Ahmet Davutoğlu: Role as an Islamic Scholar Shaping Turkey’s Foreign Policy

CHAPTER FIVE Ahmet Davutoğlu: Role as an Islamic Scholar Shaping Turkey’s Foreign Policy İştar Gözaydın

Abstract: There is little doubt that Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s current Minister of Foreign Affairs of pro-Islamic AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), is the major driving force of Turkey’s ‘proactive and multi-dimensional’ foreign policy, even though the foundations for his regional foreign policy go back to 1980’s; however it was Ahmet Davutoğlu who embedded this Ottoman reference into a reconsideration of the role of the West and of Turkey from a decidedly intellectual-Islamist position. Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu is also an academic of political science and international relations that has published several books and articles; and who is shaping the transformation of Turkish foreign policy in accordance with his ‘strategic depth’ doctrine. Professor Davutoğlu was granted a title of ambassador by the joint decision of President then Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Prime Minister at that time Abdullah Gül in 2003. As an ambassador, Davutoğlu was one of the leading actors on behalf of the Turkish government during the shuttle diplomacy for the settlement of 2008 Israel–Gaza conflict. In this chapter, I will scrutinize through his works how Davutoğlu as a scholar perceives the fields of Islam and international relations. Thus, I hope to read, at least partially, the role of religion in Turkey’s current foreign policies as well, without getting into Davutoğlu’s politics as a strategist and an implementer but as an academician and a theorist. Key Words: Ahmet Davutoğlu; Turkey; Islam; religion in international relations; strategic depth, soft power. ‘Kuzum, sen bir büyük adam olasın, dünyalar ayağına gele, herkes sana akıl danışa.’ (My lamb, may you be a great man, may the whole world lie at your feet, may everyone seek your wisdom) 1 Last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed the return of religion to the mainstream of political life in an array of settings around the world. Last decade has been a period that religion got brought into international relations. Publication of several books on the topic within this period 2 signifies the phenomenon. Almost in all of Daily prayer of paternal granny Hacıkızıebe for her only grandson Ahmet. She took care of him mostly after Davutoğlu’s mother died when he was four (cited in Zengin 2010: 27 and 32). 2 For some examples in a chronological listing see, Richard Falk (2001) Religion and Humane Global Governance, New York: palgrave; Douglas Johnston (ed.) (2003) Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik, Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press; Fabio Petito and Pavlos Hatzopoulos (ed.) (2003) Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, New York: palgrave macmillan; Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler (2004) Bringing Religion into International Affairs, New York: palgrave macmillan; Scott M. Thomas (2005) The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations, New York: palgrave macmillan; Eric O. Hanson (2006) Religion and Politics in the International System Today, New York: Cambridge University Press; Jeffrey Haynes (2007) An Introduction to International Relations and Religion, Essex: Pearson Longman; Thomas Banchoff (ed.) (2008) Religious Pluralism, Globalization, and World Politics, Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 3-121; Scott M. Thomas (2010) ‘A Globalized God: Religion’s Growing Influence in International Politics’, Foreign Affairs, 89 (6) pp.93-101; Jeffrey Haynes (2011) Religion, Politics and International Law: Selected Essays, Oxon-New York: Routledge; Jack Snyder (ed.) (2011) Religion and International Relations Theory, New York-Chichester-West Sussex: Columbia University Press. Some recent books on religion and politics have also sections on religion and international relations; see, Jeffrey Haynes (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics, Routledge, London and New York 2009, pp.271-339 1

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the related publications, it is mentioned that there exists a global resurgence/return of religion (Banchoff 2008: 9-13; Falk 2001: 2; Fox and Sandler 2004: 12-14; Haynes 2007: 19; Johnston 2003: 3; Petito and Hatzopoulos 2003: 1; Shani 2009: 311; Thomas 2005: 26-42)3. Upon discussions on Westphalian legacy (Banchoff 2008: 52-54; Falk 2001: 6-8; Fox and Sandler 2004: 22, 54; Hanson 2006: 17; Haynes 2007: 31-34; Petito and Hatzopoulos 2003: 2; Shani 2009: 308-309; Thomas 2005: 25-26; Wessels 2009: 324, 328), changing paradigms of international relations and the rise of faith-based diplomacy more or less get to be the common denominator of all mentioned material (Banchoff 2008; Falk 2001; Fox and Sandler 2004; Fox 