L. LEGASPI vs CITY OF CEBU G.R. No. 159110, December 10, 2013, EnBanc BIENVENIDO P. JABAN, SR., AND BIENVENIDO DOUGLAS LUKE BRADBURY JABAN vs COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF CEBU, CITY MAYOR ALVIN GARCIA, SANGGUNIANG PANLUNSOD OF CITY OF CEBU, HON. RENATO V. OSMEÑA, AS PRESIDING OFFICER OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNSOD, AND CITOM CHAIRMAN ALAN GAVIOLA, AS CITOM CHIEF, CITOM TRAFFIC ENFORCER E. A. ROMERO, AND LITO GILBUENA, G.R. No. 159692 MAIN TOPIC: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW / LEGISLATIVE POWER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE F: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cebu enacted Ordinance No. 1664 to authorize the traffic enforcers of Cebu City to immobilize any motor vehicle violating the parking restrictions and prohibitions defined in Ordinance No. 801. Petitioners brought suit in the RTC in Cebu City against the City of Cebuseeking the declaration of Ordinance No. 1644 as unconstitutional for being in violation of due process and for being contrary to law, and damages.Petitioner alleged that he had found his car being immobilized by a steel clamp, and a notice being posted on the car to the effect that it would be a criminal offense to break the clamp. Petitioner also alleged that he was imposed a fine without any court hearing and without due process of law, for he was not even told why his car had been immobilized. I: Whether or not Ordinance No 1664 is valid exercise of Legislative Power? H: Yes. Congress enacted the LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the various LGUs of the State’s great powers, namely: the police power, the power of eminent domain, and the power of taxation. The LGC was fashioned to delineate the specific parameters and limitations to be complied with by each LGU in the exercise of these delegated powers with the view of making each LGU a fully functioning subdivision of the State subject to the constitutional and statutory limitations. Section 458 of the LGC vests the City of Cebu with the legislative power to enact traffic rules and regulations and also generally under Section 16 of the LGC by virtue of General Welfare Clause. Delegation reflected the desire of Congress to leave to the cities themselves the task of confronting the problem of traffic congestions associated with development and progress because they were directly familiar with the situations in their respective jurisdictions. LUZON HYDRO CORPORATION vs COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE / G.R. No. 188260 / November 13, 2013 / First Division MAIN TOPIC: TAXATION / REFUND OF VAT INPUT / TAX EXEMPTIONS STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST TAXPAYER F: Petitioner filed a case for a claim of tax refund to cover unutilized Input VAT corresponding to the taxable year 2001. The petitioner alleged that it had incurred input VAT in the amount on its domestic purchases of goods and services used in its generation and sales of electricity to NPC. However, in petitioner’s VAT returns for the four quarters of 2001, no amount of zero-rated sales was declared. Likewise, petitioner did not submit any VAT official receipt of payments for services rendered to NPC.The only proof submitted by petitioner is a letter from Regional Director, stating that the financial statements and annual income tax return constitute sufficient secondary proof of effectively zero-rated. I: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a refund for unutilized VAT Input using its financial statement as proof of zero rating? H: No. Although the petitioner has correctly contended that the sale of electricity by a power generation company should be subject to zero-rated VAT under Republic Act No. 9136, it did not prove it’s having actually made zero-rated sales of electricity by presenting the VAT official receipts and VAT returns. A claim for refund or tax credit for unutilized input VAT may be allowed only if the requisites provided by the NIRC are complied with. It is settled that tax refunds, like tax exemptions, are construed strictly against the taxpayer and that the claimant has the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of its claim for tax credit or refund. Failure in this regard, petitioner’s claim must fail. As the CTA En Banc precisely found, the petitioner did not reflect any zero-rated sales from its power generation in its four quarterly VAT returns, which indicated that it had not made any sale of electricity. Had there been zero-rated sales, it would have reported them in the returns. Indeed, it carried the burden not only that it was entitled under the substantive law to the allowance of its claim for refund or tax credit but also that it met all the requirements for evidentiary substantiation of its claim before the administrative official concerned, or in the de novo litigation before the CTA in Division. RAY PETER O. VIVO vs PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAME CORPORATION (PAGCOR), / G.R. No. 187854 / November 12, 2013 / En Banc MAIN TOPIC: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW / Administrative Due Process F: The petitioner was PAGCOR’s Managing Head of its Gaming Department at the time of his dismissal from office. He was administratively charged with gross misconduct, rumor-mongering, conduct prejudicial to the interest of the company, and loss of trust and confidence which placed him under preventive suspension. The petitioner assailed the propriety of the basis for placing him under preventive suspension. After hearing charges against him, Board of Directors of PAGCOR issued a resolution informing petitioner of his dismissal from service. Civil Service Commission however, passed a resolution ruling that PAGCOR violated the petitioner’s right to due process and accordingly set aside his dismissal from service. The Commission finds that the right of Vivo to due process was violated when he was ousted from his office without the corresponding Board Resolution that should have set out the collegial decision of the PAGCOR Board of Directors. I: Whether or not PAGCOR violated the right of the petitioner to administrative due process? H: No. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The petitioner actively participated in the entire course of the investigation and hearings conducted by PAGCOR.During the administrative inquiry, the Corporate Investigation Unit (CIU) served him a copy of the memorandum of charges, which detailed the accusations against him and specified the acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses. He was also given the opportunity to appear before the Adjudication Committee to answer clarificatory questions. Lastly, he was informed through a memorandum of the decision of the Board of Directors dismissing him from the service. JOCELYN DE LEON VS ATTY. TYRONE PEDREÑA /A.C. NO. 9401 /OCTOBER 22, 2013 / EN BANC MAIN TOPIC: LEGAL ETHICS / CODE OF ETHICS/ DISBARMENT / GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT OF A LAWYER F: Jocelyn de Leon filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) a complaint for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law against Atty. Tyrone Pedreña, a Public Attorney. The records show that Atty. Pedreña rubbed the complainant’s right leg with his hand; tried to insert his finger into her firmly closed hand; grabbed her hand and forcibly placed it on his crotch area; and pressed his finger against her private part. Thereafter, the IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended the disbarment of Atty. Pedreña and the striking off of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. However, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the report and recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, and imposed upon Atty. Pedreña suspension from the practice of law for three months. I: Whether or not the disbarment of Atty. Pedreña was proper? H: No. The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the Bar and to retain membership in the Legal Profession. Members of the Bar are clearly duty- bound to observe the highest degree of morality and integrity in order to safeguard the reputation of the Bar. Any errant behavior on the part of a lawyer that tends to expose a deficiency in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor, be it in the lawyer’s public or private activities, is sufficient to warrant the lawyer’s suspension or disbarment. The determination of the penalty to impose on an erring lawyer is within the Court’s discretion. The exercise of the discretion should neither be arbitrary nor despotic, nor motivated by any animosity or prejudice towards the lawyer, but should instead be ever controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the Bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the Court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession, and to the general public. In view of these considerations, the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years is fitting and just. ATTY. OSCAR L. EMBIDO vs ATTY. SALVADOR N. PE, JR. A.C. No. 6732, October 22, 2013, En Banc MAIN TOPIC: LEGAL ETHICS / CODE OF ETHICS/DISBARMENT/FALSIFICATION OF COURT DECISION F: A complaint for disbarment against Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Atty. Salvador N. Pe, Jr. of San Jose, Antique for his having allegedly falsified an inexistent decision of Branch 64 of the Regional Trial Court stationed in Bugasong, Antique (RTC) instituted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Western Visayas Regional Office, represented by Regional Director Atty. Oscar L. Embido. The complaint stemmed from the letter requestfor a copy of the decisionrendered by Judge Rafael O. Penuela on the Declaration of Presumptive Death of Rey Laserna. Since the RTC had no record of Special Proceedings, that of the Presumptive Death of Rolando Austria was presented instead in the court proceedings in UK. After conducting its investigation, the NBI forwarded to the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas the records of the investigation, with a recommendation that the respondent be prosecuted for falsification of public documentand for violation of Section 3(a) of Republic Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The NBI likewise recommended to the Office of the Court Administrator that disbarment proceedings be commenced against the respondent. I: Whether or not the offense committed by Atty Salvador Pe warrants disbarment? H: Yes. Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyer’s disbarment or suspension from the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration of justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law not only for acts and omissions of malpractice and for dishonesty in his professional dealings, but also for gross misconduct not directly connected with his professional duties that reveal his unfitness for the office and his unworthiness of the principles that the privilege to practice law confers upon him.The test is whether the conduct shows the lawyer to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, and whether the conduct renders the lawyer unworthy to continue as an officer of the Court.  ROLANDO GANZON vs FERNANDO ARLOS G.R. No. 174321 /October 22, 2013 /En Banc MAIN TOPIC: POLITICAL LAW/ADMINISTRATIVE LAW/DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE F: The DILG of Iloilo City held its Christmas party in December 1999. While Arlos was on his way to the office to get some documents Ganzon suddenly approached and pulled out a short firearm of unknown caliber from his waist and with no provocation pointed the firearm at Arlos. In its investigation Civil Service Commission Regional Office found Rolando Ganzon guilty of Grave Misconduct and meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties. After filing a motion for consideration which was denied, Ganzon appealed to the CA which affirmed the decision of the CSC. Ganzon refutes that his acts did not constitute grave misconduct in the contemplation of the law because they were not committed in relation to his performance of duty; and that the Christmas party was not an official function as to render any untoward incident committed on the occasion thereof a misconduct. I: Whether or not the offense committed by Ganzon was connected with his public employment which warrants dismissal from service? H: Yes. Drawing and pointing the loaded firearm at Arlos evinced the intent on the part of Ganzon to cause some harm upon Arlos on whom he vented his resentment of the poor performance rating he received. Considering that Ganzon pointed his loaded firearm at Arlos not only once, but four times, Ganzon’s menacing acts engendered in the mind of Arlos the well-founded belief that Arlos’ life could be in imminent danger. That the firearm exploded when Arlos parried Ganzon’s firearm-wielding hand did not help dissipate the belief. An act is intimately connected to the office of the offender if it is committed as the consequence of the performance of the office by him, or if it cannot exist without the office even if public office is not an element of the crime in the abstract. The commission of offensive overt acts by public officials and employees within the premises of their public offices deserves administrative reprobation. The Court deems it worthwhile to emphasize as a final word that the imposition of the correct disciplinary measures upon erring public officials and employees has the primary objective of the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in the Government. NARCISO DEGAÑOS vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 162826, October 14, 2013, FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: CRIMINAL LAW / ESTAFA SUB TOPIC: CIVIL LAW / NOVATION and AGENCY F: Accused received from Spouses Atty. Jose Bordador and Lydia Bordador gold and pieces of jewelry, under express obligation to sell the same on commission and remit the proceeds thereof or return the unsold gold and pieces of jewelry. Accused however, misapplied, misappropriated and converted to their own use and benefit the said merchandise and the proceeds thereof, to the damage and prejudice of said Sps. Bordador. RTC found Degaños guilty of estafa but acquitted Luz for insufficiency of evidence, imposing on Degaños twenty years of reclusion temporal. Degaños contends that his agreement with the complainants relative to the items of jewelry and gold subject of the amended information as embodied in the relevant Kasunduan at Katibayan was a sale on credit, not a consignment to sell on commission basis. He claims that his partial payments to the complainants novated his contract with them from agency to loan, thereby converting his liability from criminal to civil. He insists that his failure to complete his payments prior to the filing of the complaint-affidavit by the complainants notwithstanding, the fact that the complainants later required him to make a formal proposal before the barangay authorities on the payment of the balance of his outstanding obligations confirmed that novation had occurred. I: Whether or not the contention of Deganos is correct? H: No. Transaction was an agency, not a sale on credit. There was no sale on credit to him because the ownership of the items did not pass to him.Article 1458 of the Civil Code, one of the contracting parties in a contract of sale obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, while the other party obligates himself to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent. Partial payments made by Deganos and his purported agreement to pay the remaining obligations did not equate to a novation of the original contractual relationship of agency to one of sale.Novation is never presumed, and the animus novandi, whether totally or partially, must appear by express agreement of the parties, or by their acts that are too clear and unequivocal to be mistaken. Although the novation of a contract of agency to make it one of sale may relieve an offender from an incipient criminal liability, that did not happen here, for the partial payments and the proposal to pay the balance the accused made during the barangay proceedings were not at all incompatible with Degafios liability under the agency that had already attached. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs RAMON PLACER G.R. No. 181753 /October 9, 2013 /FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: CRIMINAL LAW/HOMICIDE AND MURDER F: Maria Gernale and her husband, RosalinoGernale, were on board a tricycle, when the tricycle carrying appellants almost hit them. After the altercation between appellants and Rosalino, the former chased the tricycle carrying the Gernales. Appellants alighted from their tricycle and proceeded towards the direction of Rosalino who had also alighted from his tricycle.A confrontation followed and Angelina Gestiada, Rosalino’s sister, tried to pacify appellants. But appellant Ramon Placer did not heed as he stabbed Rosalino in the chest. Maria who was only about two (2) steps away saw the incident.Rosalino fell towards the direction of his tricycle and just as he was about to fall, this time Virgilio stabbed him in the stomach.Thereafter, appellants immediately fled the area on board their tricycle. Ramon and his brother Virgilio Placer with murder in the Regional Trial Court in Sorsogon City. I: Whether or not, treachery was employed in the stabbing by the appellant to charge him with murder? H: No. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on the unsuspecting victim. The fatal stabbing of Rosalino by Ramon was immediately preceded by two altercations between Ramon and Virgilio, on one hand, and Rosalino, on the other.The first altercation occurred right after the near-collision of the tricycles, while the other happened shortly after Ramon and Virgilio had blocked Rosalino’s tricycle. During the second altercation, Rosalino stood face to face with Ramon and Virgilio. It was then when Ramon stabbed the victim twice, the sequential method of attack being borne out in the necropsy report showing that Rosalino had sustained two fatal stab wounds in the chest and abdomen. Under the circumstances, Rosalino was rendered completely aware of the imminent danger to himself from Ramon and Virgilio, rendering their assault far from sudden and unexpected as to put Rosalino off his guard against any deadly assault. To stress, treachery cannot be appreciated if the victim was forewarned of an impending danger and could have foreseen the aggression of the accused. With treachery not being proved beyond reasonable doubt, the crime Ramon was properly guilty of was homicide. FAR EAST BANK TRUST COMPANY vs ROBERTO MAR CHANTE, G.R. No. 170598, October 9, 2013, FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: TOPIC: Remedial Law/Burden of Proof F: Robert Mar Chantewas a current account depositor of petitioner Far East Bank & Trust Co. (FEBTC) at its Ongpin Branch. FEBTC alleged that between 8:52 p.m. of May 4, 1992 and 4:06 a.m. of May 5, 1992, Chan had used Far East Card to withdraw funds. That the withdrawals were done in a series of 242 transactions with the use of the same machine, at P4,000.00/withdrawal. On his part, Chan denied liability. Although admitting his physical possession of Far East Cardon May 4 and May 5, 1992, he denied making the ATM withdrawalsand instead insisted that he had been actually home at the time of the withdrawals. FEBTC alleged that the ATM transactions in question would not be processed unless the PIN, which was known only to Chan as the cardholder, had been correctly entered, an indication both that it was his ATM card that had been used, and that all the transactions had been processed successfully by the PNB-MEGALINK ATM facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel with the use of the correct PIN. I: Whether or not, FEBTC was able to discharge its burden of proof against Chan? H: No. The fact that Chan’s account number and ATM card number were the ones used for the withdrawals, by itself, is not sufficient to support the conclusion that he should be deemed to have made the withdrawals. Being the plaintiff, FEBTC must rely on the strength of its own evidence instead of upon the weakness of Chan’s evidence. Its burden of proof thus required it to preponderantly demonstrate that his ATM card had been used to make the withdrawals, and that he had used the ATM card and PIN by himself or by another person to make the fraudulent withdrawals. As a banking institution, FEBTC had the duty and responsibility to ensure the safety of the funds it held in trust for its depositors. It could not avoid the duty or evade the responsibility because it alone should bear the price for the fraud resulting from the system bug on account of its exclusive control of its computer system. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on either side. This is because our system frees the trier of facts from the responsibility of investigating and presenting the facts and arguments, placing that responsibility entirely upon the respective parties. The burden of proof, is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court; or on the defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the essential allegations but raises an affirmative defense or defenses, that, if proved, would exculpate him from liability. MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HOMER T. SAQUILAVAN, Respondents. G.R. No. 203302, April 11, 2013, En Banc MAIN TOPIC: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW /(Procedural Due Process) F: Saquilayan was proclaimed the winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite during the 2010 elections. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in RTC Imus alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC First Division. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor. The COMELEC nullified the RTC’s decision and declared Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor.Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to due process because he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved. The SC En Banc dismissed Maliksi’s petition for certiorari. The Court concluded that Maliksi had not been denied due process because: (a) he had received notices of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the First Division — referring to the orders of the First Division directing Saquilayan to post and augment the cash deposits for the decryption and printing of the ballot images; and (b) he had been able to raise his objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration. The Court then pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot images were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the same evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that the First Division’s finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had been fully established by the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during the revision. I: Whether or not the SC resolution violated the petitioner’s constitutional right to due process for not informing him of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images by the COMELEC First Division. H: YES. Maliksi was not immediately made aware of that crucial finding because the First Division did not even issue any written resolution stating its reasons for ordering the printing of the picture images. It was the COMELEC En Banc’s assailed resolution that later on provided the explanation to justify the First Division’s resort to the picture images of the ballots, by observing that the "unprecedented number of double- votes" exclusively affecting the position of Mayor and the votes for Saquilayan had led to the belief that the ballots had been tampered. However, that explanation by the COMELEC En Banc did not cure the First Division’s lapse and did not erase the irregularity that had already invalidated the First Division’s proceedings. The disregard of Maliksi’s right to be informed of the decision to print the picture images of the ballots and to conduct the recount proceedings during the appellate stage cannot be brushed aside by the invocation of the fact that Maliksi was able to file, after all, a motion for reconsideration. Notably, the First Division did not issue any order directing the recount. Without the written order, Maliksi was deprived of the chance to seek any reconsideration or even to assail the irregularly-held recount through a seasonable petition for certiorari in this Court. In that context, he had no real opportunity to assail the conduct of the recount proceedings.Moreover, due process of law does not only require notice of the decryption, printing, and recount proceedings to the parties, but also demands an opportunity to be present at such proceedings or to be represented therein. Maliksi correctly contends that the orders of the First Division simply required Saquilayan to post and augment his cash deposit. The orders did not state the time, date, and venue of the decryption and recount proceedings. Clearly, the First Division had no intention of giving the parties the opportunity to witness its proceedings. SC PP: "The end does not justify the means." No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles. INTERNATIONAL HOTEL CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.FRANCISCO B. JOAQUIN, JR. and RAFAEL SUAREZ, Respondents. G.R. No. 158361, April 10, 2013, First Division MAIN TOPIC: CIVIL LAW /MIXED CONDITIONAL OBLIGATION F: Francisco B. Joaquin, Jr. proposed to the Board of Directors of the International Hotel Corporation (IHC) for him to render technical assistance in securing a foreign loan for the construction of a hotel, to be guaranteed by the DBP. The IHC Board of Directors approved phase one to phase six of the proposal, and earmarked P2 million for the project. Anent the financing, IHC applied with DBP for a foreign loan guaranty. DBP processed the application, and approved it subject to several conditions. Shortly after submitting the application to DBP, Joaquin wrote to IHC to request the payment of his fees in the amount of P500,000.00 for the services that he had provided and would be providing to IHC in relation to the hotel project that were outside the scope of the technical proposal. Joaquin intimated his amenability to receive shares of stock instead of cash in view of IHC’s financial situation. The stockholders of IHC granted Joaquin’s request, allowing the payment for both Joaquin and Rafael Suarez for their services in implementing the proposal. Joaquin presented to the IHC Board of Directors the results of his negotiations with potential foreign financiers. Negotiations with Materials Handling Corporation (MHC) and, later on, with its principal, Barnes International (Barnes), ensued. While the negotiations with Barnes were ongoing, Joaquin and Jose Valero, the Executive Director of IHC, met with another financier, the Weston International Corporation (Weston), to explore possible financing. When Barnes failed to deliver the needed loan, IHC informed DBP that it would submit Weston for DBP’s consideration. As a result, DBP cancelled its previous guaranty. IHC entered into an agreement with Weston, and communicated this development to DBP. However, DBP denied the application for guaranty for failure to comply with the conditions contained in its letter. Due to Joaquin’s failure to secure the needed loan, IHC, through its President Bautista, canceled the 17,000 shares of stock previously issued to Joaquin and Suarez as payment for their services. Consequently, Joaquin and Suarez filed a complaint in RTC Manila, impleading IHC and its Board of Directors. The complaint alleged that the cancellation of the shares had been illegal, and had deprived them of their right to participate in the meetings and elections held by IHC; that Barnes had been recommended by IHC President Bautista, not by Joaquin; that they had failed to meet their obligation because President Bautista and his son had intervened and negotiated with Barnes instead of Weston; that DBP had canceled the guaranty because Barnes had failed to release the loan; and that IHC had agreed to compensate their services with 17,000 shares of the common stock plus cash of P1 million. The RTC held IHC liable pursuant to the 2nd par. of Art. 1284 of the Civil Code. The RTC found that Joaquin and Suarez had failed to meet their obligations when IHC had chosen to negotiate with Barnes rather than with Weston, the financier that Joaquin had recommended; and that the cancellation of the shares of stock had been proper under Sec. 68 of the Corporation Code, which allowed such transfer of shares to compensate only past services, not future ones. The CA concurred with the RTC, upholding IHC’s liability under Art. 1186 of the Civil Code. It ruled that in the context of Art. 1234 of the Civil Code, Joaquin had substantially performed his obligations and had become entitled to be paid for his services; and that the issuance of the shares of stock was ultra vires for having been issued as consideration for future services. Hence, this petition. I: 1. Whether or not the respondents are entitled to compensation. 2. Whether or not the CA erred in awarding fees and costs of suit to plaintiffs- appellants. H1: YES. To secure a DBP-guaranteed foreign loan did not solely depend on the diligence or the sole will of the respondents because it required the action and discretion of third persons – an able and willing foreign financial institution to provide the needed funds, and the DBP Board of Governors to guarantee the loan. Such third persons could not be legally compelled to act in a manner favorable to IHC. There is no question that when the fulfillment of a condition is dependent partly on the will of one of the contracting parties, or of the obligor, and partly on chance, hazard or the will of a third person, the obligation is mixed. The existing rule in a mixed conditional obligation is that when the condition was not fulfilled but the obligor did all in his power to comply with the obligation, the condition should be deemed satisfied. Considering that the respondents were able to secure an agreement with Weston, and subsequently tried to reverse the prior cancellation of the guaranty by DBP, we rule that they thereby constructively fulfilled their obligation. H2: YES. We sustain IHC’s position that the grant of attorney’s fees lacked factual or legal basis. Attorney’s fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. There should be factual or legal support in the records before the award of such fees is sustained. It is not enough justification for the award simply because respondents were compelled to protect their rights. HON. JULIETA A. DECENA, HON. VIRGILIO D. PONTANAL, HON. AMELITA A. IBASCO, HON. GERRY D. RAA, HON. PEDRO N. MORA. JR., and HON. FERDINAND T. AGUILAR, complainants, vs. JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, Pili, Camarines Sur, respondent. AM No. RTJ-02-1669, April 14, 2004, Second Division MAIN TOPIC: LEGAL ETHICS F: The regular session of a municipal council was interrupted by a heckler in the audience hurling various accusatory remarks and insults at the council members. Among the matters on the agenda was the revocation of two previous council resolutions authorizing Rolando Canet to operate a cockpit in the municipality. Various municipal officials of Bula, Camarines Sur sought the dismissal from the service and the disbarment of respondent Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon, Presiding Judge of RTC Pili, Camarines Sur, on account of his conduct during the session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula. The trial court referred the matter for investigation, report and recommendation to Court of Appeals. I: Whether or not Judge Malanyaon violated the Code of Judicial Conduct H: Judge Malanyaon deserves to be taken to task for his outrageous behavior as it clearly violates the Code of Judicial Conduct. First. The remarks uttered are patently defamatory and even vulgar. Second. Judge Malanyaons harangue was directed at the members of the Sangguniang Bayan in the course of a regular session of the body. The members of the Sanggunian are, by reason of their public office, entitled to the respect of other people, especially their fellow public officers.Third. Judge Malanyaon made his remarks in a public forum. Obviously, however, he forgot or even failed to realize that he is a representative of the judicial branch of government, the judge being the visible representation of the law and, more importantly, of justice. The judiciary is loathe to interfere with the due exercise by co-equal branches of government of their official functions, absent any justiciable action brought in due course. Fourth.It must be understood that Judge Malanyaons remarks were aimed at preventing the Sanggunian from revoking the cockpit license of Canet. In doing so, he was attempting to interfere with the will of the Sanggunian as an independent legislative body. Fifth. Judge Malanyaon obstructed the Sangguniang members from performing their official duties. Sixth. The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge shall neither allow family relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment, nor allow the prestige of judicial office to be used or lent to advance the private interests of others.] It does not escape our attention that Judge Malanyaon was agitated during the Sanggunian session because the interests of his nephew-in-law (Canet) were under attack. The conduct of Judge Malanyaon relative to the legislative session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula is inexcusable and simply cannot be condoned. His actuations constitute palpable violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct: CANON 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES. Rule 2.01. A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.xxx Rule 2.03. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. The Office of the Court Administrator recommends that respondent be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). In his seventeen (17) years in the judiciary, Judge Malanyaon has not been sanctioned, except once by reprimand. With the comparative seriousness of the offense, a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) would serve as an appropriate penalty. WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon is hereby found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge, in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that the commission of the same or a similar act or omission in the future will be dealt with more severely. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALBERTO GONZALES y SANTOS, a.k.a. “Takyo”, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 182417, April 3, 2013, First Division MAIN TOPIC: CRIMINAL LAW / Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act F: An informant reported to the Provincial Drug Enforcement Group (PDEG) that Gonzales was engaging in illegal drug pushing. Police Chief Inspector Celedonio Morales planned to mount a buybust operation against Gonzales, and designated PO1 Eduardo Dimla, Jr. to act as the poseur buyer and PO2 Roel S. Chan to serve as the backup/arresting officer. PO1 Dimla marked with his own initials each of the two P100.00 bills to be used as the buy-bust money, and then recorded the marked bills in the police blotter. At noontime of that same day, PO1 Dimla and PO2 Chan met with the informant at KrusnaDaan, San Rafael, Bulacan, and the three of them proceeded to Banca-Banca, San Rafael, Bulacan, where the house of Gonzales was located. After PO2 Chan posted himself beyond possible view of the suspect, PO1 Dimla and the informant approached Gonzales, with the informant introducing PO1 Dimla to Gonzales as a buyer of shabu worth P200.00. Gonzales handed to PO1 Dimla a plastic sachet containing white substances, and in turn PO1 Dimla handed the two marked P100.00 bills to Gonzales. At that point, PO1 Dimla removed his cap, the pre-arranged signal, in reaction to which PO2 Chan then rushed forward and arrested Gonzales. PO1 Dimla then immediately marked the plastic sachet with his initials “ED.” Gonzales denied the accusation. He attested that he was only resting in front of his house when five armed men approached and forced him inside his house; that they queried him on the whereabouts of his father, but he told them he did not know; that they prevented his mother from leaving the house to seek help from barangay officials; and that after searching his house, they brought him to Camp General Alejo Santos. The RTC convited Gonzales of the crime charged due to the credence given to the narrative of PO1 Dimla. The CA affirmed the conviction of Gonzales. The allegation of appellant that his constitutional right was violated cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties enjoyed by the officers tasked to enforce the law. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies with respect to the operation deserve full faith and credit. I: Whether or not the procedures to preserve the chain of custody were strictly complied with. H: NO. To secure a conviction of the accused charged with the illegal sale of dangerous drugs as defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the State must establish the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur buyer; and (b) that the dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. The identity of the dangerous drugs is essential to proving the corpus delicti. The procedures underscore the value of establishing the chain of custody vis-à-vis the dangerous drugs. The Prosecution does not prove the violation of Section 5 of RA No. 9165 either when the dangerous drugs are missing, or when there are substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts about the authenticity of the evidence presented in court. The State, and no other party, has the responsibility to explain the lapses in the procedures taken to preserve the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs. Without the explanation by the State, the evidence of the corpus delictiis unreliable, and the acquittal of the accused should follow on the ground that his guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable doubt. A further review of the records underscores that poseur-buyer PO1 Dimla nowhere recalled in court that he and PO2 Chua had conducted the physical inventory and photographing of the shabusubject of the sale by Gonzales. In fact, in their joint affidavit of arrest,24 PO1 Dimla and PO2 Chua did not mention any inventory and photographing. The omission can only mean that no such inventory and photographing were done by them. The omission of the inventory and photographing exposed another weakness of the evidence of guilt, considering that the inventory and photographing to be made in the presence of the accused or his representative, or within the presence of any representative from the media, Department of Justice or any elected official, who must sign the inventory, or be given a copy of the inventory, were really significant stages of the procedures outlined by the law and its IRR. By way of exception, Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR both state that the non-compliance with the procedures thereby delineated and set would not necessarily invalidate the seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs provided there were justifiable grounds for the non-compliance, and provided that the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delictiwas preserved. But the non-compliance with the procedures, to be excusable, must have to be justified by the State’s agents themselves. Considering that PO1 Dimla tendered no justification in court for the non-compliance with the procedures, the exception did not apply herein. The absolution of Gonzales should then follow, for we cannot deny that the observance of the chain of custody as defined by the law was the only assurance to him that his incrimination for the very serious crime had been legitimate and insulated from either invention or malice. In this connection, the Court states that the unexplained non-compliance with the procedures for preserving the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs has frequently caused the Court to absolve those found guilty by the lower courts. CA’s decision was reversed. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CHAD MANANSALA y LAGMAN, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 175939, April 3, 2013, First Division MAIN TOPIC: CRIMINAL LAW/RA 6425/Illegal Possession and Illegal Sale F: The PNP in Olongapo City conducted a test-buy operation against Manansala, a suspected dealer of marijuana. Following the test-buy, the search yielded the 750 grams of dried marijuana leaves subject of the information. Also seized was the amount of P655.00 that included the two marked P50.00 bills used during the test buy. All the seized articles were inventoried, and Manansala himself signed the certification to that effect. SPO4 Bolina and his team brought Manansala to Camp Cabal in Olongapo City, where they turned over the seized articles to the evidence custodian, SPO2 Marcelino R. Sapad. First Asst. City Prosecutor Mario F. Manalansan filed a motion for the admission of an amended information, ostensibly to modify the offense charged from illegal sale of prohibited drugs under Section 4 of RA No. 6425 to illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 of the same law. But the RTC did not act on the motion. Nonetheless, the trial proceeded, with the Prosecution establishing the matters earlier summarized. In his turn, Manansala denied the charge, alleging that he had been the victim of a frame-up. His version states that military men clad in civilian attire arrived at his house and arrested him without any warrant, and brought him to an office. His captors mugged and then detained him when he refused to admit the sale and possession of marijuana. As of the time of his testimony, he conceded that he could not identify his captors and whoever had maltreated him, except SPO4 Bolina whom he recognized in court when the latter testified at the trial. The RTC convicted Manansala for illegal possession of marijuana. The alleged act of allegedly knowingly selling or pushing prohibited drugs by the accused was however, not sufficiently proven.On appeal, the CA dismissed the same. Hence, this appeal. I: Whether or not the offense of illegal possession of marijuana (Sec. 8, RA 6425) was necessarily included in the offense of illegal sale of marijuana (Sec.4, RA 6425). H: YES. Indispensable in every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, a prohibited drug, is the submission of proof that the sale of the illicit drug took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delictias evidence. The element of sale must be unequivocally established in order to sustain a conviction. In the case before us, the trial court correctly held that the prosecution failed to establish, much less adduce proof, that accused-appellant was indeed guilty of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana. But it is beyond doubt that he was found in possession of the same. While no conviction for the unlawful sale of prohibited drugs may be had under the present circumstances, the established principle is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller. In the case before us, it has been satisfactorily ascertained that the bricks of marijuana confiscated from accused-appellant were the same prohibited drugs subject of the original Information. Again, it should be stressed that the crime of unlawful sale of marijuana penalized under Section 4 of RA 6425 necessarily includes the crime of unlawful possession thereof. As Lacernaand similar rulings have explained, the crime of illegal sale of marijuana defined and punished under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, implied the prior possession of the marijuana. As such, the crime of illegal sale included or absorbed the crime of illegal possession. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged. According to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Court (1985), the rule then applicable, an offense charged necessarilyincludes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. SEGUNDINA A. GALVEZ, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES HONORIO C. MONTANOand SUSANA P. MONTANO and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondents. G.R. No. 157445, April 3, 2013, First Division MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW / CIVIL PROCEDURE / PETITION FOR REVIEW / NECESSITY OF ATTACHING THE PLEADINGS AND PORTIONS OF THE RECORDS TO THE PETITION F: The case involves a parcel of land in Babatngon, Leyte, which used to be owned by Sps. Eustacio and Segundina Galvez. After their marital relationship turned sour, Eustacio and Segundina separated and cohabited with other partners. Eustacio sold the property to their daughter Jovita without the knowledge or consent of Segundina. After the sale, Jovita constituted a mortgage on the property to secure her loan from the PNB. Jovita failed to pay her obligation. Hence, PNB had the property extra- judicially foreclosed. In the ensuing foreclosure sale, PNB was the highest bidder. There being no redemption, the property became PNB’s acquired asset. Respondents Sps. Honorio and Susana Montaño purchased the property from PNB. Thereafter, the Montaños tried to get the actual possession of the property, but Segundina refused to vacate. Accordingly, the Montaños sued Segundina for recovery of ownership and possession, and damages in the MTC of Babatngon, Leyte. Segundina countered that the sale of the property by Eustacio to Jovita was null and void for having been done without her knowledge and consent; that the sale to PNB as well as to the Montaños were consequently void; and that the Montaños were also buyers in bad faith. The MTC ruled in favor of the Montaños, holding that the sale by Eustacio to Jovita was merely voidable, not null and void; that because Segundina had not brought an action for the annulment of the sale within 10 years from the date of the transaction, as provided in Article 173 of the Civil Code, the sale remained valid; that Segundina did not establish that the foreclosure proceedings, auction sale, and the acquisition of the property by the Montaños were void; and that in view of the valid acquisition of the property by PNB during the foreclosure sale, the subsequent sale to the Montaños was also valid. The RTC affirmed the MTC’s decision. The CA dismissed the petition for review and held that no copies of pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations thereof were attached in violation of Section 2, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. I: Whether or not Segundina’sfailure to attach the pleadings to her petition for review warrant its outright dismissal. H: NO. The mere failure to attach copies of pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations should not cause the outright dismissal of a petition for review. The allegations of the petition must be examined to determine the sufficiency of the attachments appended thereto. The Court has laid down three guideposts in determining the necessity of attaching the pleadings and portions of the records to the petition: First, not all pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached to the petition. Only those which are relevant and pertinent must accompany it. The test of relevancy is whether the document in question will support the material allegations in the petition, whether said document will make out a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion as to convince the court to give due course to the petition. Second, even if a document is relevant and pertinent to the petition, it need not be appended if it is shown that the contents thereof can also found in another document already attached to the petition. Thus, if the material allegations in a position paper are summarized in a questioned judgment, it will suffice that only a certified true copy of the judgment is attached. Third, a petition lacking an essential pleading or part of the case record may still be given due course or reinstated (if earlier dismissed) upon showing that petitioner later submitted the documents required, or that it will serve the higher interest of justice that the case be decided on the merits. The Court considers the attachments of Segundina’s petition for review already sufficient to enable the CA to pass upon her assigned errors and to resolve her appeal even without the pleadings and other portions of the records. DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR., Petitioner, vs. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as Secretary of the Department of Justice, CSP CLAROARELLANO, as Chief State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF PROSECUTORS OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP PETER G.R. No. 197291, April 3, 2013, First Division MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW / REMEDY OF MANDAMUS directed to Prosecutors SUB TOPIC: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/ SEPARATION OF POWERS SUB TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW / CRIMINAL PROCEDURE / DISCHARGE TO BE STATE WITNESS F: The NBI and PNP charged the petitioner, and other suspects, for what became aptly known as the Maguindanao massacre. Through Department Order No. 948, then Secretary of Justice Agnes Devanadera constituted a Special Panel of Prosecutors to conduct the preliminary investigation. In a joint resolution, the Panel of Prosecutors charged 196 individuals with multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre. It appears that in issuing the joint resolution, the Panel of Prosecutors partly relied on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag. Dalandag was admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. The QC RTC issued its amended pre-trial order, wherein Dalandag was listed as one of the Prosecution witnesses. Petitioner wrote to respondent Secretary De Lima and Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the information for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the massacre through his two sworn declarations. Accordingly, petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused in the various murder cases undergoing trial in the QC RTC. Respondents questioned the propriety of the conduct of a trial in a proceeding for mandamus. Petitioner filed a motion for the production of documents, which the RTC in Manila granted after respondents did not file either a comment or an opposition. Respondents then sought the reconsideration of the order. The RTC in Manila issued a subpoena to Dalandag, care of the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ, requiring him to appear and testify. Respondents moved to quash the subpoena. Petitioner opposed the motion to quash the subpoena. The RTC of Manila issued the assailed order dismissing the petition for mandamus. Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari. I: 1. Whether the public respondents may be compelled by Mandamus to investigate and prosecute Kenny Dalandag as an accused in the information for multiple murder in the Maguindanao massacre case in light of his admitted participation threat in affidavits and official records; and 2. Whether the subsequent inclusion of Kenny Dalandag in the witness protection program justifies exclusion as an accused and his non-indictment for his complicity in the Maguindanao massacre notwithstanding admissions made that he took part in its planning and execution. H1: NO. The appeal lacks merit. The prosecution of crimes pertains to the Executive Department of the Government whose principal power and responsibility are to see to it that our laws are faithfully executed. The public prosecutors are solely responsible for the determination of the amount of evidence sufficient to establish probable cause to justify the filing of appropriate criminal charges against a respondent. Theirs is also the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not criminal cases should be filed in court. Consistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution, the Court deems it a sound judicial policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and to allow the Executive Department, through the Department of Justice, exclusively to determine what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of supposed offenders. By way of exception, however, judicial review may be allowed where it is clearly established that the public prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion. The records herein are bereft of any showing that the Panel of Prosecutors committed grave abuse of discretion in identifying the 196 individuals to be indicted for the Maguindanao massacre. Petitioner does not assail the joint resolution recommending such number of individuals to be charged with multiple murder, but only seeks to have Dalandag be also investigated and charged as one of the accused based because of his own admissions in his sworn declarations. However, his exclusion as an accused from the information did not at all amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Panel of Prosecutors whose procedure in excluding Dalandag as an accused was far from arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic. Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that “the complaint or information shall be xxx against all persons who appear to be responsible for the offense involved,” albeit a mandatory provision, may be subject of some exceptions, one of which is when a participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state witness. H2: NO. The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may become a state witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval of his application for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in accordance with Republic Act No. 6981 (The Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act). These modes, while seemingly alike, are distinct and separate from each other. Under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the discharge by the trial court of one or more of several accused with their consent so that they can be witnesses for the State is made upon motion by the Prosecution before resting its case. On the other hand, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 6981 provides that an accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he may be a State Witness pursuant to Section 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused, so that he can be used as a State Witness under Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. Save for the circumstance covered by paragraph (a) of Section 10, the requisites under both rules are essentially the same. Also worth noting is that an accused discharged from an information by the trial court pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 may also be admitted to the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ provided he complies with the requirements of Republic Act No. 6981. On the other hand, there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for the Prosecution to first charge a person in court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify for admission in to the Witness Protection Program. The admission as a state witness under Republic Act No. 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and said witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal information except when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be meanwhile charged in court as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to him of the certification of admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness. The Court shall then order the discharge and exclusion of said accused from the information. The admission of Dalandag into the Witness Protection Program of the Government as a state witness was warranted by the absolute necessity of his testimony to the successful prosecution of the Section 18, Rule 119, Rules of Court. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed by Republic Act No. 6981 were met in his case. That he admitted his participation in the commission of the Maguindanao massacre was no hindrance to his admission into the Witness Protection Program as a state witness, for all that was necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty. Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his participation in the Maguindanao massacre, as to which his admission operated as an acquittal, unless he later on refuses or fails to testify in accordance with the sworn statement that became the basis for his discharge against those now charged for the crimes. MARIE CALLO-CLARIDAD, Petitioner, vs. PHILIP RONALD P. ESTEBAN and TEODORA ALYN ESTEBAN, Respondents G.R. No. 191567, First Division, March 20, 2013 MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW / CRIMINAL PROCEDURE / PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION SUB TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW / CRIMINAL PROCEDURE /EVIDENCE / PRIMA FACIE & CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE F: Chase returned home from visiting his girlfriend, Ramonna Liza “Monnel” Hernandez. Chase’s sister Ariane decided to stay behind and leave with their house helpers, MarivicGuray and Michelle Corpus, only after Chase had left on board the white Honda Civic car. In the meanwhile, Chase exchanged text messages with his girlfriend Monnel. Security Guard (SG) Rodolph Delos Reyes and SG Henry Solis, who were stationed at the main gate of Ferndale Homes, logged the arrival of Philip on board a white Honda Civic with a male companion in the passenger seat. It was determined later on that the white Honda Civic bearing plate CRD 999 was owned by one Richard Joshua Ulit, who had entrusted the car to Philip who had claimed to have found a buyer of the car. Ulit, Pamela Ann Que, and car shop owner EdbertYlo later attested that Philip and Chase were friends, and that they were unaware of any rift between the two prior to the incident. Some witnesses alleged that prior to the discovery of the Chase’s body, they had noticed a male and female inside the car bearing plate JTG 333 engaged in a discussion. SG Abelardo Sarmiento Jr., while patrolling around the village, noticed that the side of the Honda Civic with plate JTG 333 had red streaks, which prompted him to move towards the parked cars. He inspected the then empty vehicle and noticed that its radio was still turned on. He checked the cars and discovered that the rear and side of the Honda Civic with plate CRD 999 were smeared with blood. He saw on the passenger seat a cellular phone covered with blood. It was then that he found the bloodied and lifeless body of Chase lying between the parallel cars. The SOCO team arrived. Its members prepared a sketch and took photographs of the crime scene. They recovered and processed the cadaver of Chase, a bloodstained t-shirt, blood smears, green nylon cord, fingerprints, wristwatch, and a bloodied Nokia N90 mobile phone. According to the NBI Medico- Legal Report, the victim sustained two stab wounds. The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City dismissed the complaint due to lack of evidence, motive, and circumstantial evidence sufficient to charge Philip with homicide, much less murder. On petition for review, the Secretary of Justice affirmed the dismissal and held that the confluence of lack of an eyewitness, lack of motive, insufficient circumstantial evidence, and the doubt as to the proper identification of Philip by the witnesses resulted in the lack of probable cause to charge Philip and Teodora with the crime alleged. I: Whether or not there was probable cause to charge Philip and Teodora with murder for the killing of Chase. H: NO. To start with, that the petitioner assailed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice by filing in the CA a petition for review under Rule 43, Rules of Court. That was a grave mistake that immediately called for the outright dismissal of the petition. The filing of a petition for review under Rule 43 to review the Secretary of Justice’s resolution on the determination of probable cause was an improper remedy. Indeed, the CA had no appellate jurisdiction vis-à-vis the Secretary of Justice. Secondly, even an examination of the CA’s decision indicates that the CA correctly concluded that the Secretary of Justice did not abuse his discretion in passing upon and affirming the finding of probable cause by the OCP. A preliminary investigation is “an inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. In Arula vs. Espino,18 the Court rendered the three purposes of a preliminary investigation, to wit: (1) to inquire concerning the commission of a crime and the connection of the accused with it, in order that he may be informed of the nature and character of the crime charged against him, and, if there is probable cause for believing him guilty, that the State may take the necessary steps to bring him to trial; (2) to preserve the evidence and keep the witnesses within the control of the State; and (3) to determine the amount of bail, if the offense is bailable. The determination of the existence of probable cause lies within the discretion of the public prosecutor after conducting a preliminary investigation upon the complaint of an offended party. Probable cause for purposes of filing criminal information is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committedand that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed, and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause, although it requires less than evidence justifying a conviction, demands more than bare suspicion. Under the circumstances presented, we conclude to be correct the CA’s determination that no prima facie evidence existed that sufficiently indicated the respondents’ involvement in the commission of the crime. It is clear that there was no eyewitness of the actual killing of Chase; or that there was no evidence showing how Chase had been killed, how many persons had killed him, and who had been the perpetrator or perpetrators of his killing. There was also nothing that directly incriminated the respondents in the commission of either homicide or murder. Admittedly, the petitioner relies solely on circumstantial evidence, which she insists to be enough to warrant the indictment of respondents for murder. For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with one another and must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion that a crime has been committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof. The pieces of evidence must be consistent with the hypothesis that the respondents were probably guilty of the crime and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that they were innocent, and with every rational hypothesis except that of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient, therefore, if: (a) there is more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived have been proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The records show that the circumstantial evidence linking Philip to the killing of Chase derived from the bare recollections of Ariane (sister of Chase), and of Guray and Corpus (respectively, the househelp and nanny in the household of a resident of the subdivision) about Philip being the driver of the Honda Civic. But there was nothing else after that, because the circumstances revealed by the other witnesses could not even be regarded as circumstantial evidence against Philip. In Oporto, Jr. vs. Monserate, it was held that the requirement set forth under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is mandatory. This is so because the rules on preliminary investigation do not require a confrontation between the parties. Preliminary investigation is ordinarily conducted through submission of affidavits and supporting documents, through submission of affidavits and supporting documents, through the exchange of pleadings. Thus, it can be inferred that the rationale for requiring the affidavits of witnesses to be sworn to before a competent officer so as to ensure that the affidavits supporting the factual allegations in the Complaint have been sworn before a competent officer and that the affiant has signed the same in the former’s presence declaring on oath the truth of the statement made considering that this becomes part of the bases in finding probable guilt against the respondent. Well settled is the rule that persons, such as an employee, whose unsworn declarations in behalf of a party, or the employee’s employer in this case, are not admissible in favor of the latter. Further, it has been held that unsworn statements or declarations are self-serving and self-serving declarations are not admissible in evidence as proof of the facts asserted, whether they arose by implication from acts and conduct or were made orally or reduced in writing. The vital objection to the admission to this kind of evidence is its hearsay character. In the case at bar, a perusal of the statements/affidavits accompanying the complaint shows that out of the total of 16 statements/affidavits corresponding to the respective witnesses, only nine (9) thereof were sworn to before a competent officer. Thus, it is imperative that the circumstantial evidence that the victim was last seen in the company of respondent Philip must be established by competent evidence required by the rules in preliminary investigation. GEORGE BONGALON, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 169533, First Division, March 20, 2013 MAIN TOPIC: CRIMINAL LAW / RA 7610 F: Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother, both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in Legazpi City; that when the procession passed in front of the petitioner’s house, the latter’s daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them names like "strangers" and "animals"; that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face;that the petitioner then went to the brothers’ house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house to take on the petitioner; that Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and reported the incident; that Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching Hospital. The petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that he only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn, his minor daughters, had told him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at them and about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from harming his daughters. To corroborate the petitioner’s testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did not hit or slap but only confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi" and why he had burned Cherrlyn’s hair. Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson and calling him a "sissy." She insisted that it was instead Jayson who had pelted her with stones during the procession. She described the petitioner as a loving and protective father. The RTC found the petitioner guilty of child abuse. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction. I: Whether or not the actions of the petitioner constitutes child abuse. H: NO. Although the SC affirms the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, the SC disagrees with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of Sec. 3 (b), RA 7610. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved in favor of the petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all possible circumstances in his favor. Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code. What crime, then, did the petitioner commit? Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention, the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code.  JOHNNY M. PESTO, Complainant, vs. MARCELITO M. MILLO, Respondent A. C. No. 9612, First Division, March 13, 2013 MAIN TOPIC: LEGAL ETHICS / CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY F: Johnny Pesto, a Canadian national, charged Atty. Marcelito M. Millo with conduct unbecoming an officer of the Court, misleading his client, bungling the transfer of title, and incompetence and negligence in the performance of his duty as a lawyer. Johnny averred that his wife Abella Pesto retained the services of Atty. Millo to handle the transfer of title over a parcel of land to her name, and the adoption of her niece, Arvi Jane Dizon; that Johnny and Abella gave to Atty. Millo the amounts of P14,000.00 for the transfer of title and P10,000.00 for the adoption case; that Atty. Millo thereafter repeatedly gave them false information and numerous excuses to explain his inability to complete the transfer of title; that Atty. Millo likewise made them believe that the capital gains tax for the property had been paid way back in 1991, but they found out upon their return to the country in February 1995 that he had not yet paid the tax; that when they confronted him, Atty. Millo insisted that he had already paid the same, but he could not produce any receipt for the supposed payment; that Atty. Millo reluctantly returned to Abella the amount of P14,000.00 only after he stormed out of Atty. Millo’s office in exasperation over his stalling tactics; and that Atty. Millo then further promised in writing to assume the liability for the accrued penalties. Likewise, Johnny blamed Atty. Millo for letting the adoption case be considered closed by the Tarlac office of the DSWD due to two years of inaction. Johnny brought this administrative complaint in the IBP praying for disciplinary action to be taken against Atty.Millo, and seeking the refund of P15,643.75. The IBP found Atty. Millo liable for violating Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for six months. Atty. Millo moved for a reconsideration. I: Whether or not Atty. Millo is liable for the violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. H: YES. Every attorney owes fidelity to the causes and concerns of his clients. He must be ever mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the clients. His duty to safeguard the clients’ interests commences from hisengagement as such, and lasts until his effective release by the clients. In that time, he is expected to take every reasonable step and exercise ordinary care as his clients’ interests may require. An attorney who conceals his inefficiency and lack of diligence by giving wrong information to his client regarding the matter subject of their professional relationship is guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer of theCourt. He thereby violates his Lawyer's Oathto conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his client. He also thereby violates Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, by which he is called upon to serve his client with competence and diligence. Atty. Millo’s acceptance of the sums of money from Johnny and Abella to enable him to attend to the transfer of title and to complete the adoption case initiated the lawyer- client relationship between them. From that moment on, Atty. Millo assumed the duty to render competent and efficient professional service to them as his clients. Yet, he failed to discharge his duty. He was inefficient and negligent in going about what the professional service he had assumed required him to do. He concealed his inefficiency and neglect by giving false information to his clients about having already paid the capital gains tax. In reality, he did not pay the capital gains tax, rendering the clients liable for a substantial financial liability in the form of penalties. A serious administrative complaint like this one should not be taken for granted or lightly by any respondent attorney. Yet, Atty. Millo did not take the complaint of Johnny seriously enough, and even ignored it for along period of time. His belated and terse characterization of the charge by claiming that the charge had emanated from a mere “misunderstanding” was not sufficient. Atty. Millo made his situation even worse by consistently absenting himself from the scheduled hearings the IBP had set for his benefit. His disregard of the IBP’s orders requiring his attendance in the hearings wasnot only irresponsible, but also constituted utter disrespect for the Judiciary and his fellow lawyers. Such conduct was absolutely unbecoming of a lawyer, because lawyers are particularly called upon to obey Court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with orders from the duly constituted authorities. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, vs. TOMAS CUENCA, MARCELINA CUENCA, MILAGROS CUENCA, BRAMIE T. TAYACTAC, and MANUEL D. MARANON, JR., Respondents. G.R. No. 173297, First Division, March 6, 2013 MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW / CIVIL PROCEDURE / PARTIES F: Marañon filed a complaint in the RTC against the Cuencas and Tayactac for the collection of a sum of money and damages, with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. The RTC granted the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment conditioned upon the posting of a bond of P1 million in favor of the Cuencas. Enforcing the writ of preliminary attachment, the sheriff levied upon the equipment, supplies, materials and various other personal property belonging to Arc Cuisine, Inc. that were found in the leased corporate office- cum-commissary or kitchen of the corporation. The Cuencas and Tayactac presented in the RTC a Motion to Dismiss and to Quash Writ of Preliminary Attachment on the grounds that: (1) the action involved intra-corporate matters that were within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); and (2) there was another action pending in the SEC as well as a criminal complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Parañaque City. The RTC denied the motion. The Cuencas and Tayactac moved for reconsideration but the RTC likewise denied their motion. Thus, the Cuencas and Tayactac appealed to the CA. The CA granted the petition. The case was remanded to the RTC. The Cuencas and Tayactac filed a Motion to Require Sheriff to Deliver Attached Properties and to Set Case for Hearing. Marañon filed his own comment/opposition to the motion arguing that because the attached properties belonged to Arc Cuisine, Inc. 50% of the stockholding of which he and his relatives owned, it should follow that 50% of the value of the missing attached properties constituted liquidating dividends that should remain with and belong to him. Accordingly, he prayed that he should be required to return only P100,000.00 to the Cuencas and Tayactac. The RTC commanded Marañon to surrender all the attached properties to the RTC. The RTC heldMarañon and Stronghold Insurance jointly and solidarily liable for damages to the Cuencas and Tayactac. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. I: Whether or not Marañon and petitioner Stronghold jointly and solidarily liable to pay Cuenca, et.al. for damages by reason of the alleged unlawful and wrongful issuance of the writ of attachment. Marañon insisted that he could not be personally held liable under the attachment bond because the judgment of the RTC was rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action that involved an intra-corporate controversy among the stockholders of Arc Cuisine, Inc.; and that the jurisdiction properly pertained to the SEC, where another action was already pending between the parties. H: NO. Under Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. A real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or one who is entitled to the avails of the suit. Accordingly, a person , to be a real party in interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, should appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced, that is, his interest must be a present substantial interest, not a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. Where the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the ground for the motion to dismiss is lack of cause of action. The reason for this is that the courts ought not to pass upon questions not derived from any actual controversy. Truly, a person having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as the plaintiff in an action. Nor does a court acquire jurisdiction over a case where the real party in interest is not present or impleaded. The personality of a corporation is distinct and separate from the personalities of its stockholders. Hence, its stockholders are not themselves the real parties in interest to claim and recover compensation for the damages arising from the wrongful attachment of its assets. Only the corporation is the real party in interest for that purpose. The Cuencas and Tayactac were clearly not vested with any direct interest in the personal properties coming under the levy on attachment by virtue alone of their being stockholders in Arc Cuisine, Inc. Given the separate and distinct legal personality of Arc Cuisine, Inc., the Cuencas and Tayactac lacked the legal personality to claim the damages sustained from the levy of the former’s properties. In the present case, the stockholders have brought the action not for the benefit of the corporation but for their own benefit, since they ask that the defendant make good the losses occasioned by his mismanagement and pay to them the value of their respective participation in the corporate assets on the basis of their respective holdings. Clearly, this cannot be done until all corporate debts, if there be any, are paid and the existence of the corporation terminated by the limitation of its charter or by lawful dissolution in view of the provisions of section 16 of the Corporation Law. It results that plaintiffs complaint shows no cause of action in their favor so that the lower court did not err in dismissing the complaint on that ground. DONNINA C. HALLEY, Petitioner, vs. PRINTWELL, INC., Respondent G.R. No. 157549, May 30, 2011 Third Division MAIN TOPIC: MERCANTILE LAW / CORPORATION LAW / PIERCING OF CORPORATE VEIL / TRUST FUND DOCTRINE DOCTRINE: Stockholders of a corporation are liable for the debts of the corporation up to the extent of their unpaid subscriptions. They cannot invoke the veil of corporate identity as a shield from liability, because the veil may be lifted to avoid defrauding corporate creditors. F: Petitioner Halley is an incorporator and a director of Business Media Philippines Inc. (BMPI). In the course of its business, it commissioned Printwell, Inc. to print the magazine Philippines, Inc., which is a magazine supplied and distributed by the company. Printwell extended 30-day credit accommodation in favor of BMPI and in a period of 9 mos. BMPI placed several orders amounting to P316,342.76. Only P25,000.00 was paid by BMPI leaving a balance of P291,342.76. Printwell sued BMPI for collection of the unpaid balance and later on impleaded BMPI’s original stockholders and incorporators to recover on their unpaid subscriptions. It appears that BMPI has an authorized capital stock of 3M divided into 300,000shares with P10 par value. Only 75,000 shares worth P750,000.00 were originally subscribed of which P187,500.00 were paid up capital. Halley subscribed to 35,000 shares worth P350,000.00 but only paid P87,500.00. Halley contends that they had already paid their subscriptions in full and that BMPI has a personality distinct and separate from its stockholders. The RTC held that defendant merely used the corporate fiction as a cloak/cover to create an injustice against Printwell. The lower court also rejected allegations of full payment in view of irregularity in the issuance of ORs. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC. I: Whether a stockholder who was in active management of the business of thecorporation and still has unpaid subscriptions should be made liable for the debtsof the corporation by piercing the veil of corporate fiction. H: Yes. Although a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from those of its stockholders, directors, or officers, such separate and distinct personality is merely a fiction created by law for the sake of convenience and to promote the ends of justice. The corporate personality may be disregarded, and the individuals composing the corporation will be treated as individuals, if the corporate entity is being used as a cloak or cover for fraud or illegality;as a justification for a wrong; as an alter ego, an adjunct, or a business conduit for the sole benefit of the stockholders. As a general rule, a corporation is looked upon as a legal entity, unless and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears. Thus,the courts always presume good faith, andfor that reason accord prime importance to the separate personality of the corporation, disregarding the corporate personality only after the wrongdoing is first clearly and convincingly established. It thus behooves the courts to be careful in assessing the milieu where the piercing of the corporate veil shall be done. In the case at bench, it is undisputed that BMPI made several orders on credit from appellee PRINTWELL involving the printing of business magazines, wrappers and subscription cards, in the total amount of P291,342.76 (Record pp. 3-5, Annex "A") which facts were never denied by appellants’ stockholders that they owe(d) appellee the amount of P291,342.76. The said goods were delivered to and received by BMPI but it failed to pay its overdue account to appellee as well as the interest thereon, at the rate of 20% per annum until fully paid. It was also during this time that appellants stockholders were in charge of the operation of BMPI despite the fact that they were not able to pay their unpaid subscriptions to BMPI yet greatly benefited from said transactions. In view of the unpaid subscriptions, BMPI failed to pay appellee of its liability, hence appellee in order to protect its right can collect from the appellants stockholders regarding their unpaid subscriptions. DOLORES ADORA MACASLANG, Petitioner, vs. RENATO AND MELBA ZAMORA, Respondents G.R. No. 156375, May 30, 2011 Third Division MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW /CIVIL PROCEDURE / CAUSE OF ACTION F: On March 10, 1999, Spouses Zamora filed an unlawful detainer case with the MTCC, alleging among others that: Macaslang sold to them a residential lot in Sabang, Davao City with an area of 400sqm which includes a residential house where Macaslang was then living. After the sale, Macaslang requested to be allowed to live in the house. Zamora granted the request on thereliance of Macaslang’s promise to vacate as soon as she would be able to find a new residence. After 1 year, the spouses demanded the defendant to vacate but she failed and refused. The Zamora’s sought the help of the Lupon, but no settlement was reached as shown by certification to file. Despite the due service of summons, Macaslang did not file an answer. Hence MTCC declared her in default. The MTCC ruled in favor of the Zamora’s and ordered Macaslang to vacate, pay attorney’s fees, and rental until defendant shall have vacatedthe properties in question.Macaslang appealed to the RTC alleging extrinsic fraud and that there was no actual sale considering that the deed of absolute sale relied upon is apatent nullity as her signature therein was procured through fraud and trickery. The RTC ruled in favor of Macaslang and dismissed spouses Zamora’s complaint, for failure to state a cause of action. The RTC held that the same maybe refiled in the same court by alleging a cause of action, if any. The appellate court reversed the RTC decision for having no basis in fact and law. The MTCC decision is reinstated. I: Whether in an action for unlawful detainer, where there was no prior demand to vacate and comply with the conditions of the lease, a valid cause of action exists H: Yes. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of possession or the refusal is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law (Jimenez vs. Patricia, Inc., 340 SCRA 525). In the case at bench, par. 4 of the Complaint alleges, thus: "4. After a period of one (1) year living in the aforementioned house, Plaintiff demanded upon defendant to vacate but she failed and refused;" From the foregoing allegation, it cannot be disputed that a demand to vacate has not only been made but that the same was alleged in the complaint. How the Regional Trial Court came to the questionable conclusion that Plaintiffs-appellants had no cause of action is beyond Us. xx In resolving whether the complaint states a cause of actionor not, only the facts alleged in the complaint are considered. The test is whether the court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based on the facts alleged and the prayer asked for. Only ultimate facts, not legal conclusions or evidentiary facts, are considered for purposes of applying the test.Based on its allegations, the complaintsufficiently stated a cause of action for unlawful detainer. Firstly, it averred that the petitioner possessed the property by the mere tolerance of the respondents. Secondly, the respondents demanded that the petitioner vacate the property, thereby rendering her possession illegal. Thirdly, she remained in possession of the property despite the demand to vacate. And, fourthly, the respondents instituted the complaint on March 10, 1999, which was well within a year after the demand to vacate was made around September of 1998 or later. Yet, even as we rule that the respondents’ complaint stated a cause of action, we must find and hold that both the RTC and the CA erroneously appreciatedthe real issue to be about the complaint’s failure to state a cause of action. It certainly was not so, butthe respondents’ lack of cause of action. Their erroneous appreciationexpectedly prevented the correct resolution of the action. Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from each other. FAILURE TO STATE CAUSE OF ACTION LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION Refers to the insufficiency of the Refers to a situation where the evidence pleading, and is a ground for dismissal does not prove the cause of action under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. alleged in the pleading. Justice Regalado, a recognized commentator on remedial law, has explained the distinction: xxx What is contemplated, therefore, is a failure to state a cause of action which is provided in Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16. This is a matter of insufficiency of the pleading. Sec. 5 of Rule 10, which was also included as the last mode for raising the issue to the court, refers to the situation where the evidence does not prove a cause of action. This is, therefore, a matter of insufficiency of evidence. Failure to state a cause of action is different from failure to prove a cause of action. The remedy in the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur to the evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated in this section. The procedure would consequently be to require the pleading to state a cause of action, by timely objection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a demurrer to evidence, if such motion is warranted. A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (a) The legal right of the plaintiff; (b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and (c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. If the allegations of the complaint do not aver the concurrence of these elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.Evidently, it is not the lack or absence of a cause of action that is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint but the fact that the complaint states no cause of action.Failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of an action through a motion to dismiss, but lack of cause of action may be raised at any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of the stipulations, admissions, or evidence presented.  FEDMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner vs. FEDERICO AGCAOILI, Respondent G.R. No. 165025, August 31, 2011 First Division MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW / Civil Procedure / Docket fees SUB TOPIC: CIVIL LAW / Obligations /Estoppel F: FDC was the owner and developer of a condominium project known as Fedman Suites Building (FSB) in Makati City. Interchem Laboratories purchased FSBs Unit 411 under a contract to sell. On October 10, 1980, Interchem, with FDCs consent, transferred all its rights in Unit 411 to respondent Federico Agcaoili (Agcaoili). As consideration for the transfer, Agcaoili agreed: (a) to pay Interchem ₱150,000.00 upon signing of the deed of transfer; (b) to update the account by paying to FDC the amount of ₱15,473.17 through a 90 day-postdated check; and (c) to deliver to FDC the balance of ₱137,286.83 in 135 equal monthly installments of ₱1,857.24 effective October 1980, inclusive of 12% interest per annum on the diminishing balance. The obligations Agcaoili assumed totaled ₱302,760.00.In December 1983, the centralized air- conditioning unit of FSBs fourth floor broke down. This prompted Agcaoili to write a letter to the Vice President for the repairs, but his demand was unheeded. He then informed FDC and FSCC that he was suspending the payment of his condominium dues and monthly amortizations. FDC cancelled the contract to sell which prompted Agcaoili to sue for injunction and damages in RTC Makati. The parties later on executed a compromise agreement which was approved by the RTC. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of Agcaoili. FDC appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. FDC claims that there was a failure to pay the correct amount of docket fee because the complaint did not specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees; that the payment of the prescribed docket fee by Agcaoili was necessary for the RTC to acquire jurisdiction over the case; and that, consequently, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over this case.FDC also claims that the proceedings in the RTC were void because the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action pertained to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). I1: Whether RTC did not acquire jurisdiction for failing to pay the correct amount of docket fees. I2: Whether the proceedings in the RTC were void because the jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action pertained to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). H1: No. If the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient in relation to the amounts being sought, the clerk of court or his duly authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment, and the plaintiff will be required to pay the deficiency. The non-specification of the amounts of damages does not immediately divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case, provided there is no bad faith or intent to defraud the Government on the part of the plaintiff. In Rivera v. Del Rosario, the Court, resolving the issue of the failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees due to the inadequate assessment by the clerk of court, ruled that jurisdiction over the complaint was still validly acquired upon the full payment of the docket fees assessed by the Clerk of Court. Relying on Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion, the Court opined that the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vested a trial court with jurisdiction over the claim, and although the docket fees paid were insufficient in relation to the amount of the claim, the clerk of court or his duly authorized deputy retained the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment, and the party filing the action could be required to pay the deficiency, without jurisdiction being automatically lost. Even where the clerk of court fails to make a deficiency assessment, and the deficiency is not paid as a result, the trial court nonetheless continues to have jurisdiction over the complaint, unless the party liable is guilty of a fraud in that regard, considering that the deficiency will be collected as a fee in lien. Herein, the docket fees paid by Agcaoili were insufficient considering that the complaint did not specify the amounts of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys’ fees. Nonetheless, it is not disputed that Agcaoili paid the assessed docket fees. Such payment negated bad faith or intent to defraud the Government. Nonetheless, Agcaoili must remit any docket fee deficiency to the RTCs clerk of court. H2: No. FDC is now barred from asserting that the HLURB, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over the case. FDC invoked HLURBs authority only on September 10, 1990, or more than five years from the time the prior case was commenced on February 28, 1985, and after the RTC granted Agcaoili’s motion to enjoin FDC from cancelling the contract to sell. The principle of estoppel, which is based on equity and public policy, dictates that FDCs active participation in both RTC proceedings and its seeking therein affirmative reliefs now precluded it from denying the RTCs jurisdiction. Its acknowledgment of the RTCs jurisdiction and its subsequent denial of such jurisdiction only after an unfavorable judgment were inappropriate and intolerable. EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY (NOW PHILIPPINE EXPORT ZONE AUTHORITY), Petitioner vs. JOSE PULIDO, ET. AL, Respondents G.R. No. 188995, August 24, 2011 First Division MAIN TOPIC: POLITICAL LAW / EMINENT DOMAIN /JUST COMPENSATION F: Petitioner Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) commenced expropriation proceedings on May 15, 1981 on 3 parcels of irrigated Riceland located in Rosario, Cavite. One of the lots, Lot 1406 was registered in the name of Salud Jimenez. During the pendency of the case, Lot 1406 was subdivided into Lot 1406-A and 1406-B. The RTC sustained the right of petitioner to expropriate the 3 parcels of riceland but released Lot 1406-A from expropriation. Petitioner appealed but later on, on January 4, 1993, it entered into a Compromise Agreement with the Estate of Salud Jimenez (due to Salud Jimenez having meanwhile died on October 30, 1984). The agreement stipulates essentially that petitioner agrees to withdraw its appeal with regards to Lot 1406-A while the Estate agrees to waive its claim for any damages. The parties also agreed that the Estate would transfer Lot 1406-B to petitioner in exchange for Lot 434. This Agreement was approved by the RTC but petitioner failed to transfer the lot to the Estate. This prompted the latter to file a Motion to Annul the Order, which the RTC granted. The RTC directed petitioner to return Lot 1406-B to the Estate. The petitioner went to the CA by petition for certiorari and prohibition, which was partially granted by the appellate court and ordered the RTC determine the just compensation for Lot 1406-B. I: Whether or not just compensation should be based on the value of Lot 1406-B prevailing in 1981 or in 1993. H: Just compensation for Lot 1406-B must be based on value of property prevailing in 1993. [xx] The petitioner submits that just compensation for Lot 1406-B was only P41,610.00, the equivalent of the zonal valuation of Lot 1406-B under Tax Declaration No. 7252 issued in 1981; that any amount above Lot 1406-Bs 1981 zonal valuation would unjustly enrich the Estate of Salud Jimenez due to the escalated price of the expropriated property; and that the Estate of Salud Jimenez was entitled only to compensation for the loss of its vacant and idle land at the time of taking and/or filing of the complaint, whichever came first, and not to the incremental benefit that has been derived therefrom after the introduction of improvements thereto by the petitioner. On the other hand, the Estate of Salud Jimenez maintains that just compensation for Lot 1406-B must be based on the value of the property (and of other properties adjacent to it) in 1993 when the parties entered into the Compromise Agreement and agreed that the just compensation for Lot 1406-B was Lot 434, or Lot 434s equivalent value. We completely agree with the RTCs observation that when the parties signed the compromise agreement and the same was approved, they had in fact settled between themselves the question of what is just compensation and that both of them had intended that defendant would be compensated on the basis of prevailing values at the time of the agreement. We further completely agree with the CAs conclusion that by agreeing to a land swap in 1993 in the ill-fated compromise agreement, [PEZA] had impliedly agreed to paying just compensation using the market values in 1993. [xx] In due course, the RTC found that just compensation of Lot 1406-B was P6,200.00/square meter. Such finding, which the CA upheld, took into due consideration the clear and convincing evidence proving the fair valuation of properties similar and adjacent to Lot 1406-B at or near 1993, the time in question. [xx] In addition, the owner is entitled to legal interest from the time of the taking of the property until the actual payment in order to place the owner in a position as good as, but not better than, the position he was in before the taking occurred. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner vs. HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT SANGKAY, NAMELY: CEBU, BATOWA-AN, ET AL., ALL SURNAMED MACABANGKIT, Respondents G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011First Division MAIN TOPIC: POLITICAL LAW / JUST COMPENSATION / PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD OTHER TOPICS: REMEDIAL LAW /CIVIL PROCEDURE / APPEALS F: Pursuant to RA 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the National Power Corporation), NPC undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the 1970s to generate electricity for Mindanao. This project included the construction of several underground tunnels to divert the water flow from the Agus River to the hydroelectric plants. Respondents, as owners of the land situated in Ditucalan, Iligan City, sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with the alternative prayer for the payment of just compensation.They alleged that they had belatedly discovered that one of the underground tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus River for the operation of the Hydroelectric Project in Agus V, Agus VI and Agus VII traversed their land. They also alleged that the underground tunnel had been constructed without their knowledge and consent and that the presence of the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their land. In its Answer with Counterclaim, NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to compensation under section 3(f) of Republic Act No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land was established; that their cause of action, should they be entitled to compensation, already prescribed due to the tunnel having been constructed in 1979; and that by reason of the tunnel being an apparent and continuous easement, any action arising from such easement prescribed in five years. After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of the Heirs of Macabangkit, which was affirmed by the appellate court. I1: Whether the CA and the RTC erred in holding that there was an underground tunnel traversing the Heirs of Macabangkits land constructed by NPC I2: Whether the Heirs of Macabangkits right to claim just compensation had prescribed under section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395, or, alternatively, under Article 620 and Article 646 of the Civil Code H1: No. The existence of the tunnel underneath the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit, being a factual matter, cannot now be properly reviewed by the Court, for questions of fact are beyond the pale of a petition for review on certiorari. Moreover,the factual findings and determinations by the RTC as the trial court are generally binding on the Court, particularly after the CA affirmed them. Bearing these doctrines in mind, the Court should rightly dismiss NPCs appeal. NPC argues, however, that this appeal should not be dismissed because the Heirs of Macabangkit essentially failed to prove the existence of the underground tunnel. It insists that the topographic survey map and the right-of-way map presented by the Heirs of Macabangkit did not at all establish the presence of any underground tunnel. Even assuming, for now, that the Court may review the factual findings of the CA and the RTC, for NPC to insist that the evidence on the existence of the tunnel was not adequate and incompetent remains futile. On the contrary, the evidence on the tunnel was substantial, for the significance of the topographic survey map and the sketch map (as indicative of the extent and presence of the tunnel construction) to the question on the existence of the tunnel was strong, as the CA correctly projected in its assailed decision. xx More so, the Ocular inspection conducted on July 23, 1998 further bolstered such claim of the existence and extent of such tunnel. This was conducted by a team composed of the Honorable Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 01, Lanao del Norte, herself and the respective lawyers of both of the parties and found that, among others, said underground tunnel was constructed beneath the subject property. H2: No. Five-year prescriptive period under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 does not apply to claims for just compensation. The CA held that Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 had no application to this action because it covered facilities that could be easily discovered, not tunnels that were inconspicuously constructed beneath the surface of the land. xx A cursory reading shows that Section 3(i) covers the construction of works across, or otherwise, any stream, watercourse, canal, ditch, flume, street, avenue, highway or railway of private and public ownership, as the location of said works may require. It is notable that Section 3(i) includes no limitation except those enumerated after the termworks. Accordingly, we consider the term works as embracing all kinds of constructions, facilities, and other developments that can enable or help NPC to meet its objectives of developing hydraulic power expressly provided under paragraph (g) of Section 3.The CAs restrictive construal of Section 3(i) as exclusive of tunnels was obviously unwarranted, for the provision applies not only to development works easily discoverable or on the surface of the earth but also to subterranean works like tunnels. Such interpretation accords with the fundamental guideline in statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, so must we not. Moreover, when the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the Congress intended to convey. Even so, we still cannot side with NPC. We rule that the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an action for damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just compensation for their land.xx PETRONILO J. BARAYUGA, Petitioner, vs. ADVENTIST UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS BOARD OF TRUSTEES, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN, NESTOR D. DAYSON, Respondents G.R. No. 168008, August 17, 2011 First Division MAIN TOPIC: MERCANTILE LAW / Corporation Law / Vested right in office OTHER RELATED TOPICS: REMEDIAL LAW / Provisional Remedies / Writ of Injunction DOCTRINE: The injunctive relief protects only a right in esse [“existing right”]. Where the plaintiff does not demonstrate that he has an existing right to be protected by injunction, his suit for injunction must be dismissed for lack of a cause of action F: Adventist University of the Philippines (AUP) is a non-stock and non-profit educational institution. It is incorporated under Philippine laws and was directly under the North Philippine Union Mission (NPUM) of the Southern Asia Pacific Division of the Seventh Day Adventists. During the 3rd Quinquennial Session of the General Conference of Seventh Day Adventists held from November 27, 2000 to December 1, 2000, the NPUM Executive Committee elected the members of the Board of Trustees of AUP, including the Chairman and the Secretary. Respondent Nestor D. Dayson was elected Chairman while the petitioner was chosen Secretary. After the conclusion of the 3rd Quinquennial Session, the Board of Trustees appointed petitioner as President of AUP. During his tenure, or from November 11 to November 13, 2002, a group from the NPUM conducted an external performance audit. The audit revealed the petitioner’s autocratic management style, like making major decisions without the approval or recommendation of the proper committees. He also made purchases and withdrawals without valid supporting receipts and without the approval of the Finance Committee. The audit concluded that he had committed serious violations of fundamental rules and procedure in the disbursement and use of funds. In a special meeting held on January 27, 2003, the members voted to remove petitioner as President because of his serious violations of fundamental rules and procedures in the disbursement and use of funds as revealed by the special audit. The petitioner brought his suit for injunction and damages in the RTC, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order against the Board of Trustees. The RTC granted the TRO while the appellate court reversed the lower court’s decision. I1: Whether petitioner can still be protected by the injunctive writ issued by the RTC I2: Whether petitioner has a legal right to the position of President of AUP H1: No. The injunctive writ issued by the RTC was meant to protect the petitioner’s right to stay in office as President. Given that the lifetime of the writ of preliminary injunction was co-extensive with the duration of the act sought to be prohibited, this injunctive relief already became moot in the face of the admission by the petitioner himself, through his affidavit, that his term of office premised on his alleged five-year tenure as President had lasted only until December 2005. In short, the injunctive writ granted by the RTC had expired upon the end of the term of office (as posited by him).xx A valid writ of preliminary injunction rests on the weight of evidence submitted by the plaintiff establishing: (a) a present and unmistakable right to be protected; (b) the acts against which the injunction is directed violate such right; and (c) a special and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damages. In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writconstitutes grave abuse of discretion and will result to nullification thereof. Where the complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage sans proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for a preliminary injunction. H2: In AUP’s case, its amended By-Laws provided the term of the members of the Board of Trustees, and the period within which to elect the officers, thusly: Article I Board of Trustees Section 1. At the first meeting of the members of the corporation, and thereafter every two years, a Board of Trustees shall be elected. It shall be composed of fifteen members in good and regular standing in the Seventh-day Adventist denomination, each of whom shall hold his office for a term of two years, or until his successor has been elected and qualified. If a trustee ceases at any time to be a member in good and regular standing in the Seventh-day Adventist denomination, he shall thereby cease to be a trustee. Article IV Officers  Section 1. Election of officers. – At their organization meeting, the members of the Board of Trustees shall elect from among themselves a Chairman, a Vice-Chairman, a President, a Secretary, a Business Manager, and a Treasurer. The same persons may hold and perform the duties of more than one office, provided they are not incompatible with each other. In light of foregoing, the members of the Board of Trustees were to serve a term of office of only two years; and the officers, who included the President, were to be elected from among the members of the Board of Trustees during their organizational meeting, which was held during the election of the Board of Trustees every two years. Naturally, the officers, including the President, were to exercise the powers vested by Section 2 of the amended By-Laws for a term of only two years, not five years. Ineluctably, the petitioner, having assumed as President of AUP on January 23, 2001, could serve for only two years, or until January 22, 2003. By the time of his removal for cause as President on January 27, 2003, he was already occupying the office in a hold-over capacity, and could be removed at any time, without cause, upon the election or appointment of his successor. His insistence on holding on to the office was untenable, therefore, and with more reason when one considers that his removal was due to the loss of confidence on the part of the Board of Trustees. HEIRS OF SPOUSES TEOFILO M. RETERTA and ELISA RETERTA, namely: EDUARDO M. RETERTA, CONSUELO M. RETERTA, and AVELINA M. RETERTA, Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES LORENZO MORES and VIRGINIA LOPEZ, Respondents G.R. No. 159941, August 17, 2011 First Division MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW /SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION / CERTIORARI SUB TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW /CIVIL PROCEDURE /JURISDICTION F: Petitioners commenced an action for quieting of title and reconveyance in the RTC in TreceMartires City, averring that they were thetrue and real owners of the parcel of land situated in Trez Cruzes, Tanza, Cavite, having inherited the land from their fatherwho had died on July 11, 1983; that their late father had been the grantee of the land by virtue of his occupation and cultivation; thattheir late father and his predecessors in interest had been in open, exclusive, notorious, and continuous possession of the land for morethan 30 years; that they had discovered in 1999 an affidavit dated March 1, 1966 that their father had purportedly executed whereby hehad waived his rights, interests, and participation in the land; that by virtue of the affidavit, Sales Certificate No. V-769 had been issuedin favor of respondent Lorenzo Mores by the then Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that Transfer Certificate of TitleNo. T-64071 had later issued to the respondent. Respondents, as defendants, filed a motion to dismiss, insisting that the RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due tothe land being friar land, and that the petitioners had no legal personality to commence. RTC granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.The petitioners had challenged the dismissal by petition for certiorari, but the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed their petition on theground that certiorari was not a substitute for an appeal, the proper recourse against the dismissal. I: Whether a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was the proper remedy to assail the trial court’s dismissal of the case. H: No. The CA seems to be correct in dismissing the petition for certiorari, considering that the order granting the respondents’ motion to dismiss was a final, as distinguished from an interlocutory, order against which the proper remedy was an appeal in due course. Certiorari, as an extraordinary remedy, is not substitute for appeal due to its being availed of only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. xx The order that the petitioners really wanted to obtain relief from was the order granting the respondents’ motion to dismiss, not the denial of the motion for reconsideration. The fact that the order granting the motion to dismiss was a final order for thereby completely disposing of the case, leaving nothing more for the trial court to do in the action, truly called for an appeal, instead of certiorari, as the correct remedy. The fundamental distinction between a final judgment or order, on one hand, and an interlocutory order, on the other hand, has been outlined in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,viz: FINAL JUDGMENT/ORDER INTERLOCUTORY ORDER The concept of ‘final’ judgment, as An order that does not finally dispose distinguished from one which has of the case, and does not end the Court’s ‘become final’ (or ‘executory’ as of right task of adjudicating the parties’ [final and executory]), is definite and contentions and determining their rights settled. A ‘final’ judgment or order is one and liabilities as regards each other, but that finally disposes of a case, leaving obviously indicates that other things nothing more to be done by the Court remain to be done by the Court, is in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication ‘interlocutory,’ e.g., an order denying a on the merits which, on the basis of the motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the evidence presented at the trial declares Rules, or granting a motion for extension categorically what the rights and of time to file a pleading, or authorizing obligations of the parties are and amendment thereof, or granting or whichparty is in the right; or a judgment denying applications for postponement, or or order that dismisses an action on the production or inspection of documents or ground, for instance, of res judicata or things, etc. Unlike a ‘final’ judgment or prescription. Once rendered, the task of order, which is appealable, as above the Court is ended, as far as deciding the pointed out, an ‘interlocutory’ order controversy or determining the rights and may not be questioned on appeal liabilities of the litigants is concerned. except only as part of an appeal that Nothing more remains to be done by may eventually be taken from the the Court except to await the parties’ final judgment rendered in the case. next move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes ‘final’ or, to use the established and more distinctive term, ‘final and executory. Moreover, even Section 9 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, cited by the petitioners, indicates that the proper remedy against the denial of the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was an appeal from the final order dismissing the action upon the respondents’ motion to dismiss. The said rule explicitly states thusly: Section 9. Remedy against order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration. – An order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration is not appealable, the remedy being an appeal from the judgment or final order. The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration independently of a judgment or final order is logical and reasonable. A motion for reconsideration is not putting forward a new issue, or presenting new evidence, or changing the theory of the case, but is only seeking a reconsideration of the judgment or final order based on the same issues, contentions, and evidence either because: (a) the damages awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision or final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law.10 By denying a motion for reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial court finds no reason either toreverse or to modify its judgment or final order, and leaves the judgment or final order to stand. The remedy from the denial is to assail the denial in the course of an appeal of the judgment or final order itself.  ANGELINA PAHILA-GARRIDO, Petitioner vs. ELIZA M. TORTOGO, ET. AL, Respondents G.R. No. 156358, August 17, 2011 First Division MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW / CIVIL PROCEDURE / APPEALS SUB TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW / PROVISIONAL REMEDIES / INJUNCTION F: On June 23, 1997, Domingo Pahila commenced in the MTCC in Bacolod City an action for ejectment with prayer for preliminary and restraining order to evict several defendants, including the respondents herein, from his properties, docketed as Civil Case No. 23671 and raffled to Branch 6 of the MTCC. He amended the complaint to implead the spouses of some of the defendants. However, he died during the pendency of the action, and his surviving spouse, herein petitioner Angelina Pahila-Garrido, was substituted for him on September 24, 1998. The defendants in Civil Case No. 23671 were divided into two discrete groups. The first group included those defendants occupying Lot 641-B-1and Lot No. 641-B-3 all owned by the plaintiff. The defendants in this group relied on the common defense of being agricultural tenants on the land.The second group’s common defense was that the plaintiff’s title was not valid because their respective portions were situated on foreshore land along the Guimaras Strait, and thus their respective areas were subject to their own acquisition from the State as the actual occupants. The MTCC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTCC. Only the second group, which includes respondents herein, appealed the RTC’s decision to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the appeal. On April 5, 2000, the MTCC issued the writ of execution upon the petitioner’s motion. The writ of execution was duly served on August 24, 2000 upon all the defendants, including the respondents, as the sheriff’s return of service indicate. On April 20, 2001, the respondents filed a motion to quash against the April 5, 2000 writ of execution. The petitioner then directly came to the Court through her so-called "petition for review on certiorari," seeking to annul and set aside the writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction issued by the RTC pursuant to its order dated November 12, 2002 I: Whether the present petition is a proper remedy to assail the November 12, 2002 order of the RTC H: The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final. The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to. CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. RENATO L. MATEO, Respondent. G.R. No. 175485, July 27, 2011 First Division MAIN TOPIC: CIVIL LAW / SALES / BUYER IN GOOD FAITH OTHER RELATED TOPICS: CIVIL LAW / PROPERTY / TORRENS TITLE F: Petitioner previously purchased the land in question from China Banking Corporation. The land in question was previously sold by the mother of Renato Mateo to a certain Rodolfo Pe. In turn, Rodolfo Pe constituted a mortgage on the land in favor of China Bank for the security of a loan. The mortgage was foreclosed because Pe failed to pay his obligations and the bank consolidated its ownership of the property after Rodolfo failed to redeem. A TCT was issued in favor of China Bank. In 1991, Casimiro Development Corporation (CDC) brought an action for unlawful detainer against the respondent’s siblings. Respondent counters that CDC acquired the property from China Bank in bad faithbecause it had actual knowledge of the possession of the property by the respondent and hissiblings. I: Whether CDC is an innocent purchaser for value. H: Yes. To start with, one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the certificate of title, but only has to rely on the certificate of title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. The pertinent law on the matter of burdens and claims is Section 44 10 of the Property Registration Decree. Considering that China Bank’s TCT No. 99527 was a clean title, that is, it was free from any lien or encumbrance, CDC had the right to rely, when it purchased the property, solely upon the face of the certificate of title in the name of China Bank.The CA’s ascribing of bad faith to CDC based on its knowledge of the adverse possession of the respondent’s siblings at the time it acquired the property from China Bank was absolutely unfounded and unwarranted. That possession did not translate to an adverse claim of ownership that should have put CDC on actual notice of a defect or flaw in the China Bank’s title, for the respondent’s siblings themselves, far from asserting ownership in their own right, even characterized their possession only as that of mere agricultural tenants.Under no law was possession grounded on tenancy a status that might create a defect or inflict a flaw in the title of the owner. The vendee’s notice of a defect or flaw in the title of the vendor, in order for it to amount to bad faith, should encompass facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious person to make further inquiry into the vendor’s title,25 or facts and circumstances that would induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation.26 In other words, the presence of anything that excites or arouses suspicion should then prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and to investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face of said certificate. What the foregoing circumstances ineluctably indicate is that CDC, having paid the full and fair price of the land, was an innocent purchaser for value. 10Section 44. Statutory liens affecting title. — Every registered owner receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith, shall hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate and any of the following encumbrances which may be subsisting..  MASING AND SONS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and CRISPIN CHAN, Petitioners, vs. GREGORIO P. ROGELIO, Respondent. G.R. No. 161787, April 27, 2011 First Division MAIN TOPIC: LABOR LAW / LABOR RELATIONS / EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP, RETIREMENT BENEFITS DOCTRINE: In any controversy between a laborer and his master, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence are resolved in favor of the laborer. F: Rogelio is an employee of the Ibajay branch of MSDC, with Lim as Branch Manager. In 1991, he availed himself of the SSS retirement benefits, and in order to facilitate the grant of such benefits, he entered into an internal arrangement with Chan and MSDC to the effect that MSDC would issue a certification of his separation from employment notwithstanding that he would continue working as a laborer in the Ibajay branch but it was only on 1997 that Rogelio was paid his last salary but without retirement benefits, he was 67 years old at that time. Rogelio then filed the case for payment of his retirement benefits before the Labor Arbiter. MSDC defense is that they were not engaged in copra buying in Ibajay and they did not ever register in such business in any government agency and that Lim is an independent copra buyer. The Labor Arbiter declared that there was no employer-employee relationship between Rogelio and MSDC. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The appellate Court ruled in favor of Rogelio and set aside the decision of the NLRC. I1: Whether Rogelio had remained the Company's employee from July 6, 1989 up to March 17, 1997 I2: Whether Rogelio is entitled to retirement benefits H1: Yes. We agree with the CA’s factual findings, because they were based on the evidence and records of the case submitted before the LA. The CA essentially complied with the guidepost that the substantiality of evidence depends on both its quantitative and its qualitative aspects. Indeed, the records substantially established that Chan and MSDC had employed Rogelio until 1997. In contrast, Chan and MSDC failed to adduce credible substantiation of their averment that Rogelio had been Lim’s employee from July 1989 until 1997. Credible proof that could outweigh the showing by Rogelio to the contrary was demanded of Chan and MSDC to establish the veracity of their allegation, for their mere allegation of Rogelio’s employment under Lim did not constitute evidence, but they did not submit such proof, sadly failing to discharge their burden of proving their own affirmative allegation. In this regard, as we pointed out at the start, the doubts reasonably arising from the evidence are resolved in favor of the laborer in any controversy between a laborer and his master. H2: Yes. Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7641, provides 11 11Article 287. Retirement. – Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract. In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements; Provided, however, That an employee’s retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than those provided herein. In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year. Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half (1/2) month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves. Was Rogelio entitled to the retirement benefits under Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7641? The CA held so in its decision, to wit: Having reached the conclusion that petitioner was an employee of the respondents from 1950 to March 17, 1997, and considering his uncontroverted allegation that in the Ibajay branch office where he was assigned, respondents employed no less than 12 workers at said later date, thus affording private respondents no relief from the duty of providing retirement benefits to their employees, we see no reason why petitioner should not be entitled to the retirement benefits as provided for under Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended. The beneficent provisions of said law, as applied in Oro Enterprises Inc. v. NLRC, is apart from the retirement benefits that can be claimed by a qualified employee under the social security law. Attorney’s fees are also granted to the petitioner. But the monetary benefits claimed by petitioner cannot be granted on the basis of the evidence at hand. We concur with the CA’s holding. The third paragraph of the aforequoted provision of the Labor Code entitled Rogelio to retirement benefits as a necessary consequence of the finding that Rogelio was an employee of MSDC and Chan.Indeed, there should be little, if any, doubt that the benefits under Republic Act No. 7641, which was enacted as a labor protection measure and as a curative statute to respond, in part at least, to the financial well-being of workers during their twilight years soon following their life of labor, can be extended not only from the date of its enactment but retroactively to the time the employment contracts started. CRISANTO F. CASTRO, JR., Petitioner, vs. ATENEO DE NAGA UNIVERSITY, FR. JOEL ABORA, and MR. EDWIN BERNAL, Respondents. G.R. No. 175293, July 23, 2014, FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: LABOR LAW/ RETIREMENT BENEFITS VS. RELIEFS AWARDED TO ILLEGALLY DISMISSED EMPLOYEE. F: Petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case against herein respondent. The case was decided in petitioner’s favor, but while on appeal, the latter executed quitclaim for the settlement of retirement benefits. The original complaint was dismissed holding that the execution of the quitclaim rendered the case moot. I: Whether the execution of a quitclaim on the settlement of retirement benefit is tantamount to settlement of claim for accrued salaries pending litigation? H: No. Execution of the receipt and quitclaim was not a settlement of the petitioner's claim for accrued salaries Worthy to stress is that retirement is of a different species from the reliefs awarded to an illegally dismissed employee. Retirement is a form of reward for an employee's loyalty and service to the employer, and is intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, and to lessen the burden of worrying about his financial support or upkeep.29 In contrast, the reliefs awarded to an illegally dismissed employee are in recognition of the continuing employer-employee relationship that has been severed by the employer without just or authorized cause, or without compliance with due process. Hence, for as long as the employer continuously fails to actually implement the reinstatement aspect of the decision of the LA, the employer's obligation to the employee for his accrued backwages and other benefits continues to accumulate.36 Retail, service and agricultural establishments or operations employing not more than ten (10) employees or workers are exempted from the coverage of this provision. Violation of this provision is hereby declared unlawful and subject to the penal provisions provided under Article 288 of this Code.  REYNALDO S. MARIANO, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. G.R. No. 178145, July 7, 2014 FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: CRIMINAL LAW / APPLICATION OF ART. 65 IN RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE CASES F: The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan charged the petitioner with frustrated murder for hitting and bumping Ferdinand de Leon while overtaking the latter's jeep. after trial, the RTC convicted the petitioner of frustrated homicide. On appeal, the decision was modified from frustrated homicide to reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. Still not satisfied, petitioner appealed the decision maintaining that the injuries sustained by the victim was a result of mere accident and that petitioner is not guilty of any crime. The petitioner further contends that his voluntary surrender be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance. I: Whether or not the mitigating circumstance maybe appreciated in this case. H: No. Contrary to the petitioner’s insistence, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5 of Article 365, Revised Penal Code, expressly states that in the imposition of the penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code. "The rationale of the law," according to People v. Medroso, Jr.: x x x can be found in the fact thatin quasi-offenses penalized under Article 365, the carelessness, imprudence or negligence which characterizes the wrongful act may vary from one situation to another, in nature, extent, and resulting consequences, and in order that there may be a fair and just application of the penalty, the courts must have ample discretion in its imposition, without being bound by what We may call the mathematical formula provided for inArticle 64 of the Revised Penal Code. On the basis of this particular provision, the trial court was not bound to apply paragraph 5 of Article 64 in the instant case even if appellant had two mitigating circumstances in his favor with no aggravating circumstance to offset them. COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, Petitioner, vs. OILINK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, Respondent. G.R. No. 161759 , July 2, 2014, FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: Corporation Law / Doctrine of Piercing the Veil of Corporate Fiction F: URC and OILink are two separate corporations having interlocking directors. In applying for and in expediting the transfer of the operator’s name for the Customs Bonded Warehouse thenoperated by URC, the Vice president sent a letter to manifest that URC and Oilink had the same Board of Directors and that Oilink was 100% owned by URC.Oscar Brillo, the District Collector of the Port of Manila, formally demanded that URC pay the taxes and duties on its oil imports that had arrived. URC made an undertaking that it shall pay the liability out of the collectibles of OILink. An assessment was made to Oilink and the BOC refused to issue clearance to Oilink unless the tax liability be paid. Hence, Oilink objected arguing that it cannot be held liable for it is not a party liable to the tax deficiency. I: Whether Oilink can be made liable invoking the principle of piercing the veil of corporate fiction No. In Philippine National Bank v. Ritratto Group, Inc.,the Court has outlined the following circumstances thatare useful in the determination of whether a subsidiary is a mere instrumentality of the parent-corporation, viz: 1. Control, not mere majority or complete control, but complete domination, not only of finances butof policy and business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no separatemind, will or existence of its own; 2. Such control must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other positive legal duty, or dishonest and, unjust act incontravention of plaintiff's legal rights; and 3. The aforesaid control and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or unjust loss complained of. In applying the "instrumentality" or"alter ego" doctrine, the courts are concerned with reality, not form, and with how the corporation operated and the individual defendant's relationship to the operation.11 Consequently, the absence of any one of the foregoing elements disauthorizes the piercing of the corporate veil. Indeed, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has no application here because the Commissioner of Customs did not establish that Oilink had been set up to avoid the payment of taxes or duties, or for purposes that would defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, defend crime, confuse legitimate legal or judicial issues, perpetrate deception or otherwise circumvent the law. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 16, CEBU CITY, SILVERIO BORBON, SPOUSES XERXES AND ERLINDA FACULTAD, AND XM FACULTAD & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents. G.R. No. 157163, June 25, 2014, FIRST DIVISION MAIN TOPIC: Remedial Law / Propriety of Issuing Injunction Order F: Herein private respondents filed a case for annulment of promissory notes and cancellation of real and chattel mortgages against petitioner alleging that they obtained a loan from BPI secured by promissory notes and real and chattel mortgages. The bank compelled them to issue postdated checks to cover the loan under the threat of foreclosing the mortgages. The bank, filed a motion to dismiss essentially arguing that foreclosure is their legal right. Hence, private respondents filed the instant action with prayer for injunction. The court denied the motion to dismiss but granted the injunction. I: Whether the issuance of Injunction is proper. H: No. As with all equitable remedies, injunction must be issued only at the instance of a party who possesses sufficient interest in or title to the right or the property sought to be protected. It is proper only when the applicant appears to be entitled to the relief demanded in the complaint, which must aver the existence of the right and the violation of the right, or whose averments must in the minimum constitute a prima facieshowing of a right to the final relief sought. Accordingly, the conditions for the issuance of the injunctive writ are: (a) that the right to be protected exists prima facie; (b) that the act sought to be enjoined is violative of that right; and (c) that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. An injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, or a right which is merely contingent and may never arise; or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action; or to prevent the perpetration of an act prohibited bystatute. Indeed, a right, to be protected by injunction, means a right clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. The issuance ofthe writ of preliminary injunction upon the application of the respondents was improper. They had admittedly constituted the real estate and chattel mortgages to secure the performance of their loan obligation to the petitioner, and, as such, they were fully aware of the consequences on their rights in the properties given as collaterals should the loan secured be unpaid. The foreclosure of the mortgages would be the remedy provided by law for the mortgagee to exact payment. In fact, they did not dispute the petitioner’sallegations that they had not fully paid their obligation, and that Civil Case No. CEB-26468 was precisely brought by them in order to stave off the impending foreclosure of the mortgages based on their claim that they had been compelled to sign pre-printed standard bank loan forms and mortgage agreements. ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 158298, August 11, 2010, (Third Division) MAIN TOPIC: CIVIL LAW /CIVIL COD / FAMILY CODE / Declaration of Nullity of Marriage SUB TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW / Misjoinder of Parties F: Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother CresencianoAblaza and LeonilaHonatoalleging that the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person could impugn the validity of the said marriage at any time, due to the marriage being void ab initio. I: Whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of marriage of his deceased brother. H: YES. Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003. Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit: 1) Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and2) Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003. Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner. The Court noted that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code requireda marriage license for their validity; hence, her participation in this action is made all the more necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage license. The omission to implead was not immediately fatal, however, considering that Section 11, Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead her, for under the same rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may be made "on motion of any party or on (the trial court’s) own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just." SC PP: “A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." RE: CASES SUBMITTED FOR DECISION BEFORE JUDGE DAMASO A. HERRERA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 24, BIÑAN, LAGUNA. A.M. No. RTJ-05-1924, October 13, 2010 (Third Division) MAIN TOPIC: LEGAL ETHICS / CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT F: Judge Damaso A. Herrera, former Presiding Judge, filed an application for optional retirement effective April 5, 2004 which was approved by the Court. Then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., now a Member of the Court, initiated an administrative matter for agenda dated October 1, 2004 to report on the cases submitted for decision before newly-retired Judge Herrera, citing 55 of such cases mentioned in the March 2004 monthly report of Judge Herrera’s branch, some of which were already beyond the reglementary period to decide. The report further indicated that the cases submitted for decision as reported in the December 2003 monthly report totaling 26 increased to 55 in the March 2004 monthly report due to the addition of 29 cases; that Judge Herrera failed to request the extension of his time to decide the cases; that Branch 24 did not submit the monthly reports of cases within the period required under Administrative Circular No. 4-2004; and that most of the cases submitted for decision had not been reflected in the submitted reports. I: Whether or not Judge Herrera’s failure to decide his cases with dispatch constituted gross inefficiency which warranted the imposition of administrative sanctions upon him. H: YES.Section 15(1), Article VIII, of the Constitution requires a trial judge to dispose of all cases or matters within three months from the time of their submission for decision. Conformably with the constitutional prescription, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct admonishes all judges to dispose of their courts’ business promptly and to decide cases within the required period. Unless every trial judge earnestly, painstakingly, and faithfully complies with this mandate of efficiency, the present clogged dockets in our judicial system cannot be cleared. Judge Herrera was guilty of undue delay in the disposition of the cases pending him his court. Prior to his early retirement, he had not decided 49 cases already due for decision, which total did not include the four cases that Judge Herrera claimed to have by then decided and the two that had supposedly become due for decision already within the period of prohibition for him to act in view of his application for early retirement. The Court cannot overstress this policy on prompt disposition or resolution of cases. Delay in case disposition is a major culprit in the erosion of public faith and confidence in the judiciary and the lowering of its standards. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period, without strong and justifiable reason, constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanction on the defaulting judge. Judge Herrera’s plea of heavy workload, lack of sufficient time, poor health, and physical impossibility could not excuse him. Such circumstances were not justifications for the delay or non-performance, given that he could have easily requested the Court for the extension of his time to resolve the cases. Without an order of extension granted by the Court, a failure to decide even a single case within the required period rightly constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction. SC PP: “Justice delayed is justice denied” - Every judge should decide cases with dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. Indeed, a judge must display that "interest in his office which stops not at the minimum of the day’s labor fixed by law, and which ceases not at the expiration of official sessions, but which proceeds diligently on holidays and by artificial light and even into vacation periods. Only thus can he do his part in the great work of speeding up the administration of justice and of rehabilitating the judiciary in the estimation of the people. EDUARDO B. OLAGUER, Complainant, vs. JUDGE ALFREDO D. AMPUAN, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 33, Quezon City, Respondent. A.M. No. MTJ-10-1769, October 6, 2010 (Third Division) MAIN TOPICS: LEGAL ETHICS>CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT F: The complainant charged respondent Judge with delay in rendering a decision, gross inefficiency, and conduct unbecoming of a judge relative to his handling of Civil Case No. 27653. The said civil case had been already pending for eight years because respondent Judge had allowed the case to drag unnecessarily. He claimed that respondent had failed to render a decision despite the lapse of six months and had likewise failed to act on the last two motions he had filed. The complainant averred that the Branch Clerk of Court had informed him that the cause of delay had been the reconstruction of the various transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs). Respondent Judge explained that he had inherited Civil Case No. 27653 from two predecessors, and that he had started handling it only on November 18, 2005, but only for the last five hearings. He averred that the stenographers who had taken the TSNs had transferred to another court, causing a delay in the submission of the TSNs; and that the charges against him were unfair, stressing that he conducted daily hearings because his sala was designated as a Special Court for Tax Cases, Election Court, and Small Claims Court. I: Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty of gross inefficiency. H: YES.Respondent Judge really failed in his duty to promptly and expeditiously dispose of Civil Case No. 27653. In so failing, he ran afoul of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 28 dated July 3, 1989, whose paragraph three provides: A case is considered submitted for decision upon the admission of the evidence of the parties at the termination of the trial. The ninety (90) day period for deciding the case shall commence to run from submission of the case for decision without memoranda; in case the court requires or allows its filing, the case shall be considered submitted for decision upon the filing of the last memorandum or upon the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier. Lack of transcript of stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend the period for deciding the case unless the case was previously heard by another judge not the deciding judge in which case the latter shall have the full period of ninety (90) days for the completion of the transcripts within which to decide the same. The respondent should have forthwith issued the order directing the stenographers to submit the TSNs after the complainant had manifested that the defendants had not filed their memorandum. Yet, he did not, but instead took more than seven months before issuing such order on March 15, 2009. Moreover, the Court states that the additional court assignments or designations imposed upon respondent Judge did not make him less liable for the delay. Verily, a judge cannot by himself choose to prolong the period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law. Had his additional court assignments or designations unduly prevented him from deciding Civil Case No. 27653, respondent Judge could have easily sought additional time by requesting an extension from the Court, through the OCAd, but he did not avail himself of this remedy. Without an order of extension granted by the Court, his failure to decide within the required period constituted gross inefficiency that merited administrative sanction. Nevertheless, the Court recognizes that respondent judge inherited a total of 1,605 cases upon his assumption on August 10, 2005, and that the omission complained of is the first and only administrative charge against him. The Court is inclined to mitigate his liability, and opt to impose a reprimand, with stern warning that a repetition of the offense or the commission of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. CITYTRUST BANKING CORPORATION (now Bank of the Philippine Islands), Petitioner, vs. CARLOS ROMULO N. CRUZ, Respondent. G.R. No. 157049, August11, 2010 (Third Division) MAIN TOPIC: CIVIL LAW / Damages and Attorney’s Fees F: Respondent, an architect and businessman, maintained savings and checking accounts at the petitioner’s Loyola Heights Branch. The savings account was considered closed due to the oversight committed by one of the latter’s tellers. The closure resulted in the extreme embarrassment of the respondent, for checks that he had issued could not be honored although his savings account was sufficiently funded and the accounts were maintained under the petitioner’s check-o-matic arrangement (whereby the current account was maintained at zero balance and the funds from the savings account were automatically transferred to the current account to cover checks issued by the depositor like the respondent).Unmoved by the petitioner’s apologies and the adjustment made on his accounts by its employees, the respondent sued in the RTC to claim damages from the petitioner. The RTC ruled in the respondent’s favor. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC explaining that the erroneous closure of the respondent’s account would not have been committed in the first place if the petitioner had not been careless in supervising its employees. I: Whether or not there were decisive fact situations showing excusable negligence and good faith that did not justify the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. H: NO.Firstly, the errors sought to be reviewed focused on the correctness of the factual findings of the CA. Such review will require the Court to again assess the facts. Yet, the Court is not a trier of facts. Thus, the appeal is not proper, for only questions of law can be elevated to the Court via petition for review on certiorari. Secondly, nothing from the petitioner’s arguments persuasively showed that the RTC and the CA erred. The findings of both lower courts were fully supported by the evidence adduced. Unquestionably, the petitioner, being a banking institution, had the direct obligation to supervise very closely the employees handling its depositors’ accounts, and should always be mindful of the fiduciary nature of its relationship with the depositors. Such relationship required it and its employees to record accurately every single transaction, and as promptly as possible, considering that the depositors’ accounts should always reflect the amounts of money the depositors could dispose of as they saw fit, confident that, as a bank, it would deliver the amounts to whomever they directed. If it fell short of that obligation, it should bear the responsibility for the consequences to the depositors, who, like the respondent, suffered particular embarrassment and disturbed peace of mind from the negligence in the handling of the accounts. Thirdly, in several decisions of the Court, the banks, defendants therein, were made liable for negligence, even without sufficient proof of malice or bad faith on their part, and the Court awarded moral damages of P100,000.00 each time to the suing depositors in proper consideration of their reputation and their social standing. The respondent should be similarly awarded for the damage to his reputation as an architect and businessman. Lastly, the CA properly affirmed the RTC’s award of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. It is never overemphasized that the public always relies on a bank’s profession of diligence and meticulousness in rendering irreproachable service. Its failure to exercise diligence and meticulousness warranted its liability for exemplary damages and for reasonable attorney’s fees. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BRINGAS BUNAY y DAM- AT, Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 171268, September14, 2010 (En Banc) MAIN TOPIC: CRIMINAL LAW / BOOK 1 / Total Extinguishment of Criminal Liability F: RTC in LunaApayao tried and found the accused guilty of qualified rape. This court sentences the accused to suffer the Supreme Penalty of DEATH. On December 13, 2001, the accused was committed to the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City. The conviction was brought for automatic review, but the Court transferred the case to the CA for intermediate review on November 9, 2004.On August 10, 2005, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of the accused for qualified rape. While on appeal, the Court received the letter from Bureau of Corrections advising that the accused had died due to cardio-respiratory arrest, with pneumonia as the antecedent cause. I: Whether or not the criminal liability of the accused is totally extinguished by the death of the accused during the pendency of the appeal in the Supreme Court. H: YES.Such extinction is based on Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, which pertinently provides: Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.xxx The death of the accused likewise extinguished the civil liability that was based exclusively on the crime for which the accused was convicted (i.e., ex delicto), because no final judgment of conviction was yet rendered by the time of his death. Only civil liability predicated on a source ofobligation other than the delict survived the death of the accused, which the offended party can recover by means of a separate civil action. SUGNI REALTY HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, COMPLAINANT VS. JUDGE BERNADETTE S. PAREDES-ENCINAREAL [THEN IN HER CAPACITY AS ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 10, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, IN DIPOLOG CITY], RESPONDENT A.M. No. RTJ-08-2102, October 14, 2015 (First Division) MAIN TOPIC: LEGAL ETHICS / JUDICIAL ETHICS SUB TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW / SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS /FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER F: Complainant instituted the action forunlawful detainer against Spouses Falames in the MTCC of Dipolog City. MTCC rendered its decision in favor of the complainant, whichpromptly filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal on June 21, 2005. However, theMTCC did not resolve the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal, andinstead elevated the records to the RTC in Dipolog City in view of theFalames’ filing of their Notice of Appeal. In the RTC, the appeal wasassigned to Branch 10, where respondent Judge was the Acting PresidingJudge. The complainant later on submitted its Manifestation requesting thesimultaneous hearing on July 18, 2005 of its Motion for Execution Pending Appeal and Motion to Suspend Proceedings. However, respondent Judge cancelled all hearings scheduled on July 18, 2005 in order to observe andcelebrate Law Day as directed by the Supreme Court. It was shown that she was to lead the Law Day festivities.On August 19, 2005, the complainant filed an Urgent Motion toDismiss Appeal, averring as grounds for dismissal the Falames’ failure to post the supersedeasbond, and to deposit the monthly rental of P350,000.00.On September 26, 2005, however, respondent Judge did not resolve the Urgent Motion to Dismiss Appeal but instead issued an order to stay execution of judgement and for defendants to post the bond and the aforesaid monthly rental within 20 days from receipt of the order. On October 28, 2005, the complainant, undaunted, filed an UrgentMotion To Resolve and Grant Immediately, whereby it reminded respondent Judge to resolve the previous motions. Ignoring the reminder, respondent Judge issued the order of November 8, 2005 whereby she denied the complainant’s Urgent Motion to Dismiss Appeal, on the ground that defendants-appellants have not filed a supersedeas bond with opposition thereto by the defendants that the motion to dismiss had no proof of service. In open court, however a copy of said motion to dismiss was tendered to the defendants’ counsel. In addition, the decision stated that acting presiding judge (Paredes-Encinareal) had already ceased to hold the position when on October 6, 2005 she received through FAX the order revoking her designation as acting presiding judge of RTC Branch 10, Dipolog City.The complainant insists that the order of November 8, 2005 was null and void because respondent Judge had by then been relieved as the Acting Presiding Judge of the issuing court.Respondent Judge argued that she had the authority under item 2 of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC 12 to still issue the order of November 8, 2005. Respondent Judge posited that the charges of corruption, bias, and partiality against her were frivolous, despicable and allegations without proof. I: 1. Whether or not Respondent Judge disregarded the pertinent rule on the filing of the supersedeasbond and monthly deposits in issuing the September 26, 2005 order. 