2009; Hanson 2006; Haynes 2007; Haynes 2009; Petito and Hatzopoulos 2003; Shani, 2009; Thomas 2005; Wessels 2009). Religion is understood in this context, “as encompassing both the teachings and beliefs of organized religion and all spiritual outlooks that interpret the meaning of life by reference to faith in and commitment to that which cannot be explained by empirical science or sensory observation and is usually associated with an acceptance of the reality of the divine, the sacred, the transcendent, the mysterious, the ultimate (Falk 2001: 30). Soft power is another concept used in regards to the role of religion in international relations; referring to “the capability of an entity, usually but not necessarily a state, to influence what others do through attraction and persuasion” (Haynes 2009: 296). In Snow’s (2009: 3) words, ‘… soft power is not the same as little old ladies sipping tea; it is often used in conjunction with more forceful and threatening forms of compliance and persuasion’. It is quite recent that religious soft power gets considered with regard to foreign policy 4 (Haynes 2007: 44-55; Haynes 2009: 296-304; Thomas 2005: 12, 69, 109-110, 214-216) Joseph Nye, who coined the term two decades ago (Nye 1990), perceives religion in international relations as a persuasive power reserved for same-faith parties. According to Nye, “religion is a double-edged sword as an American soft-power resource, and how it cuts depends on who is wielding it” (2004: 59); and focusing on Wahhabism, which he calls a “sorcerer’s apprentice that has come back to bedevil its original creator”, the Saudi Government (Nye 2004: 96). My perception of the concept of soft power is similar in substance but not identical to a combination of the second dimension (agenda setting) and the third dimensions (or the radical dimension) of power as expounded by Steven Lukes in Power: a Radical View (Lukes 2005, 20-29).5 Turkey is not at all an exception to these developments in the international relations. There is little doubt that Ahmet Davutoğlu, Turkey’s current Minister of Foreign Affairs of pro-Islamic AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), is the major driving force of Turkey’s ‘proactive and multi-dimensional’ foreign policy (Keyman, 2009), even though the foundations for his regional foreign policy go back to 1980’s. However, it was Ahmet Davutoğlu who embedded this Ottoman reference into a reconsideration of the role of the West and of Turkey from a decidedly Islamic or intellectual - Islamist position (Öktem 2010: 25). Born in the mountainous southern part of Konya (Taşkent) in 1959, he attended to middle and high school in Istanbul – Istanbul Erkek Lisesi, a prestigious and old establishment from the ends of the nineteenth century with a strong education predominantly in German. He graduated from Boğaziçi University, Istanbul with a double major in economics and political science. Davutoğlu completed his MA degree in public administration and Ph.D. in political science and international relations both in Boğaziçi University. Davutoğlu’s residency as Professor of Political Science at the International Islamic University in Malaysia (IIUM) between 1990 and 1995 was a particularly important period in his career, (includes four articles: Jonathan Fox, “Integrating religion into international relations theory”; Jeffrey Haynes, “Religion and foreign policy”; Giorgio Shani, “Transnational religious actors and international relations”; David Wessels, “Religion and globalization”). For an article that investigates the relationship between preferences affected by Islamic worldview of Turkey’s new leadership and foreign policy through models, see Güner 2011. 3 Thomas defines the global resurgence of religion, as the concept is used in this context, as follows: “the global resurgence of religion is the growing saliency and persuasiveness of religion, i.e. the increasing importance of religious beliefs, practices, and discourses in personal and public life, and the growing role of religious or religiously-related individuals, non-state groups, political parties, and communities, and organizations in domestic politics, and this is occurring in ways that have significant implications for international politics.” (Thomas 2005: 26) 4 John O. Voll uses the term in a “negative” context reminding the readers, a religious impetus in U.S foreign policy that was reinforced by Bush administration had resulted in an increase in the soft power of Osama Bin Laden and other radicals. (Voll 2008: 262-268) It is also interesting to see that in a book on soft power in international relations religion only finds place in a context of ‘building bridges to moderate Islam’ in an article titled ‘Dialogue-based Public Diplomacy: a new Foreign Policy Paradigm?’ (Riordan 2005). 5 For critical views on the concept of soft power see articles of Steven Lukes’ and Janice Bially Mattern’s in Berenskoetter and Williams.

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alerting him to the fact that “[t]he majority of people in the world do not live in the West, and we have to be aware that their concerns and traditions are every bit as important as those of the West”.6 He worked in Marmara University, Istanbul between 1996 and 1999. He was promoted to associate professorship in 1993 and to full professorship in 1999. Davutoğlu was the chair of the International Relations Department at Beykent University, Istanbul from 1999 to 2004. Professor Davutoğlu was granted a title of ambassador by the joint decision of President then Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Prime Minister at that time Abdullah Gül in 2003. As an ambassador, Davutoğlu was one of the leading actors on behalf of the Turkish government during the shuttle diplomacy for the settlement of 2008 Israel–Gaza conflict. He also worked as the senior consultant to the Prime Minister from 2002 to 2009. He has been the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey since May 1, 2009. Prof. Dr. Ahmet Davutoğlu is also an academic of political science that has published several books, and articles. His publications include Alternative Paradigms: the Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory, The Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World in English, Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth7), and Küresel Bunalım (The Global Crisis) in Turkish. All through Davutoğlu’s work (and consequently through his diplomatic career) we may trace his perception of Muslim culture not to be a subsidiary to Western culture, but an alternative. In his first book Alternative Paradigms: the Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory, which is produced from his Ph.D. dissertation, Davutoğlu asserts that the differences between Western and Muslim paradigms cause an obstacle for the study of contemporary Islam as a subject of social sciences, especially of international politics. He (1994a: 5) argues that: The interrelationship of ontology, epistemology, axiology and politics might be a meaningful anchor point to understand the irreconcilability of the philosophical bases of Islamic and Western political theories, images and cultures. (…) The principle difference between Islamic and Western weltenshauungs is related to the contrast between the “ontologically determined epistemology” of Islam and the “epistemologically determined ontology” of the Western philosophical traditions. This difference is especially significant in understanding the axiological basis of political legitimacy and the process of justification. In other words, Islamic and Western paradigms are incompatible because they are based on opposite relationship between God and humans. From his point of view, Islamic culture and religion is based on an ontological hierarchy whereas Western culture is based on ontological proximity. This means that ‘the conflicts and contrasts between Islamic and Western political thought originate mainly from their philosophical, methodological, and theoretical background rather than from mere institutional and historical differences’ (Davutoğlu 1994a: 2). Thus, the main thrust of Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory is to show that what Davutoğlu calls “the West” and “ the East” are two radically and fundamentally different paradigms. The difference between the two paradigms is so irreconcilable that even translation between the terms of one to the other is impossible; hence one cannot translate dawlah as ‘state’ (Davutoğlu 1994a: 96-109), shura as ‘parliament’ (Davutoğlu 1994a: 111-134), and not even din as ‘religion’. The two paradigms can only be alternatives to each other; so attempts at fusion, modernization or reform along Western lines are doomed to failure. Hence, despite its philosophical sophistication, Davutoğlu’s thesis boils down to be a reverse mirror-image of Rudyard Kipling’s orientalist adage: “East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet”. 8 As Yusof (2007: 7) points out, ‘Davutoğlu appropriates Husserlian phenomenology in explaining the evolution and transformation of the idea or consciousness of God in Western philosophico-theological history’. Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory is based on some bold Keynote lecture at the Oxford Conference ‘Turkey’s Foreign Policy in a Changing World’, 30 May, 2010 (cited in Öktem 2010: 25). 7 Subtitle of the book may be translated as ‘Turkey’s International Position’ (as in Balcı and Miş 2008: 403; Crooke 2010: 19; Hale and Özbudun 2010: 182; Gordon and Taspınar 2008: 105; Kösebalaban 2001: 693; Meral and Paris 2010: 86; Müftüler-Baç 2011: 289; Walker 2007: 35) For some other translations see, Fuller (2008: 169): ‘Turkey’s Place in the World’; Köni (2011: 71): ‘Strategic Analysis’; Larrabee (2010: 178): ‘Strategic Depth and the International Position of Turkey’; Murinson (2006: 962): ‘The Turkish International Location’; Öniş and Yılmaz (2009: 23): Turkey’s International Standing; Robins (2006: 199): ‘Turkey’s International Location’; Sözen (2010: 121): ‘The International Position of Turkey’. 8 It is interesting that Davutoğlu himself critically mentions Kipling in Küresel Bunalım in regards to his White Man’s Burden (2002: 98). 6