2. Whether or not Respondent Judge was guilty of unreasonable delay in resolving the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal. 3. Whether or not Respondent Judge is without authority in issuing the order of November 8, 2005. H1: YES. Respondent Judge showed gross ignorance of the law or procedure, bias and prejudice on the basis that her order of September 26, 2005 had effectively extended the Falames’ period for the posting of the supersedeasbond and for depositing the monthly rental specified in the decision of the MTCC. She had no authority to do so under the law and jurisprudence. A rule as plain and explicit as Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court 13is not liable to be misread or misapplied, but should only be implemented without hesitation or equivocation. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge. 14 Such offense may be penalized with dismissal from the service, or suspension from office without pay for more than three months but not exceeding six months, or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. 15As penalty, therefore, respondent Judge is fined in the amount of P21,000.00. This case presents the opportune occasion to remind judges of the first level courts to 12Except as herein provided, all cases shall remain in the branch to which these have been raffled and assigned. Only cases that have been submitted for decision or those past the trial stage, i.e. where all the parties have finished presenting their evidence, prior to the transfer or promotion to the judge to which these are raffled/assigned shall be resolved or disposed by him/her in accordance with the guidelines herein set forth. 13Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. – If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with theRegional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of thepremises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined by thejudgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeedingmonth or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the MunicipalTrial Court, with the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court towhich the action is appealed. x xx (bold emphasis supplied) 14Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court 15Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. always adhere to the mandate of Section 19, by issuing writs of execution upon motion of the plaintiffs in actions for ejectment whenever the defendants have failed to stay execution. They should not leave to the appellate courts the action on the motions for execution because that action would be too late in the context of Section 19. The trial and appellate judges should constantly be mindful of the summary nature of the ejectments actions, and of the purpose underlying the mandate for immediate execution, which is to prevent the plaintiffs from being further deprived of their rightful possession. Otherwise, they stand liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure. H2: NO. That on July 18, 2005, the day on which the motion would be heard, had coincided with Law Day, an event that the Court had required the entire Judiciary to observe. She thus felt constrained to cancel not only the hearing of the complainant’s motions but also the hearings in other cases set on said date. If the delay could not be attributed to respondent Judge on the basis of her plausible explanation, she was not guilty of unreasonable delay. H3: The Judge sought to justify her issuance of the order of November 8, 2005 by citing the guideline under item 2 of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC. The justification should fail, however, because the guidelines under items 5 and 6 16, were those that were directly applicable.Nonetheless, respondent Judge’s issuance of the order of November 8, 2005 should not be considered as censurable conduct in the absence of the substantial showing of her having done so with malice, or in bad faith, or with fraud or dishonesty, or with a corrupt motive. Considering that her good faith was presumed, the complainant carried the burden to establish her having acted with malice, or bad faith, or with fraud, or with dishonesty, or with a corrupt motive. Yet, the complainant did not discharge its burden. Moreover, her denial of the complainant’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal could have also been characterizedas an error of judgment on her part. That characterization was far from improbable because, after all, she was not an infallible functionary of the Judiciary. Accordingly, she should not be disciplined. CHEVRON PHILIPPINES INC., PETITIONER VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, RESPONDENT SEPTEMBER 1, 2015, G.R. NO. 210836 EN BANC (RESOLUTION) MAIN TOPIC: TAXATION LAW / TAX REFUND F: Chevron sold and delivered petroleum products to Clark Development Corporation (CDC) in the period from August 2007 to December 2007. Chevron did not pass on to CDCthe excise taxes paid on the importation of the petroleum products soldto CDC in taxable year 2007. On June 26, 2009, Chevron filed an administrative claim for tax refund or issuance of tax credit certificate in the amount of P6,542,400.00. Considering that respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) did not act on the administrative claim for tax refund or tax credit, Chevron elevated its claim to the CTA by petition for review. The CTA First Division denied Chevron’s judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit through its decisionand later on denied Chevron’s Motion for Reconsideration. In due course, Chevron appealed to the CTA En Banc which, in affirmed the ruling of the CTA First Division, stating that there was nothing in Section 16A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC Items 5 and 6: 5. Should any case be left undecided by the transferred/detailed/assigned judge, the judge conducting the inventory shall cause the issuance to the parties of a notice of transfer/detail/assignment of the judge to which the case had been assigned, with a directive for the plaintiff/s to manifest, within five (5) days from receipt of such notice, whether or not he/she desires that the transferred judge should decide the case. The desire of the plaintiff, who may opt to have the case decided by the new judge, shall be respected. However, should the defendant oppose the manifestation of the plaintiff, the new judge shall resolve the matter in accordance with these Guidelines. Should the plaintiff fail to submit such manifestation within the said 5-day period, the presumption is that he/she desires that the case be decided by the transferred judge. 6. The manifestation of the plaintiff that the case should be decided by the transferred judge shall be forwarded to the Office of the Court Administrator which, upon receipt thereof, shall issue the proper directive. A directive requiring the transferred judge to decide the case immediately shall state any of these conditions: a) If the new station of the transferred judge is within the province of the judicial region of his/her former station, the case shall be decided in such station by the transferred judge who shall adjust his/her calendar to enable him/her to dispose the undecided case at his/her own expense without sacrificing efficiency in the performance of his/her duties in his/her new station. b) If the new station of the transferred judge is outside of the province in the judicial region of his/her former station, the records of the undecided case shall be delivered either by personal service or by registered mail, to the transferred judge and at his/her own expense. In either case, the Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish the parties to the case with a copy of such directive and the transferred judge shall return to his former branch the records of the case with the decision that the new judge shall promulgate in his stead. 135(c) of the NIRC that explicitly exempted Chevron as the seller of the imported petroleum products from the payment of the excise taxes; and holding that because it did not fall under any of the categories exempted from paying excise tax, Chevron was not entitled to the tax refund or tax credit. Chevron appealed to the Supreme Court but the Court (Second Division) denied the petition for review on certiorari for failure to show any reversible error on the part of the CTA En Banc. Hence, Chevron has filed the Motion for Reconsideration, submitting that it was entitled to the tax refund or tax credit because ruling promulgated on April 25, 2012 in Pilipinas Shell, on which the CTA En Banc had based its denial of the claim of Chevron, was meanwhile reconsidered by the Court’s First Division on February 19, 2014. I: Whether or not Chevron was entitled to the tax refund or the tax credit for the excise taxes paid on the importation of petroleum products that it had sold to CDC in 2007. H: YES. Pilipinas Shell concerns the manufacturer’s entitlement to refund or credit of the excise taxes paid on the petroleum products sold to international carriers exempt from excise taxes under Section 135(a) of the NIRC 17. However, the issue raised here is whether the importer (i.e., Chevron) was entitled to the refund or credit of the excise taxes it paid on petroleum products sold to CDC, a tax-exempt entity under Section 135(c) of the NIRC 18. Notwithstanding that the claims for refund or credit of excise taxes were premised on different subsections of Section 135 of the NIRC, the basic tax principle applicable was the same in both cases – that excise tax is a tax on property; hence, the exemption from the excise tax expressly granted under Section 135 of the NIRC must be construed in favor of the petroleum products on which the excise tax was initially imposed. Accordingly, the excise taxes that Chevron paid on its importation of petroleum products subsequently sold to CDC were illegal and erroneous, and should be credited or refunded to Chevron in accordance with Section 204 of the NIRC. Pursuant to Section 135(c), petroleum products sold to entities that are by law exempt from direct and indirect taxes are exempt from excise tax. The phrase which are by law exempt from direct and indirect taxesdescribes the entities to whom the petroleum products must be sold in order to render the exemption operative. Section 135(c) should thus be construed as an exemption in favor of the petroleum products on which the excise taxwas levied in the first place. The exemption cannot be granted to the buyers– that is, the entities that are by law exempt from direct and indirect taxes – because they are not under any legal duty to pay the excise tax. CDC was created to be the implementing and operating arm of the Bases Conversion and Development Authority to manage the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ).As a duly-registered enterprise in the CSEZ, CDC has been exempt from paying direct and indirect taxes pursuant to Section 24 of Republic Act No. 7916 (The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995), in relation to Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9400 (Amending Republic Act No. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion Development Act of1992). Inasmuch as its liability for the payment of the excise taxes accrued immediately upon importation and prior to the removal of the petroleum products from the customshouse, Chevron was bound to pay, and actually paid such taxes. But the status of the petroleum products as exempt from the excise taxes would be confirmed only upon their sale to CDC in 2007 (or, for that matter, to any of the other entities or agencies listed in Section 135 of the NIRC). Before then, Chevron did not have any legal basis to claim the tax refund or the tax credit as to the petroleum products. Consequently, the payment of the excise taxes by Chevron upon its importation of petroleum products was deemed illegal and erroneous upon the sale of the petroleum products to CDC. Section 204 of the NIRC explicitly allowed Chevron as the statutory taxpayer to claim the refund or the credit of the excise taxes thereby paid. 17SEC. 135. Petroleum Products Sold to International Carriers and Exempt Entities or Agencies. – Petroleum products sold to thefollowing are exempt from excise tax: (a) International carriers of Philippine or foreign registry on their use or consumption outside the Philippines: Provided, That the petroleum products sold to these international carriers shall be stored in a bonded storage tank and may be disposed of only in accordance with the rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Commissioner; 18Section 135. (c) Entities which are by law exempt from direct and indirect taxes.  TEOFILO GIANGAN, SANTOS BONTIA (DECEASED), AND LIBERATODUMAIL (DECEASED), PETITIONERS VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT August 26, 2016, G.R. No. 169385 (First Division) MAIN TOPIC: CRIMINAL LAW / R.A. 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act F: In his capacity as the barangay chairman of Barangay Luyang, Province of Cebu at the time material to this case, Giangan, along with his co-accused Domail, a barangay councilor, andBontia, the head of the barangay tanods, were charged with the violation ofSection 3 (e) of R. A. No. 3019 19. The prosecution alleged that the accused, in relation to their office, conniving and confederatingtogether and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, withmanifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there willfully,unlawfully and feloniously destroy the fence made of wooden posts andstraight wires in an agricultural land situated at Luyang, Carmen, andowned by Aurelia F. Bernadas, without proper court order or authority oflaw.Giangan averred that as the barangay chairman of Luyang, he believed that the site of the fence was a road because the residents complained that they could longer pass through especially during high tide; that such complaint was why he removed the fence; and that he simply told Bernadas and her husband that he was forced to remove the fence because of the complaint of the residents. The RTC ruled in favor of the complainant and found the accused guilty as charged. Sandiganbayan affirmed the judgment of conviction. I: Whether or not Giangan as the lone surviving is guilty of violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019. H: We find that the Sandiganbayanerred in ruling that Giangan and his co-accused had acted with gross bad faith and manifest impartiality when they removed the wooden posts of the fence of Bernadas. On the contrary, their actuations evinced good faith. We note that it was not at all disputed that access through the road had long been permitted even by the owner and her predecessor. In that context, Giangan as the barangay chairman acted upon the honest and sincere belief that he was then summarily abating the nuisance that a regular user of the obstructedroad had just reported to him. A further indication of the good faith of Giangan was the turning over of the wooden posts to the police station, manifesting that the accused were acting within the scope of their authority. Also worth noting is that at the time of the removal of the wooden posts the owner held no building permit, and had not filed any application for a building permit on the construction. 19Section 3.Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: -----xxxxxx----- (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.  NILO V. CHIPONGIAN, PETITIONER VS.VICTORIA BENITEZ-LIRIO, FEODOR BENITEZ AGUILAR AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS August 26, 2015, G.R. No. 162692 (First Division) MAIN TOPIC: REMEDIAL LAW /SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS /SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS /APPEALS IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (Rule 109) F: The late Vicente Benitez was married to Isabel Chipongian, thepetitioner's sister. Isabel had predeceased Vicente and the couple had no offspring. After the death of Isabel, Vicente and the petitioner had executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement respecting the estate of Isabel, whereby the latter waived all his rights to the estate of Isabel in favor of Vicente. According to the petitioner, however, Vicente executed an affidavit on the same date whereby he affirmed that the waiver did not extend to the paraphernal properties of Isabel.Upon the death of Vicente, Victoria Benitez Lirio (Victoria), a sister of Vicente, and Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Feodor), a nephew of Vicente, initiated proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Vicente in the Regional Trial Court. The RTC appointed Feodor the administrator of Vicente’s estate. The petitioner intervened in Special Proceedings in order to exclude the paraphernal properties of Isabel from inclusion in theestate of Vicente.On June 8, 1994, the petitioner specifically moved for the exclusion ofthe paraphernal properties of Isabel from Vicente’s estate. However, hewithdrew the motion even before the RTC could rule on it. Instead, he fileda Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in- Intervention.Respondents Victoria and Feodor opposed the complaint-in-intervention. The RTC granted the Motion for Leave to Intervene and to AdmitComplaint-in- Intervention, and admitted the complaint-in-intervention of the petitioner. However, on August 21, 1998, the RTC rendered judgment dismissing thecomplaint-in- intervention, and ordering the costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner. The petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the judgment,but the RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration on March 8, 1999.Thus, on March 19, 1999, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal.On March 30, 1999, the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.On April 19, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsiderationvis-à-vis the order denying due course to his notice of appeal.On July 5, 1999, the RTC issued its order whereby it conceded that the petitioner had timely filed the notice of appeal, but still denied the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that he had not perfected his appeal because of his failure to pay the appellate court docket fees.On July 26, 1999, the petitioner brought his Motion to Set Aside the July 5, 1999 order denying his Motion for Reconsideration.On August 13, 1999, the RTC denied the Motion to Set Aside. The petitioner instituted his petition for certiorari in the CA,alleging that the RTC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing his appeal, and denying his Motion for Reconsideration. On October 30, 2002, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari opining that the start of the period of 30 days happened on September 18,1998, the date when his counsel received the decision dismissing hisintervention. I: Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in dismissing his petition for certiorariassailing the dismissal of his complaint-in-intervention and the denial of due course to his notice of appeal by the RTC on the ground of the late payment of the appellate court docket fees. H: No. Under Section 3 of Rule 41 20, a party who wants to appeal a judgment or final order in special proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order 20Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellantshall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30)days from notice of judgment or final order. However, an appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. The within which to perfect an appeal because he will be filing not only a notice of appeal but also a record on appeal that will require the approval of the trial court with notice to the adverse party. For the petitioner, therefore, the period for perfecting the appeal by record on appeal was 30 days from notice of the final order dismissing the intervention. The start of the period of 30 days happened on September 18, 1998, the date when his counsel received the decision dismissing his intervention. Considering that the petitioner did not submit a record on appeal in accordance with Section 3 of Rule 41, he did not perfect his appeal of the judgment dismissing his intervention. As a result, the dismissal became final and immutable. He now has no one to blame but himself. The right to appeal, being statutory in nature, required strict compliance with the rules regulating the exercise of the right. As such, his perfection of his appeal within the prescribed period was mandatory and jurisdictional, and his failure to perfect the appeal within the prescribed time rendered the judgment final and beyond review on appeal. With this outcome, we no longer need to dwell on the denial of due course to his notice of appeal because of the late payment of the appellate court docket fees. period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (n) (bold emphasis supplied)