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generalisations; for example, for Davutoğlu ‘the West’ is based on not Christianity but a ‘proximity to God’ which blurs the fundamental, ontological difference between godhead and humanity, which antedates (and postdates) Christianity. While such generalisations may prove insightful and illuminating at times, Davutoğlu remains oblivious to variations and some of the major shifts in the history of Christianity. For example, the whole moral dimension of the Augustinian critique of the “pagan proximity to God” is disregarded. Something that maybe more relevant for Davutoğlu’s purposes is the major split within Christianity prior to the reformation. Part of the Eastern Orthodox Church’s critique of the Western (catholic) Church’s version of Christ-centered Christianity was that the latter with its realistic depictions of Christ and the Saints, with its understanding of ‘imitatio Dei’ etc. compromised God’s transcendence; hence made him more ‘proximal’ to humanity. This critique can obviously be related to various issues like iconoclasm, on which the Eastern Church carried marked affinities with, and perhaps influences from Islam. Furthermore, Davutoğlu, while particularly sensitive to the representation of Godhead on earth (the issue of clergy), does not take the almost total disappearance of the figure of Christ (the man-God) from the Enlightenment debate on religion. It is difficult to see how the ‘God of Philosophers’ (the Deus sive Natura of Spinoza) preserved his ‘proximity to humanity’ compared to a ‘sovereign” God who is still conceived of in personal terms as in Islam. On the other hand, somewhat surprisingly in a student of Şerif Mardin, Islam too is seen in extremely monolithic terms; for Davutoğlu Islam is the ‘high sunni tradition’. In Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory there exists just a very dismissive and passing reference to ‘… some extemist factions of Khawarij and Shi’a’ (Davutoğlu 1994a: 57), but no saints of the Atlas, no evliyas, sheikhs, dedes and what is most telling, no discussion of that most extreme statement of proximity between man and God: ‘En el Haq’. At a basic, phenomenological (or maybe anthropological) level, the contrast between a religious attitude based on an obedience to a God conceived as the ‘wholly other’ and one that is based on the veneration of a Man-God does seem to be useful, but one should probably view this contrast more as a continuum rather than a dichotomy as Davutoğlu does. However, even conceived of in dichotomous terms, the poles do not map as neatly on to existing historical religions or civilizations; not even when they are conceived of in as ‘ideal-typical’ ways as Davutoğlu conceives of Islam and the West. It is probably true that Islam nowhere developed trinitarian tendencies; however reference to categories of human beings of varying degrees of godliness (some of which influenced perhaps by Christian examples) abound in the Islamic tradition(s). On the other side of the coin, at least some of the (post)Enlightenment unitarian (Deist and Theist) tendencies in the West have been manifestly influenced by Islam. In Alternative Paradigms: the Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory what Davutoğlu seems fail to appreciate is that tawhid itself is an essentially contested concept. In indulging in such denial, he forecloses any possibility of a process of learning from each other, which we know to have occurred historically, let alone a synthesis. Despite the impressiveness of the intellectual apparatus he deploys, Davutoğlu seems to be remarkably ‘innocent’ of any Hegelian influences. That comes at a price: he ends up writing not as a scholar but as the ‘organic intellectual’ of a political bloc. In The Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World, Davutoğlu initially makes an analysis of state of things after the ‘pulling down of the Berlin Wall’ (1994b: iii) what he qualifies as a civilizational transformation and crisis. Fukuyama’s thesis (1990) that later evolves to his book The End of History and the Last Man in 1992, and which is a reformulation of Alexandre Kojève’s reading of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, seems to be a trigger for asserting his claims against the ‘theories of endism’ and suggests ‘Islamic paradigm provides a comprehensive counter-proposal to this civilizational crisis’ (1994b: 114). Fukuyama’s second-hand and distorted reading of Hegel apparently infuriate Davutoğlu 9 with what I believe to be a very good cause; however it is remarking that Davutoğlu refers in several occasions to Hegel in The Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World, especially assuming that actually the writing of this book precedes Alternative Paradigms: the Impact of Islamic and Western

Later in his works Fukuyama get mentioned in similar contexts repeatedly: Fukuyama’s assertion of Islam world as a new threatening pole to Western values (Davutoğlu 2001: 136, 253, 294); Fukuyama’s ‘evangelist’ approach (Davutoğlu 2002: 8-9, 35-36, 253, 294); Davutoğlu’s criticisms to ‘end of history thesis (2002: 6, 11, 16, 18, 42, 62, 70, 80-82, 97-99104, 127, 165-166, 178, 209, 221-222, 249-250). Davutoğlu points out an ‘imaginative continuity’ from a book published in 1926 under the title to Huntington’s thesis (Davutoğlu 1997: 1). For an evaluation of Davutoğlu’s approach to ‘crash of civilizations’ metaphor, see, Balcı 2009: 96.

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Weltanschauungs on Political Theory in which the philosopher never gets mentioned.10 It seems that Davutoğlu prefers to read Hegel along the unfortunate line of Karl Popper and leaves him aside from his further intellectual realm. 11 One may observe the repercussions of his line of perception of Islam and international relations reflected in Davutoğlu’s first two books in his third book of chronological publishing, Stratejik Derinlik (Strategic Depth). In this book Davutoğlu sets up his ‘strategic depth’ doctrine that shapes the transformation of Turkish foreign policy for almost a decade. In the introduction of Stratejik Derinlik, he lists what he calls the dimensions in social sciences including international relations: description, explanation, understanding, giving a meaning, and influencing. According to Davutoğlu (2001: 3), while stepping from description to influencing, paradigms of mentality enters the scene more and more; hence his perceptions of alternative paradigms reappear in his ‘doctrine’ and consequently in his policies. He formulates a country’s relative weight and power in international affairs as follows: Power = (constant data + potential data) x (strategic mentality x strategic planning x political will) (Davutoğlu 2001: 17). In this formulation, constant data involve geography, history, population and culture; whereas potential datas include economic capacity, technologic capacity, and military capacity. Hence the book develops into an analysis of Turkey’s weight and power in international affairs with its ‘frontiers’ (Davutoğlu 2001: 19) that expand ‘beyond the homeland in the cognitive map of policymaker’s minds’ (Aras 2009: 4). Davutoğlu (2008: 78) argues that: In terms of geography, Turkey occupies a unique space. As a large country in the midst of Afro-Eurasia’s vast landmass, it may be defined as a central country with multiple regional identities that cannot be reduced to one unified character. Like Russia, Germany, Iran, and Egypt, Turkey cannot be explained geographically or culturally by associating it with one single region. Turkey’s diverse regional composition lends it the capability of maneuvering in several regions simultaneously; in this sense, it controls an area of influence in its immediate environs. According to Murinson (2006: 947), the origins of ‘strategic depth’ doctrine can be traced to Özal’s neoOttomanism, 12 “the multi-dimensional” foreign policy of the Erbakan government, and Davutoğlu’s innovative approach to geopolitics reflected in his previous works like his article ‘The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order’ that was published in a journal of Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Davutoğlu 1998). According to Ulgen (2010: 5), strategic depth doctrine is based on a comprehensive historical-cultural reading of Turkey’s position in international politics that highlights the country’s Ottoman legacy and Islamic tradition. In Davutoğlu’s reading, Turkey is a “central country,”13 blessed with multiple identities and a location at the heart of Eurasia where Asia, Europe and Middle East meet; it is not a ‘bridge’14 as some claim (Davutoğlu 2002: 191-193). 10 Davutoğlu mentions in Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World that it had already been ready for publication in November 1992, however was delayed due to the urgency of some other projects (1994b: iv). 11 Davutoğlu’s negative perception of Hegel later appears in his book Statejik Derinlik when he qualifies the philosopher’s reading of history, and Hitler’s concept of IIIrd Reich as a ‘parallel in strategic mentality’. (2001: 29). In Küresel Bunalım, one observes a neutral or even rather a more positive approach to Hegel: ‘limitless freedom’ (Davutoğlu 2002: 2); ‘distorted and victimised ideas in the name of political pragmatism’ (Davutoğlu 2002: 31). 12 Alessandri (2010: 14) claims that ‘Davutoğlu has a particular inclination for imaging Turkey’s future by relating it to the past, but he nonetheless knows that Turkey’s success in the years to come critically depends on its ability to come to terms with the new realities of today rather than foolishly hoping to revive Turkey’s glorious past. In this respect, the fascination with ‘neoOttomanism’ should hardly be embraced by anyone seriously caring about the future of Turkey as the illfated history of the Ottoman Empire is well known’. Gordon and Taspinar (2008: 51) note that Davutoğlu’s ‘neo-Ottoman’ vision is very different from that promulgated in the late 1990’s by Erbakan where he sought to create an Islamic alliance with Muslim countries as an explicit alternative to the West, AKP ‘want to reach out to the east to complement their ties to the West, not to replace them’. According to Çandar (2009: 5), ‘… Davutoğlu, (…) has taken great pains to define the guiding principle as “zero-problems with neighbors” rather than “neo-Ottomanism”, (b)ecause “neo-Ottomanism” is a throw-back to Turkish sentiments of grandeur and can equally be perceived as expansionism by the regional counterparts of that foreign policy’. A defense against ‘NeoOttomanism’ can be found in Kınıklıoğlu, 2009. Also for an interview with İbrahim Kalın, chief foreign-policy adviser to Prime Minister Erdoğan, on neo-Ottomanism see, Kalın 2009. For some previous depictions of neo-Ottomanism in Turkish foreign policy, see Duran 2006: 303. 13 For a geneology of the ‘central state’ metaphore for Turkey see, Bilgin 2007: 747. 14 For an evaluation of the ‘bridge’ metaphore for Turkey see, 2010: 85-86.

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Basic conviction that Turkey is not a bridge but a central country (merkez ülke) is a crucial element in Davutoğlu’s perception. Upon these premises, in an article titled ‘Turkey should become a central country’ that appears in Radikal, a daily Turkish newspaper he asserts what Turkish foreign policy should be based on by five interdependent principles (2004): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Democratization without risking security and stability (broadening the sphere of freedoms and strengthening domestic political legitimacy); Good relations (zero problem) with neighbors; Proactive, multinational, and complementary policies; A new diplomatic style (self-confidence); Transition from static diplomacy to rhythmic one (to increase the influence of Turkey in international organizations to become a global power).

Davutoğlu suggests that in order to achieve these goals, not only the diplomats and politicians but also the intelligentsia of Turkey need transformation in mentality; thus he depicts such characteristics as, ‘in Eastern platforms one who is not uneasy with her/his eastern identity, but is able to face up to this identity and can produce thesis and solutions in that identity; in Western platforms one that has assimilated Western notions and is capable of debating on Europe’s future with a European view’ (Davutoğlu 2004). According to Davutoğlu, Turkey’s multiple identities yield a multidimensional foreign policy that seeks to avoid privileging one relationship over another. To the extent that Turkey commands more influence in its own near abroad, it will have a stronger position with respect to other power centers as well as global powers. The objective of Davutoğlu’s doctrine is therefore, to establish Turkey as an important player in international diplomacy. Beyond the academic discussions surrounding Turkey's potential and place in the world, Stratejik Derinlik advocates seeking to counterbalance Turkey's dependencies on the West by courting multiple alliances to maintain the balance of power in its region. The premise of this argument is that Turkey should not be dependent upon any one actor and should actively seek ways to balance its relationships and alliances so that it can maintain optimal independence and leverage on the global and regional stage. 15 In Fuller’s (2008: 44) reading of Davutoğlu, ‘… only when Turkey overcomes its own internal historical and psychological hang-ups about Islam and begins to understand the Middle East in its own psychological terms can Turkey develop effective relationships (…) in other regions’. Another aspect of such an understanding is as Barkey (2010: 252) notes, ‘… a Turkey that does not solidify its position in Asia cannot aspire to being anything more than a minor player in Europe’. The bottomline is ‘to overcome the contradictions in its identity and reformulate it under the pressure of globalization, turkey needs to participate in the globalization process as an active agent, drawing on its geographical, historical, and cultural depth, and fertilizing Western modernity with the Ottoman-Islamic civilizational heritage’ (Kardaş 2006: 318-319). Küresel Bunalım is an outcome of several TV interviews held after September 11 that Davutoğlu evaluates the state of things and that he qualifies as a ‘global crisis’. In this context, Ronald David Laing (1927-1989), a Scottish psychiatrist associated with the antipsychiatry movement, is a source that Davutoğlu refers to quite frequently in regards to his ideas expressed in his 1966 book The Divided Self. In an interview dated 26 September 2001, Davutoğlu uses the concept ‘divided self’ in the context of problems that have emerged in western ontology and argues in detail that Islam may respond in a positive sense to international order and to globalization (Davutoğlu 2002: 98). In this framework, Davutoğlu qualifies another division in self: ‘when one (Davutoğlu uses the term ‘mentality’ instead of ‘one’) that has no knowledge of Ottoman classics but of Hegel looks back to her/his culture, certainly experiences fragmentation between her/his self and her/his cultural identity’ (Davutoğlu 2002: 106). He projects this perception in Stratejik Derinlik by employing concepts like inner self/embodied self/false-self to For a detailed analysis of the foreign policy application of Davutoğlu’s doctrine, see Duran 2008: 88-89. For ‘Turkey’s methodological approach to world affairs’, see Davutoğlu 2010: 3. Fuller (2008: 169) evaluates Stratejik Derinlik as, ‘… perhaps the most systematic, substantial, and comprehensive vision of Turkey’s strategic position yet written. It is based on sophisticates and complex – if controversial- reading of history, political cultures, geography, geopolitics, global balances, and national interests. Davutoğlu’s critics accuse him of shaky historical readings on many issues, but the importance of the book lies in its broad thrust and comprehensive vision and not as a history of the world’. For another a very flattering evaluation of Davutoğlu, see Falk 2011. 15

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Turkey (Davutoğlu 2001: 59). Davutoğlu’s endeavour to understand the self turns out to be as essentialist as his understanding of the phenomenological world. Laing’s views of a “wholesome” self looks hopelessly naïve when looked at from a more contemporary perspective,. The enormous body of work associated with Laing’s contemporary colleagues Like Melanie Klein, Donald Woods Winnicott and Heinz Kohut (among others) view self as being a product of necessary division within the totality of the psychological material. Conflicts and division are not contingent “errors” that may be superseded but rather are constitutive of the self. Davutoğlu uses the Turkish expression ‘yumuşak güç’ (soft power)16 in an interview; however, then he refers to it as ‘soft security’ by using the concept in English, and alternatively using the Turkish ‘güvenlik’ for security. He expresses that (translation is by the author): I explained about the concept of Soft Security (used in English in the original text) in a speech of mine in (a) NATO summit. Sincerely, Turkey’s major contribution to NATO is this. That is Soft Power. (…) There is security provided by military means, and there is also security provided by lowering the tension and through diplomacy. One of the most important countries of NATO to have a Muslim majority population is by itself Soft security. (Akyol 2011: 99) As Fotiou and Triantaphyllou (2010: 99) point out, ‘indications of (…) a soft power 17 aspiration are seen in (Turkey’s) mediation efforts between Syria and Israel, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the United States (US) and Iran. These aspirations are also visible in its Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform initiative proposed during the Russian–Georgian crisis of 2008, signs of rapprochement with Armenia, its warming relations with Russia, the steps taken towards resolution of the Kurdish issue, its role in Sudan, its accusations against China of committing ‘genocide’’ against the Uighurs, its co-chairmanship of the Alliance of Civilisations, as well as its contacts with Khaled Meshal and Hamas, and the Iraqi Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.’ These attempts all coincide with Ahmet Davutoğlu’s contributions to Turkish foreign policy. In all these instances, Davutoğlu the man of action, the politician, the diplomat appear to be far more sensitive to the varieties of Islamic experience and interpretation than the Davutoğlu the theoretician, the academician who insists on the cohesive unity of Islam as an alternative paradigm. Concluding, in order to express my concerns over perceiving Islam as a monolithic body, I would like to focus on two separate implementations of the Justice and Development Party-ruled administrations over the last decade in Turkey. Those two implementations both are admittedly related more to internal affairs but which has obvious international repercussions. The first is the abolishing of various restrictions on the religious (Christian and Jewish) minorities in Turkey, especially those pertaining to purchase and sale of foundational properties which can be justified in terms of a traditional Islamic paradigm. One could go further and agree with Davutoğlu that a religious rather than a nationalistic framework is far more conducive to an understanding of the plights of religious minorities, that only making peace with one’s own religious background and sensibilities, enable a peaceful co-existence with other religious backgrounds and sensibilities. However, the celebrations initiated by the present administration around the birth of the Prophet Mohammed (kutlu doğum haftası: the “blessed birth week”) raise issues of a different order. Despite criticisms from more traditionalist circles, the date for the week was determined not according to the traditional lunar calendar that according to which all the traditional religious holidays are determined but according to the international solar calendar. Moreover, the date chosen for the festivities, roughly the second week of April, is far from being “innocent” as it so obviously vies for public attention with the Christian Easter and the Jewish Passover. But it is not just about the date. The iconography of the festivities clearly derives to a large extent from those of Christmas—though not perhaps Christmas as Christian rite but rather Christmas as a modernist and consumerist cultural ritual. But either way, one would be hard put to find a traditional Islamic legitimation or precedent for the occasion; it would seem to be precisely the syncretistic fusion that makes Davutoğlu so uncomfortable. On his behalf, one could say that such syncretism does not lie at the level of doctrine but rather at the level of popular consumption. By such a line of argument is clearly foreclosed if we really want to interpret Islam not as a Kirişçi and Kaptanoğlu (2011: 711) also claim that Davutoğlu’s ‘stated goal for Turkish foreign policy is to transform Turkey into a strong regional, and even global, actor through the exercise of soft power’. 17 For Turkey’s obstacles to be a soft power, see Altunışık 2008: 49-50.

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theological orthodoxy, but instead a genuinely universalistic Weltanschaaung, an “alternative paradigm” in Davutoğlu’s terms. Only by creatively engaging foreign, alien elements rather than by aspiring towards an artificial coherence can a paradigm become truly universalistic. I hope it should be clear that I am not criticizing the syncretism underlying practices like the “blessed birth week” - to the contrary. Turkey owes the kind of soft power it exercises not only to its size, geography or population but even more so to the heterogeneous nature of the religious experiences it harbours and the creativity with which people and administrations respond to this heterogeneity. A festivity like the ‘blessed birth week’ would have been unimaginable in, say Wahhabi Saudi Arabia or Shiite Iran; however it is precisely the syncretistic nature of Turkish Islam that makes Turkey into such a pliable tool of soft power in international politics. This is a different division, a non-malignant dividedness that Davutoğlu does not seem to have envisioned but nevertheless exhibits in his own being. The administration of which he is a part, clearly has such universalistic aspirations and so far has been pursuing them with remarkable success; but the bookish scholar, more concerned with consistency and coherence would seem to condemn the dividedness such syncretism implies. Works Cited Akyol, Taha. (2011) Tarihin Dönüşü. İstanbul: Yakın Plan. Alessandri, Emiliano (2010) ‘The New Turkish Foreign Policy and the Future of Turkey-EU Relations’. Istituto Affari Internazionali : Documenti IAI 1003. http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/IAI1003.pdf Altunışık, M. B. (2008) ‘The Possibilities and Limits of Turkey’s Soft Power in the Middle East’. Insight Turkey 10 (2): 41-54. Aras, Bülent. (2009) ‘Davudoğlu Era in Turkish Foreign Policy’. SETA Policy Brief no. 32. Ankara: Siyaset Ekonomi ve Toplumsal Araştırmalar Vakfı. Aras, Bülent & Görener, Aylin. (2010) ‘National role conceptions and foreign policy orientation: the ideational bases of the Justice and Development Party's foreign policy activism in the Middle East’. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 12 (1) pp.73-92 Balcı, Ali & Miş, Nebi. (2008) Turkey’s Role in the Alliance of Civilizations: A New Perspective in Turkish Foreign Policy?. Turkish Studies. 9 (3) pp.387-406. Balcı, Ali. (2009) ‘The Alliance of Civilizations: The Poverty of the Clash/Alliance Dichotomy?’. Insight Turkey 11 (3): 95-108. Banchoff, Thomas (ed.). (2008) Religious Pluralism, Globalization, and World Politics, Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press. Barkey. Henry J. (2010) ‘Turkey and the Great Powers’ In Kerslake, Celia, Öktem, Kerem & Robins, Philip. Turkey’s Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century. London: palgrave macmillan. Bilgin, Pınar. (2007) ‘“Only Strong States Can Survive in Turkey’s Geography”: the uses of “geopolitical truths” in Turkey’. Political Geography. 26 (7) pp.740-756. Cizre, Ümit. Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The making of the Justice and Development Party. LondonNew York: Routledge. Crooke, Alastair. (2010) ‘The Shifting Sands of State Power in the Middle East’. The Washington Quarterly. 33 (3) pp.7-20. Çandar, Cengiz (2009) ‘Turkey’s “Soft Power” Strategy: A New Vision for a Multi-Polar World’, SETA Policy Brief no. 38. Ankara: Siyaset Ekonomi ve Toplumsal Araştırmalar Vakfı. Davutoğlu, Ahmet. (1994a) Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Weltanschauungs on Political Theory. Lanham-New York-London: University Press of America. ---. (1994b) The Civilizational Transformation and the Muslim World. Kuala Lumpur: Quill. ---. (1997) “Medeniyetlerin Ben-idrâki.” Divan. 2 (3) p.1-53. ---. (1998) ‘The Clash of Interests: An Explanation of the World (Dis)Order’. Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs. II (December 1997-February 1998) pp.1-17. ---. (2001) Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu. 54th ed. Istanbul: Küre. ---. (2002) Küresel Bunalım: 11 Eylül Konuşmaları. 18th ed. Istanbul: Küre. ---. (2004) ‘Türkiye Merkez Ülke Olmalı’. Radikal daily. February 26. ---. (2008) ‘Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Vision: An Assesment of 2007’. Insight Turkey. 10 (1) pp.77-96.

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